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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with those who crossed the frontier from the north China
regimes to the Kitan Liao, from the end of the Tang to the treaty of Shanyuan in 1005. It
contributes to an understanding of frontiers by analysing a specific frontier situation, and
by considering the construction of real and imagined frontiers, both in the tenth century
and by later historiographers.
Chapter 1 narrates the movement of the political frontiers between the north China
regimes and Liao (including a series of maps.) Chapter 2 analyses over 200 'acts of
crossing,' chiefly according to the degree of volition involved.
Chapters 3 to 7 present five case studies exploring how various forces acted together
to affect individuals, and the changes taking place by 1005. The manner of recording is
considered alongside the events.
Those who crossed the frontier to Liao have often been regarded as disloyal to China.
Chapter 8 surveys the meaning and uses of the concept of zhong ('loyalty') up to the
eleventh century, and applies the results to the actions and recording of the case study
subjects. Those who crossed to Liao are assumed to have felt a Chinese identity, which
should have kept them loyal to the Middle Kingdom. Chapter 9 uses the modern concept
of ethnocentrism to examine how a continuing sense of ethnic identity was ignored in the
early tenth century, then increasingly utilised in later decades, as one aspect in the sharper
definition of regimes. Loyalty thus acquired an ethnic content, limiting individual
choices.
The multiple frontiers - real and conceptual - of the early tenth century gradually
converged to make the single line fixed by the treaty of Shanyuan. Subsequently, the
concepts of 'China' and `Chineseness' were reconstructed by historiographers seeking to
make sense of the tenth century in their own terms.
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Conventions
The name of the Kitan regime alternated irregularly between 'Great Kitan' and 'Great
Liao.' The regime and its people are referred to here as 'Liao' or `Kitan' without
reference to the official title in force at the time. The Five Dynasties Hf-t are known as
the Wudai, for convenience. There are two Jin 1  regimes in the tenth century. The
leaders of the princedom of Jin founded the Later Tang in 923; they are referred to as
Taiyuan Jin where differentiation from the Later Jin (936-947) is necessary. In line with
the usual convention, emperors are referred to by their temple name, frequently prefixed
by the regime name. This is anachronistic but convenient, especially when dealing with
so many emperors and regimes. For ease of reference, dates are converted to the
Gregorian calendar, modified to use the western year within which most of the relevant
lunar year falls, in the form Western year: Lunar month. Where a date falls within the
next western year, this may be given in brackets, eg. 946:12 (947.)
Romanisation of Chinese is in pinyin. For non-Chinese peoples standard usage is
employed, except for the Kitan, where I follow Sechin Jagchid. All quotations have been
standardised to pinyin and British spelling. Characters are included in the text for the first
appearance of each historical name or title in each chapter, except for the commonest
regime and temple names, which only appear once. A character list and glossary of titles
are also appended for ease of access. Translations of titles come largely from Hucker, A
dictionary of official titles in imperial China (1985), with occasional adaptation. The
names of historical figures are abbreviated to their given names; family names are used
for writers. The pronunciation of the character it has changed to chan, but the traditional
pronunciation has been retained for the place-names Shanyuan fliq and Shanzhou
Many places in tenth century north China were commonly known by more than one
name. There is a tendency to use the name favoured by the text in use; alternatives are
noted in brackets the first time they appear. If it subsequently seems helpful to keep two
alternatives in mind, they are hyphenated. Where different places have the same
romanisation, subscript numbering is used to differentiate, unless there is no possibility
of confusion. The suffix zhou ,11,1 is frequently omitted, as in the texts. Regions referred
to in the texts by combining two prefectural names are indicated thus: YiDing gz, etc.
The maps are based upon those found in the Ditu chubanshe series of historical atlases. I
regret that it has proved impractical to enlarge them satisfactorily.
In quotations, round brackets 0 are used to mark insertions needed to make sense in
English; square brackets normally [1 enclose explanatory notes; and curly brackets 0
show differences between very close texts.
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Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the frontier between north China and its non-Chinese
neighbour, the ICitan Liao i.TA regime (907-1125), in the tenth century, from the death-
throes of the Tang )ff dynasty (618-907) until the fixing of the line between Song 5'g
(960-1276) and Liao by the treaty of Shanyuan itg- in 1005. Despite the number of
general theories propounded about the nature of China's northern frontier, notably by
Lattimore, but more recently by Thomas Barfield,' there have been very few, if any,
studies of how specific frontiers worked in real terms. This thesis contributes to an
understanding of frontiers by providing an analysis of the detail of what was happening
on one frontier in a particular period.
In the present age the word 'frontier' tends to conjure up the image of a linear divider
which can be drawn on a map. This is reinforced by the attempts, in times and places
continuing up to the Berlin Wall, to reify the concept of a 'frontier' by physically creating
a concrete marker of the boundary line. The 'Great Wall' of China is a fine example of
this endeavour, and although the monolithic existence of a real 'Great Wall' has recently
been challenged, 2 the idea of the Wall recurs throughout Chinese history. It is, for
instance, the single constant feature on a series of historical maps from the Southern
Song W5g,' even when they show the kingdom ruled by the legendary Shun R, and the
travels of the mythical Yu A, two thousand years before the Great Wall is supposed to
have been created by Qin Shihuang VMA.4
This series provides us with some of the earliest maps of any kind surviving from
China,5 but, as twelfth century representations of former times, they clearly cannot be
regarded as contemporary evidence for tenth-century views of the frontier. Nevertheless,
it is worth noting that the maps for each of the Five Dynasties (Wudai Eft, 907-959),
and for the expansion of China under the first two Song emperors, 6 show the boundaries
of the states concerned. Whilst the same area - China proper - is shown on each map,
1. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian frontiers of China (1951); Thomas Barfield, The perilous frontier: nomadic
empires and China, 221 B.C. to A.D. 1757 (1989.)
2. Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: from history to myth (1990.) •
3. Shui Anli's Lidai dili zhi zhang tu (Reproduction of a Song edition by the Shanghai guji chubanshe 1989.)
4. In 221 B.C. Waldron discusses what is known about Qin Shihuang's Wall and its predecessors, Great Wall,
pp.13-21.
5. No maps survive from earlier than the eleventh century. Joseph Needham, Science and civilisation in China,
vol.3 (1970), pp.547-50. Cf. Chang Sen-don, Some observations on the cartographic nature of Chinese
thematic maps, Chine ancienne (1977), pp.25-30. Also Endymion Wilkinson, The history of imperial China: a
research guide (1990), p.109.
6. The map of Song Taizong's achievements is literally called 'Map of the emperor Taizong's unification'
pp.90- 1.
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there is no fudging of reality: where territory within the Wall was held by other powers,
this is clearly marked. Hence although the Wall is there, it seems to function more as a
point of reference than as a line to be held. It defines -the limit of China as the Song
wished China to be; it did not have to reflect the limit as it actually was. As Arthur
Waldron puts it, 'without any such line to rely on, the full magnitude of the problem of
defining China becomes clear,' 7 and this question of what we mean by China is one
important issue indirectly addressed by this thesis. In deference to the problem I have
avoided unqualified use of the name 'China,' preferring the 'Central Plains' ring with
reference to a geographical entity, and the 'Middle Kingdom' 1=I=I E when talking in more
abstract terms.
The representativeness of maps is always limited by the necessity they introduce of
rigidly defining situations, and particularly boundaries. Hence the series noted above
provides one map for each of the Wudai, but gives no indication of territorial changes
within the period of each dynasty. The problem has not been surmounted in the present-
day counterpart of this series: the set of historical atlases produced by the Ditu chubanshe
(Cartographic Publishing House.) The detailed maps for the Tang dynasty are drawn
according to the dili zhi in the Tang dynastic history, and thus freeze Tang China
as it was in 741. The addition of two further general maps of Tang China are an
inadequate attempt to convey the many boundary changes which took place over nearly
three centuries. This is unavoidable if such reference works are not to become unwieldy,
but it does tend to make frontiers look more fixed than they may have been at the time.
This is especially a problem in times of great upheaval like the tenth century. During
the Wudai, pieces of territory changed hands constantly between all the competing
powers in north China, including the Liao, who also regularly raided south, to a greater
or lesser depth. The northern frontier, like all the other frontiers at the time, was thus not
the static entity it appears to be on maps, but was a 'shifting frontier.' This is the subject
of Chapter 1, which, in the absence of a standard account of the period, concurrently
provides a general narrative to help the reader negotiate details about minor players. 8 It
also includes its own series of maps in an attempt to convey the frontier changes visually.
But although it is instructive to consider the frontier as a line defined in political terms,
this will only take us so far.
Lattimore's description of frontier zones has for long provided a corrective to the
notion that frontiers are necessarily linear, and it is this conceptualisation of the frontier as
not merely a line, but a place, which provides the springboard for the main part of the
study here. Studies of the late Tang-Wudai-early Song period have tended to focus, not
7. Waldron, Great Wall, p.9.
8. A chronology is also appended.
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unnaturally, on relations between the court and the provinces: the centre-periphery axis.
They have thus regarded the frontier from, as it were, a viewpoint within a power on one
side of it. Although this is, of course, a valid approach, illends to restrict the view of the
frontier, seeing it in terms of what authority could be imposed on it from a central power
of some kind. The frontier is seen as the line around one particular polity, when it is also
the line between two (or more) different polities. Seen from this altered perspective, the
frontier assumes a life of its own, not merely dependent on the powers it divides and
defines, but also crucially having an effect on those powers from the outside. This kind
of viewpoint gives rise to different questions. Hence this study is concerned with the
frontier itself, and aims to treat it almost as an entity in its own right, with forces pulling
and pushing not just from within a single power, but from the two powers between
which the frontier is drawn. We aim to see what it is on both sides that makes the line of
the frontier exist where it does. This requires that we see the groups involved as equal in
status, rather than as 'civilised' versus 'barbarians.'
As soon as we start looking at a real frontier, we find that it is made by people. A
frontier is given reality only because it exists in the minds of human beings. Hence it is
clear that despite the fluidity in the 'line' of the tenth-century north China frontier, the
concept of demarcation always remained. The reports of frontier officials indicate that
they had an acute consciousness of when their state had been invaded, there are
numerous references to frontier patrols, and individuals were never in any doubt about
which side of the line they were on, even if they were unsure of which side they would
rather be. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to approach the frontier via the people who
gave it shape, and the people most actively involved in this were surely those who
crossed the frontier, and thereby consciously acknowledged its existence.
People could acquire experience of both sides of the frontier through crossing in
either direction, and although a parallel study of southward movement would
undoubtedly contribute to our understanding of the issues, it is beyond the capacity of
this thesis to study both; hence I have looked only at those Chinese who went north and
took service with the Liao. Over two hundred of these, whom I shall call the first
generation Liao Chinese, are discussed in general terms in Chapter 2. They are widely
mentioned in the secondary literature, but even now are usually dismissed as 'renegades,'
(Arthur Waldron, 1990), 'turncoats,' (Zhou Jun, 1990) or even 'traitors' (Thomas
Barfield, 1989), 9 implying that it is somehow inherently wicked to serve a non-Chinese.
The writers mentioned are all trying to take new approaches to the history of China, and
are strongly aware of the prejudices of earlier scholarship, but the cultural assumptions
9. Waldron, Great Wall, p.135; Zhou kin, Xu Xuan qiren yu Songchu 'erchen,' Lishi yanjiu 1989:4, passim;
Barfield, Perilous frontier, p.52.
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are so deeply ingrained in the written materials (primary, and to a large extent, secondary)
that it is hard to escape the perpetuation of the damning view expressed by the neo-
Confucian and later sources." There is no previous study of frontier crossers in a
western language, and where such people are discussed in more depth in the Chinese
literature, it is almost always in terms of their role in the sinicisation' of the Kitan. Such
an approach focusses upon what happened after these people crossed to Liao, but it says
nothing about their behaviour in making the crossing. The Liao Chinese have been
labelled, and their actions have been used to demonstrate China's cultural superiority, but
there has not yet been any attempt to explain what they did and why. Hence we seek here
to examine the act of crossing itself, for its significance in defining not just the physical,
political frontier, but also the conceptual frontiers created by ideas of loyalty and ethnic
identity.
Loyalty and ethnicity are aspects of the same problem, but it has proved useful to
separate them out for analytical purposes. The concept of loyalty, discussed in Chapter 8,
occurs throughout Chinese history, taking many different forms. In the tenth century
central authority had broken down to be replaced with a plethora of leaders, lords, rulers
and emperors; territory changed hands constantly and there was no guarantee that one's
lord of today would last the night. This had been sporadic since An Lushan's
rebellion, and endemic since Huang Chao's NY_. For over two hundred years from the
middle of the eighth century and through most of the tenth, decisions about where to
place their loyalty were faced by almost every official at some point in their career, and in
many cases more than once. The problem of where and how to place one's loyalty did
not affect a single group, but was the dilemma of several generations. The relationship of
these decisions to the issue of legitimation could be critically important to leaders, and
accordingly, they took a keen interest in the practice and encouragement of loyalty.
Ethnicity was not a concept recognised as such in the tenth century, but it is clear that
there was a sense of ethnic identity. Throughout this thesis, we will be talking,
conventionally enough, about 'the Chinese' and 'the Liao,' which are taken to mean,
respectively, 'the inhabitants of north China who lived in what they and their recorders
regarded as a Chinese fashion,' and 'the Kitan, with associated tribal and sedentary
peoples (excluding "the Chinese") who accepted Liao rule.' These are generous
definitions which are intended to be as unobjectionable as possible so that analysis can be
concentrated upon the act of crossing itself and not distracted by debate as to which
10. It is particularly easy for Chinese writers to maintain a linguistic prejudice against the Kitan, because the
Chinese vocabulary for non-Chinese peoples exists in a historical context where words and concepts associated
with the non-Chinese have been contrasted unfavourably with Chinese words and concepts. We have yet to see
the coining of non-discriminatory Chinese words, and to use the words hu waiguo and the like, is to
remain within the predominantly anti-foreign thought-world of those who wrote the majority of the records.
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'incidents of crossing' should be counted. In fact, they simply reflect the basic division
observed in our texts, and are therefore effective in the sense that where the people
studied identify themselves, or are identified by others, it is as members of one of these
two groups. The aspects used for identification vary from case to case, and there is often
an active non-identification with the other group. The sources identify Chinese by stating
the name of their place or region of origin, showing them in service to a north China
leader, or sometimes quoting them declaring a regional affiliation. By these means,
people who could not strictly be defined as Han, such as those with Shatuo ancestors, are
included in the category of 'Chinese.' That the Liao at least could accept justifications of
behaviour couched in terms of the cultural differences between themselves and the
'Chinese' suggests that the idea of Chinese identity in some form was recognised at the
time as having explanatory power in the appropriate situations.
However, a systematic study of something as complicated as ethnicity requires
materials in which we can observe identification, by self and others, over a large number
of individuals. It is not entirely impossible that the materials could be found; there is, for
instance, a fair amount of surviving poetry from the tenth century," but the search
required to do justice to the topic is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, the
writings of court-based literati officials, which are most likely to have survived, are not
necessarily related to the acts of crossers, as the two groups frequently operated in very
different circumstances. There is very little evidence for what people are said to have
thought, and this is deeply prejudiced by the preconceptions and aims of those who did
the recording. We can, however, look more dispassionately at what people did.
Studying crossings, the real acts of real people, we can see that at some times many
people crossed, at others very few did. This reflects a variation over time in the range of
possibilities perceived to be available. Individual decisions about crossing were made
with reference to the perceived options. These options were partly defined by the
prevailing attitudes of the time. At certain times attitudes strongly militated against
crossing, at others there was less concern. Hence whilst crossings are not a completely
reliable guide to what people were thinking, they do point towards possible trends. For
this reason, the emphasis here is on annalistic information, concentrating on what people
are said to have done rather than attempting to interpret what they or others wrote. With
the predominantly factual information presented in this study, the concept of
ethnocentrism has proved to be a more fruitful approach to the question of ethnicity than
the attempt to locate any overt sense of ethnic identity, and it is this which is the main
focus of Chapter 9. This does not mean that ethnic identity is never visible in the sources
used here, but it can be seen in only a small selection of individual cases, who may or
11. Collected in QWDS, QWDSB, QFS, QTSB, etc.
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may not be representative. Unfortunately, there is, as yet, no comprehensive study of
historical Chinese attitudes to foreigners and to being Chinese, which makes it hard to
place what we can see for the tenth century in a longer context of fluctuations in attitude.
There have been a number of recent works dealing with ethnicity in the Qing s in and later
periods, for example, Pamela Crossley's Orphan warriors (1990), and Frank DikOtter,
The discourse of race in modern China (1992), but the quantity of materials assembled
for these books give an indication of the scale of enterprise that would be needed to
produce a work of wider scope.
It is apparent, then, that we are dealing with a number of different frontiers, and that
these do not necessarily coincide. People who identified themselves as Chinese could
give faithful service to the non-Chinese Liao, indicating that the frontiers defined by the
concepts of loyalty and ethnicity ran in different places. And this is not to mention the
constant movements in the political frontier. The task here is to try to show how the
different frontiers interweave and interact over time, and how these relationships affect,
and are shaped by, individual human beings. In addition, we have to consider the
influence of the recorders upon our picture of the tenth-century world. The five case
studies presented in Chapters 3 to 7 show something of the interplay of the various forces
at work, and of the different kinds of frontiers; they set individual frontier crossings in
the context of the pressures of an individual life, and of the mode of recording of that life.
Although it is necessary to isolate certain issues for purposes of analysis, it is in the case
studies that the issues come together and can be seen in human terms.
We have hinted that our sources will be under scrutiny alongside the people they
discuss. Since frontiers are the creations of human beings, in historical terms this means
that they are created by our use of the historical evidence. Successive historians
reexamine and reevaluate what survives, and then 're-create' - create again - their own
conception of the frontier.' 2 That understood, the nature of the written sources for the
tenth century can create considerable problems when we try to assess the contemporary
view of the frontier and those who crossed it. These problems are such that they justify a
consideration of what we might call the 'historiographical frontier' as an inescapable part
of the task to be undertaken.
12. For historians as active creators of the past, see, inter alia, Edwin Ardener, The construction of history:
'vestiges of creation,' History and ethnicity (1989), edd. Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald & Malcolm
Chapman, pp.22-33.
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Introduction
The texts
Although many of the questions under discussion here are clearly already issues in the
texts, we have to consider that they might have become issues because later assessments
of the period were coloured both by hindsight and by greatly changed views of what
constituted right behaviour. This is particularly noticeable over the question of loyalty.
Some of the problems can be highlighted by some notes on the production of the texts
concerned, which will also show how some of these problems can be turned to
advantage.
As we are dealing with people who crossed to the Liao regime, it has obviously been
necessary to use the Liao dynastic history, the Liao shi3"4„M (LS.) This has also been
taken as the endpoint for materials, because with the compilation of the official history,
the record of the dynasty was considered, symbolically, to be 'fixed.' The work was not
produced under regular circumstances, and was not completed until 1344, some 350
years after the events discussed here." In parallel with this text, I have also used the
various histories and related works produced in the main north China regimes; a group of
texts referred to here as the 'southern sources.' However, one peculiarity of the LS
derives from the slowness with which Chinese-style historiographical practice was
adopted by the Liao." Accordingly it was chiefly compiled not from archival material
collected by the Liao bureaucracy, but from a collection of works surviving in the
fourteenth century, only some of which had any connection with the Liao
historiographical office. These included, directly or indirectly, almost all the southern
sources. The relationships between these works are illustrated in Figure 1, and there
follow a few words about each of the main surviving texts in chronological order of
compilation.
The main source for north China in the first half of the tenth century, and the most
contemporaneous, is the dynastic history of the Wudai, the Jiu Wudai shi ffEftt
(JW.) It was a tribute to the perceived importance of history writing, being produced in
less than two years in the early Northern Song it5g, from 973-4, from an almost
complete set of government records kept even in the confusion of the Wudai. It was re-
written as the Xin Wudai shi WHftt (XW) in 1055 and this revisionist work became
13. There are numerous works on the compilation of the LS, including Chan Hok-Lam, Chinese official
historiography at the Ytian court: the composition of the Liao, Chin and Sung histories, China under Mongol
rule (1981), ed. John Langlois, pp.56-106; Richard Davis, Historiography as politics in Yang Wei-chen's
'Polemic on legitimate succession,' T'oung pao 69:1-3 (1983), pp.33-72; Feng Jiasheng, Liao shi yuanliu kao
yu Liao shi chu xiao (1933); Herbert Franke, Historiography under Mongol rule: the role of history in
acculturation, Mongolia studies 1 (1974), pp.15-26; Qiu Shusen, Tuotuo he Liao Jin Song san shi, Yuan shi ft
beifang minzu shi yanjiu jilcan 7 (1983), pp.10-21.
14. This should perhaps be less surprising if we take account of Denis Twitchett's overall point in his The
writing of official history under the T'ang (1992), that historiographical practice did not begin to become
regularised until the Tang dynasty, and was still subject to serious disruption by political events.
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preferred to such an extent that the old one was banned in 1207. It was lost sometime
after the early fifteenth century but by this time most of it had already been broken up and
included in the Yongle da dian 7-i<gy; (YLDD.) From this and other works on the
same period Qing scholars were able to reconstruct between eighty and ninety percent of
the JVV. The annals and the biographies of commoners are almost completely intact and
despite some of the obvious problems with this work, it has a good reputation. In its own
day it was criticised for following the Wudai Veritable Records (shilu ma) too
closely. 15 This is something for which to be grateful, although we do not know exactly
how close the correlation was, and there is still potential for mistakes, corruptions and
interpolations in such a reconstructed text.
The XW was basically a rewriting of the JW using some additional materials.16
Ouyang Xiu Riga wrote the XW with clear motives. He was critical of the JW for its
lack of interpretation and moral judgement and his own work was a conscious attempt to
rectify this. He has himself been criticised for going too far; he used the selective
presentation of information to argue his case for a particular moral judgement and
followed up at the end of most chapters with a commentary on the moral conclusion to be
drawn, which can be exclamatory in style:7
The major narrative work covering this period is the Zizhi tongjian (TJ),
produced for the court under the direction of Sima Guang IT-OgY6, with the explicit aim
of providing instruction for rulers. It was compiled in the period from 1067 to 1085 and
covers the whole of Chinese history to date in annalistic form, without biographies or
other sections, from 403 B.C. to the end of the Wudai in 959. It is known to have used
322 different sources, from the dynastic histories, including the JW, to various unofficial
works, many little known. Despite being highly regarded for its general adherence to
declared historiographical principles, it naturally still shows signs of the pressures and
prejudices of the time of compilation and there are said to be many mistakes in the Wudai
section!' Sima Guang, like Ouyang Xiu, wrote from a firmly neo-Confucian viewpoint,
and Sima follows Ouyang in criticising the minister Feng Dao st-, who served under
five different regimes, including the Liao. Not only is the TJ important for its quality and
15. Wang Gungwu, The Chiu Wu-tai shih and history-writing during the Five Dynasties, Asia Major 6:1
(1958), pp.1-22.
16. Including the Wudai ton gjian Hftta, Wudai hui yao Eft*R. Tang yu lu Fg a, flu guo zhi
Beimeng suoyan J.L0%,-4 Wudai shi bu Htt.t/r6 and Wudcri shi quewen HittrAi3c.Chai Degeng, Shi ji juyao
(1982), p.118.
17. See notice on the Wudai sluji Eitt.16 (the alternative name for the XV) by Tonami Mamoru, A Sung
bibliography (1978), ed. Yves Hervouet, p.63; and James T.C. Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu: an eleventh-century neo-
Confucianist (1967), pp.105-10.
18. See Ming K. Chan, The historiography of the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien: a survey, Monumenta serica 31
(1974-5), pp.1-38; notice by G. Lewin in Hervouet, Sung bibliography, pp.69-70.
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scope, it also has a vital role as a transmitter of information. When we come to the Qidan
guo zhi (QG) and the LS, it is often the case that their ultimate source is the
JW: a work which had been banned before either the QG or LS was compiled. In these
cases the information is always found in the TJ as well, suggesting that without the TJ to
carry information forward from the JW, the QG and LS would have been more deficient
sources.
The draft for the continuation of the TJ, Li Tao's 7r-Ar Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian
MW-tbtiEKA (CB), was written in the same spirit as the TJ, and partly as a reaction
against the intrusion of Southern Song factionalism into historiographical works. It
appeared in several instalments before the final version was produced in 1183, but parts
of it were lost as early as the end of Southern Song. Like the JW, what remained was
preserved by its inclusion in the YLDD and recompiled by Qing historiographers in the
Qianlong	 reign."
Surviving works specifically concerned with the Liao are all considerably later in
date. The QG was presented to the Southern Song court by Ye Longli WI414. , probably
in 1247, when the Song were concerned to stave off Mongol advances. It was based
entirely upon Song written materials, but most heavily used were the TJ and its
continuation. Via the TJ there was an indirect link with the JW. There is said to have been
a direct connection too, but the JW had been out of favour and falling into disuse for 40
years and its tolerant viewpoint was unfashionable. Whilst copies must have existed and
could have been used in theory, for the sections of the QG used here, a direct link with
the JW is not immediately obvious.
The LS, as noted above, was finished in a rush in 1344. It is based on three main
works. The first was the Veritable Records of the first seven Liao reigns, a single work
presented at the Liao court in 1085 and which made its way to the Liao's successors, the
Jurchen Jin
	
The second work was an incomplete history presented to the Jin court by
Chen Daren 13--)Ki± in 1207. It was partly based on the Veritable Records and also used
an earlier Jin work, itself based on the Veritable Records. The third work was the QG.
The TJ would have been available and there is evidence for its limited use. The NI was
also a source for the LS, both in its own right, and in its use in the compilation of the
Veritable Record, Chen Daren's history and the QG. At each stage of the compilation, the
LS ran into political problems, mostly concerned with the legitimacy of the Liao regime
and the implications of recognising it for the dynasties which co-existed with and
followed it.2°
19. Notice by Shiba Yoshinobu; Hervouet, Sung bibliography, pp.72-5.
20. See n.13 for references.
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It is well known that the SS was compiled at the same time as the LS, being presented
in 1345. The work was, however, conducted quite separately, save for the overall
direction of the history projects by Toghto ER, Ouyang Xuan A and a number of
others.21 The four LS compilers appear to have had little communication with their 23
counterparts on the SS project. Discrepancies between the two works abound, making it
unlikely that either made extensive use of material collected for the compilation of the
other.22 The SS was largely compiled from the well-kept government records of the Song
and would have had less recourse to a chain of works derived one from another. The SS
can therefore be assumed to provide an independent view of events, without the need to
interpret or re-interpret slim available evidence. Coming from a totally different
perspective, it could also be expected to contain at least a certain amount of different
information.
The nature and functions of Chinese historical writing influenced what was recorded
and how it was written, and we should be aware of these factors when working with the
texts. The historiographer had a responsibility to produce a 'truthful record,' but history
also had an instructional purpose. This didactic function was not necessarily perceived to
be in opposition to the search for accuracy, but the historiographers' need to explain the
correct moral verdict means we must beware of taking accounts recorded in a Chinese
history at face-value. They often have a point to make. In addition, the concern and care
over the production of what was intended to be the 'truthful record' shows a conscious
awareness of how powerful a tool of government history can be. It had a legitimating
function which was consciously exploited. Despite this, the historiographers do seem to
have been genuinely concerned to preserve the integrity of their texts, but the claim that
large amounts were simply copied verbatim and that therefore we can treat a dynastic
history as a contemporary work, does not stand up to scrutiny. The compilers would edit
for style and would even re-write when they thought it was necessary. Passages can
often be very close, and odd phrases might survive untouched through a whole series of
texts, but successive historiographers were not merely collectors and copiers; they were
always, at the very least, active editors.
The works discussed above were produced in the period in which the neo-Confucian
orthodoxy was becoming dominant, and revisionism in the name of textual purification
was rampant. Any study of the pre-neo-Confucian periods of Chinese history necessarily
has to pay attention to later versions of what happened, because those views have
conditioned our vision of the period actually under consideration. In some cases the
issues raised by the later historiographers and commentators have taken on such a
21. The project compiled three histories in all; the third was the fin shi
22. For details see Chan, Official historiography, esp. pp.64-8, 75-9.
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powerful life of their own that whilst they may not, in fact, bear any relevance to the
earlier historical situation, they nevertheless cannot be ignored. Although we would do
well to consider these later works as in one sense secondary materials, with which we
may disagree subsequent to reconsideration of primary evidence, the complication is that
in many cases these works are widely treated as primary sources.
For the tenth century there is a particular shortage of materials of all kinds, beset with
the problems described; but we are fortunate in two ways. First, there is more than one
official source, giving the tenth century an advantage over periods with only one dynastic
history. Secondly, the sources leading to the LS are unusually closely related. This offers
the opportunity to use the sources comparatively, allowing the changes and lacunae to
reveal changes in concerns, even if not the initial concerns themselves, and thus lead to
consideration of questions which might otherwise be overlooked. Such an approach also
reduces the danger of unconsciously internalising the viewpoint of the canonical texts.
Hence I have taken a close comparative approach to a relatively small number of sources:
chiefly the annals and biographies sections of the works mentioned above, supplemented
where appropriate by collections such as the Cefu yuangui fFIM-5-ta (CFYG) and the
Liao shi shiyi (LSSY, a compilation from Song and Yuan works), along with
the small amount of surviving poetry and personal writings. The subjects for the case
studies were selected on the basis of available biographical material, in order that a
method of close textual comparison might be applied. As these individuals have very few
surviving writings, information about them has to come largely from annalistic and
biographical materials. For most periods of Chinese history there is such a wealth of
surviving literary material that the annals and biographies tend to be relegated to
providing narrative structure and mundane information, as background to the institutional
studies for which the zhi, t .„ and biao 	  in the dynastic histories seem designed to
provide. Yet as sources for historical events, rather than for the analyses of individual
writers, the annals and biographies are the closest we can now get to what really
happened. When used comparatively they can reveal a surprising amount.
As a final point here, it is worth reiterating that in dealing with the tenth century we are
looking at a period of transition: we are concerned with a process of change at the
moment it happened, and about the structuring of that change after the event. In trying to
do so we are dealing with process rather than structure, and we must therefore keep in
mind the dynamic nature of the multi-faceted situations that we have to describe in a linear
fashion.
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PART ONE
PALPABLE FRONTIERS
Chapter One
The shifting frontier
The history of tenth-century China is extremely complicated, and still lacks a narrative
treatment in English.' This chapter does not attempt to fill that gap with a comprehensive
account of events, although it is intended to provide a certain amount of historical
background. The focus will be upon the movements of the northern frontiers of the
Middle Kingdom riz , the people who made them happen, and the significance of the
changes in terms of the legitimation and consolidation of regimes.
In setting out this goal, we immediately run into the problem of defining what we
mean by 'the frontier.' In 1005 the treaty of Shanyuan laid down a well-defined
border line between Liao M and Song 5g, putting the seal on the reunification of the
Middle Kingdom and marking the beginning of 120 years of diplomatically-maintained
peace.' The clarity of this demarcation, both historical and territorial, should not blind us
to the fact that a century earlier this frontier could not be said to exist. Of course there
were territorial regimes and of course their leaderships were conscious of where the
boundaries of those territories lay. But the region through which the unified 1005 border
would one day run was divided between a multitude of small, inconstant powers, whose
relationships, and thus their borders, shifted continually as each strove for survival and
advantage. There was not a single frontier line dividing 'China' from 'the barbarians,'
but a whole network of borders between regimes led by families variously of 'Han -A,'
Bohai	 ICitan	 Shatuo i.4)13t, Tangut A-JO, Xi A, or other origin.3 Rather than
being a 'frontier region' between two states, there was a 'region of frontiers' comprising
many regimes. Movements of the frontiers could leave an individual stranded in what had
suddenly become enemy territory. The same individuals were in a position to themselves
contribute to the shifts of the frontier by taking the territory they controlled over to
1. There are two well-known accounts of political and military developments, focussing on structural and
institutional changes. Wang Gungwu, The structure of power in north China during the Five Dynasties (1963),
(hereafter Wang), which covers up to 947, and Edmund Worthy, The founding of Sung China, 950-1000:
integrative changes in military and political institutions (Ph.D. diss. 1976), which includes a chapter of
narrative. An account for the Liao now exists to fill out the spare chronology in WF. Denis Twitchett, The
Khitan and the Liao dynasty, in CHC 6: Alien regimes and border states, forthcoming. In Chinese, narratives
include Tao Maobing, Wudai shi Ilk (1985), Shu Fen, Liao shi gao (1984), and Yang Shusen, Liao shi flan bian
(1984.) The annalistic primary material has been discussed in the Introduction.
2. For a detailed account of events leading to the treaty, see Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Der Friede von Shan
Yuan (1005 n. Chr.) (1959); for the diplomatic maintenance of peace see, Melvin Thlick-Len Ang, Sung-Liao
diplomacy in eleventh- and twelfth-century China: a study of the social and political determinants of foreign
policy (Ph.D. diss. 1983.)
3. The significance of these designations varied; a topic discussed in Chapter 9.
14
Chapter 1 - The shifting frontier
allegiance to the 'other side.' This situation changed over the century, so that although in
the first half the Kitan were just one of many competing powers, by the end only they
and the Song were left, and a clear line could then be . drawn between them without
reference to those who lived on the frontier. It is this changing role of individuals in
defining where frontiers lay which is traced below.
Background situation
Tang Taizong (r. 626-649) had managed to bring the Middle Kingdom and the
steppe under united rule but after his death the empire began to contract again. So, for
instance, the confederation of Kitan tribes which had formally submitted to him in 628
rebelled, and only submitted again in 715. The Kitan continued to resist Tang )ff control,
and in 751 the Youzhou ,!::4+I governor An Lushangc-* Lit was sent against them. It
took him until 755 to defeat them, and later in that year his rebellion marked the
beginning of decline in Tang fortunes. It was Uighurs HE who crushed opposition in
763 and kept the dynasty going, and it was Uighur suzerainty that the Kitan then
accepted. After the rebellions, and until the end of the dynasty, the northeastern
provincial governors, some of them of Kitan origin, retained a very high degree of
autonomy, despite the efforts of Tang Dezong
	
(r. 779-805), Xianzong	 (r.
805-820) and Muzong (r. 820-824) to recover control there, in the region known as
Hebei /17k. Two years after the collapse of the Uighur empire in 840, the Kitan
submitted to Tang again. Meanwhile, in the Yellow RiverA.:/-11J heartlands of the empire
successive rulers could not halt the growth of local unrest during the ninth century, which
culminated in the rebellions of Huang Chao MA and others from 875 to 884. It was
during this period that the leading players in the early tenth century rose to prominence,
as the most powerful of the northern governors were enlisted on the side of the dynasty.'
These governors were the latest generation to hold the title jiedushi
Originally this referred to a general, temporarily given concurrent prefectural and military
powers in order better to deal with a frontier emergency. By the end of the seventh
century increased pressures on the frontier brought a professionalisation of the Tang
armies and an end to the temporary character of the jiedushi post. Jiedushi were
appointed to large areas including several prefectures. During An Lushan's rebellion, the
4. For fuller coverage of this background see Barfield, Perilous frontier; Charles Peterson, Court and province
in mid and late T'ang, and Robert M. Somers, The end of the T'ang, CHC 3: Sui and T'ang China 589-906 pt. 1
(1979), pp.464-560, 682-789; Twitchett, Liao. For detail and dispute see E.G. Pulleyblank, The background of
the rebellion of An Lu-shan (1955), and Peterson, The autonomy of the northeastern provinces in the period
following the An Lu-shan rebellion (Ph.D. diss. 1966); also Pulleyblank's The An Lu-shan rebellion and the
origins of chronic militarism in late T'ang China, and Twitchett, Varied patterns of provincial autonomy in the
Tang dynasty, Essays on T'ang society (1976), edd. John Perry & Bardwell Smith, pp.33-60, 90-109; and
Wang.
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Tang court was forced to spread the provincial jiedushi system from the frontier to the
interior, only to find that it could not unilaterally undo this de facto decentralisation. In
_.
the northeast the court effectively ceased to have any control over appointments to
governorships, and only rarely could do anything but accept the succession of a
governor's son or the takeover by a powerful local general. Those taking power in this
way never failed to request court confirmation in their post. They did not usually declare
themselves jiedushi straight away, but first took the title of (jiedu) liuhou maw&
before applying to the court for the full title of jiedushi. A feature of the system was that
regional army units would sometimes 'elect' their leader to a particular official post,
frequently that of liuhou, and with this backing the pretender would seek confirmation
from the court. During the ninth century it was a mark of court strength if an emperor
was able to impose his own choice of governor on a northeastern province, while in the
tenth there were occasional confirmations in the post of liuhou, not jiedushi; an indication
of the evolving character of these posts.5
In what follows it will be apparent that the frontier region suffered greatly from the
disruption brought by constant fighting. Refugeeism is a recurrent problem mentioned
throughout all the sources, and the deliberate, forced transfer of populations was widely
practised. Even when there was no war going on, cross-border raids, in both directions,
were so common that our sources mention only those which were particularly significant.
From this it seems likely that a relatively large proportion of the frontier population, both
Chinese and non-Chinese, was involved in such raiding. But raiders must have
something to raid, and it appears that their main objectives were grain and livestock. This
implies that people on both sides of the frontier practised both agriculture and stock-
raising, supplemented by raiding. Trade continued despite military activity, but it is
impossible to say how much because there are no figures for official trade, and unofficial
exchange is necessarily a matter of conjecture. Life was evidently simply a matter of
survival, but whilst members of the ruling classes could make some individual choices,
the common people only rarely had any say in deciding which regime they should place
themselves un.der.6
5. Translating these two titles runs the risk of implying that their functions and powers were fixed throughout
the period. As this was not the case it has been decided to leave them in transliteration for the most part. Where
they are translated, 'military governor' or 'governor' is used for jiedushi, and 'successor governor' or
'successor' for liuhou. The best description of the system is in des Rotours, Traite des fonctionnaires et de
l'armee (1948), pp.656-8, 820-1, 824ff, 825 (liuhou) and notes. See also Peterson, Autonomy of the
northeastern provinces, pp.2-8, 55n; and Wang, passim.
6. It is hard to pin down what frontier life, specifically, was like. The overall socio-economic situation of the
'mature' Liao dynasty, with some references to the tenth century, is described in WF; see esp. Sections II, III, V,
XI, and Section XII for refugees. The many Chinese articles on the subject do little more than reiterate the
information collected there, concentrating on the process of 'sinicisation.' Amongst these, Yao Congwu,
Qidan hanhua de fenxi (includes discussion), Dalu zazhi 4:4 (1952, repr. 1988), pp.507-22, is probably the
most balanced, despite its age. Japanese materials, eg. Shimada Masao, Ry6dai shalcaishi kenkya (1952), also
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Part 1 - Fragmentation in the early tenth century
Raids, alliances and allegiances at the end of the Tang, c.900-907
In the years leading up to the forced abdication of the last Tang emperor, north China was
controlled by two main leaders. They were Li Keyong 2 )EE, leader of the Shatuo
princedom of Jin W, based at Taiyuan KJ,-g and controlling the territory known as
Hedong
	
, and the Chinese Zhu Wen
	 also known as Zhu Quanzhong
ex-Huang Chao rebel, the governor of Sian ft and a number of other provinces, broadly
comprising Henan 1 171 *. Their competition for control of the dying Tang empire was
fuelled by personal hatred, and when it was not played out in direct fighting between
them, it was conducted by proxy, using any available lesser power. While the Tang
dynasty survived they treated the court and emperor as an ultimate reference point, but
consultation was nominal and done simply out of the need for formal legitimation of
actions, whether they were the attacking of a fellow governor or a request for
confirmation in a newly gained territory.' Once the Tang had ended, the submission or
support of other powers became an important indicator of the legitimacy of a regime,
which equated with military strength.
Of the lesser leaders, the most important were the Hebei governors Liu Rengong
the Youzhou jiedushi; and Wang Chuzhi rAA, the Yiwu 	  jiedushi.
Youzhou was the northernmost of the Hebei governorships, and throughout the 150
years since the rebellion of An Lushan had been the province least under central
government contro1. 8 However, the dominance of the new power-brokers was such that
when the governorship of Youzhou changed in 895, it was now caught up in the rivalry
between Zhu Wen and Li Keyong. Keyong supported Liu Rengong for appointment to
the province, thereby becoming 'patron' to Rengong's 'client.' 9
 Yiwu was much smaller,
being a 2-prefecture fragment broken off Youzhou by Tang Dezong after the rebellions of
781-6." It was strategically important as it offered the potential to outflank Youzhou.
Wang Chuzhi came under Zhu Wen's control when Wen recommended him to the
governorship in 900."
tend to focus on 'influences.' Owen Lattimore still provides the most vivid impression of life in these regions:
Inner Asian frontiers; and cf. Barfield, Perilous frontier.
7. For details of this situation, see Wang, chs. 1-3.
8. See Peterson, Court and province, pp.547-52, and Autonomy of the northeastern provinces, passim.
9. JW 26:350; TJ 260:8465, 8475. The terms 'patron' and 'client' are borrowed from European history of a
similar period. Rengong yearned for independence, so for instance he tried to avoid responding to Keyong's
demand for troops in 896-7. JW 26:354-5.
10. Pulleyblank, Origins of militarism, p.49; and Peterson, Court and province, p. 99.
11. TJ 262:8537.
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At this time the future founder of Liao, Abaoji Pil.f2U1, was the yuyue -TM, or
commander-in-chief, of the Kitan tribal confederation, and one of the lesser leaders in the
region. Although Abaoji did not seek to rule the Central Plains cinN, he did want to
enlarge his authority and enrich himself. His main point of contact with north China was
through Youzhou, with whom the Kitan already had a longstanding relationship. In the
eighth and ninth centuries the governor of the region had traditionally held a concurrent
title giving him responsibility for controlling the Xi and Kitan, and Kitan missions to
China regularly left behind large parties at Youzhou to conduct trade.'
There is not space here to give a detailed account of all the territorial changes of this
period. Suffice it to say that by 901, Zhu Wen controlled much of the old Tang realm on
both sides of the Yellow River. Apart from the provinces governed by himself or his
appointees, Wen also received the submission of other governors, most significantly
Wang Chuzhi and the jiedushi at Zhenzhou Mfli (also prince of Zhao kn.)" Wen
dominated the Tang court and was able to maintain his own candidate on the Tang throne,
while continuing to present himself as the loyal defender of the emperor. Li Keyong
cultivated a similar image," while his strength in Hedong was increased by the firmer
adherence of Liu Rengong, driven to swallow his pride and ask for Taiyuan Jin
assistance by the attacks of Zhu Wen." This request improved Li Keyong's control of
the band of territory across the top of north China, although neither he nor Zhu Wen were
ever able to assume such submissions were permanent. Zhu Wen was unable to conquer
Hedong or Youzhou and so never had a frontier with the ICitan, but he was soon to have
dealings with them anyway as they came under the dynamic leadership of Abaoji.
Abaoji's first concern was not with the faraway Zhu Wen, but with his immediate
neighbours, whom he variously attacked on an annual basis." In north China the first
incursion recorded by the LS was in 902, but there were others before that. Most of the
raids recorded were on Li Keyong's Hedong, but Abaoji's attention was really focussed
on Keyong's 'client' Liu Rengong in Youzhou (Lulong Rengong started raiding
into Kitan territory soon after he was made governor in 895, burning pasture land, taking
prisoners and driving off herds. Abaoji must have reciprocated because when Rengong
refused to send troops to join Li Keyong's forces in 897:7, he used the excuse of a Kitan
raid.' 7 In 903:12 Rengong captured Abaoji's brother-in-law, and this is said by the JW to
12. Twitchett, Liao, pp.14-15.
13. JW 26:357; TJ 262:8534; XV,/ 1:7
14. Twitchett, Liao, pp.25ff, Wang, pp.62ff.
15. Attacks began in 900. JW 26:356-7; TJ 262:8530.
16. LS 1:1-3. There is a brief summary of events up to the founding of Later Han in JW 137:1827-37.
17. JW 137:1827; TJ 261:8505-6.
18
Chapter 1 - The shifting frontier
19
Chapter 1 - The shifting frontier
have prevented Kitan raids for over ten years." The raids just a couple of years later, in
905, 906 and subsequently, show the JW to be exaggerating, but its claim makes more
_.
sense in the context of constant annual raiding by both parties; raiding so commonplace it
barely warranted being recorded.
Raiding Rengong's 'patron,' Hedong, was clearly profitable, providing booty and
population, 19 but in 905 or 90720
 Abaoji made an agreement of brotherhood with Li
Keyong, which stopped the raids. (Map 1.) 21 The TW and TJ say that the agreement was
for a joint attack against Liang A*; the LS relates an alliance against Liu Rengong, which
produced results in the form of several captured prefectures.' The emphasis in the
records reflects the chief worries of the leaders with which each text was concerned, but
the significance of the agreement for us is that for the first time Abaoji became directly
involved in the 'internal' affairs of north China. This involvement moved Abaoji into a
different league, for in swearing brotherhood it is clear that Li Keyong was willing to
recognise Abaoji as his equal, at least for the sake of immediate interests. 23 But Abaoji
felt no commitment to Keyong's cause against Zhu Wen and the joint attack never
materialised. Abaoji remained more concerned with his neighbour Rengong, and the 906
attack on Youzhou was accompanied by gifts to Zhu Wen. 24 Our sources do not relate
these gifts to Wen's own attacks on Rengong a few months later, 25 but given his earlier
efforts to control Hebei he doubtless welcomed the opportunity to attack a Youzhou
already softened up.
An important feature of the political environment which Abaoji was entering was
that individual members of the ruling classes, down to a relatively low level, could
significantly influence the balance of power through the placing of their allegiance. To
take one example, when Rengong came under Zhu Wen's attack in 906, he sent for Jin
help, and a joint force attacked Ze M and Lu n'i in order to draw Wen back south. The
18. TJ 264:8623; JW 137:1827. Twitchett has suggested that it was this aggressive behaviour that provoked
the Kitan to unite in defence of their livelihood. Twitchett, Liao, p.26.
19. Most notably 95,000 people and countless animals from Hedong in 902:7. LS 1:2.
20. JW 26:360; LS 1:2 give 905. JW 137:1828 gives 907, and TJ 266:8679 with note from the Kaoyi, argues
for this date.
21. Place names and boundaries from 907 appear on Map 1, which can be referred to until superseded by the
next map, and so on. These are effectively only sketch maps, because despite the large amount of information
in the standard works, exact boundaries cannot always be determined, especially for the northern regimes.
22. LS 1:2. `Keyong offered troops for the avenging of Liu Rengong's deeds at Muguajian *LEM; Taizu gi
agreed to this.' This phrase has been much overlooked by commentators on the agreement
23. Depending on the date of the agreement, it could have been Abaoji's first act as a newly ascended emperor
(907, LS 1:3) or he could still have been yuyue (905), in which case he was undermining the authority of the
then khaghan, Hendejin ftr.MM. See Twitchett, Liao, pp.33-5 on the problem of dating the start of the dynasty.
24. LS 1:2; JW 2:39.
25. JW 26:360; TJ 266:8668, 8670.
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governor of Lu, Ding Hui TO, surrendered, and this loss forced Zhu Wen not only to
abandon his attack on Cangzhou tftfii (a satellite of Youzhou) but hastily to take the
throne himself, apparently in an effort to regain control of the situation.' It was thus a
defection and the corresponding territorial loss which forced Wen finally to end Tang and
establish his new Liang dynasty." The act of a single person changing their allegiance
could thus have a tremendous impact. We might further note that in such a scenario the
court has only a secondary role, and the focus is instead on the frontier zone itself as the
origin of events. Zhu Wen's accession did not change this state of affairs.
The Liang	 dynasty and the Yan AN dynasty, c.907-914
Almost as soon as Zhu Wen took the throne as emperor of Liang (temple name Taizu
tla), Abaoji sent an envoy to establish peace with the new court. Keyong was
singularly unimpressed by this total disregard of their agreement, and is said to have
hated Abaoji from then on. Not only had Abaoji not joined in an attack on Zhu Wen, he
had now recognised his legitimacy,' thus effectively reneging on the agreement of
brotherhood with Keyong. Bonds of brotherhood were standard currency amongst the
military classes of the time, being a good way of making certain of another's loyalty; to
break one was a crime against morality."
Although the ally was different, Abaoji's involvement with north China was still
channelled through Youzhou. Wen's 906-7 attack had failed to conquer the province, but
it does seem to have finally provoked Rengong's son, Shouguang gr-r3rE, to usurp his
father's position in order to lead an effective defence. 3° However, at some point not long
after Wen became emperor, Shouguang submitted to him and was confirmed as jiedushi.
This action of Shouguang's was that of a lesser ruler seeking moral backing for their
authority from the power perceived to be strongest at the time; it also contributed to the
legitimation of Zhu Wen's new dynasty.
In Youzhou, Shouguang's brother Shouqi 	 the Pingzhou	 jiedushi,
fled to the Kitan. According to the LS he arrived with several thousand troops, and was
26. Wang, pp.83-4.
27. TJ 266:8671-5; JW 26:360; LS 1:3.
28. TJ 266:8679-80; JW 137:1828.
29. This subject is worthy of more discussion, for which there is not space here. The operation of the
brotherhood to which Song Taizu a belonged is highlighted by Worthy. Founding of Sung, p.165 and in
Yang Lien-sheng, A 'posthumous letter' from the Chin emperor to the Khitan emperor in 942, HJAS 10 (1947),
p.421, referring to the XW.
30. Rengong had retreated to a mansion in the mountains, where he sought an elixir of youth, and hoarded
money. Zhu Wen's general Li Sian	 had led an army into Youzhou territory. TJ 266:8671; JW 137:1827.
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given a post?' The TJ, on the other hand, claims that although Shouqi set off for Kitan,
he was diverted to Hedong. 32 Only four months later (907:11), Shouguang's older
brother Shouwen gmc, the Yichang ag jiedushi in Cangzhou (under the Jin),
requested the Liang to punish Shouguang for his unfilial behaviour towards his father.33
Shouwen's province would be the first place attacked in the event of renewed hostilities
against Youzhou, so this was a pragmatic choice. These two incidents illustrate the range
of possible options available at this time to those with regional authority, and emphasise
the immediacies upon which decisions were based.
While Zhu Wen's authority was bolstered by the submissions of Shouguang and
his brother, Keyong's successor Cunxu Vt% 34 was reinforced in his position by the
stubborn refusal of the beleaguered Jin city of Luzhou to surrender to repeated Liang
attacks. The great Jin general Zhou Dewei AIWA contributed to this confirmation of
legitimation by bringing his army to Taiyuan and demonstrating his allegiance.
Nevertheless the military situation was serious for the Jin. Luzhou was considered
strategically crucial to the holding of Hedong, and so help was requested from Fengxiang
(Qi 0) and money sent to the Kitan for cavalry assistance." No response came
from Fengxiang and it seems unlikely that the Kitan helped either as in 908:5 Abaoji
asked Zhu Wen for investiture, which was agreed on condition that he help Liang to
destroy the Jin. Meanwhile Cunxu asked for cavalry to attack Lu, citing his father's
agreement with Abaoji. 36
 Zhu Wen's effort to make use of Abaoji to neutralise Jin
suggests that Abaoji was now taken seriously in the north China power circuit, but there
do not appear to have been any Kitan attacks on Jin.
Towards the end of 908 Liu Shouwen attacked his brother Shouguang at Youzhou.
Shouguang promptly asked the Jin for help, and they took the opportunity to back him,
successfully, against their rivals. 37 Shouwen next turned to the Kitan for help, apparently
hiring a tribal force which in the spring of 909 helped him to win a battle at Jisu RiX .38
Shouwen was captured in the course of this battle, and Shouguang was thus able to push
31. IS 1:3.
32. The reason is unexplained. Ti 266:8672.
33. Ti 266:8686. Shouguang apparently sent gifts to Liang in 908:1, perhaps to remind Zhu Wen of his value.
JW 4:59.
34. Keyong died in 908:2.
35. TJ 266:8694.
36. Ti 266:8700; JW 137:1828.
37. TJ 267:8706.
38. Ti 267:8710 gives 909:3, 15 1:4 gives 909:5.
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on to Cangzhou, where the commanders made Shouwen's son their leader and resisted
Shouguang."	
• -.
The options available to the smaller independent power at this time, and the
uncertainty over which of Liang and Jin was going to end up holding the Mandate is
demonstrated by Shouguang's attempt to play the situation both ways. In 909:6 he asked
for deals with both powers, offering Zhu Wen the opportunity to pacify the Jin, and the
Jin the opportunity to destroy the usurping Liang." The Liang accepted Shouguang's
offer and honoured him with the title prince of Yan in 909:7, 4 ' ignoring their backing for
Shouwen. The Kitan offered no further help to Shouwen's son, and Cangzhou fell at the
beginning of 910, allowing Shouguang to secure himself in his province.' In mid-911
Shouguang's ambitions were such that he needed appeasement, extracted in the form of
titles from six northern governors, including Li Cunxu of Jin and Wang Chuzhi of Yiwu,
as well as the Liang court. 43 But only two months later, still dissatisfied, Shouguang
declared himself emperor of Great Yan Qlk. Despite his imperial pretensions,
Shouguang clearly had yet to secure his northern border, for on the day of his investiture
the Kitan captured Pingzhou." Given the usurpation in Yan the Liang were hardly likely
to intervene on Shouguang's behalf, and meanwhile the Kitan continued to send envoys
to Liang, with missions in 911:4 and 11.45
Shouguang does not seem to have tried to recover Pingzhou. Instead he managed to
turn all his neighbours in north China against him by first killing a Jin envoy who refused
to treat him with imperial rites, then threatening to attack Jin, and finally invading
Yiwu." The Yiwu jiedushi, Wang Chuzhi, sent urgently to Jin, and Cunxu sent Zhou
Dewei with 30,000 troops, and, helped by the surrender of Zhuozhou igm, the Jin
swept through to beneath the walls of Youzhou in the first month of 912. According to
the LS, at this point the Kitan joined in, with Abaoji personally leading an attack which
reached Youzhou in 912:3. Shouguang, in desperate need of support, turned to Zhu
Wen, who was prepared to overlook the declaration of Great Yan if it meant he could
39. TJ 267:8710; JW 135:1803.
40. TJ 267:8712.
41. TJ 267:8713.
42. TJ 267:8720. He executed Shouwen in 910:1.
43. TJ 268:8742 (911:6); JW 27:375 (911:3-5.)
44. TJ 268:8744-5; JW 27:376; LS 1:5. Only the TJ mentions the capture of Ping/hot'.
45. LS 1:5.
46. 911:10-11. TJ 268:8746-8; JW 27:376. He also conducted a despotic registration of his population.
47. LS 1:5.
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prosecute his quarrel with the Jin and extend his own authority." In fact, Zhu Wen's
attack in support of Shouguang was to be his last act. The Liang throne changed hands
twice within a year," and Shouguang, left to defend himself as best he could, appealed
unsuccessfully to all and sundry, including the Kitan. It seems that the Kitan Continued to
take part in the war, attacking and taking Pingzhou in 912:7, and sending envoys to
Liang straight afterwards." This is strange because there is no record of Yan, Jin or
Liang retaking the prefecture from the Kitan after 911:8. Stranger still, as Yan collapsed
in the course of 913, a Jin general is recorded as taking 'Yam Pingzhou' and capturing its
prefect.51 There is no time here to attempt to reconcile the conflicting accounts, but the
confusion over this one case shows how fluid the boundary could be and how individual
commanders could influence its line.
The fall of Yan is simply a larger case in point. Shouguang's generals, officials and
population had been fleeing his side since the moment he disregarded Feng Dao's Ate_
warning that it was folly to attack Jin. Some, like Dao, fled to Jin, others went to the
Kitan. As Shouguang's regional officials left him, they often took their territories with
them, until only the stronghold of Youzhou itself was left. 52 Shouguang asked everybody
he could for help, including the Kitan, 53 but none came. He held out until early 914,
when he and Rengong were executed. The Liang then turned their attentions back to the
south rather than continue a lost war in the north. With the Jin conquest of Yan, the Kitan
were left with only one southern neighbour.
The rise of the Taiyuan ±N Jin , c.915-922
In 915:3 the death of the WeiBo i jiedushi Yang Shihou eng and the rebellion of
the garrison provoked the next round of the Liang-Jin conflict which ended in 916:9 with
Li Cunxu the master of all Hebei. 55 (Map 2.) 'While Cunxu was occupied to the east, in
916:8 Abaoji took the Jin prefecture of Yu e with the capture of the Zhenwu IRA
48. Ti 268:8751; JW 28:379. Wen had no scruples over accepting the mutinous murderer of Liu Shouguang's
son as the new Yichang jiedushi. 28:380) Yichang (seat: Cangzhou) was too strategic an acquisition for
niceties, even on behalf of an ally.
49. Zhu Yougui *a3:1 killed his father in 912:6, and was himself killed in 913:2, to be succeeded by his
younger brother Youzhen *X51 (temple name Modi
	
.TW 28:380-1; Ti 268:8759, 8767.
50. LS 1:6.
51. TJ 268:8772; JW 28:381.
52. Feng Dao's flight: Ti 268:8747. Other examples: Zhao Feng MR fled to Jin, 912:1, Ti 268:8750; Liu Xun
JJII took Xizhou	to Jin, 912, TJ 268:8764; Shouguang's 'generals and troops surrendered one after the
other,' and loss of all but Youzhou, 913:10, Ti 268:8777; refugee populations, XW 72:886.
53. Kitan, TJ 268:8777; Yang Shihou, JW 28:382.
54. -TIN 8:118, 28:383-4; TJ 268:8777-269:8781, passim; LS 1:6, misdated to 913:1.
55. Ti 269:8786-8806; JW 8:121-7; 28:385-9.
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jiedushi Li Siben 11, 1 2, and attacked Yunzhou i fk aJ'ii in Cunxu's lands. Abaoji clearly
did not intend to take any territory that was going to be difficult to hold, because as soon
as he heard Cunxu's relief force was on its way, he withdrew from Yunzhou.56
Shortly after Cunxu emerged victorious in Hebei, he saw the advantages of trying
to re-establish an alliance with the Kitan. Although Abaoji had risked a breach with the
Liang by declaring himself emperor (temple name Taizu )011.) in 916:2 and rejecting use
of the Liang calendar in favour of his own, relations remained cordial, with the Liang
sending envoys in 916:4 and subsequently. 57 In 916:12 Cunxu sent his uncle and aunt as
hostages to the Liao court, strongly suggesting an agreement had been made, but any
court decision was overturned by activity on the frontier, centred once again in Youzhou.
The Jin Xinzhou i 	 jiedushi, resented for his poor governance, was killed by his
army under Lu Wenjin )1a. When they were refused entry to Xinzhou, Wenjin led
them over to the Kitan. The following month, Wenjin, appointed Youzhou liuhou by the
Kitan, led an army against Xinzhou and defeated the new (Jin) Youzhou jiedushi Zhou
Dewei, whose seat was besieged until reinforcements forced a Kitan withdrawal in
917:8, and some kind of peace was achieved. 58 An indication of the haziness of the
boundary in this area is that Wenjin is said to have raided from Pingzhou for some years,
and the Kitan to have pastured flocks in Ping and Ying t, with the knowledge of
Dewei.59
The Kitan left the Liang and Jin to their struggles for the next couple of years but
were soon to become much more active players in the north China scene. In 921:2
Chengde (seat: Zhenzhou) was taken over to Kitan allegiance by the 'elected' liuhou,
Zhang Wenli 3002. He killed the former jiedushi Wang Rong who had held his
post from Jin while maintaining a semi-autonomous position as prince of Zhao. Wenli
promptly asked the Liang for help and the Jin for confirmation as jiedushi. Cunxu's
continuing struggle with Liang Modi put Wenli in a strong position, and Cunxu agreed to
confirm Wenli as liuhou, though not as jiedushi. The Liang agreed to help Wenli, then
changed their minds, and so he turned to the Kitan for backing." Ironically, it was
Wenli's wax-ball letters to them which provided a convenient reason for Cunxu to launch
the desired attack when he found himself in a strong enough position to do so in 921:8.
56. Ti 269:8805; JW 28:388, 137:1828; LS 1:11. The LS says that Siben's seat was at Shuozhou Am, and
that Abaoji attacked rather than took Yu , Xin i
57.	 LS1:10-11; TJ 269:8808-10.
Wu	 Gui Of4 and Ru g.
58. TJ 269:8811-270:8819; JW 28:389-90, 137:1828-9; LS I:11-12.
59. Ti 269:8812-3.
60. T.1 271:8864-67; JW10:146, 29:397, 137:1829.
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Wenli was killed in the first clashes, but his son Chujin 3Kart continued the struggle,
holding Zhenzhou against a siege.8`
The Jin attack on Zhenzhou worried the Yiwu jiedushi Wang Chuzhi, who
controlled the other minor power in the region. He feared that once Zhen fell, his own
territory of YiDing at would be next. One of Chuzhi's sons, Yu h-5, had fled to the
Jin when his brother was given more favour, and had been made prefect of Xinzhou 1,
which bordered Kitan territory. When Cunxu refused to pardon the Zhenzhou leader,
Chuzhi sent to Yu for help. Chuzhi asked him to offer payments to his neighbours, the
Kitan, in return for the relief of the siege of Zhenzhou, and agreed to make Yu his heir.
This worried the previously favoured brother, Wang Du In, who deposed his father
and declared himself liuhou. He was swiftly confirmed in his post by Liang, leaving
Cunxu free to deal with Zhenzhou, which, ignorant of the changed circumstances, had
now sent to Chuzhi for help. 62 The help that arrived at Zhenzhou was Kitan, under the
guidance of Wang Yu. Their attack on Dingzhou ij‘li provoked Wang Du to send for Jin
help.63 These two appeals show that the Kitan were now seen as a viable backer by the
minor powers of the region, even though they were not infallible. In 922:1, they were
defeated by Wang Du and the Jin at Dingzhou, with heavy losses. Zhenzhou remained
unrelieved, and fell in 922:9.84
Later Tang &)* and Liao M, c.923-936
Cunxu was now in the ascendant, and after more fighting was able to declare himself
emperor of the Later Tang (temple name Zhuangzong) in 923:4, receiving the submission
of the Liang ruling classes six months later. 65 Paying no attention to this change, and
despite their setback at Dingzhou, the Kitan not only continued, but intensified their
regular raids on Youzhou, with nine recorded in the LS between 922 and the beginning
of 925• 68 These were of varying depth, but the most important was yet another capture of
Pingzhou from the Jin in 923:1.67 For the most part though, these were just more of the
usual raids, and they appear to have stopped after Zhuangzong appointed Zhao Dejun
lett i  as Youzhou jiedushi in 925:2.88 The Tang then took 75 days to conquer Shu
61. TJ 271:8867-8; JW 29:398.
62. TJ 271:8868-9; SW 28:399; LS 2:17.
63. TJ 271:8870; TW 29:399, 137:1829-30; IS 2:17.
64. TJ 271:8871-3; JW 29:400-2.
65. TJ 272:8879-8902; JW 29:404-30:417.
66. LS 2:18-20; TJ 272:8884-273:8929; JW 137:1830.
67. TJ 272:8881, 8884; LS 2:18, 3:27.
68. TJ 273:8930; SW 32:445.
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in the south. 69
 After this the Kitan made peace with the Tang, leaving Liao Taizu free to
fight the Bohai without fears of an attack from the south."
....
In fact, the Kitan need not have worried, because the Tang almost immediately
became preoccupied with the mutiny of the WeiBo army in 926:2. (Map 3.) Li Siyuan
oilqg was sent to suppress the rising, but was acclaimed emperor by his troops in
926:4 (temple name Mingzong r)M.) 71 He then had to spend the next few months
putting down rebellions in Yedu AM (Weizhou n,4ii ) and Bianzhou and consolidating
his position. According to the TJ, the Kitan tried to take advantage of the death of
Zhuangzong by demanding territory in return for an undertaking not to invade the
south.' However, this appears to have been an opportunistic demand as the ICitan were
preoccupied with the subjugation of Bohai, which took until 926:8, and the succession to
Taizu, whose death in 926:7 was followed by several months of tension until his brother
Deguang1,V,316 (temple name Taizong JK,'--) secured the throne. 73 Hence neither major
power was in a position to exploit the other's situation, but it was an ideal opportunity for
smaller leaders. In 926:10, the jiedushi of Liao Lulong (now centred on Pingzhou), Lu
Wenjin, took a huge army, and his strategic territory, back to Tang allegiance. He had
held the governorship since fleeing to Kitan in 917, but apparently he and his Chinese
troops missed their homeland. 74 At this point the Kitan had been in Pingzhou for more
than ten years, and they were not prepared to see it return to the Central Plains, so despite
agreeing a peace with the Tang in 927:9, they retook the territory early in 928.75
Mingzong's real concern was not, however, the Kitan themselves, but the problem
of Wang Du in Yiwu. Du, the son of Wang Chuzhi, had successfully chosen his
allegiances so as to become and remain governor. 76 He was now inciting the other Hebei
governors to refuse tribute or taxes, and not to take part in punitive expeditions.
Mingzong sent Wang Yanqiu EiN,* to deal with the recalcitrant governor, so in 928:5,
Du brought Xi and Kitan reinforcements (his former enemies) to fight the Tang. Yanqiu
defeated both them and a second force, and Zhao Dejun and the people of Youzhou
69. Planning began in 925:9; it was all over in 925:11. TJ 273:8936-274:8946; JW 33:451	 460.
70. Ti 274:8956. The other sources do not mention either Kitan fears or requests for peace. LS 2:21-2; JW
34:468.
71. TJ 274:8957-275:8983; JW 34:469-35:491.
72. Ti 275:8989-90.
73. IS 2:23-3:28; TJ 275:8988-8991. Twitchett, Liao, pp.48-50 gives a clear account of the events around the
succession.
74. Ti 275:8994; JW 37:511. In 936 Wenjin fled the newly-established Later Jin for Shu. Ti 280:9166.
75. Ti 276:9013; 3W39:533. The IS does not record this capture, although it says that two people 'fled' from
Lulong in 926, implying that the territory did not change allegiance. LS 2:23.
76. See above, p.27.
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harried the Kitan retreat, capturing several generals." The effect of this on the local
perception of the power structure might be seen in the actions of Zhang Xichong 	
the Liao Chinese jiedushi of Lulong who had replaced Lu Wenjin after his flight. In
928:8, after the Kitan defeats, he killed his Kitan general and brought his army of 20,000
over to Tang.' This must have affected the morale of the defenders of Dingzhou, but
they continued to hold out for another six months before Yanqiu was finally able to take
the city in 929:2, with the capture of 2000 Kitan. 79 The Chinese sources credit Yanqiu's
two victories of 928 with keeping the Kitan from further breaches of the northern
frontiers, and with bringing them to send tribute to the Tang court, but the Kitan raids on
Yunzhou i
 a few months later would seem to negate this claim."
With Wang Du out of the way, Mingzong could continue to consolidate his rule, a
process symbolically assisted by the flight of Abaoji's son to Tang in 930:11. 8 ' (Map 4.)
This son, Yelii Bei Irmfg, prince of the conquered Bohai territory of Dongdan
was by all accounts highly sinicised: a bibliophile and painter. 82 It is however, less likely
to have been these inclinations that led him to flee, than the continuing suspicion he was
under as former heir apparent, and the proximity of Dongdan to Tang territory.
As the star of the Later Tang ascended, the Kitan conceded to the extent of sending
envoys, in early 932, to request the return of their generals captured in the Dingzhou
campaigns. Mingzong was confident enough to refuse to send back all but one, despite
Kitan raids said to be intended to force his hand. Yet the fact that Mingzong returned one
general shows that he was trying to tread the fine line between maintaining his prestige
and avoiding war, and he emphasised this when he sent back a Kitan envoy who had
asked to stay." Fear of Kitan strength and intentions now began to grow at all levels of
leadership in the Central Plains. The usual Kitan raids on Tang Lulong-Youzhou were
stopped by the defensive building of the governor Zhao Dejun, 84 so they started raiding
the more westerly Yunzhou When reports came from Yunzhou that the Kitan were
building siege equipment, the Tang decided they had to deal with the 'barbarian' (hu 4g)
threat. Discussions on the matter resulted, in 932:11, in Shi Jingtang Evjog being
appointed Beijing kj35; liushou gc.-1, (vicegerent) and Hedong jiedushi concurrently with
77. TJ 276:9017-22; SW 39:537-41, 137:1832; LS 3:28-9.
78. TI 276:9023; JW 39:541 (928:int 8.)
79. TI 276:9024-7; JW 40:548.
80. TI 276:9029, 9030.
81. TJ 277:9052-3; JW 41:571; IS 3:32.
82. See his biography LS 72:1209-11.
83. TJ 277:9067, 9072; SW 43:589-90.
84. TJ 278:9076; SW 43:592.
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four other governorships. He was to be based at Jinyang . 11f PA (Taiyuan), the traditional
heartland of the Tang ruling house, in an almost impregnable strategic position." This
appointment apparently resulted in the Yuzhou prefect Zhang Yanchao Ma-E taking his
city over to the Kitan, for the simple reason that he had a grudge against Jingtang. 86 That
he had the option of joining the Liao was due to Yuzhou's frontier position.
Yanchao's willingness to turn to the Kitan was exactly the kind of behaviour which
provoked court fear of them, which in turn lay behind many responses to events in this
period. In 933:2, Li Renfu 1. 1-14-1, the Dingnan jiedushi at Xiazhou 1411 died and
his son declared himself liuhou in his father's place. The court's reaction was governed
by their fears that the son, Yichao *fta, would join forces with the Kitan. To try to
prevent such a scenario, the court attempted to transfer Yichao to be Zhangwu
liuhou. This had the opposite effect to the one desired, as Yichao was provoked to rebel.
After an unsuccessful Tang punitive action, Yichao was confirmed, belatedly, as Ding,nan
jiedushi. When Yichao died in 935:2, he was replaced as jiedushi by his brother without
a murmur from the court. In fact, it was Renfu who had approached the Kitan, but they
had refused him any help, even though their own internal position was secure.' This
govemment-by-paranoia which had produced the debacle over Dingnan was soon to
destroy the Later Tang, as they engineered the fulfilment of their own worst prophecy.
The greatest dangers for the Tang at this point came from the inside. A coup by the
imperial prince Congrong 	 'f;M was foiled in 933:11, and then Mingzong died. His
successor Li Conghou 	  EN (Midi MA-) lasted five months before an attempt to
transfer his adopted brother, Congke M .11, the prince of Lu	 provoked Congke's
rebellion, which led to his succession as Feidi	 in 934:4." At this point the self-
exiled Yelii Bei, now known to his Tang lords as Li Zanhua 2 VV, sent to Liao
Taizong requesting that he send a punitive mission against Feidi. It is notable that up until
now, the Liao had made no effort to take advantage of Tang troubles, and that once
again, their intervention came only in response to a request."
It took the Kitan another four months to attack south, and when they did, from
934:9, it was still not a major expedition, but raids which the zongguan #:pgr (area
85. TJ 278:9079-80; JW 43:596.
86. TJ 278:9080. Although it was in the frontier region, Yu did not have a border with Liao, so the territory
might not have changed allegiance in practice.
87. TJ 278:9082-5, 9090, 279:9127-8; 1W 44:603-5.
88. TJ 278:9091-279:9117; JW44: 609-46:632.
89. LS 3:36. Of course, we would expect the LS to justify Liao attacks on the Central Plains in this way, but in
most of the earlier cases the Central Plains sources confirm that major Kitan attacks were a result of invitations
from within the Middle Kingdom.
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commander-in-chief) Jingtang was able to drive off easily. Nevertheless, the raids were
continuous, and Jingtang requested more troops and supplies to deal with them. Jingtang
_.
was by now under suspicion with the court and when he was ordered to transfer from
Hedong to Tianping in 936:5 he was provoked into rebelling. The Tianxiong a
(WeiBo) general Zhang Lingzhao 3A-Rei was amongst several leaders who promptly
joined Jingtang with units of troops. At the same time the Tang mobilised a punitive force
under Zhang Jingda 31eA, and as this army invested Jingtang's capital at Jinyang in
936:7 he quickly turned elsewhere for support, contacting the very people he had once
been sent to defend against, the Kitan. According to the TJ, Jingtang had already
discussed making such a move with his closest advisors two months beforehand.9°
Part 2 - Alliance and war in the middle years
The Liao-jina il alliance, c.936-942
Jingtang had the highest status of any 'crosser' to the Liao, and his agreement with
Taizong is probably the most famous event of the Wudai period, resonating down
through the entire Song dynasty (and beyond) as marking the beginning of the
'barbarian' encroachment on north China which culminated in the Yuan 5-E conquest of
the whole country. Under the agreement Jingtang subordinated himself to Taizong by
treating him as a father, promised annual payments of gold and silk, and handed over
what were to become known as the Sixteen Prefectures -1---1-<4,(1. 9 ' (Map 5.) Into Liu
Zhiyuan's MIA mouth are put warnings of the dangers of going beyond a pledge of
allegiance to a father-son relationship, and beyond annual gifts of gold and silk to
parcelling out land. These fears were precisely the ones over which Jingtang's son was to
bring his dynasty to its end and the ones which the Song were most concerned about. 92
While the Kitan waited until the autumn before coming south, Zhang Jingda built an
encircling wall around Jinyang in the eighth month, and settled down to a siege.
Although this pressed hard upon the occupants of Jinyang, it did not last long, because
when the Kitan did arrive in 936:9, they inflicted a heavy defeat upon Jingda's forces and
turned the besiegers into the besieged at their camp, Jin'an zhai tfgz-g . After sending a
90. TJ 279:9124-280:9147 (earlier discussion at 280:9142); JW 46:639-48:663, 75:983-4; LS 3:36-8.
91. The original offer of 'the circuit of Lulong and all the prefectures north of Yanrnen pass RiC315r (TJ
280:9146) translated into the prefectures of You 10, Ji i fij, Yingi 5(, Mo X, Zhuo tY, Tan tt, Shun MR, Xini
Aq, Gui 0, Ru 'ffl, Wu A, Yun g, Yhig2 la, Huai] ilf, Shuo 01 and Yu r (TJ 280:9154.) The palace edition of
the LS used by WF gives Ying 3 * and Ping * instead of Ying i and Mo, but the Liao already held Ying 3 and
Ping, and the list has been changed without comment in the Zhonghua shuju edition, to agree with the TJ. They
are marked and highlighted on the map for 938, this being the date of formal handover.
92. TJ 280:9146. Also see Chapter 9 for further comment on the significance of this story.
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message to tell the Tang court of his defeat, Jingda was cut off, and a long siege began.93
The Tang court, most of whose imperial forces were committed in the north, was now
constrained to conscript a new army to try to help Jingda, in order to supplement the
provincial armies of Zhao Dejun at Youzhou and Fan Yanguang m-gy6 at Tianxiong
(seat: Weizhou.) 94 Some sources claim that Dejun communicated with the Kitan from this
early stage and negotiated with them to replace Jingtang as the ruler of the soon-to-be-
conquered Central Plains. Whatever the truth of this or the order of events, Dejun was
not successful in persuading the Kitan that they should back him rather than Jingtang, for
Taizong did not go back on his formal investiture of the latter as emperor of Later Jin
&-ff (temple name Gaozu WID in 936:11." Not long afterwards, the fortress of Jin'an,
which was running out of food, was surrendered by one of its generals, who had killed
the stubbornly loyal Zhang Jingda. Zhao Dejun and his son Yanshou surrendered to the
advancing Jin-Liao force and with them went the last effective fighting force on the Tang
side. The Tang capital, Luoyang NM, surrendered, Feidi killed himself, and the Later
Jin replaced the Later Tang. One constant continued through this upheaval: the chief
minister Feng Dao, who took office under Jin Gaozu as he had under Mingzong, Midi
and Feidi .96
Although Taizong had been careful not to send his army to Luoyang with Jingtang,
he was happy to mark the Kitan possession of Youzhou by renaming it as the Southern
capital, Nanjing M. 97 However, even in this province Kitan rule was not accepted
everywhere. As the Kitan army withdrew after seeing Jingtang safely installed, Wu Luan
the panguan (administrative assistant) of Yunzhou i in the Sixteen
Prefectures, refused to accept Taizong's rule and was attacked for his pains. Luan held
out for six months and sent to the Jin court for help. Although Jingtang had offered to
buy back the Sixteen Prefectures, his dependent position was such that he could not but
meekly accept the Kitan refusal. Naturally he was not now going to create trouble for an
ally to whom he was so deeply indebted, but he did write to the Kitan asking them to lift
the siege, while he recalled Wu Luan to the south." Another official, this time at
Yingzhou2 WM, similarly would not suffer the shame of serving the Kitan and removed
himself to the south." Such reactions were by no means the only ones found amongst
93. TJ 280:9147-9; JW 48663-4, 75:984-5, 137:1833; LS 3:38.
94. TJ 280:9149-52; JW 48:665, 137:1833; LS 3:38-9.
95. LS 3:38; Ti 280:9152-3, 9155-6; JW 137:1833. For further discussion see Chapter 5.
96. TJ 280:9157-281:9188; JW 48:666-8, 76:992; LS 3:39-40.
97. Ti 281:9167; JVV 76:995, 137:1833; LS 4:44.
98. Ti 281:9169, 9175, s.a. 937:2, 6; LS 3:40, s.a. 937:1. The LS reports that Luan surrendered and was killed.
99. Ti 281:9169. His was one of the Sixteen prefectures handed over to the Liao. See n.91.
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Chinese, and their overall significance is diluted by the fact of the alliance being at the
highest possible level. Just as the subordinates of jiedushi found their choices governed
to a large extent by the actions of their superiors, so the subordinates of the emperor
found themselves with limited room for manoeuvre.
Apart from resistance to Kitan control of the Sixteen Prefectures, there were also
recurrent objections to Shi Jingtang's rule, but the success of either was ultimately limited
by the removal of the Kitan as possible supporters of opposition. The first of these was
the rebellion in 937:6 of the Tianxiong jiedushi, Fan Yanguang, which lasted until he was
pardoned by Jingtang and moved to Tianping in 938:9. Yanguang was apparently
testing the sincerity of the alliance, because according to the LS, in 937:3 he asked for
ICitan help against Jingtang, which was refused and followed by Liao-Jin discussions of
how to handle the affair.m
Such cooperation continued throughout the reign, bearing out the statement that
Jingtang was keen to render good service to the Liao. In 940 over a thousand tents
(tribal units) of the Tuyuhun 1-"6-X, complaining of poverty and cruel treatment, fled to
the Jin. The Kitan sent envoys to chastise the Jin for accepting the fugitives, and
Jingtang, adhering to a tacit agreement, returned those Tuyuhun living in the four
northern prefectures to their original lands. 1 °2 This action is generally interpreted by
Chinese commentators as a sign of Jin weakness against the 'barbarian' Kitan, but it
could also be read as a further indication of the extent to which it had become possible to
maintain peace on the northern frontier through negotiation rather than warfare. The next
time such a situation arose was in 1005, with the treaty of Shanyuan, in which
agreements such as the return of fugitives were set out explicitly. 1 ' Viewed in the light of
that later agreement, it may be possible to see the Jin-Liao arrangement as a prototype of
working relationships between Chinese and non-Chinese states on the northern frontier,
but this early version was destroyed in the next jin reign by the forces of court politics
allied with irredentism.
In a similar incident, the jiedu fushiMat ETEgft (deputy governor) of Liao
Shuozhou, Zhao Chong Mg, drove out his jiedushi and asked to submit to the Jin in the
spring of 941. This was followed, in the sixth month, by the revolt of the Chengde
jiedushi, An Chongrong gZ-WC at Zhaozhou am. He claimed to Jin Gaozu to be
resentful of the Jin subordination to the Kitan and of the transfer of goods to the Kitan,
100. TJ 281:9168-9189 passim; JW 76:1003-4, 77:1018; LS 3:40-1.
101. TJ 282:9210.
102. TJ 282:9219, s.a. 940:12; SW 79:1045, s.a. 941:1; LS 4:48, s.a. 940:9.
103. It may well be that there were similar documents for the Jin-Liao agreement, but so far as I know, none
survive.
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and to demonstrate the strength of his feeling he killed Kitan envoys who had come to
him and raided the southern border of Youzhou territory. He then demanded a war
against the Kitan, pointing out that the Tuyuhun and Tuque 5-tig subjects of the Kitan
were willing to fight. This proposal was quashed by the prudent Sang Weihan
who advised against making enemies of the 1Citan. An envoy was despatched to Liao,
where he defused the anger of Taizong by some fast talking, but was not allowed to
return.' Chongyong remained in place, but in 941:12 he rebelled again and marched on
Yedu. On hearing of this, the Liao released the Jin envoy. Chongrong was defeated, and
withdrew to defend his provincial capital of Zhenzhou, where in 942:1 one of his
garrison generals led the imperial forces into the city. Chongrong was taken and
executed, and his head sent to the Kitan as a gesture of good faith.' °5
The Liao-Jin war, c.942-947
These regional murmurings were added to on the level of contact between courts. Shi
Jingtang died in 942:6 and was succeeded by his young son Chonggui -a-k (temple
name Chudi ffiV or Shaodi z.YV.) Chudi was much influenced by irredentist generals
and officials at court, who encouraged him to refer to himself only as the grandson of
Liao Taizong, not as his subject. Taizong took this as an insult and reminded Chudi of
the debt owed to the Liao by Jingtang for his kingdom.' After this first diplomatic shot,
patched up thanks to the still-influential Sang Weihan, there was a long, slow build-up to
war, which could be read as further evidence for the extent of agreement achieved
between Jingtang and Taizong. With greater will from the south, it is possible that such
agreement could have been transformed into something more institutionalised, as
happened between the Song and Liao. However, Chudi's attitude was to ensure that the
936 arrangement remained an entirely personal deal between two individual rulers,
conferring no benefits, or, in Chudi's mind, obligations, upon their successors.
The TJ claims that the Jin heard of an impending Liao invasion in 943:2, but
discussions continued for another seven months, until the leader of the irredentist party,
Jing Yanguang F-tMa, had all Kitan merchants in Jin killed, and the official responsible
for them imprisoned. (Map 6.) The official, Qiao Rong am, was sent back to Liao with
a message from Yanguang declaring that whilst the emperor could accept being called a
grandson, he refused to be called 'subject,' and was quite ready to fight about it. Taizong
was angered, and it is a mark of his restraint that he only imprisoned the Jin envoys then
104. TJ 282:9222-3, 9228; JW 79:1048; LS 4:49-50.
105. TJ 282:9231-283:9233; IW 80:1054-6; LS 4:50.
106. TJ 283:9237, 9242-3; JW 80:1062, 81:1068, 137:1834; LS 4:51-2.
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present at the court, rather than killing them as the ICitan merchants had been killed. 107 In
the twelfth month of the year, the Liao were apparently encouraged to attack by reports of
Jin weakness from the Jin Pinglu ra jiedushi (seat Qingzhou Mii), Yang Guangyuan
fY61, and by the ambitions of their own general Zhao Yanshou kma, son of the
Zhao Dejun whose earlier similar ambitions had helped to ensure the fall of Later Tang. 1 08
The sources thereby absolve Taizong from much of the responsibility for this attack,
preferring to confer the blame on individual ministers. The sources clearly implicate the
supporters of war at the Jin court with pushing the situation over the brink, leaving Chudi
at best without blame for the war, and at worst as a pawn of his own ministers.
Whoever the driving forces behind the start of the war, there is little doubt that it
started with a huge Liao advance at the very end of 943 led by Zhao Yanshou, who had
apparently been promised emperorship of the southern regime if he were able to conquer
it. In 944:1 the eastern arm of a two-pronged attack took Beizhou pffl and advanced to
Liyang VIM, while the western arm attacked Taiyuan. These setbacks were enough to
prompt Chudi to ask for a restoration of the old peace, but the Liao, as if the size of the
force and length of preparation time were not enough to indicate, were not simply
conducting a punitive raid: this time they meant business, and were led by a general with
a great deal to gain by success. The request for peace was refused.1°9
However, as soon as the Jin actually fielded a defensive army, the military situation
balanced out somewhat. In 944:2 Yang Guangyuan defected to Liao as he had promised,
and the Liao eastern army attacked Yunzhou2
 TM in order to help him. But when faced
by Jin armies on the battlefield, the Liao were defeated. This defeat is credited with
halting their eastward advance, which in turn removed the possibility of relief for Yang
Guangyuan. Instead, Taizong personally led an attack on Shanzhou MAI, but the battle
resulted in no clear victory and the Liao forces withdrew north by separate routes, taking
the opportunity to wreak savage destruction on the way. 11 ° The actual fighting war
slackened off at this point, while the Jin taxed the people fiercely to pay for it. A punitive
expedition was sent against Yang Guangyuan, with the Liao sending him assistance, an
apparent reversion to the interference techniques used widely during the first two Wudai
regimes. The relief force was defeated, and Guangyuan's son eventually persuaded his
father to submit to the Jin besiegers. Guangyuan was killed." Meanwhile in the west,
107. TJ 283:9253-4; LS 4:52, s.a. 942:7; TW 137:1834.
108. TJ 283:9243, 9256; JW 137:1834.
109. TJ 283:9260-3; RV 82:1084-6, 137:1834; LS 4:53.
110. TJ 284:9265-8; JW 82:1086-9; LS 4:54.
111. TJ 284:9271-2, 9278-9; JW 82:1090, 83:1097-8; LS 4:54.
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Guo Wei ma, a general of the powerful Hedong jiedushi Liu Zhiyuan, was inciting
Zhiyuan to declare his separation from Jin and form his own regime, instead of defending
_.
Jin as he had been appointed to do.112
In 945 the Jin took the upper hand for a while, and following a Liao defeat at
Yangcheng lilig once again requested peace. The Jin advantage was not so very great, as
the emperor was willing to concede to the designation as subject in order to end the
hardships caused by the war. The Liao were also suffering from the prolonged fighting
but made demands for territory and for the handing over of Sang Weihan and Jing
Yanguang that the Jin refused to meet. / /3
A new Liao invasion came in 946:6, apparently at the instigation of Sun Fangjian
who had set himself up in Dingzhou as a frontier power, pledging allegiance to
Jin or Liao to suit his best advantage." 4 After a series of minor actions the Jin, in 946:10,
sent the Tianxiong jiedushi Du Chongwei thalA with Li Shouzhen'",--1 _a to attack the
Liao. They were delayed by ceaseless rain, and as they waited supplies became harder to
transport and morale flagged. Eventually they were defeated and in 946:11 the Liao
marched on Jin in force. In the next month the Liao army faced Du Chongwei's force at
the Hutuo river tvr-E*, with Chongwei too nervous to cross it and join up with the Jin
forces at Hengzhou ''J'1'-Zhenzhou. While Du fretted, the Liao were able to cut his
supply and withdrawal line. Du felt obliged to surrender, despite the unhappiness of his
army at this move. The surrendered Jin general Zhang Yanze 1KOM was sent by the
Kitan to take Bianzhou where Jin Chudi submitted and the Jin dynasty was ended. Liao
Taizong entered Bian in 947:1, keeping on Feng Dao as chief minister and receiving the
surrender of almost all the capital and provincial officials, save for a couple: Shi
Kuangwei PEA, the Zhangyi VA jiedushi, rebelled at Jingzhou Mii, while He
Chongjian ir,ITL
 at Xiongwu MA killed the Kitan envoys informing him of the change
of regime." 5
The Liao occupation of the Central Plains, 947
The Liao attempted to rule the Central Plains for about five months, against increasing
resistance. According to the TJ this was not least because of the policy of 'smashing the
112. Ti 284:9275.
113. TJ 284:9280-9294; JW 83:1099-1104; LS 4:55-6.
114. TJ 285:9303-4; JW 84:1115; LS 4:57.
115. TJ 285:9306-286:9330; SW 84:1116-26, 99:1324; LS 4:57-8.
40
Chapter 1 - The shifting frontier
pasture and grain' and greatly increased taxation. 116
 In Hedong, Liu Zhiyuan, who like
so many others had at first accepted the Liao conquest as a fait accompli, was encouraged
by his general Guo Wei amongst others, to assume leadership of the opposition forces.
Zhiyuan declared himself emperor in 947:2, without, however, changing the name or
,
reign era of the dynasty, and ordered all circuits to punish the Kitan. H7
 Quickly there
broke out all over the Central Plains a whole series of revolts, involving the occupation of
cities, the killing of Liao envoys, and a widespread transfer of allegiance to Liu
Zhiyuan. 118 Taizong was dismayed at the extent of discontent with Liao rule and was later
to observe that one of his oversights in the conquest was not to have transferred all the
provincial governors at an early stage." 9
 In the third month he set off for home, leaving
Xiao Han OM in charge of Bianzhou, now renamed Xuanwu jun PAW. Taizong's
entourage included several thousand Jin officials, as part of his stated intention to transfer
the whole official body to the north.1213
Taizong died in 947:4 before seeing the very end. Zhao Yanshou promptly tried to
claim his promised reward, declaring himself regent for the southern realm, but
Taizong's son Wuyu 71:11' got Kitan noble backing to remove and imprison Yanshou,
before returning to the north in 947:5 to consolidate his grip on power. /21 Wuyu was thus
effectively abandoning the Central Plains, following the lead suggested by his father in
his dying days. Even under a Chinese puppet ruler, it seems unlikely that the Liao could
have maintained control over the Central Plains without a great deal of expenditure and
effort, and possibly not even then. If Wuyu had not headed north to make sure of his
control there, he might have lost the Liao state as well as the Central Plains.
Part 3 - Approaching stability in the later years
Chinese recovery of the Central Plains under Later Han tkA, 947-950
With the new Liao emperor departed, the Liao forces in the Central Plains began to head
north as Liu Zhiyuan exerted increasing authority over the Chinese provinces, receiving
submissions but also facing some surprisingly stubborn opposition. Xiao Han, left to
116. TJ 286:9334-5. The destruction of crops would have had an immediate impact, but the taxation measures
might not have had time to take effect. See Zhao Guangyuan, Lae lun Qidan jundui zai Zhongyuan 'cla caoyu,'
Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiusheng yuan xuebao 1986:6, pp.67-71.
117. Ti 286:9339-41; _TW 99:1324-5; LS 4:59.
118. TJ 286:9340-48; _TIN 99:1325-6; LS 4:60. The previous defections from Liao were to the Southern Tang,
demonstrating very clearly that the discontented would seek alternative higher authorities wherever they could
be found.
119. Ti 286:9354; LS 4:60.
120. TJ 286:9348-51; JW 99:1326-7; LS 4:60.
121. Ti 286:9356-287:9364; JW 99:1329; LS 4:60, 5:63.
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mind the southern realm by the late Liao emperor, now returned north, leaving the son of
Tang Mingzong, Li Congyi lit, in charge of the south. Congyi, a reluctant deputy,
sent an invitation to Liu Zhiyuan, who had him killed. The following month Zhiyuan
entered Bian and declared a new dynasty, the Later Han *A. His temple name was
Gaozu 1 122 Du Chongwei, left behind by the Liao withdrawal, sent his submission
from Yedu to the new emperor in 947:7. Gaozu tried to transfer Chongwei to be
governor of Guide no.,. Chongwei rebelled, occupied Yedu and made contact with his
erstwhile captors and rewarders in the shape of the Liao general Mada Chongwei
surrendered to Han after a four-month siege and was executed in 948:1. 123 This failure
was followed by a Han attack on Hengzhou in 947:8, helped by the city population and
the former Jin officials being held there. Mada cut his losses, abandoned Hengzhou and
headed north to Liao-controlled Dingzhou, governed by Sun Fangjian. Han Yindi
AlVt' succeeded his father Gaozu in 948:2, and shortly afterwards the Liao tried to
transfer Sun Fangjian from Dingzhou. This provoked him to return his allegiance to the
south, which resulted in his restoration to his former post as Yiwu jiedushi, and the
abandonment of Dingzhou by a Mada fearful of full-scale Chinese rebellion. Fangjian's
realignment of Dingzhou meant that the last of the Jin territory lost to the Liao at the end
of the war had been recovered by Han.124
Despite the alacrity with which the Central Plains provinces had turned to Liu
Zhiyuan in order to be rid of the Liao, they were less keen to accept Han rule in the
longer term. (Map 7.) In 948:3, the month of the final Liao withdrawal, there were three
rebellions. Zhao Siwan kft,E,Mg occupied the newly recovered Chang'an Li
Shouzhen occupied Hezhong 1171E17 and Wang Jingchong i5-7.k* occupied Fengxiang.
Siwan and Shouzhen joined forces and turned to the Liao for assistance, as they were
once again available as allies for rebels. Having bought support with generous gifts to
officials at all levels, Han Yindi and Guo Wei were able to raise an army against Li
Shouzhen, whose requests for Liao help had been fruitless. When Hezhong was placed
under siege in 948:11, Shouzhen's requests for help were no longer directed northwards,
whence there had been no response, but to the Southern Tang M*, whose force was
beaten back. Shouzhen and his ally Siwan both submitted in 949:7, having received no
Liao help at all, despite repeated requests.'
122. Ti 287:9359-68; JW 100:1331-35; LS 5:63-4.
123. Ti 287:9368-9, 9376-8, 9384; JW100:1340.
124. TJ 287:9371-2, 288:9389; JW 100:1336, 1347-8.
125. Ti 288:9387-9411; JW 101:1346-102:1359.
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Although the Liao and Southern Tang discussed a joint expedition against the Han
in 948:4, nothing came of this for nearly 18 months, and even then the attack was really a
return to the old Kitan habits of raiding Hebei and withdrawing before any advance
against them. To counter these attacks, Yindi appointed Guo Wei as Yedu liushou and
Tianxiong jiedushi in 950:4, effectively placing a great deal of power in his hands. This
was exactly the same kind of overreaction to the Liao threat which had given Shi Jingtang
his opportunity, and in 950:11 the dangers of such concentration of authority were seen
once again as the previously loyal Guo Wei raised an army in rebellion. Yindi was killed
by a mutinous army and Guo Wei set up a relative of Zhiyuan's on the throne, retaining
the trust of the imperial house such that when the next Liao raid hit Neiqiu RE in the
same month, Wei was sent to deal with it. En route, he was proclaimed emperor by his
army. The real extent of the danger posed by the Liao raids may be measured by Guo
Wei's willingness to ignore his mission and return forthwith to the capital, where in
951:1 he established the Later Zhou Witi dynasty, with the temple name of Taizu
tC.126
Later Zhou. Wig, and Northern Han k	 c.951-958
Although Feng Dao was again given employment under the new dynasty, Zhou Taizu's
actions in this period suggest an emperor determined to start afresh, with a new austerity
in the style of government. Liao, responding more quickly than usual to a change of
dynasty, sent envoys to request peace. However, at almost the same time, the brother of
the Han founder, Liu Chong Er, declared himself emperor at Jinyang in order to
continue the dynasty, an extension now known as the Northern Han ILA. Recognising
the need for support, Liu Chong turned immediately to the Liao for an alliance and a joint
force attacked Jinzhou 1-Y1 4+1, although without success. In 951:2, the Liao congratulated
Zhou Taizu on his accession whilst acknowledging Han requests for military aid, but
after Liu Chong requested formal investiture as emperor from Liao, they became less
friendly towards Zhou, detaining some envoys in 951:5. At this point the frontier
governor of Dingnan, Li Yiyin 	 	 placed himself under his neighbours the
Northern Han. Liu Chong was formally invested in 951:6, and repeated his request for
troops to attack Zhou,'" There is no doubt that despite their inability to hold north China
directly, the Liao were still the other power in north China which counted, and were the
natural recourse for the Han restorationists seeking to oppose the Thou. Meanwhile, the
126. TJ 288:9415-290:9450 passim; JW102:1362, 103:1370-77, 110:1457-62; LS 5:64.5.
127. TJ 290:9452-62 passim; JIAT 110:14-64, 111:1468-72; LS 5:65-6 (envoy exchanges recorded regularly to
LS 9:101.)
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exchanges of envoys between Liao and Northern Han were the first in a relationship
between rulers that was to be conducted entirely through such contacts.
Liao Shizong tft sent troops to join the Northern Han attack on Thou in 951:9,
but the advance was delayed by his assassination. After the succession of his cousin
Muzong the allies besieged Jinzhou, but Zhou reinforcements inflicted a heavy
defeat. Meanwhile, the people of Northern Han were taxed heavily by Liu Chong, and
are said to have resented the subordination to the Liao such that many of them fled to
Zhou territory. Such flight only emphasised the claimed legitimacy of the Thou dynasty,
as it was taken to prove the righteousness of rule by that regime. On the other hand,
Murong Yanchao vgas, the Taining VT4- jiedushi (seat: Yanzhou 5E41,1) under Later
Han, at first sent tribute to the Zhou, then joined up with the Southern Tang and Northern
Han to rebel, but his allies failed him. The Southern Tang assisting army was defeated,
and the Northern Han-Liao force withdrew from Jinzhou, leaving Yanchao in a much
weakened position.' Once again we see the mixed reactions to a new regime arising
from differing circumstances, with challengers appealing to the strongest alternative
sources of authority for support.
Zhou Taizu began to apply a stricter definition of the northern frontier. (Map 8.) In
952:9 he sent out an order to the people there that they were not to raid the Liao borders
for captives and plunder. In the same month, the Liao raided Jizhou2 	 411 and took
several hundred able-bodied people north with them, killing them en route because they
were rebellious. These two pieces of information make it clear that population movement
was two-way, and that the Liao were not the only group who practised frontier raiding
for profit. Only the month after this raid, the Liao prefectures of Ying 	 Mo 	 and
You IgN suffered severe flooding, forcing many people off their land as refugees who
moved south into more hospitable terrain. This happened to be Zhou-held Hebei, where
they were received and given relief. At the end of the year the prefect of Linzhou
turned from Northern Han to Zhou allegiance. With Liao raids on Ding and Zhen and
Northern Han raids on Fuzhou ffori the situation looked as fluid as it ever had been. 129 A
difference was soon to come, brought by a change of emphasis at court.
In 954:1 Zhou Taizu died and Liu Chong took advantage of the change of ruler to
launch an attack on the Thou in 954:3, with a large force of Liao allies. At Gaoping A*,
Thou forces turned defeat into victory by a night attack, in which they slaughtered over a
thousand Zhou infantry who had earlier surrendered to the Han on the battlefield; but the
128. TJ 290:9462-78; JW 111:1474-112:1482; LS 6:69.
129. TJ 291:9482-97; JIN 112:1484-113:1487; LS 6:71.
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subsequent Zhou siege of Jinyang was abandoned after two months.' 3 ° After a smooth
succession to the Northern Han throne in 954:11, in which the relationship with Liao was
firmly maintained, Liao attacks continued on Hebei. In 955 the new Zhou emperor
Shizong t'7-J - began extensive work to defend his territory, dredging the river between
Shen g and Ji2 , building fortifications and posting garrisons. The Zhou regime also
strengthened itself from within, with Shizong declaring his desire to restore the old
borders, holding discussions on gains and losses, and ordering senior ministers to write
on remaining loyal to the lord in times of trouble."' Such determination suggests a
change from the previous Wudai regimes. Although certain ministers had adopted an
irredentist stance to further their own ends, earlier rulers had either been fighting for the
Central Plains or accepting of Liao refusals to return the lands. The initiative was now for
expansion, and came from the highest level. Most importantly, it was also backed by a
conscious programme of preparation in many areas, not least of which was the renewed
awareness of the uses of moral obligations. The Liao themselves were also showing less
interest, despite many requests for their intervention. They did nothing to help Southern
Tang when they sought help against a Zhou attack beginning in 955:11, and provided
only half-hearted support in 957:11 for a Northern Han attack on Luzhou, which failed.
The Zhou campaign against Southern Tang continued for some years, but it was
apparently not until 958:4 that the Liao took advantage of this to recommence frontier
raiding, to which the Zhou retaliated almost immediately by taking Liao Shucheng
AA:32
Zhou assault on Liao, c.958-959
After the formal submission of the Southern Tang ruler in 958:5, the Zhou turned straight
back to the Northern Han, and took six of their fortresses. Then, in the spring of 959,
Zhou Shizong moved to recover the Sixteen Prefectures. Taking the newly cleared water
routes from Cangzhou deep into Liao territory, the emperor led a land and water force
which swiftly took the three passes of Yijinguan Waqiaoguan .tiguM and
Yukouguan I:I IN (all in the area north of Mozhou.) The Liao defending generals of
Yingzhou2 , Mozhou and Yizhou gfii surrendered with their cities, and the Zhou armies
are accordingly said to have taken southern Yan (i.e. southern Youzhou) without
bloodshed. They withdrew only because the emperor became ill.' 33
 It was of course in
130. TJ 291:9501-20 passim; JW113:1503-17 passim; LS 6:72.
131. Ti 292:9523-7; PN115:1525-28; LS 6:73.
132. TJ 292:9527-294:9583 passim; JW 115:1528-118:1573 passim; LS 6:74-5.
133. Ti 294:9595-7; JW 119:1580-1; LS 6:75.
47
Chapter 1 - The shifting frontier
-
48
Chapter 1 - The shifting frontier
the interests of the recorders to show Zhou Shizong as having the Mandate and being a
generous victor, and a bloodless war suggested that there was no strong attachment to the
other side, thus reinforcing Zhou claims to legitimacy.
The Northern Han provided some distraction to the Zhou by attacking across their
frontiers, but the immediate danger to the allies was withdrawn when Zhou Shizong died
in 959:6, to be succeeded by a child of seven. (Map 9.) The Southern Tang immediately
took advantage of this to assert their independence, covering their backs through renewed
friendship with the Liao, whose envoys they feasted. Although the Zhou were not
actively attacking either party at that point, espionage flourished, and Zhou agents at the
feast murdered the Liao envoys. Ignorant that the Southern Tang were not to blame,
Muzong cut off relations, robbing them of a much-needed ally.
Such friendship was to be all the more missed after the founding of the Song
dynasty, which came just six months later. In the New Year of 960 came a report from
Zhen and Ding that the Northern Han and Liao were attacking. It is said that Zhao
Kuangyin's MEN, army, who had long served under him, considered it inadvisable to
have a minor on the throne in such dangerous circumstances and refused to fight Liao
unless Kuangyin was emperor. As had been the case with Guo Wei and the founding of
the Zhou, a Liao attack provided the opportunity and excuse for the change of regime, as
once again the pretender ign-ored the supposed danger from the north in order to march to
the capital to declare himself emperor.'
Early Liao-Song relations and the Northern Han, c.960-979
The Southern Tang and Wuyue AM promptly sent their congratulations to the Song, but
the Northern Han incited raids on Hexi MN by the local tribes, and the Liao invaded
Dizhou UM in support of their allies. In addition, not all the provincial governors were
delighted at Zhao Kuangyin's accession (temple name Taizu.) The Zhaoyi FFIA jiedushi
(seat: Luzhou) Li Yun 	  although given a senior court appointment by Kuangyin,
decided to rebel, weeping endlessly over a portrait of Zhou Taizu. The Northern Han
invited Yun to join them, asking in their turn for support from the Liao, but then marched
south without waiting for them. Yun, meanwhile, did not stay with the Han forces, and
the Song were able to crush him in 960:6, at which the Han returned to Jinyang.135
While the Liao dealt with high-level rebellion in 960:7 and 10, Song Taizu
concentrated on asserting his control over the new dynasty. There were no big
campaigns, only border skirmishes, but the perceived strength of the Song was
134. TJ 294:9597-9606; JIV 119:1583, 120:1591-7; LS 6:75-6; SS 1:3.
135. CB 1:10-18; LS 6:76; SS 1:4-6.
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demonstrated in 961:9 by the surrender to them of the Liao general Jielif ign whom they
appear to have accommodated. Nevertheless, the Song concern with the border is shown
in an edict of 961:10, which banned frontier people from making cross-border raids, and
ordered that previously pillaged horses be returned.' This repeats the Zhou move of
952:9 and appears to have been calculated to keep the peace on the frontier by providing
no excuses for attacks from the north. The importance of controlling this kind of activity
is demonstrated very clearly by parts of the 1005 Shanyuan treaty, which provides for the
return of fugitives and the regulation of border trade. The continuing concern of Song
Taizu not to make trouble for his northern neighbours, at least just yet, was shown in his
non-exploitation of the internal troubles in Liao resulting from poor rule and ambitious
imperial relatives.
In 962:4, Taizu made the first of several frontier appointments which aimed to
secure the north from attacks by the Northern Han, ICitan, and the Dingnan jiedushi Li
Yixing Vggi-, in order to allow the confident prosecution of the conquest of the
southern states. The chief means used by the new officials to achieve this was apparently
intelligence information, but a certain amount of fighting continued, for in 963:7 the
Anguo jiedushi (seat: Xingzhou) Wang Quanbin led an attack on the
Northern Han. In the autumn, the Han ruler urged the Liao to raid the borders, but did
not wait to join up with the Liao force. Relations between the allies deteriorated when the
Han stopped paying the agreed subsidy to Liao and Han envoys were detained in return,
but in the absence of other supporters the Han had little choice but to patch things up and
restart payments at the end of 963. Although relations remained uneasy, a Song attack on
Han Liaozhou fl‘l in 964:1 brought the Liao south in response to a Han request for
help. The prefect of Liaozhou surrendered to the Song and both sides claimed victory in
the subsequent battle. In the last months of the year, both powers became preoccupied
with the regions furthest from their common frontier and hostilities there ceased for the
time being.' 37
The Northern Han and Liao raided separately in 966:1, and although such
skirmishes happened occasionally, both major regimes were more concerned with
ongoing internal problems than with creating external ones. Hence it was not until a new
Northern Han ruler acceded in 968:7 that Song Taizu, perhaps prompted by a steady
trickle of Han submissions, ordered preparations for a serious attack, which came in
968:9. The Han sent for Liao help, their advance prompted the Song to withdraw, and
the Liao pillaged Song territory before returning north. A more determined attack the
136. LS 6:76; CB 1:19-2:55 passim; SS 1:7-10.
137. CB 3:66-5:139 passim; LS 6:78, 7:81; SS 1:13-16.
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following year led to a siege of Taiyuan-Jinyang and a defeat of relieving Liao troops
coming from Dingzhou in 969:5, after which the Song managed to divert the river to
flood the city. A Han minister who wanted to surrender was killed by his own side, and
as the Song camp began to suffer from illness, the Liao sent more assistance to Han. The
Song withdrew, but took with them over 10,000 households from the Taiyuan district,
for resettlement in Henan and Shandong I.LIW with gifts of grain!"
In the middle of this campaign the emperor Liao Muzong was murdered, but the
accession of Jingzong went smoothly enough that there was no disruption in the
war effort. Jingzong's style of rulership came to resemble more closely that of a Central
Plains ruler, with an increased emphasis on the role of Chinese officials in policy
making. It may have been this reorganisation which prompted sixteen Kitan tribal groups
to give their allegiance to the Song in 969:10. This was quite a coup for the Song, but the
tribes' motives are unclear. They were moving to an alien regime where, culturally, they
were going to suffer privations, and the leaders could hardly hope for greatly increased
status. Whilst welcoming such defections, the Song continued to seek closer regulation
of the frontier. In the first half of 970 there were several edicts aimed at stamping out
undesirable trading practices. Related to this was the movement from Xizhou FAI of a
Song prefect, noted for having kept the Liao from breaching the frontiers for ten years.
The value of such officials, who were able to provide frontier security, is further
demonstrated by the recording of the death of the jiedushi He Jiyun fama in 971:7,
after some twenty years of keeping out the Liao. He is said to have understood them, and
to have filled them with fear)"
Although skirmishes continued through the early 970's, the Liao-Song war had
more or less petered out by now and peace discussions began. Sources favouring the
Song claim that the Liao initiated the talks and vice versa, but in any case, it is clear that
both sides were willing to talk. Accordingly, this was an unusually mutual peace-making,
with neither side in an overwhelming position. Such a balance was to characterise Song-
Liao relations throughout their long association. Following the practice used between
Liao and Northern Han, Liao-Song relations now focussed around regular envoy
contacts, as is especially clear in the LS annals. In 975:3 a Liao envoy to Song was
feasted and given generous gifts, Song envoys returned the visit in the seventh month,
and new year greetings were exchanged. Liao envoys were sent to discuss substantive
issues in 976:3 and the Song sent birthday greetings in 976:5. Regular exchanges
138. CB 7:166-10:225 passim; LS 7:84-8:90; SS 2:23-9.
139. CB 10:234-11:249, 12:269-70; LS 7:87, 8:89-91; SS 2:31.
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continued until the Song launched the campaign which destroyed Northern Han in early
979. 140
It seems likely that peace with the Liao was part of a deliberate ploy on the part of
the Song to remove the Han's ally and thus weaken that state further to allow Song to
crush it. In 976:8 Song envoys arrived in Liao while one arm of a large Song expedition
defeated the Han beneath the walls of Taiyuan. The Han sent to Liao for help, and
according to the LS this was immediately sent, regardless of all the Song diplomatic
cultivation of Liao. However, as the other Song force withdrew, it captured some 37,000
people from the Han population 'behind the mountains,' further depleting Han resources.
Despite the recent fighting, the Liao resumed regular envoy contact with the Song only a
few months afterwards, prompted by the need to acknowledge the death of Song Taizu
*tlg and the accession of his brother as Taizong
The beginning of a new state of affairs is suggested, in 977:1, by the Jurchen
tribes in the northeast bringing tribute to Liao instead of raiding them. Later in the year
they asked for posts, suggesting that they now regarded the Liao rather than the Song as
the best repository of legitimate authority. They also resumed the sending of regular
tribute, followed a couple of months later by the Uighur in the northwest. The Liao
continued to support the Han, now with food sent in response to a request in 977:3.1'
Such a dependence on outside resources did not bode well for the continued survival of
the Han regime.
The effective functioning of envoy relations on the frontier in this period is
demonstrated by the Liao demand to Han that 400 Tuyuhun rebel households be returned
whence they had fled in Taiyuan district. However, the envoy activity between both
friends and potential enemies was conducted alongside plans for, and actual, warfare. At
the end of 977 the Han ruler became afraid on hearing from his border lords that the Song
were stockpiling siege weapons and supplies in the prefectures of Jin, Lu, Xing 5,
Ming A, Zhen and Ji2 . He knew what such preparations were likely to mean for Han,
and he also seems to have become afraid of what the continued Liao-Song contacts meant
for his own regime. In 978:1 he sent his son as a guarantee to the Liao court to encourage
a positive response to yet another request for help.' In fact no Song attack came in 978,
but this was to prove the lull before the final attack on Northern Han, which came at the
beginning of 979.
140. CB 328-20:446 passim; LS 8:94-9:101 passim; SS 3:42, 44-4:60 passim.
141. CB 17:372-87; LS 8:95-6; SS 3:4.8-4:54.
142. LS 9:99.
143. CB 18:418, 19:420; IS 9:100.
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After consultation, Taizong ordered attacks on Taiyuan from all sides. When Liao
Jingzong sent to ask the reasons for this attack, Taizong said that Hedong (Northern
Han) was opposing the Mandate and that Song would fight Liao if Jingzong sent help to
the Han. When the Han asked for help, Jingzong did not hesitate but sent troops under
some of his leading tribal officials. Meanwhile Taizong marched in person from his
capital and reached Zhenzhou during 979:3. After a Song victory over Liao on the way to
Taiyuan, which put paid to serious help from the north, there was fierce fighting around
the city until in the fifth month the Han ruler sent money and admitted his crimes. With
this surrender, Northern Han was finally brought under Song control, providing not only
territory and population, but also an army of 30,000. Not all the Han generals
surrendered when their ruler did, the most notable example being Liu Jiye gitgg, who
only surrendered in 9'79:8 when Taizong made the ex-Han ruler order it. Taizong treated
Jiye with honour and generosity, and gave him a prefecture.'
Initial hostilities between Liao and Song, c.979-982
Having had such swift and total success against not only the Northern Han but also in the
defeat of a large Liao army, Taizong sought to take advantage of his victory by marching
north against the Liao. (Map 10.) An initial victory over one Liao army brought Taizong
to the south of Liao Nanjing (Youzhou.) A second Liao force also got into difficulties and
sent to Nanjing for help, but the city was itself soon besieged. The temporary vicegerent
there was the Liao Chinese Han Derang Wft	 , who organised the city's defences while
help under several different generals set out for Nanjing. One Liao army met the Song at
the Gaoliang ;R river and was defeated, but then two other forces arrived, joined up
and attacked the Song, at which point they were supported by a force sallying out from
within the city. The people are said to have raised a great shout and the Song were
soundly defeated, leaving the emperor to flee south ignominiously. Taizong's reaction to
this setback was to come to the belief that the Liao were now bound to invade, and he
ordered a mobilisation to ambush them when they did.' 45
The Liao came south in 979:9, only to be defeated by a Song force at Mancheng
Ate, and pursued with heavy losses. The war was conducted in a low-key manner for
the next twelve months. The destruction of Northern Han as the third power in the north
brought a realignment of individual allegiances, and in 980:3 the former Northern Han
general Yang Ye SA defeated his erstwhile allies the Liao at Yanmen J 19, killing their
general, an imperial son-in-law. It is said that the Liao were so scared of Ye that the mere
144. CB 20:442-52, 459-60; LS 9:101; SS 4:60-2.
145. CB 20:453-8; LS 9:101-2; SS 4:62-3.
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sight of his banner was enough to drive off raiders. In 980:10 Liao Jingzong in person
surrounded Waqiaoguan, and a Song attack on the camp was chased off by Xiao Han
and others, leading to a Song defeat and the capture of several generals. Having achieved
this much the Liao withdrew, perhaps made cautious by the experience of the unhappy
occupation of the Central Plains in 947, and more immediately, by a knowledge that the
Liao and Song forces were now too evenly balanced for success to be easy. Song
Taizong was apparently less cautious in his approach, lacking the chastening experience
of the Liao imperial house. When he saw the Liao withdraw after their success, he
wanted to attack Youzhou-Nanjing again, but was persuaded he would do better to wait,
a decision criticised almost immediately. As it was, Taizong contented himself with
ordering the repair and improvement of the northeastern defences. 146
In 981 there were two brief Liao raids on Yizhou, and an unsuccessful attempt by
Song Taizong to make an alliance with the Bohai for a campaign. In appealing to a group
which had once been a border power in its own right, Taizong was applying methods
from the earlier part of the century, but now that the Bohai were firmly part of the Liao
empire, Taizong's actions amounted to subversion. The Bohai expressed some interest in
the plan, but in the end did not follow through. In 982:5 the Dingnan liuhou based at
Xiazhou, Li Jipeng fan, presented five prefectures to the Song court. 147
 This Li
Jipeng was the grandson of the Li Yiyin who had placed Dingnan under the Northern
Han in 951, and the first Xiazhou governor to come to court for four generations.
Jipeng's distant cousin Jiqian ME objected to this subordination, and fled to set
himself up in opposition to the Song. Nevertheless Taizong was delighted at this political
coup, and he could only have been happier when in the same month the three arms of a
large Liao invasion force were driven off with heavy losses.148
Renewed war, c.982-999
With the death of Liao Jingzong and his succession by Shengzong E',- . in 982:9, both
Song and Liao focussed on internal matters. The Liao were keen to deal with various
tribes which were resisting their authority, whilst Taizong worked on securing the
frontier zone against attack so as to encourage cultivation. Activities related to this policy
created worry in Liao in early 983. They saw the Song building fortifications along the
north bank of the river near Zhuozhou and stockpiling provisions along the frontier.
146. CB 20:462-21:485; LS 9:102-4; SS 4:63-5.
147. Ruth Dunnell, The Tanguts and the Tangut state of Ta Hsia, (Ph.D. diss. 1983), gives five prefectures, but
SS 4:68 gives only four, and CB 23:519-21 does not note the incident at all s.a.982:5. Dunnell provides a clear
narrative, but does not detail the subsequent changes of allegiance.
148. CB 22:488-23:521 passim; LS 9:104-5; SS 4:65-8.
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Their response was to make preparations in their turn, which included the retrieval of a
thousand households which had migrated to Song.'" In 985 the Koreans made an
agreement with the Song for a joint attack on Liao, and in 986:1 a large force marched
north. By the fourth month the Song armies under Cao Bin NW had pushed through in
the west as far as Yunzhou i and Yuzhou in the Sixteen prefectures, helped by local
risings against the Liao. However, the Liao were able to cut Cao Bin's supply route at
Zhuozhou, eventually forcing a Song withdrawal which was harried and heavily defeated
at the Juma
	
river.'"
While the Liao were dealing with this invasion, they received an approach from
Dingnan-Xiazhou. Li Jiqian had fled Xiazhou in 982, then in 985:2 had occupied
Yinzhou v41,1 and set himself up as Dingnan liuhou. He was presumably hoping for
Song confirmation, but instead they sent a punitive expedition. In 986:2 Jiqian offered
his submission to the Liao, who confirmed him as Dingnan jiedushi, and later in the year
married a princess to him.' Jiqian was never an active or reliable ally of Liao, but they
were willing to encourage him to be an irritant to the Song.
The Liao retook Yuzhou in 986:7 and defeated the Song commander Pan Mei 414.
As the Liao advanced into Huanzhou Pan Mei and the ex-Han general Yang Ye
rounded up whole populations and moved them south. Ye disagreed with Pan Mei's
plans, and ended up being wounded and captured in battle, abandoned by his general.
His firm adherence to the Song is demonstrated by his refusal to eat, which in three days
brought about his death.' Towards the end of the year the Song were defeated at
Warigdu MS, and Xiongzhou 1-441‘1 fell, after which the Liao troops were let loose for a
great pillaging of the southern territories. They took Xingzhou and Shenzhou,
conscripting the common people into their depleted armies, demanding frequent military
training, and transferring the populations. These depredations were such that Taizong
agreed in 987:5 to an army levy of one in eight. The urgency of the operation was
emphasised by reports at the end of the year from the northeast that the Liao were about
to invade again, which proved to be wrong.' When the Liao did attack in 988:9, they
took as far south as Qizhou [ r J‘I'l and Xinle WO, defeating three Song armies, before Li
Jilong art led a Song recovery from 988:11. Jilong drove the Liao out of Yizhou,
but they attacked it again in 989:1. They drove off a Song relief force, and the defending
149. CB 23:527-43; LS 9:105-10:111; SS 4:69-70.
150. CB 27:602-20; LS 11:119-12:130; SS 5:76-80.
151. CB 23:519; LS 11:119, 127; SS 4:68-5:76 passim.
152. He is an early example of extreme loyalty to the Song anti-Liao cause; see Chapter 8.
153. CB 27:620-28:642 passim; LS 11:123-12:129; SS 5:78-81.
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general abandoned the city and went south. In 989:7 the Song general Yin Jilun 971-fait
caught the Liao army unawares and killed a senior general, resulting in the withdrawal
and scattering of the army. 154 A desire for peace brought a lull in direct hostilities which
lasted nearly ten years while the two major powers continued to support opposite sides in
the struggle between the Dingnan rivals, Li Jiqian and Li Jipeng.
Li Jiqian had increased his raids on the Song frontier from 988:5, prompting Song
to restore his cousin Jipeng to the Dingnan governorship, with the name Zhao Baozhong
afgTg, and orders to deal with Jiqian. In 988:12 Jiqian turned briefly from his
allegiance to Liao to accept the post of Yinzhou prefect from the Song, but then changed
his mind in 989:3 and again sent tribute to the Liao. In 990:3 he was defeated by Jipeng-
Baozhong's Xiazhou army, and at the end of the year was given a noble title by the Liao.
Jiqian's friendship with Liao lasted until he heard in 991:7 that a Song punitive force was
heading his way, at which he returned to Song allegiance, was made Yinzhou guanchashi
NitX,{1t (surveillance commissioner) and bestowed with the name Zhao Baoji
Three months later Jipeng-Baozhong surrendered to Liao, receiving a noble title, senior
posts and his old name. However glad the Liao were that Jipeng had come over to them,
they did not want to lose Jiqian-Baoji without a fight, and so sent a senior official, Han
Dewei trf„t)A, to try to win back his allegiance. When Jiqian refused this, Dewei
pillaged in Dingnan on his return home. Later, in 994, Jipeng and Jiqian clashed again,
with Song, but not Liao, involvement, resulting in the Song imprisoning of Jipeng and
pardoning of Jigian.' 55
The Liao used the hiatus in direct hostilities to strengthen their position with their
other neighbours. The Jurchen were in a weaker position than their Dingnan rivals, so
when an appeal to the Song for military help against a Kitan attack received only a letter
in return, the tribes gave their allegiance to the Liao. The next target was Koryo
attacked in 992:12, with peace made the following month, and Korean use of the Liao
calendar beginning some fourteen months after that. Although this indicates that the
Koreans perceived the Liao to be the stronger of the two main powers, the Liao still
attacked again in 994:6. Koryo appealed to the Song, who refused assistance, fearing to
disrupt the peaceful conditions on the northern frontier. Accordingly, the Koreans
stopped sending tribute to Song and continued their attachment to Liao. In 995:11 they
sent tribute, and boys to learn the Kitan language. In 996:3 the Liao married a member of
the consort house to the Korean king.156
154. CB 29:657-30:685; LS 12:131-35; SS 5:83-4.
155. CB 29:653-30:685, 32:718-36:790 passim; LS 13:141-2; SS 5:88-95.
156. CB 32:728, 36:789-90; LS 13:143-7; SS 5:88-98. Liao-Koryo relations are not mentioned in the Song
sources.
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In all this time, although direct fighting had long ceased, there had been no formal
peace agreement between Liao and Song. In 994:9, Song Taizong again sent envoys to
request a peace, but this was refused. This may have lia.d a practical reason. The Liao
were now more concerned than ever to make use of those they had captured. In 994:11
an edict required the names of all Song captives with any skills or talents useful to the
regime. The Liao might also have been trying to increase their population by raiding. In
995:1 Han Dewei led a large cavalry force south from Zhenwu, and another attack hit
Xiongzhou in the fourth month. Both were defeated by local forces, suggesting that they
were not invading armies.' Raids aside, relations continued to be conducted partly
through third parties. Despite his submission to Song, Li Jiqian had continued his attacks
in the Lingzhou rE4f1 region. In late 996 and early 997 he was twice defeated by local
Song forces, after which the Liao gave him the noble title they had earlier granted to
Jipeng. However, at the end of the year he again sought a post from Song, whilst they
had decided that punitive measures would not work, and so restored his name as Zhao
Baoji. In this year both Song Taizong and the king of Koryo died. In the latter case, there
was an abortive attempt to return allegiance to Song, and it was the Liao who sent envoys
to invest the new king.'"
War and the treaty of Shanyuan Mg-H, c.999-1005
Liao-Song hostilities recommenced in 999. In the seventh month the new Song ruler
Zhenzong despatched a general to prepare the region around Ding for the expected
Liao raids. Li Jiqian provided a softener by attacking Lingzhou and Fuzhou in 999:9. The
Song army defeated him, but then when the ICitan army headed south, the forces at Then
and Ding were too afraid to leave their camps and those who suggested fighting were
cursed by the others. The Liao were therefore free to attack Suicheng A4A, a small and
unprepared city defended by a resourceful official who created a skating rink around his
walls, forcing the Liao to withdraw, pillaging as they went. Despite a rebellion in
Xichuan NJI I, at the beginning of 1000 Zhenzong went north in person. The army
stationed at Dingzhou now emerged from its camp to face the Liao, only to be defeated,
as was an assisting force. The Liao plundered as they withdrew, with the Song pursuit
force not daring to press its mission.' 59
The next couple of years were punctuated by Li Jiqian's harassment of
northwestern Song territory and the improvement of Song frontier defences. In 1002:3,
157. CB 37:807-9; LS 13:145-6; SS 5:95-7. The Song peace initiative does not appear in the Song sources.
158. CB 41:862-3, 42:896; LS 13:149-50; SS 5:100-6:106.
159. CB 45:955-46:988 passim; LS 14:154-5; SS 6:109-113.
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the Liao sent another army south and in the fourth month this defeated a Song army,
leading to a hard-fought attack on Taizhou 4 ,11,1, followed by a Liao withdrawal. One can
see why the later Chinese interpreted these attacks as softening-up or testing operations,
looking for an opportunity to break through weak defences into the heart of the empire,
but in fact the Liao never pressed on beyond a certain point, and never maintained any
attack in the face of concerted resistance. Nevertheless, Song fears were real enough, and
were expressed in an edict telling all frontier officials to report daily by fast courier on
Liao activities. They also ordered the digging of fields in order to hinder enemy
cavalry. 160
The Liao-Song war sputtered on with a new Liao attack in 1003:4, during which
the Song general Wang Jizhong aA,r,t was captured. Although preparations were
ordered, it was not until 1004:4 that the Song frontier defence forces were gathered for a
counter-attack, only to be pre-empted by the next Liao assault in 1004:intercalary 9. The
campaigning was inconclusive, and peace talks began while the fighting continued. In
1004:11 Zhenzong himself went up to the front at Shanzhou, or Shanyuan, to finalise
arrangements for the peace treaty. This was agreed in 1004:12, and the two emperors
returned home. Liao Shengzong took his army with him, whilst the Song dispersed their
forces more slowly, returning them to agricultural labours with gifts of draft animals, and
making new arrangements for the garrisoning of the frontier. There was a restoration of
regular envoy exchanges between Liao and Song, which was to form the framework for
a peace lasting over a century and providing a successful, non-violent means of resolving
disputes between the two states.161
The terms of the treaty are well known, but those of most interest here are the less
commonly cited provisions for the institutionalisation of the frontier. (Map 11.) The
border populations were to 'maintain' the frontier line and were not to raid each other,
while the emperors pledged themselves to the return of fugitives.' 62 These arrangements
imply the prior existence of a known frontier line; the difference was that it was no longer
locally negotiable. The treaty located one very definite point on that line by naming
Xiongzhou as the place for handing over the Song payments to Liao, and the new fixed
line came to be punctuated, and thus partly defined by, official trading posts on either
side.' 63 The intention seems to have been to freeze the situation exactly as it was when the
160. CB 47:1015-53:1172 passim; LS 14:155-8; SS 6:112-18.
161. CB 54:1190-58:1301; LS 14:158-60; SS 7:121-7. See also Schwarz-Schilling, Friede von Shan-yiian,
ch.2, pp.40-63 and section 3 for translations and full references; and Ang, Sung-Liao diplomacy, passim.
162. See QG 20:189-90; CB 58:1299.
163. There may even have been maps, as disagreement between them was raised in the territorial dispute of
1074-5. See Ang, Sung-Liao diplomacy, 88ff. The provision for markets does not appear in the 'oath letters'
exchanged by the emperors. See CB 59:1313ff; SS 186:4562, and Shiba Yoshinobu, Sung foreign trade: its
scope and organisation, China among equals: the Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th to 14th centuries
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treaty was made, and to seal the frontier except for limited and carefully controlled trading
and diplomatic activity. 164
As Schwarz-Schilling has pointed out, this put an end to crossings, 165 but it is only
when we look at the preceding century that we can see just what had changed. The
freedom of movement, both physical and of allegiances, enjoyed by a large group of
individual officials and frontier populations in the first half of the century had become
progressively more restricted in the second half as the rivalries in the region coalesced
into the two major powers of Song and Liao. By the beginning of the eleventh century it
was possible for the imperial centres to prevent any further changes of allegiance by
anybody who was not the ruler of a power in their own right. The multiple options of the
earlier years had been reduced to a polarised duality, made concrete in the frontier line
fixed by the treaty. The history of the eleventh century frontier is one of competition or
cooperation between centres, to the exclusion of those who actually lived and worked in
the frontier zone. The power of the frontier to influence events had been lost, and the
focus shifted into the interiors, symbolised in both cases by the removal of the emperor
from the battlefield and from close personal contact with his aides, into the ritualised
remoteness of the inner palace.
(1983), ed. Morris Rossabi, pp.98-100.
164. As exemplified in the story of Wang Jizhong. See below Chapters 7 and 9.
165. Schwarz-Schilling, Friede von Shan-yilan, pp.56-7.
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The first generation Liao Chinese
Having outlined the general political background in which a continually shifting frontier
was partly defined by the act of crossing it, in this chapter we will consider those acts of
crossing in more detail.
Given the nature of our sources, the majority of the 200 or so cases recorded are of
individuals from what we might call the 'ruling classes,' and although we can but work
with the record as it survives, we should not forget that the total number of Chinese taken
into the Liao regime was very large indeed. Wittfogel estimated the number to be some
two-and-a-half million, and whilst his calculations rely on available information largely
relating to the stabilised empire of the eleventh century or later, his figures do at least
suggest what order of population we are thinking about.' Naturally the vast majority of
these people are the laobaixing -fftet who are rarely mentioned in our sources and even
more rarely appear as individuals. Their reasons for entering the Liao regime were
usually nothing to do with their own free choice. If their area was conquered or captured,
or handed over by one regime to another, the common people came under new masters,
with a more or less changed set of obligations, and they had little choice in the matter.
Hence, ordinary Chinese came under Liao control mostly not when they themselves
moved, but when the frontier shifted over their heads, leaving them in Liao territory. As
these changes follow the course of wars with great precision they simply confirm what
we already know about the transfer of control over territory and population. In any case,
most of this multitude of changes produce no annalistic record of the size of population
involved or what happened to them. At best we might hear general remarks about the
economic situation of the people, for instance in terms of levels of taxation, or that the
population of a particular place was moved to some other place. Even where we have that
much information, we have to remember that population registers were never highly
accurate in this period, not least because the population moved so much between each
registration. In addition, when territory changed hands, although the new owner might
acquire the relevant registers, there was no guarantee that those appearing on them had
not left the area, either to avoid the fighting which had ended in their changed ownership,
or long before that.
1. WF pp.52-6, especially table p.55. Wittfogel discusses some of the problems involved in trying to produce
his figures, and suggests that they should be regarded as minimums. His presentation of the information in the
LS dili zhi provides a listing of those places in the stabilised empire which are noted to have had
Chinese populations acquired by migration or capture.
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The most infamous example of crossings as a result of the shift of the frontier is the
handover of the Sixteen prefectures under the agreement between Shi Jingtang
(Jin Gaozu) and Liao Taizong in 936. Some Chinese argued against such a move at the
time, and most have smarted ever since under the shame of voluntarily surrendering
control over what has been seen as inalienably Chinese territory.' In political terms there
is a big qualitative difference between losing territory after a spirited military defence and
giving away the same territory. Yet for the populations concerned the peaceful change of
ownership, in which it seems that they retained their officials and administrative system
intact, was undoubtedly a good deal better than finding themselves under different rule
after having armies march and fight across their lands, destroy their crops, rape the
women and probably kill or take captive at least some of the population, leaving the
villages impoverished for years to come. In addition, the territories handed over to Liao
were perennially frontier lands, and had already changed hands and been fought over
innumerable times, chiefly by powers considered to be Chinese. The handover of
registers for the Sixteen prefectures is recorded because of its unusual political
significance, but it is the exception that proves the rule. Normally it is enough for the
annals to indicate what territory changed hands, recording movements of population only
when there is something unusual about them.
This, of course, included much movement of frontier populations as a result of
natural or man-made disaster, most often famine as a result of flooding or war. These
have been excluded from consideration here on the grounds that the records in the main
sources are too vague to be of use in this study. In any case, refugeeism is a topic in
itself, and it is likely that refugees frequently gave little thought to where they might go,
and often returned as soon as circumstances improved.
Method and criteria
Most of this chapter consists of the presentation of and commentary on information
extracted from the annals sections of the relevant dynastic histories, as well as from the
TJ and CB. Information about crossings has been set out in the table which follows
(Table 1.) This information is analysed according to various criteria in a series of
histograms. The table and graphs have been produced from inevitably incomplete data,
and they should not be taken as representing an accurate count of the actual number of
people who crossed the frontier. They chiefly measure recorded incidents of crossing, in
2. Sima Guang records Liu Zhiyuan AU-W:4 as advising that no territory should be included in the offer. TJ
280:9146, and see Chapter 9. Cf. almost any present-day Chinese writing mentioning these lands, eg. Wang
Jinlu, Liaodai jiangyu kaoltie, Dongbei difang shi yanjiu 1987:1, pp.81-5 and He Tianrning, Lun Liao
zhengquan jiequan Yan-Yun de biranxing ji lishi zuoyong, Liao Jin shi lunji, vol. 4, pp.100-15.
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Chapter 2 - The Liao Chinese
any one of which anything from one individual to over a million households may be
recorded.
People are only accepted as crossers if their act of crossing is covered by the sources.
There are some gaps in the sources where people are noted as holding prominent
positions in Liao service, but where no indication is given of when they crossed to Liao.
One such is the family of Geng YanyiTriXM, who is known chiefly through three tomb
inscriptions.3 These people are not included here. Similarly, the LS records surrenders
and the presentation of prisoners at court, and also contains several cases showing what
happened to those who had crossed to Liao. The latter cases are recorded without giving
any information about these people's arrival, and so to avoid the danger of counting the
same group twice they are not included here.4 Cases of deliberate deception are also
omitted. The promise to cross if certain conditions were met was sometimes used to
deceive the other side into placing themselves in a vulnerable position. Such 'dirty tricks'
reflect the prevalence of crossing and its value to the other side, but do not contribute to a
picture of actual crossings. Finally, the voluntary crossings by Li Jiqianft'aM and his
cousin Jipeng van are omitted because the conditions operating in what was then the
far northwest were so different to those in the northeast which is our main concern here.'
Crossers who are named are counted as one incident each, even if several are named
as crossing at the same time. If a crossing is recorded in different sources which suggest
it should be categorised in two different ways (typically one source makes the crossing
seem voluntary, another suggests duress) then this is noted in the table, but the likeliest
category is chosen for use in the histograms. These decisions are arrived at by comparing
what the different sources say in the light of what we know about them, but the process
is inevitably somewhat subjective. This simply reflects the nature of our sources. It is
also an appropriate method when what we are trying to examine is the issues surrounding
the act of crossing, from the motivations of the crossers themselves to the manner of their
recording. The histogram shows in graphical form what it was that the historiographers
considered worth recording from the incomplete information they themselves would have
3. Zhu Zifang, Liaodai Geng shi san muzhi kaoshi, Liaoning di yi shifan xueyuan xuebao 1978:3, pp.42-63,
Luo Jizu, Du 'Liaodai Geng shi san muzhi lcaoshi,' Shenyang shifan xueyuan xuebao 1979:1, 2, pp.91-2, Zhu
Zifang, Dui 'Liaodai Geng shi san muzin kaoshi' de yi dian buchong - jian da Luo Jizu tongzhi, Shenyang shifan
xueyuan xuebao 1979:1, 2, pp.93-5, Zhu Zifang & Xu Ji, Liao Geng shi muzhi kaoltie, Kaogu xue jikan 3
(1983), pp.196-204.
4. They are, however, included in the table, marked out by brackets. An example illustrating the possible
danger of repetition is Table 1, #210 and the bracketed entry following #211. 700 soldiers surrendered and were
presented to court in 989:5. Eight months later, in 991:1, 500 Song soldiers were selected to form a new army.
These 500 could come from the 700 captured earlier, or from the pool of all Song troops captured to date, or be
newly acquired. Hence we err on the side of caution.
5. Jiqian gave his submission in 986:2, 989:3, and perhaps c.997; Jipeng his in 991:10. See Chapter 1 for
references. The situation in the northwest warrants the full study by Dunnell, Tanguts.
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had. As such, this format is useful for showing tendencies, which will be discussed
below, but the actual figures should not be taken literally.6
Types of crossing
I have found well over two hundred instances of Chinese whose act of crossing to Liao is
recorded. They include many groups of laobaixing or soldiers, but many more
individuals, as more information was always recorded about those of higher rank. In
addition to references found scattered through the annals, about sixty of these individuals
have biographies in the histories of the Wudai, or in the SS, which have been referred to
where appropriate. About a further twenty people have biographies in the LS. Every case
was individual, and some of the better-recorded crossers are discussed more fully in the
following chapters, but the purpose here is to provide a broad picture of trends and
tendencies, and to relate that to the political events.
It needs hardly be said that those who crossed the frontier were always either in the
frontier zone or the battle zone, wherever those areas happened to be at the time, with the
exception of the crossings around the fall of the Later Jin to Liao in 946-7. Those who
crossed the frontier did so in various ways. The main criterion used to categorise crossers
is the degree of free choice which seems to be involved in their act of crossing. Clearly
there are problems in defining something so nebulous, especially at such a distance, and
with, in many cases, so little information. As with any history, a great deal depends on
the manner of recording, and we can probably never know the full range of factors
operating in any one situation. Nevertheless, it has been possible to categorise individual
crossings on the basis of where the initiative for the crossing seems to have come from,
regardless of the many unknown factors. Hence it seems possible to define three basic
categories:
1. 'Voluntary' crossings, where the people concerned are under no immediate
external threat, and who, according to the impression given in our sources, simply decide
to cross of their own free will. Such a decision was frequently made on the basis of
political advantage, very often to gain support in a bid for greater autonomy against an
erstwhile master, as we have seen in the previous chapter. The court officials who
showed their willingness to join Liao were a particular case expressing an often similar
motivation, as shown by the couple of instances where bribes were paid to try to secure
re-employment (#110, 135.) Exceptions to this are Zhao Yanshou's k-MA wife, who
was allowed to go from Later Jin to join her husband in Liao (#64), and a group of
leaderless civilian crossings towards the end of the century (#177, 178, 185, 209), which
6. Although tendencies are noted, not every case fitted the perceived pattern. In addition, circumstances
changed unevenly: there is no such thing as a 'steady progression.'
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are discussed in more detail below. Meanwhile personal safety, more than advantage,
was clearly behind Li Xu's	 flight in 1002 (#216.)
2. Crossings under duress, where the crossers appear reluctant to come over, but are
subject to a direct and immediate external threat, and where a prominent alternative to
crossing is death. The typical example of such crossings is the surrender of commanders
inside a besieged city, before the city falls to assault. This is usually done in preference to
the risk of waiting for the arrival of a relieving force in time to prevent the said assault,
which could be nothing but bloody. In these circumstances it is possible to see that there
is some, albeit small, element of choice involved. In terms of the opposing concepts of
loyalty and self-preservation, it is the most challenging of situations for a Chinese
educated in traditional mores.' It is striking that in the flux of the Wudai period, it was
most often self-preservation, which some might call commonsense, that won out. Clearly
this is the most fluid of the categories, as often people are classified into it on the basis of
a tiny amount of information, perhaps a line or less. (This is particularly the case with
groups of surrendered soldiers.) At times it seems best to emphasise the small element of
choice its members do have; at others to stress their lack of realistic alternative options.
The other class of crosser found in this category is members of staff of prominent leaders
where the subordinates' own motivation is unclear. Being in a position to take a more
'honourable' line of action if they so chose, and as occasionally happened, we must
assume that there was at least some freedom of choice involved here.
3. Involuntary crossings, where there was not the slightest element of choice. This
comprises chiefly the capture of defeated or fleeing troops, many of the crossings
associated with the fall of Later Jin and the seizure of populations in raids or war. It also
includes smaller numbers of those captured at the fall of their city, as well as the detention
of envoys and capture of spies. It is probably the easiest category for which to identify
members, with, as noted above, just a question mark over whether there is a difference
between troops who 'surrendered' and those who were 'captured.' Although it is often
assumed that these amount to the same thing, this study requires a recognition of the
difference in vocabulary, simply because we lack the detail to do otherwise. It is hoped
that the flexibility of the second category will allow some correction of any, inevitable,
distortions.
There is, finally, a fourth group, of 'crossings' in the form of alliances with the Liao,
or where crossings occurred as a result of those alliances. Hence Ski Jingtang (#48) and
Liu Chong gm. (#148) can both be seen to have 'crossed' in this sense, as can Du
Chongwei's t±ZA son Hongsui th 3L,F4 (#138), sent to the Kitan noble Mada a ,,, as
an envoy and detained as a hostage for Chongwei's continued loyalty to the Liao. Clearly
7. See Chapter 8.
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this type of crossing was only an option for those with at least a province under their
control, and a crossing is treated as an alliance rather than a voluntary submission only if
it appears that the crosser retained their autonomy and is not said to have 'pledged their
allegiance,' or similar. They are typically marked by a request to Liao for troops to assist
against a stronger power.
Figure 2 shows all those recorded as crossing the frontier. The peaks in the graph are
mostly readily explained. The early fairly steady rate of crossings between 900 and 920
reflects the fluid frontier situation in Hebei at this time. The rise in the next column stems
from the heating up of the Liang-Jin struggle for control of the Central Plains, in which
the Liao were increasingly involved, leading up to a peak in the early 920's, when Liao
and Jin ambitions were being contested through the medium of Wang Yu's ti:C efforts
to keep Yiwu an independent province. The generally increased crossing activity in
the columns for 935-955 results firstly from the Liao-Jin alliance and crossings
associated with Liao aid in the war against Later Tang. The most important event in this
respect was the fall of Jin'an zhai tf-gngin 936:intercalary 11 (#49-58.) Secondly, most
dramatically, these mid-century crossings result from the war and conquest of Jin by Liao
in 946-7. Crossings continue at a high level during the early Zhou period, when the Liao
were allied with the Northern Han, and drop off dramatically in the later period of the
alliance, when the enemy was the Song, only rising briefly in the last phase of the war
bringing about the fall of the Northern Han in 979. After this they recommence with a
different emphasis, peaking during the 986-9 and the pre-Shanyuan campaigns.
We shall next look more closely at what lies behind this graph, and examine the
breakdown into different types of crossings as defined above, as well as the significance
of individual crossings, as against those of groups with or without leaders, civilian or
military. To discuss the crossings in chronological sequence would simply be to reiterate
what is set out in the table. Here it will be more informative to take a thematic approach,
beginning with crossings which were hardly crossings at all, although they do reflect
significantly on the attitudes of north China leaders in this period.
Alliances
Whilst there are no dramatic peaks in Figure 3 (overleaf) the 'clumping' of the bars does
reflect the level of competition for autonomy, with Liao alliances arising almost whenever
there was a significant attempt by one leader to resist the authority of another. This gives
some indication of the readiness of north China leaders of this period to look north for
support, reinforcement and legitimation of their efforts to gain and retain a greater
autonomy of governance than the major powers wished to allow. It is visible in the early
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Figure 3: Alliances between north China leaders and Liao, 900-1004
alliances with Zhang Wenli 3K,Ms1 and Wang Yu (#25, 27)8 and continues into mid-
century. The gaps in the pattern for the early part of the century correspond largely to an
absence of this kind of challenge, coinciding and interacting with a variety of other
factors. Between 900 and the end of 904 the Liao dynasty had not yet been established,
and Abaoji RRIR was only just making his reputation. Between 910 and the end of
914 the challenger was Liu Shouguang Er4r- 316 , whose father had regularly raided Liao,
and who was perceived to be in an untenable position unworthy of assistance (following
#15.) For most of the period between 925 and the end of 934, Later Tang power was at
its height under Mingzong, who won provincial support (from already weakened
provinces) partly by allowing some autonomy to the governors. 9 When Wang Du
tried to resist Mingzong's control in 928 (#40), it was this support which deprived Du of
friends in the Central Plains and weakened his position such that he could not just seek
military help from the Kitan in the form of an alliance, but felt obliged to pledge the
allegiance of his province in order to get what he wanted. Hence his crossing is counted
as a voluntary submission, not an alliance. In the same way, although only Shi
Jingtang's deal shows up on the graph for 935-9, both Zhao Dejun kfif., (#55, 56) and
Yang Guangyuan tlYcA (following #64) had discussions with Liao along similar lines
which just did not produce anything concrete. When Dejun entered Liao it was as an
official of the defeated Later Tang, not as a leader in his own right, but Guangyuan was
offered a second opportunity when relations broke down between the Liao and Jin in the
early 940's (#71.)
After this the plethora of deals and cooperations gives way to a single alliance which
ran for nearly thirty years. In the first half of 951 the rump government of the Later Han
turned to the strongest alternative source of power in its quest to recover the control of the
8. Zhang Wenli gained Liao support for his occupation of Zhenzhou OK then seat of the independent
province of Zhao 114, in 921:7. His son continued the relationship until he was crushed by Liang forces. (LS
2:18 and biography at JW 62:829.) Wang Yu offered the Liao material incentives for an alliance in the winter of
921, at the behest of his father Wang Chuzhi 'AI, who feared for the integrity of his independent province
of Yiwu once Zhao had been subdued. (LS 2:17; TJ 271:8870; RV 29:399-400.)
9. See Wang, pp.177-81.
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Central Plains lost to the Zhou. The alliance was a close one, with a more or less
continuous flow of envoys between the two states and with Liao forces regularly
employed to help with Northern Han attacks on their southern enemy, or in the defence
of Han territory against Zhou and Song expeditions. On the other hand, the closeness of
the alliance and the increasing Han dependence on Liao resources as those of Hedong
dried up, did not, apparently, prevent the Han from harbouring the desire to be rid of
their Liao allies and quasi-suzerains. In 954:3 Liu Chong, believing his troops could be
victorious at Gaoping TA* without the help of their Liao allies, excitedly told his most
senior officials that the Han might be able not only to destroy the Zhou, but also the Liao,
in a single battle which would both recover the Central Plains and rid the Han of their
reliance on another power.' It all went wrong for Liu, but certainly this was the last
alliance between the Liao and a north China power. As the graph shows, the change is
extremely marked. Although the Han alliance continued right to the end of that dynasty in
979, the imposition of Thou and then Song authority in China, south as well as north,
meant that no other north China powers remained to seek alternative help and legitimation
after 952." This changed situation contrasts with the period before the advent of the
Zhou, when as we have seen there was continual recourse to the Liao for help from north
China leaders.
Voluntary crossings
Closely paralleling this contrast is the distribution of those who can be said to have
crossed to Liao voluntarily, without the application of overt pressure. This is shown in
Figure 4. It is no surprise that this reflects to a very large extent the movements of
Figure 4: Voluntary crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004
16 —
14—
12 —
an
.:.,'	 10—
N
2	 8 --(.)
.5	 6 —
0
"E'	 4 -
a,
-a
'.0	 2 —
C
••-•
n"
-1111
R	 groups
0	 individuals
to
(no leader
south
named)
1	 F-1
100C990
.	 returned
11::::
V:.:',
::::::::A"::::::
111
.r.e•
1.:•'::::
date 900 910 920	 930	 940 950
I
960
1 I
970
i
980
10. TJ 291:9504-5.
11. In 952:1 Murong Yanchao *-nst' af sought Liao help for his rebellion against the Zhou. (#151)
84
Chapter 2 - The Liao Chinese
individual leaders. Our sources naturally pay more attention to the lives of those
considered important, and the actions of these people could have serious political or
territorial consequences. They also occupied social and economic positions from which it
was possible to make choices about their own lives in a way that was largely.unavailable
to those lower down the scale. The graph shows that after 955 only two people of
sufficient importance to be named crossed to Liao entirely of their own free will. These
were a Song general who, unusually, chose active surrender over defeat and capture
(#206), and a well-to-do fugitive from justice, Li Xu (#216.)
The interesting thing about this graph is the presence of what appear to be entirely
voluntary submissions of groups of Song people, without any clear leadership, and
where refugeeism is not stated to be the issue. These occur during the wars of the 980's.
They include 70 border villages in 983:2, who appear to have placed themselves under
the jurisdiction of Nanjing *V; circuit, based at Youzhou (#177.) This was
followed, three months later, by the return of a thousand households from Song to Liao,
this time apparently under the persuasion of a Nanjing official who was probably
following up the coup of obtaining the 70 villages (#178.) The other two incidents are
isolated, consisting of 240 Song people in 986 (#185), and 17 Song jinshi M± with
their families in 989 (#209.) This would appear to imply that even in this period the Song
population of the northern frontier might have been more flexible or pragmatic in its
attitude towards the Liao than were the central authorities, but the fact that they are all
found in the LS raises other issues which will be discussed below.
This group of crossings occurs in a period of Chinese history notably lacking in
'peasant uprisings,' when the common people appear to choose, en masse, to follow a
charismatic leader. Peasant uprisings throughout history were rarely more than local and
it was in the interests of bigger power-players to crush them swiftly; perhaps even more
so during the Wudai. In this period it is also likely that there was simply too much else
going on for brief, local disturbances to make it into our sources; the disruption of the
period would mean a reduced likelihood of such things either coining to the attention of
local officials, or of being considered worthy of reporting upwards. Yet difficulties of
recording aside, it could be that there was no need for risings, at least among the frontier
populations, when there was an alternative power to which submission could be made.
Some support for this suggestion can be derived from the activities of the minor official
Sun Fangjian TA. Al and the people of Langshan W. Suffering from bandit attacks
which the Jin court did nothing about, Fangjian organised the local people to resist the
bandits themselves. When Jin and Liao severed relations, Fangjian turned to fighting off
Liao raiders. At this time he pledged allegiance to the Jin court, but when repeated
requests for help against the raiders were not met, Fangjian led his fortress to surrender
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to the Liao (#84.) 2 This incident is the nearest we find to a peasant uprising in tenth-
century north China.
The voluntary crossings by groups of the common people stand in contrast to the
almost complete absence of voluntary individual crossings in the same period. This
suggests that social and military status was a significant factor in choosing to cross.
Hence in the early part of the century there were more crossings by people from the
higher levels of society, who often took with them the populations they controlled; while
in the latter part of the century there were very few individual crossings, which
contributed greatly to a reduction in overall numbers of crossings. Both the general
reduction in crossings and the marked change in behaviour at the higher levels of society
make sense in the context of the increasingly close organisation of the state introduced by
the Zhou and taken further by the first two Song emperors. Given that higher status
conferred greater freedom of choice, the change in behaviour among the ruling classes
also seems to reflect a shift in attitudes. As conventional strictures regarding the
importance of loyalty were chiefly aimed at the official and educated classes, it may be
that with the continuing survival of the Zhou-Song regime' and the evident energy of its
first two rulers, it was possible for there to be a revival of the higher ideals of loyalty. As
the dynasty progressed, the issue of loyalty was one which came to be emphasised more
than ever, as we shall see in Chapters 8 and 9.
Crossings under duress
Crossings under some kind of duress are shown in Figure 5 (overleaf), where we see the
same major peaks as in the other categories. There was none of this kind of crossing
before 915," although there were plenty of others, implying that before 915 crossings
were rather more clear-cut: the crosser was either clearly choosing to cross, or taken very
definitely against their will. These findings appear to reflect the fluid situation of raiding
and easy realignments characteristic of north China at the very end of Tang and through
most of the Liang dynasty, when there were many contenders for power. In these
circumstances, where every leader was searching for the decisive edge over their rivals, it
would appear that nobody though twice about heading north if that seemed to offer the
greatest advantage at the time. In addition, the Liao were far less closely involved in north
China politics than would later become the case, and this may have made it easier for
frontier Chinese to turn to them. In this period Chinese leaders seem to have regarded the
12. These details are given in TJ 285:9303-4.
13. Here I follow Worthy, Founding of Sung, pp.1-2, in seeing the Zhou as a part of the Song, although with
regard to crossings and the fixing of the frontier, his rejection of 1004 (sic) as a cut-off date cannot hold.
14. Or probably 920. It is unclear how much pressure Liu Yin NIN was under to cross (#22.)
86
El individuals/senior officials
,
groups (no leader named)
1111 returned to south
I	 1	 1	 I	 1	 I
date 900 910 920 930 940 950 960 970 980 990 100C
Chapter 2 - The Liao Chinese
Figure 5: Crossings under duress from north China to Liao, 900-1004
Liao as providers of extra cavalry if in alliance, and of alternative legitimate title to
powerful regional positions if submission was offered. As it became apparent that the
Liao were a potential threat to north China, enthusiasm for alliances and voluntary
submissions by the powerful tailed off and disappeared, and it was thus more likely that
situations would arise in which submission might come only under protest.
After a gap reflecting precisely the last alliance with the Northern Han, there is a
special case from 979 of two Northern Han generals fleeing Han after their final defeat by
the Zhou (#172, 173.) Taking account of this, it is really not until the renewal of war
between Liao and Song in 986 that crossings under duress appear to recommence, but at
a much lower level. All of these five crossings involve groups rather than individuals.
Although the first two mention leaders, they are not named, and the presence of at least
some civilians is implied (#195, 202.) The last three are of soldiers with no leaders
mentioned (#204, 210, 220.)
In this we might see an indication of the real effects of the attempts by Song Taizu and
Taizong to increase imperial control over the commanders of their armies. While the
proportion of individuals submitting only under duress has fallen drastically from its level
before 955, numbers of groups crossing under duress have remained at their previous
level. Because the first two Song emperors succeeded in reducing the powers of
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governors and then separating out their military and territorial jurisdictions," the actions
of individual military commanders were less likely to involve the transfer of territory.
Given the reduced sphere of action of these commanders, they no longer benefitted from
a decision to cross to Liao, and so they stopped doing it and thus stopped taking their
troops with them." It was, however, still possible for troops themselves to decide to
hold out, and subsequently to surrender when their situation looked impossible, all
without the intervention of a commander important enough to be mentioned. This
maintenance of the level of leaderless crossings is a further reflection of the reduced
importance of individual commanders. Troops had never, after all, necessarily needed
commanders to encourage them to hold out against the enemy; indeed individual generals
such as Du Chongwei are said to have made their armies surrender against their will
(#88 . ) 17
 As we have already noted the absence of alliances and the reduction in voluntary
crossings for this period, so there is also here the suggestion of a growing inclination, at
all levels in the Chinese army, to resist the Liao to the end, and this is supported by the
next graph, since all the remaining crossers from this period were captured.
Involuntary crossings
It is clear from Figure 6 (overleaf), showing occasions when crossers had no choice in
the matter, that this was by far the largest single category of crossings. It also contains an
important anomaly. The bars for 960-69 are almost entirely composed of Northern Han
envoys detained by the Liao emperor Muzong 	 in anger at what was considered to be
an inadequate level of 'service' from the Han (#160-5, 167-9) 18 These fall within our
criteria for defining crossings, but they were very special cases. The two parties were
close allies, and it was unprecedented for the Liao to treat allied envoys in such a
manner.' 9 These incidents had no bearing upon the current relationship between Liao and
Song, and did not prevent the Liao from providing help for their allies. It is important that
we do not allow these incidents to distort our view, because without them we would see
an extremely low level of crossings maintained for a period of twenty years. This is
significant, and will be discussed further below.
As to the rest of the graph, aside from the peak covering the conquest of 947, the next
tallest bar is that covering 985-9, when the second Song-Liao war was raging. About half
15. This also applied to the border generals, although they retained more freedom of action for longer than
their counterparts in the central armies. Worthy, Founding of Sung, pp.165-198, esp. pp.190-5, 272-87.
16. With the exception of Guo Rong 	 (#206.)
17. The reluctance of the army is emphasised by Sima Guang, D r 285:9318-9.
18. CB 4:113-4.
19. It may be unprecedented in the tenth century, but much checking would be required to verify this. Nluzong
was notorious for his hot temper and irrationality. See LS j.6-7 for his reign, or Twitchett, Liao, pp.73-8.
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Figure 6: Involuntary crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004
date 900 910 920 930 940 950 960 970 980 990 100C
of these incidents come from 986, the same year that there were mass defections of Liao
frontier officials pledging their administrations to Song allegiance.' The captives are
those taken as a result of the Liao campaign to recover these lands, and although they
reflect a failure to fulfil Song ambitions, they also contribute to a sense that there was a
great deal of determination at all levels on the Song side. We can examine this issue more
closely if we look specifically at the crossings which can be identified as being of a
military nature.
Military crossings
The capture or surrender of ordinary soldiers is not recorded in significantly greater detail
than crossings by common civilians (68 military crossings as against 63 civilian.)
However, military crossings are frequently quantified, if only in approximation.
Figure 7 (overleaf) shows proportionately high figures for military crossings without
leadership from the Song period, and these reinforce the impression given by the
involuntary crossings and those under duress, that individual military leaders were of less
20. LS 11:120-2; CB 27:608-10; SS 5:77-8.
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Figure 7: Military crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004
date 900 910 920 930 940 950 960 970 980 990 100C
importance than they had been.' In many earlier instances the soldiers cross as a result of
the decision or capture of their commander, but notably in the period 930-954 there are a
number of occasions when the troops themselves seem to come to a group decision to
cross, under duress, without this being attributed to a leader (eg. #43, 44, 85, 95,146.)22
In the same period the number of recorded instances of such leaderless troops being taken
prisoner, implying no decision to cross on their part, is relatively small: only three
instances (#78, 80, 157.) During the later period of the Song war, 975-994 on the graph,
the opposite is the case. Incidents where troops choose to cross, again under duress, are
very few, whilst cases of soldiers taken prisoner are relatively huge. Troops are no
longer being led across to Liao, and left to their own devices they show a greater
tendency to fight on and risk capture rather than surrendering.
Changes in the style of warfare, involving more, smaller fortifications and a Song
army closely controlled by the emperor himself,23 may well have contributed to a
preference to fight and be captured rather than make a pragmatic surrender. Some of the
sources also hint at a period of great brutality towards prisoners, with an increase in mass
21. Although there was still a premium on their capture, as for example in the case of Wang Jizhong Tatlikt,
#218 and Chapter 7.
22. In this period there are no cases of leaderless troops crossing entirely voluntarily.
23. The SS in particular makes far more mention of 'fortresses' and we how that there were major fortification
programs conducted by Zhou Shizong and his Song successors. For imperial control of the Song armies, see
Worthy, Founding of Sung, ch. 4.
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executions,24 which would naturally have encouraged armies to fight on and take their
chances in the hope of victory rather than risk death as a result of surrender. Whilst
leaders were generally less important in this later period, the actions of those few
mentioned would seem to lend weight to the suggestions here, as although large numbers
of them made a decision to cross in mid-century, during the Song war there are only two
occasions when leaders bring troops over to Liao (#195, 206.) Setting the marked change
in this pattern against the consistent absence of voluntary crossings by leaderless troops
throughout the century, 25 we might further suggest that the mood of the common soldiery
remained more stable with regard to crossing to Liao than did that of their commanders.
Civilian crossings
To balance the military crossings we should examine what civilian crossings there are in
the records. Unlike with the military, exact numbers are rarely found when dealing with
the civilian population, but two striking figures, probably recorded because of their
unusual size, are a claim by Abaoji to have taken 95,000 prisoners in a raid in 902:7 (#1),
Figure 8: Civilian crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004
24. In 986:5, orders were given that all the surviving Song troops taking refuge in Pingzhou 4E 1+1 were to be
wiped out, LS 11:122; 986:11, Song people captured by patrols were executed, LS 11:125; 986:12, many Song
prisoners killed, LS 11:126; 987:1, all the able-bodied in Wenan 3C were killed because the city refused to
surrender, LS 12:129. There were also attempts to control the amount of pillaging, suggesting that things got
out of hand rather too often. For instance in 986:12 no pillage was allowed at Yangtuan cheng LS
11:126, and there were punishments for excessive pillaging in 988:12, LS 12:132. After early 989 the Liao
armies seem to have been under closer control.
25. The single case is troops of Liu Shouguang, who evidently had good reason to flee (#11.)
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and by Taizong to have brought 1,090,118 households under Liao control after the
conquest of Later Jin (#129.) The latter was a very short-lived gain, although an
unknown proportion of these households would almost certainly have been permanently
relocated northwards into Liao territory. The other unusually large figure must also be
considered within the context of Liao Taizu's subsequent seizure of power and drastic
revision of the Kitan political power structure, 26 which would naturally be written up to
Taizu's advantage in the surviving records. Nevertheless, when seen in the context of
more frequent though less specific references to the populations of whole counties or
prefectures, the 'exact' figures cited do not seem so extraordinary.
Figure 8 provides confirmation that very few indeed of the common civilian
population had any say in their own crossings. Over half of the recorded incidents (36
out of 63) show that the populations involved, or occasionally their leaders, 27
 had no
choice at all in the matter of their crossings; in other words, most of them were captured,
whether in raids or as a result of full-scale war. The peak, naturally, comes in 947, but
this still leaves slightly less than half where some kind of decision was made. This was
usually by groups where leadership is mentioned, but we lack any records of whether the
population followed these leaders willingly or not. Certainly it is rare for a group of
commoners to themselves make any kind of decision to cross, and where this happened,
it is significant, as discussed above. In general, the graph shows a similar pattern to the
previous one, for military crossings, so in the earlier period (c.920-954), crossings of the
civilian population are made under the leadership of generals and officials, usually
named, whilst during the Song war the smaller number of crossings shows the
population acting largely without clear leadership.
It must be remarked that the vast majority of crossings recorded for the civilian
population, regardless of method of crossing, are to be found in the LS. This latter is an
indication of how important was the acquisition of population to the recorders of the
dynasty and their masters and mistresses. We have not listed here a couple of instances
from the texts which mention ransoming as a common feature of frontier life, 28 but it is
clear that this is what was actually happening in #166 and #212. In the first case the loss
of people in a raid moved the Song to launch a counter-raid to take prisoners of their own
and thus force an exchange of captives; while in the second, the Liao punished some of
their own people for raiding and ordered the return of those taken. These incidents are
suggestive of a level of local cross-border raiding which is likely to have affected more
26. See Twitchett, Liao, pp.29-35.
27. Only three of the leaders had no choice: #18, 24, 76.
28. TJ 281:9181; LS 11:120-1, 12:133.
92
Chapter 2 - The Liao Chinese
communities for more of the time than did war." The scale of this activity is hinted at by
the explicit strictures against it to be found in the oath-letters confirming the treaty of
Shanyuan.
Notable features of the graphs
No matter how one chooses to calculate it, there was clearly an enormous influx of
Chinese to Liao in 946-7, when the latter conquered all of north China. This is reflected
in nearly all the graphs presented here. 947 is often seen as the turning point in the
history of this period, both for the Chinese regimes and for Liao, and with good reason.
Although in 936-7 there had been a small influx of elite individuals and a transfer of
control over general populations, this was nothing to touch the upheaval brought by the
946-7 conquest. Some 80% (54 out of 66) of the crossings in the 945-9 column relate
directly to the loss of the imperial armies and the occupation of the Central Plains in the
period 946:11-947:5. About 40% of the incidents (26 out of 66) involve crossings where
no choice was available, and all but a handful of these are a result of the occupation of the
Jin capital Bianzhou and the stripping of all useful personnel from there to be taken north.
Such an experience was most unusual, if not unprecedented, for the capital officials.
Certainly many had gone through a change of regime in which they remained in their jobs
while the ruling house was replaced, or at most were moved between cities in the Central
Plains, but to be uprooted and transported north was another matter altogether.
Liao Taizong's intention was to remove the entire bureaucratic body to his capital at
Shangjing, and several thousand officials began the journey in 947:3 (#123.) With the
worsening of the Liao position in north China, combined with what was to be Taizong's
terminal illness, most of the officials were left behind at Hengzhou 'J'['1-Zhenzhou 41,1
a couple of months into the journey. 3 ° Most of them appear to have been present there in
947:9 when the Chinese garrison mutinied and drove out the Kitan noble Mada, before
submitting to the Han court. 31 Although many of those who had begun the journey thus
managed to get back to the south, they still had colleagues in the north who could not or
did not want to return. This upheaval affected far more of the capital official classes than
29. Cross-cultural comparisons suggest the ubiquity of this kind of activity in frontier regions, see later
medieval examples from Wales (Rees Davies, Frontier arrangements in fragmented societies: Ireland and Wales,
p.93), Ireland (Katherine Simms, Bards and barons: the Anglo-Irish aristocracy and the native culture, p.190)
and the Castilian-Granada frontier (Manuel Jimenez, Frontier and settlement in the kingdom of Castile (1085-
1350), p.70; Angus MacKay, Religion, culture and ideology on the late medieval Castilian-Granadan frontier,
pp.219-20; and esp. Jose Lopez de Coca Castaiier, Institutions on the Castilian-Granadan frontier 1369-1482,
pp.137-9), all in Medieval frontier societies (1989), edd. Robert Bartlett & Angus MacKay.
30. Those who continued included Li Huan and XuTaifu .f-EM, as well as the palace women, eunuchs and
musicians. (TJ 287:9364) From what we know of Chinese who are later found still in Liao service, there must
have been a number of others too, but there is no way of knowing exactly how many.
31. Feng Dao ziga, Li Songett., and He Ning 11 fi were certainly there, TJ 287:9377.
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had ever had direct contact with the ICitan before, and it may be that in these events we
can see the origins of the increasingly anti-foreign attitudes of the subsequent north China
regimes?' In addition to the highly important gains of administrative and palace
personnel, Taizong claimed to have 'obtained' over a million households of the
conquered population (#129.) We know not exactly what degree of coercion was
involved in doing this, but judging from the surprisingly large number of submissions
where there was at least some choice (see Fig. 2), the chances are that most of these
households were gained through the chosen submission of those in charge of them. This
would also explain how the figure given in the LS comes to be measured in households,
and to be so precise: 1,090,118 households exactly. Taizong clearly had possession of
registers for the 76 places he says have surrendered to him.33
We might further note that there were more submissions involving some level of
choice than there were completely involuntary crossings, which contributes to an overall
picture of most officials reacting to the Liao conquest as just another change of dynasty.
In time of potential dynastic change, regional officials each made their own choices about
when or if they would throw in their lot with the pretender. A decisive battle or
surrender, such as that of Du Chongwei at Zhongdu qiao 1 =1 /M, would bring any
remaining governors flocking to the banner of the person they now felt obliged to
recognise as the new ruler. Diehard loyalty did occur, but it was rare, and hence all the
more valued, often by the new ruler as well. When the new ruler reached the capital, a
senior minister would lead the body of officials to greet him and make a formal show of
submission, in the form of 'confessing crimes' or 'requesting punishment.' The new
ruler's role in this ritual was to absolve the officials of any fault, save for the odd handful
of ministers regarded as truly responsible for the opposition shown the new ruler, and to
reappoint them to their positions. There was no shame necessarily attached to any of this,
though some individual ministers did feel it. This is precisely what happened in 946-7; if
we were to change the names, then from the account in the annals, this could be any other
dynastic change of the tenth and probably other centuries.34
Of course a certain amount of all such accounts may well have been written according
to formulae for precisely such events, but given that even the LS recognises how hard it
was for Taizong to impose his rule on the Central Plains, we might expect more
intimations of illegitimacy about Taizong's rule in the JW if there really was such strong
feeling against the ICitan as we are led to believe. Taizong certainly does some things
32. See Chapter 9.
33. Although these registers might well have been inaccurate (see above, p.62.)
34. Dynastic changes, with re-appointments and new appointments can be found at: Tang to Liang, JW 3:47-9;
Liang to Later Tang, JW 29:403-4; Later Tang to Jin. JW 76:992-3; Jin to Han, JW 100:1332-3; Han to Zhou..
JW 110:1457-70; Zhou to Song, SS 1:4-5.
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which are not quite what a Chinese pretender would find normal, like leaving the capital
to camp at Chigang VI:IN on his first night as ruler," but there is nothing in the behaviour
of individual governors and ministers to suggest that Taizong does not enjoy the
possession of the Mandate as made manifest in the will of the people, in other words, the
ruling classes.
This is a situation inviting lengthy commentary for which there is not space here.
Suffice it to say that the willingness of governors and ministers to accept Taizong on the
same basis as they would accept any other new ruler (in the same way that capital
officials had accepted An LushanT'ca al, for instance) suggests that they did not find
Kitan-Liao rule to be inherently unacceptable. The governors could have kept fighting.
Although the imperial armies had all surrendered, to besiege one gubernatorial seat after
another throughout the Central Plains would have been an impossible drain on even the
best resourced of the tenth-century north China powers. The surrenders of the governors
were not feints, but for real. In surrendering, they did not know that the Liao would
withdraw only a few months after their entry into Bianzhou. They may have had it in
mind to rebel as soon as they could, but they must have known that carried very many
risks of its own; that they could not be assured of support, and without it they were
unlikely to survive their attempt. The sources themselves suggest that it was the policies
of the new government, not the government itself, which provoked Liu Zhiyuan gliwA
to raise his standard in revolt.36
Aside from the peak associated with the conquest of 947, the most striking feature of
all the graphs shown here should be a gap between 955 and 975, in which there were
virtually no crossings. We have already noted the distorting effect of Liao Muzong's
detentions of Northern Han envoys, and if we discount these then there was only a
maximum of three crossings in this twenty-year period (#159, 166, 170) 37 This was the
period in which the Northern Han, in close alliance with the Liao, fought for the control
of the Central Plains and latterly for their survival against the Thou and then the Song.
Although the Liao recognised the Thou dynasty which forced the establishment of
Northern Han, under the new emperor Muzong they quickly came to the conclusion that
their interests were best served by the continued support of the remnants of the Han
dynasty. Clearly there were unlikely to be crossings from the territory of an ally, and the
positioning of the Han (see Map 8) greatly reduced the length of the Liao frontier with
Thou and Song, so there were fewer opportunities for raids on non-allied territory. On
35. TJ 286:9328.
36. V 286:9334-5, and see Chapter 1.
37. #159 is an estimated date for the crossing of Zhao Anren whose native place of Leshou VX in
Shenzhou Ml+1 may have been amongst those 'border prefectures' captured by the Liao general Xiao Siwen
WM in 958:4. LS 6:75.
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the positive side, there were also fewer opportunities for the Zhou or Song to strike at
Liao. Any crossers from Zhou might be expected to go to Northern Han, perhaps out of
cultural considerations, but also for the sound political reason that the Han were the other
contenders for control of the Central Plains, and anybody choosing to change sides could
thus find justification for so doing.38
Mere alliance was not the most significant factor though. When we consider the other
period of Liao-north China alliance - the cooperation with Shi Jingtang and the Later Jin
from 936 to the beginning of war in earnest in 944 - we find a marked contrast. Where
there is an almost complete absence of crossings to Liao in the later period, under the Jin
there was a steady flow, albeit a smaller one. This continued even when the Later Jin
dynasty was established and the alliance was firm, as can be seen from the 940-44
segments of the histograms. Whereas the Liao-Jin alliance gave Liao direct access to the
centre of power in north China, the Northern Han did not control the Central Plain; but
the Han did act as the channel and mediator for Liao contact with north China. Hence it
was the existence of Northern Han not as an ally, but as a buffer state, which was
significant, providing, as it did, an alternative destination for potential crossers.
Outcomes of crossing
We cannot consider the circumstances under which crossing occurred without looking at
what happened to people after they arrived in Liao. In the case of voluntary crossings,
and for individuals of the ruling classes, the likely outcome of going to Liao would have
been a factor in the decision-making process, as we shall see. Naturally, larger groups
and regional populations rarely had the same range of choices as individuals, and the
majority of them found themselves relocated, often to cities and prefectures established
especially for them." There they seem to have been encouraged to farm, and artisans
were sought out and even employment by the court, though it is unclear exactly what
projects they worked on. Armies and smaller groups of soldiers were almost always
redeployed as Liao troops, sometimes reorganised or split up under new commanders,
sometimes kept largely intact under their former, surrendered, commanders.
For individuals though, the Liao regime could offer a deal which was similar to that
available from the other north China regimes." The vast majority of recorded individual
crossers did reasonably well out of their change of allegiance. Their immediate fates,
where known, are noted in the table of crossings. Generally, the very least they obtained
was to be left in their post, with only the source of their orders changed. In some cases
38. See Chapter 8_ On a practical level, the Northern Han frontier with Thou was very long.
39. The extent of relocation can be seen in the LS dill zhi, see a. /.
40. Detailed accounts can be found in the case studies.
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where the sincerity of the crosser was doubted a small Liao force, or an inspector of
some kind, or both, might be left behind to keep an eye on the new subject, but this
appears to be extremely rare.' In many cases the rewards of crossing came in material
form, as gold and silks, and such like, which must have eased the transition between
regimes and cultures considerably. It was not at all unusual for promotion to be part of
the package as well. From the earliest tenth century and right through the conquest of
Later Jin, it was quite common for senior generals to be given high honorific court posts
and important regional positions at the level of liushou and jiedushi. After the conquest
there are fewer individual crossings, and as the officials are less important they are
recorded in less detail. For those few for whom there is information, we can see the same
tendency continuing. Pan Yunian AStt, Zhao Anren ktga: and Wang Jizhong
IM,`Tti, attained high positions within Liao (#147, 159, 218), Guo Rong I'M appears to
have retained his post (#206), a half-a-dozen captive literati were given official positions
(preceding #210), and Wu Bo AEI and Wang Jien iag, both developed their careers
while in Liao (#219, 226.) There is, as far as I have been able to see, only a single case
where an individual crosser ended up worse off as a result of their crossing. This was
Yang Gun VAR of Daizhou MC who was imprisoned by Liao Muzong for his lack of
merit (#156.) It may simply be that Gun had the misfortune to arrive in Liao during the
reign of an emperor who was to become renowned for his arbitrary cruelty.42
On the down side, the number of deaths of crossers increases as the century wears
on, but many of these were either not at Liao command, or entirely comprehensible in the
circumstances. In the early period, up to the conquest of Jin, there are a couple of
suicides, both of people clearly torn apart by the pressures they faced. The first was Li
Jida alt, who felt forced to turn to the Liao when he saw his father and brothers
killed for plotting against the Later Tang, and the second was Huangfu Yu a-mg (#37,
98.) Yu was a general in Du Chongwei's command at the time of his surrender at
Zhongdu qiao, and having declined a commission to serve in the Liao army against his
former masters, refused to eat and soon after killed himself in despair. Unfortunately for
Yu, he died just too soon to see the comeuppance of his fellow commander Zhang Yanze
3Rgiz, who had embraced Liao allegiance and led his force to take the Jin capital of
Bian on Liao Taizong's behalf. Once the city had surrendered, Yanze let his troops loose
for two days of pillaging, and took the opportunity to settle some personal scores as well
(for instance, killing Sang Weihan AaVi.) For this Taizong had him executed, and let
the populace feast on his body (#92.) During the Song war, there is an increased
41. One case involves a guard of 300 cavalry sent with an inspector to 'oversee' Zhang Xichong 	 when
he replaced the Lulong jiedushi Lu Wenjin ZMA, who had returned to the south (#12.)
42. Cf. the case of Li Huan, Chapter 6.
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incidence of massacres of enemy prisoners, usually in a ritual manner apparently intended
to increase the chances of victory,' but it is only an increase from no recorded incidents
to four, concentrated within a short period of seven years (#176, preceding #184,
following #187, #197.) After this, there are several cases showing good treatment of
prisoners, such as giving them fur clothing (#204) and rewards (#220.) Before this, the
only time we hear of a captive population being massacred is when several hundred able-
bodied men of Jizhou 2 a 4,F1 turned rebellious (#152.) Whilst this is undeniably a brutal
response, it was nevertheless not done gratuitously. In addition, there are two further
cases of spies being executed (#179, following #218), a fate which must have been
accepted as one of the risks of the job.
Returners
There is little doubt that for a sizeable proportion of those who crossed the frontier to
Liao, the north China regimes were in fact the preferred locations, leading a significant
proportion of people to head south again when they had the chance. These are almost
always individuals; we only hear of a handful of groups returning. These are populations
from Shucheng Azig, Luancheng giA and Wuqing xian J-L-mg (#65, 85, 212), the
prefectural and capital officials of what had been Later Jin (#119, 123), a group of 67
soldiers captured at Bozhou 144'11 (#72) and several hundred Song troops rescued by
their fellows (#170.) It is clear that more still would have liked to return, and several
failed attempts are recorded (eg. #34, 41, 57, 98, 126, 159, 218) 44 but for our purposes
here only those who actually made it back are counted. If we discount the anomalous
cases of the Northern Han envoys, then 48 of our recorded crossers returned to north
China service, comprising rather more than a fifth (22%) of the total recorded crossers.
As yet there are no figures from other periods or places with which to compare this
proportion, so it is not clear whether it should be considered high or low. However, as is
clear from the black shading in Figure 2, all but a couple of the relevant, recorded returns
fell in a sharply limited period, between c.912 and 947:7 (#14, 137.) Between these
years the proportion of returners to crossers in any one period fluctuated between 19%
and 43%. The tiny number of three returns after 947 (discounting Northern Han envoys)
does nothing to reduce the overall impression of a sharp cut-off in such incidents.
43. WF p.268n.
44. Also see case studies.
45. A discussion of (#14) Han Yanhui's $2g?it likely date of return can be found in Chapter 3. There was one
other return in the 965-9 period apart from the Northern Han envoys: the Song soldiers mentioned above, who
were rescued by a special mission (#170.)
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Judging from the proportion of those who did it, we can see that it was by no means
impossible to return south, at least in the first half of the century. We might be tempted to
assume that it would be the category of involuntary crossers: those taken to Liao entirely
against their will, who would be most likely to return. In fact when we break down the
figures further, we find this is not the case at all: rather the opposite is true, that it was far
more likely for those who had had some kind of choice in their crossing to later choose to
cross back again. Of all those returning, 71% had had some kind of say in their original
crossing, moving either voluntarily or making a choice under duress. Surprisingly,
slightly more returners had originally crossed without any pressure, although the
difference in the figures for the two sub-groups is small: 53% simply reversed an earlier
voluntary decision, while 47% had been reluctant to cross originally.
The surprisingly high proportion of returners whose original crossings had been
voluntary suggests that the treatment of those Chinese arriving in Liao was affected by
the manner of their crossing. It looks as if those who showed more willingness to come
to Liao in the first place were given more freedom, and perhaps treated with more
generosity, than those who had done their utmost to avoid entering Liao. That some of
these people made use of their freedom to return to the Central Plains was perhaps a price
the Liao were willing to pay for the sake of enhancing the likelihood of faithful service
from those who had made their own decision to cross. If an individual stayed, the Liao
stood to gain a servant made reliable through the exercise of their own free will, and if the
individual chose to return, then the Liao rulers did not have to spend time worrying about
whether or not that person would indeed prove to be reliable.
The freedom of movement apparently granted by the Liao was no different from that
permitted by the other regimes who shared control of north China in this period. As we
shall see in the earlier case studies, movement between regimes, whether Chinese or not,
was tolerated, and to a certain extent, encouraged, by many rulers. Although in doing this
a ruler stood to lose their own best people to better prospects, they were themselves
trying to entice the best people from other regimes, and so were forced into a position
where in order to acquire talent, they had to be prepared to risk losing it too. These
pressures appear to have contributed to an improvement in the conditions of service, if
not the remuneration, of those with services to offer, and to a necessity for wider
consultation and rule-by-consensus, at least among the elite.
This is not the place to delve further into this fascinating issue, but Wang Gungwu
provides numerous pointers to such a situation in his standard work on the Wudai period,
which is primarily a study of the individual relationships on which power had to be based
in the first half of the century. Perhaps the most striking example of what happened when
such a consensus was lost was the end of the autonomous governor Liu Shouguang.
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When he declared himself emperor in 911, Shouguang is said to have set up an
executioner's block and axe in his courtyard, in an effort to terrorise his officials into
subordination. Many of his troops are said to have fled north to Liao (#11), and it is quite
possible that large segments of his population did so too. When the princedom of Jin
attacked him in response to his expansionism, Shouguang's officials fled his regime,
leaving him to the mercies of his enemies. This story has clearly been given emphases to
make the point about the fate of wicked rulers. The historiographers are evidently
outraged by Shouguang's violently coercive behaviour towards his officials and delight at
his comeuppance. 46 In this they simply reflect the conventional wisdom regarding the
relationship between rulers and their officials. Having said that, the story is nevertheless
an indication of the extent to which, in this unusual period, it was possible for officials to
put into practice the principles upon which they claimed to serve, rather than merely
paying lip service to them. For once, officials were in a position genuinely to wield some
of the power for which they were always willing to argue, but which they rarely actually
had.
The change of circumstances identified by both Wang Gungwu and Edmund Worthy,
who date their studies of north China accordingly, 47 is also reflected dramatically in the
numbers of returners. After 947 almost none are recorded. We will recall that from
approximately the same date, the proportion of crossings involving some choice drops
markedly, which thus correlates with what we have seen about the relationship between
likelihood of returning and the element of choice in the original crossing. It also
reinforces the suggestion that those crossing involuntarily were given less freedom of
movement and thus fewer opportunities to return. That this latter category comprised
mostly groups of soldiers without obvious leadership, while the former consisted largely
of individuals important enough to be recorded by name, is surely not a coincidence. It
would appear that social status had a definite bearing on the range of choices perceived to
be available to different classes of people in similar situations. Most of the crossings
involving choice were by individuals, and were before mid-century, with a significant
proportion returning. By contrast, most of the later crossings were involuntary, by
groups, and they did not return. Furthermore, from the detail available in some cases it is
clear that in the early years of the dynasty at least, there were those who would actively
choose Liao service as the best of their realistic options. The availability of this option
seems to have diminished significantly after 936 and drastically after 947, when it may
even have disappeared altogether. This change in the range of realistic choices is clearly
46. We could, for instance, ask why, if Shouguang was so terrible, it took over two years for the Taiyuan Jin to
overcome him? Clearly not all his generals and troops abandoned him, although this may simply reflect the
individual stake that generals and officials had in the regimes they supported.
47. Wang, to 947; and Worthy, Founding of Sung, from 950.
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related to the increased organisational control and centralisation of authority, giving a
tighter focus for identity and loyalty to those considering themselves to be part of the
Chinese world.
Ethnic groups
As explained in the Introduction, the people considered here are understood to be
'Chinese' in cultural and geographical terms, regardless of genealogy. Even though the
majority of them do appear to be 'Han,' the group can be broken down further. Ethnic
identity (Han, Shatuo, etc) can be established for about a third (35%) of the crossers in
Table 1, and Figures 9 and 10 plot crossings by identifiable Han Chinese and non-Han
(mostly Shatuo) respectively. There were over three times as many Han crossers as non-
Han (79 as against 24), reflecting the predominantly Chinese population.48
Figure 9: Han crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004
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Han and non-Han people could be equally active in making the decision to cross: in
both groups 33% of total crossings were voluntary. However, the non-Han distinguish
themselves in a tendency to make alliances with the Liao. Only 7% of the Han crossers
48. See Eberhard, Conquerors and rulers: social forces in medieval China (second edn. 1965), ch.6. At various
times in Chinese history non-Han groups found it advantageous to fabricate Han descent (see, for instance,
Pamela Crossley, The Qianlong retrospect on the Chinese-martial (hanjun) banners, Late imperial China 10:1
(1989), pp.63-107, for a particularly well-documented case.) It is not clear to what extent this was the case in
the tenth century, so we can but take ethnic ascriptions at face value.
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became Kitan allies, but a third of the non-Han group did so: nearly five times the Han
proportion. This may be a result of a greater understanding amongst Shatuo people of
steppe power structures based upon confederation rather than hierarchy. The alliance
sought by the non-Han leader and the allegiance pledged by the Han official might have
been functional equivalents framed within two different traditions. But whatever the
reason, it appears that non-Han people were more likely to turn north for assistance than
were Han.
Figure 10: Non-Han crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004
The non-Han appear more decisive about crossing than the Han. Where only two of
the non-Han crossings were under duress (8%), 22% of the Han crossings were in this
category. The Han were also twice as likely to leave Liao for the Central Plains regimes,
with 42% as against 21% returning south. Accordingly, the positive activity of non-Han
people in crossing to the Liao was countered by an element of resistance to crossing
amongst the Han, and a continuing attachment to the south, leading to returns.
These findings suggest that Han people, on average, were less comfortable than non-
Han with the prospect of permanent residence in the north, so to this extent the Han
exhibit an ethnic consciousness. However, this has to be seen in the context of a large
total number of crossings, of whom the majority were probably Han. In addition, the
maintenance of similar levels of voluntary crossing indicates that a considerable minority
of Han Chinese found Liao service no more of a problem than did their non-Han
colleagues. We shall return to people in this category in some of the case studies.
The recording of crossings
A final point of interest concerns the recording of crossings and crossers. About 60% of
the individuals listed in Table 1 have a biography in at least one of the major sources, and
most of those with a biography in the JW also have one in the XW. As we have seen, a
majority of those who crossed did not return, so we would expect fewer of these people
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who stayed in Liao to have biographies in the two Wudai shi or the SS, simply through
lack of information. Under the weight of accumulated assumptions, we might further
expect those who remained in the Liao to be deliberately denied biographies in these
sources as 'turncoats.' In fact, of those crossers who have biographies in the Central
Plains sources, nearly two-fifths (37%) are of people who did not return. Furthermore, it
is rare for the act of crossing not to be mentioned in the biography, whatever the source.
Hence the writers of the sources appear to have seen nothing inherently wrong in giving
biographies to people who went to Liao and did not come back.
Some historiographers, however, could be far more selective in their presentation of
the annals for the period. Notable amongst these writers was Ouyang Xiu. His annals
section in the XW was intended to give the 'official version' of what happened, and his
heavy editorial hand is strikingly visible in his omission of all but the crossings it was
either impossible to ignore or which made some point about the cruelty of the enemy'
(eg. #125, when all the men in Xiangzhou ffriisi were slaughtered and the women taken
prisoner.) This is not explicable simply by the brevity of his annals section (12j.) because
he takes care to include certain information less assiduously noted in the other sources."
In the annals he records only 16 of the more than 220 crossings found in the other
annalistic sources. He is also uncompromising to those he does record, in several cases
removing the detail which would allow us to see when elements of duress were involved.
His favoured phrasing is that so-and-so 'rebelled and pledged allegiance' &RI or
'rebelled and submitted' fR14-. He applies this 'rebel' terminology to the two Jin army
surrenders led by Yang Guangyuan at Jin'an in 936 (#49), 5 ' and Du Chongwei at
Zhongdu qiao in 946 (#88.) He does not, however, mention that the Tang forces at
Jin'an were running out of food, or that both armies had had their communications cut.
In making such revisions, Ouyang is visibly applying his view that history should make
clear moral judgments. 52
 There is simply no space in Ouyang's account for mitigating
circumstances, and thus he removes any ambiguity about the conduct of crossers, making
it easy for his condemnation of such actions to be implied."
49. A tendency also found in the CB, discussed below.
50. He seems particularly concerned to record activities related to the dignity of the emperor's court, for
instance, envoys received, hunting expeditions and rituals performed.
51. In this case he says that Yang Guangyuan surrendered to the Kitan, whereas in the J IM he is said to surrender
to the Jin.
52. See James T.C. Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu: an eleventh-century neo-Confucianist (1967), pp.100-11.
53. As we shall see in Chapter 8, his attitude towards side-changing was clearly set out in his biography of
Peng Dao, although this piece leaves an ambiguity of its own regarding the difference between serving Central
Plains regimes and foreign ones.
103
Chapter 2 - The Liao Chinese
Curiously, whilst he quested for brevity and strict verdicts, Ouyang Xiu is the only
one of our historiographers to record Liu Zhiyuan's apparently active consent to asking
for ICitan help in 936 (#47.) This contrasts with Sima Guang's care to show Zhiyuan's
objections to some of the specific terms of the offer made to the Liao. 54 Otiyang is careful
to record the returning to allegiance of the Central Plains governors after Liu Zhiyuan
established the Later Han dynasty, and notes Zhiyuan's banning of the making of Kitan
clothing or items, but he is also not as rude as one might expect in his commentary at the
end of the chapter." This introduces a note of ambiguity about Zhiyuan's moral
character, and about both his and Ouyang's attitude to the Kitan in general, which is only
compounded by the brevity of the account.
The SS annals are also brief, and are even more reticent about crossings than Ouyang,
managing to include only Wang Jizhong's capture. The reasons for this absence are less
clear. Certainly the information was available, as many crossings are recorded in the LS
for the same period, so this is another case which indicates the degree to which the LS
and SS historiographers did not work together. What it also suggests, by extension, is
that the Song sources for the SS did not themselves record such crossings. This was
perhaps because such events did not reflect well on the regime, both for reasons to do
with the attraction of people to the regime, described above, and because no regime likes
to dwell upon defeat by recording its consequences in detail.
In contrast to the XW and SS, the CB does not suffer from excessive brevity, which
makes the relative absence of crossings there all the more notable. Like the XW, the CB
does not leave out anybody of any importance, but while only 21 crossings are recorded,
17 of them are not found in the other sources, and the CB makes the sole mention of
another five attempted crossings which never came to anything. Nearly half (9) of the
actual crossings it records are the detained Northern Han envoys, but of the rest, six are
carefully described incidences of common people falling into Liao hands. So, for
instance, in 987, the Liao are said to have retaliated for their failure to take cities by
pillaging the rural areas surrounding them, carrying off the women and children (#198.)
Sometimes the Song response is also set out, so in 965 the seizure of people from Yizhou
gm provoked a Song counter raid for an equal number of Liao prisoners to be
exchanged (#166.) The first incident shows to moral disadvantage the tactics used by the
Liao; the second demonstrates the concern of the Song government for its people. If we
thus suspect a definite purpose to the selection of these very minor incidents for
recording, this thought is not discouraged by the other two cases found only in the CB.
These are a minor commander who escaped back to Song, where he was rewarded with a
54. Ti 280:9146, and see Chapter 9.
55. XW 10:100-2, 107-8.
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promotion, and a fugitive from justice whose case provides the emperor with an
opportunity to behave with generosity (#215, 216.) These cases stand together with those
where a potential crossing comes to nothing. These include the thwarting of plans to flee
Song for Liao, such as in the case of Fu Tinghan f4a, and the Liao 'general Geng
Shaozhong R2 Fitf?,, (following #170, preceding #184), along with the return of a Song
envoy whom Liao Jingzong Of -R-,'-- found to be too virtuous to detain (following #171.)
It is therefore no surprise that we find no cases of the surrender or capture of Song troops
save the incidents mentioned above where this is accompanied by Song efforts to get
them back. Setting this beside its generally fuller record, the CB is shown to be even
more reluctant than the SS to preserve the details associated with lack of success.
As to the rest of our sources, they reflect, with smaller numbers, the general pattern
of crossings produced from combining the materials, with no striking differences in the
proportions of different types of crossing. The only notable feature is that the JW records
only one of the crossings associated with the war over Yiwu in the early 920's: that of
Wang Yu himself, and also underreports the crossings at the time of the fall of Later Tang
and establishment of Jin. In the case of the JW, compiled in haste at the beginning of the
Song, before the regime, and literary production, had really settled down, these
omissions are probably more to do with the problems of recording than with editorial
policy. It is also the case that the annals for the Liang are the least well preserved, and
although the Later Tang annals cover the Liang period as well, they do so from the
viewpoint of the Taiyuan Jin, and hence according to a different set of criteria. The
crossings which do make it into the JW for these two periods are all well-recorded
elsewhere, and involve some of the most notable players in the events of the time. It is
probably fair to say that even if there had been no written record to work from, then these
are the people whose names and actions would have been remembered and put down
anyway.
The general level of reporting of crossings to Liao reflects a lack of squeamishness on
the subject which is only highlighted by the cases of deliberate editing. The fullness of
the record suggests that there was little stigma attached to tenth-century crossings to the
Liao, either at the time, or amongst those arbiters of official morality rewriting history
through the first century or so of the Northern Song. A more detailed exploration of the
issues surrounding crossing to the Liao follows in five case studies. In these a series of
interrelated texts will be dissected and compared to see what light they throw on the
changes wrought by successive historiographers on the image presented of some of the
crossers recorded in the most sources, and for what these case studies can tell us about
the shifting attitudes of tenth-century Chinese.
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INDIVIDUAL FRONTIERS: CASE STUDIES
The case studies which follow take a comparative approach to the texts on each of the five
individuals who have biographies of their own in both the LS and in at least one of the
Central Plains sources, that is, the JW, XW, SS or QG. These biographical accounts are
filled out by the passages on these individuals found in the TJ and CB, as well as other
texts which appear to have been used in the compilation of the LS and SS, such as the
Long ping ji (LPJ) and Don gdu shi hie (DDSL.) Where personal or other writings are
available, these have also been used, but the materials for this period remain relatively
scanty. The chapters are intended to be read with reference to the appended tables of
parallel texts. Full references to the main sources are given in the tables, which are
therefore omitted in the text. The theme of loyalty recurs throughout these case studies,
and to save recurrent references to later chapters, it should be noted here that detailed
discussions of this issue can be found in Chapters 8 and 9.
106
Chapter Three
Han Yanhui
Han Yanhui started his career at the beginning of the tenth century in the Youzhou Ot1411
regime of Liu Shouguang Wijy6. He was sent as an envoy to the nascent Liao regime,
where he was detained for refusing to show obeisance to the emperor, and was put to
work pasturing horses until his worth was recognised and he obtained government
employment. At one point he escaped from Liao, but then chose to return north,
confident of a positive reception. He spent the rest of his life in service to the Liao and is
credited with the establishment there of the basis for a Chinese-style administrative
system.
Information on Han Yanhui is relatively scarce. He has short biographies in the LS and
QG, and is mentioned a handful of times in the TJ, while in the XW, he appears only in a
biographical, thumbnail sketch in one of the 'Appendices on the four types of barbarians
nmcja.'i Although we know from the TJ kaoyi tA that he had a biography in the
shilu fta (veritable records) of Han Gaozu, he is completely omitted from the JW. This
absence may partly be due to his early arrival in Liao, before systematic record-keeping
had been adopted,' but it is likely that the circumstances of his service in the Central
Plains were more significant. Yanhui served the Youzhou regime of the Liu family, for
which no independent records survive, and although he was briefly at the court of the
pre-dynastic Later Tang, unless he had been involved in major events, there would have
been little reason for their records to notice him. There are thus a good many problems in
trying to assemble a picture of Han Yanhui, and a number of uncertainties remain.
As Han Yanhui does not appear in the JW, Ouyang Xiu, in the XW, must be given
much of the credit for retrieving Han Yanhui from what otherwise is likely to have been
total obscurity. Given that the non-imperial biographies in the JW are believed to be
largely intact, and the absence of so much as a mention of Yanhui in the surviving annals
of the same work, it is most likely that Ouyang Xiu obtained the information for his
1. The extra materials gathered in the LSSY and LSJSBM are drawn only from the main sources already covered
here. They do not add to our knowledge.
2. The first recorded order for a historical account was in 941:2, 27th March. (LS 4:49.) The first shilu were
presented in 991. (LS 13:141.) Yanhui himself is credited with having 'set down the records,' which must have
been at some time before his death in 959. (LS 74:1243.) The earlier years of the dynasty have left a thinner
record in the LS annals than the later years.
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description of Yanhui from other sources. Given Ouyang's moralistic motives in writing
the XW, we can be fairly certain that he had a good reason for retrieving Yanhui.
Yanhui's LS biography is a much patchier work than that of say, Zhang Li ,UE,
which clearly derives almost entirely from the QG. 3 For Yanhui the correlation is nothing
like as close, although the QG was used in the compilation of the LS account. With a few
notable exceptions, most of the incidents recorded in the QG are also found in the LS, but
there is a good deal of rewriting and there are a number of passages which seem to derive
more closely from the XW than from the QG. 4 There is also a lot of information found in
the LS but not in the other three texts.
Earliest employment
Yanhui's given name means 'extending excellence' (or 'honour.') We know from the
note on his death in his LS biography that he was born in 882. 5 He was from Anci g(-A7
in Youzhou (Lulong raft.)6 Hence Yanhui was born during the Huang Chao NA
rebellions in a region with a long tradition of control by hereditary governors.' His
father, Mengyin *IR, was a prefect, serving successively in Ji i ij, Ru g and Shun AN,
which were later amongst the Sixteen prefectures (Table 2, §2.) The position of prefect in
a frontier zone was an important one, and Mengyin's reappointment to three similar posts
indicates that he was considered loyal, reliable and effective in the job. Although all three
prefectures were technically under the jurisdiction of Tang Hebei dao ta (circuit), in fact
they were controlled by the autonomous Lulong jiedushi, who appointed his own
prefects.' In 895, when Yanhui was 13, the patronage of Li Keyong
	 JELJ. of the
Taiyuan Jin placed Liu Rengong tilt--- in charge of the province, and Yanhui's family
must have been amongst those coming under his authority.9
Yanhui is said in the LS to have been 'talented,' and Rengong to have 'appreciated his
worth,' summoning him to be a wenxue 5(:)V (instructor, 8:3) at the regional capital of
You with a job as lushi canjun ti*ow (administrative supervisor, 5b-8a) for Pingzhou
5ji4sH (§3.) It is likely to have been later on that he worked with Feng Dao AO: in the
zhihou yuan /L:E{R In- (court of ushers) which appears to have been some kind of court of
3. See Chapter 4.
4. Peng Jiasheng, Liao shi yuanliu, p.40, points out that the QG biography of Han Yanhui is phrased
differently to those in the LS and XW.
5. He died in 959, at 78 sui.
6. Only the LS gives all this information; the others give only Youzhou. Anci is to the southeast of Youzhou.
7. Peterson, Autonomy of the northeastern provinces.
8. Wang, pp.9, 21.
9. TJ 260:8475.
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reception, and probably after this that he became guancha duzhishi #3MPI.
(surveillance and revenue commissioner, 7) for Youzhou." It is important to note that
Yanhui began his career owing his position to a regional magnate rather than the imperial
court. This could be expected to have some influence on his attitudes to loyalty and where
he felt his was due, which could only have been compounded by the great favour he
received at Rengong's hands.
In 907:4, Rengong' s son Shouguang gll'41-'16 usurped his father's position, and
Yanhui was one of those who continued to serve, holding the post of canjun
(adjutant) under Shouguang (§4.)" This mention of service to Rengong then Shouguang
makes Yanhui, at an early stage in his career, someone who transfers his allegiance. The
father-son succession lends a degree of legitimacy to Yanhui's actions, as it was
considered quite in order to serve the son of one's original master. However, Yanhui' s
LS biography leaves to the annals any mention that Shouguang replaced his father by
usurpation, and without that information, one would not think anything but good of
Yanhui's action. Nevertheless, the issue of loyalty versus practical reality had come up
for the first time for Yanhui when he was just 25. By this time, and in a regional
administration, the question was an ambiguous one. It is not at all clear to what loyalty
would have been owed; whether it was directed towards persons, institutions or places,
but as we have seen in Part 1, people in Yanhui's situation were unlikely to set much
store by any allegiance save one which could give them something concrete.12
Yanhui is not reported to have protested at Shouguang's usurpation, either on
grounds of the breach of filial piety or of the overthrow of an imperial appointee. This is
not surprising in itself, except that four years later, Yanhui is noted as one who speaks
his mind regardless of the consequences. We might speculate inconclusively about the
many possible reasons for this contrast of early silence with later outspokenness. He may
have been too scared or uncertain to make a protest; he may have been too junior for any
protest he did make to have an impact; he may have approved of Shouguang's actions.
Whatever his unknown reasons at this point, by 911, when Shouguang declared himself
emperor of Yan Yanhui was prepared to speak out against it, and it is attractive to
suggest that after an early experience of voluntary or enforced silence in reaction to major
breaches of propriety, he determined to speak up in future.
10. The exact structure of offices in the Hebei gubernatorial administrations of this period is rather obscure,
owing to the current confusion and rapid changes coming on top of 150 years of autonomy, but it seems
reasonable to suggest Tang ranks for these offices.
11. QG, TJ, XW. It is not clear whether this is the different post called canjun or an abbreviation. The LS does
not mention any transition of power, and thus leaves us to assume that Yanhui retained his posts, including that
of lushi canjun.
12. Also see Wang, chs.2-5, passim.
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The QG biography alone mentions Yanhui's part in the 911 events (§5), and the story
seems intended to demonstrate Yanhui's courage in speaking out against improper
behaviour. When Shouguang set himself up as emperor of Yam," Yanhui protested
against this. Shouguang decided to crack down hard on dissent and set up an
executioner's axe and block in his court, warning that those who dared to remonstrate
would be beheaded. One Sun He Nil was evidently prepared to risk a trial of the new
emperor's resolve. He remonstrated strongly, and suffered the penalty. Yanhui escaped
this punishment, according to the QG, because he was a longstanding member of
Shouguang's retinue of aides and hitherto had been highly regarded. Although Sun He
was also a senior minister, he did not enjoy the same privileged position as Yanhui. In
909-10 he had been one of the staunch supporters of Shouguang's brother Shouwen
WI: 3Z against the usurpation of their father.I4
Although the QG is the only one of the four texts considered here to mention Yanhui
in connection with it, the axe incident itself is recorded in the other three, and in the JW.15
In these other works, Sun He is the only remonstrator mentioned and far more detail is
given; we are told what he said to arouse Shouguang's wrath and there is a full account
of the horrible punishment meted out to him. Ye Longli has cut all this in the QG and left
only a brief mention of Sun He's misfortune to provide a pointed contrast to the courage
and luck of his subject, Han Yanhui. In doing this, Ye was taking one aspect of the
image of Yanhui given in the TJ and emphasising it, making Yanhui very definitely an
official who did not fear to speak his mind to his master on points of principle, even if
this placed him in personal danger. 16
 It is striking that even though the LS is the only
work giving us details of Yanhui's early career, this incident does not appear there at all.
13. In 911:8. JW 27:376; 135:1805; TJ 268:8744; X 114/ 39:426; LS 1:5.
14. JW 135:1803; XW 39:424-6, and see Chapter 1.
15. JW 135:1803, XW 39:424-5, TJ 268:8744-5. Although the TJ dates the incident with the axe to 911:8, the
JW biography of Liu Shouguang appears to place it in 907:6 and the declaration as emperor to 907:8, but it
must be that the couple of characters giving the year have been lost in transmission. A similar ambiguity arises
in the XW biography, which gives no clear date to the axe incident so that it could appear to be in c.908. The
SW and XW both place the incident before the declaration as emperor, as part of sections showing Shouguang's
cruelty and growing hunger for power and position. The QG has followed the TJ in placing the axe incident
immediately after Shouguang's adoption of the title of emperor and before his formal accession (TJ 268:8745.)
16. Ye Longli seems to find this an attractive trait; cf. his account of Zhang Li, QG 16:161-2. The LSJSBM
5:109 maintains the impression, saying that Yanhui 'remonstrated strenuously but was not heeded.' This phrase
is quoted as if it were from the LS, but cannot be found there.
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Arrival in Liao
The date of Yanhui's mission to Liao is given no more precisely than the 'later years' of
Liu Shouguang, when the TJ and QG say that he was 'weak and weary.' 17 Yanhui had
an audience with the Liao emperor at which he refused to bow or to make obeisance as
Taizu required. This angered Taizu, who detained Yanhui and sent him out to herd
horses, evidently a shameful and probably a difficult job for a literary official (§6-7.)
Later he was summoned to a further audience at which he impressed Taizu such that he
was made a mouzhu (planner.) In his new employment Yanhui oversaw the
settlement of the newly acquired Chinese population and the establishment of a Chinese-
style administration, and helped to pacify a number of tribes (§10-16.) But then he fled to
the court of the prince of Jin, where he fell out with Wang Jian TA and felt it safest to
return to Liao, being rightly confident that he would be welcomed (§17-26.) All this must
have happened before or only shortly after Wang Jian's death in 913:12.18
The sources all agree on this order of events, but the dating of Yanhui's arrival in
Liao is a serious problem. 19 The TJ kaoyi discusses it when Yanhui's mission is
mentioned in an entry under 916:12 covering his subsequent employment. Sima Guang
quotes Yanhui's biography in Han Gaozu's shilu:
During Tianyou [904-7] the lianshuai glig Liu Shouguang attacked Zhongshan E1 1 Ill and did not
win; he wanted to join up with the northern barbarians [beirong k3,2] and sent Yanhui to convey
this to the enemy.
As Shouguang did not take over from his father until 907, this must be the implied arrival
date,' but Sima rejects this on the grounds that the longstanding Liu enmity towards the
Kitan would have prohibited recourse to them in such times of strength. Sima eventually
plumps for late 911 or early 912, and although he points out that this is based on no more
reliable information than the weakness of Shouguang, it does make sense. Shouguang,
having newly declared himself emperor, had turned on Wang Chuzhi's Yiwu
(YiDing gt) province in 911:11, leading Chuzhi to ask Li Cunxu
	 of the
Taiyuan Jin for help. 21
 In 912:1 the Jin responded by attacking Youzhou, and with his
17. QG 1:2 says 'at the end of the Tang,' IS 74:1231 has 'after Shouguang became shuai RiD (leader - of Yan):
LS 71:1199-1200 says 'when the prince of Jin, Li Cunxu-21,E#M, wanted to form an alliance.' XW 72:890 gives
no time marker other than Liu Shouguang's rulership.
18. JW 60:806.
19. This is despite the apparent importance of Yanhui's mission to and detention in Liao, suggested by there
being seven accounts of it in our four sources. The IS records it twice and the QG three times.
20. Sima Guang dismisses a further option of 900 because Rengong was still in charge of Youzhou at the time.
21. JW 27:376; TJ 268:8748.
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capital so easily threatened, Shouguang asked the Liang emperor for assistance.' Given
his later appeals to all and sundry, 23 there is reason to suggest that he might have sent an
envoy to the Kitan too, although there is no mention of a specific mission at this time.24
However, this dating would give Yanhui a maximum of nearly two years before
Wang Jian's death in which to pasture horses, settle Chinese households, help pacify
tribes, organise the Liao administration, flee, quarrel with Wang Jian, and return to Liao.
Whilst not totally impossible, it would have been an extraordinarily busy time for
Yanhui, surely worthy of comment? On balance, it seems more likely that in this case
Sima Guang has failed to take into account the rest of the story he is telling, and that the
shilu dating of c.907 is, in fact, right.25
Unfortunately, the QG notes Yanhui' s presence at the axe incident in 911, so
according to this text he could not have left before then; yet the 907 dating is so
compelling that we must reconsider the QG account. We saw that the axe incident itself is
well-recorded by the other sources, without mention of any minister but Sun He, but
hesitated there to suggest explicitly that Ye Longli had invented Yanhui's involvement.
However, the QG is known to be unreliable, and it is quite possible that Ye Longli was
willing to stretch the truth to do this on Han Yanhui's behalf, but it is more satisfying to
go further than that, and to reconsider the dating of the axe incident. It is the TJ, Ye
Longli's main source, which firmly dates the incident to 911:8, and it could well be the
case that Ye, accepting the TJ datings, felt he could get away with the addition of Yanhui
to the axe story without it being obviously impossible. However, as noted above,' the
earlier sources are less certain of the timing of the axe incident, and even imply datings of
907 or 908, while Sima Guang's note in the kaoyi shows clearly that the Ti is uncertain
about much to do with Liu Shouguang's regime. If the TJ got its dating of the axe
incident wrong as well as the timing of Yanhui's arrival, and the QG followed these
blindly, then c.907 could still be the most likely date for Yanhui's arrival in Liao.
In fact, what is interesting about this is not so much the actual date of Yanhui's arrival
as the fact that Sima Guang's choice of dating turns Yanhui into some kind of prodigy,
22. JW 28:379; Ti 268:8751. The latter says that Shouguang first requested help. LS 1:5 makes an
unsubstantiated claim that in 912:2 the Liao emperor went in person to attack Shouguang. The sentence has no
subject and it seems likely that the compiler has mistaken Liao Taizu for Liang Taizu, who at the time stated did
personally go to fight Shouguang (JW 28:379; Ti 268:9751-2.)
23. For instance, he was begging for relief from Zhou Dewei MENA, the Jin general, in 912:10 (JW 28:381)
and continued to do so repeatedly until his capture.
24. The earliest report actually to mention a mission to the 1Citan is a TJ entry for 913:10. (Ti 268:8777.) The
JW says that Shouguang sent for help in 913:3, without saying to whom, and four months later that he did so
'repeatedly.' (SW 28:381, 382.) These dates are much too late to be credible.
25. The Ti covers a large portion of Yanhui's life in this single account, with a minimum of dating.
26. See n.15.
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achieving an enormous amount in an incredibly short time; for Sima had access to the
JW, and he would therefore have known when Wang Jian died.
Initial employment and early service to the Liao
The TJ version of Yanhui's early experiences in Liao is much more detailed than the XW
account. The main addition to the TJ version, which is then carried over into the QG and
LS, is the intervention of the Shulii empress qaff on Yanhui's behalf (§9.)
... the Shulii empress advised the ruler of the Kitan saying, `Yanhui can stick to his principles
without bending; in this he is one of the virtuous people of the present age, why do (you)
dishonour (him) by employing him as a herder? You ought to employ him with propriety.'
The added contribution of the Shulii empress serves to emphasise Yanhui's qualities
beyond the brief account of the XW. The comment in Ouyang's version that the emperor
merely 'came to understand [Yanhui's] talents,' is now supplemented with a reminder of
the courage and moral uprightness of one who refused to give what he considered to be
unwarranted obeisance to another ruler.
From the Chinese point of view, it is perhaps curious that the empress, a woman, is
credited with pointing out to Taizu the virtues he should be making use of, not insulting
with menial labour. The empress's behaviour would not be so surprising to the Kitan,
amongst whom women played a more active role than their counterparts in northern
Chinese society.' Her involvement could be read both ways, either as a reflection on
Taizu, as being ruled by a woman, or as an indication from Sima Guang that he knew
that some in the Kitan state recognised upright principles when they saw them. Sima's
idea of such principles was naturally that valued by the Chinese of his own day. It may
also be significant that in the TJ the Shulii empress comments that Yanhui is 'one of the
virtuous people of the present age' (my italics), which may indicate an understanding of
the difficulties of sustaining a full-blooded Confucian approach to moral behaviour in
such volatile times. The corollary to this is that the ability to make such a statement
confirms that the Shulii empress, at least, knew what moral behaviour was supposed to
consist of, in Chinese terms. The role of the emperor as selector of ministers is also
emphasised by this story; in each version Taizu becomes impressed with Yanhui's
capabilities and decides to employ him in an important post (§10.)
As it is related in the later texts, the whole affair is almost a parable of the 'civilising'
of the Kitan rulers. Taizu's first reaction to Yanhui's refusal to bow can be read as that of
an uncivilised autocrat who cannot recognise a principled stand when he sees one.
Through the agency of some character with influence over him, in this case his wife, he
is persuaded that there might be merit in somebody who can make such a stand. By the
27. See WF pp.199-202.
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time of the second interview a change has been wrought in the emperor such that he can
see Yanhui's qualities and employ him in a position fitting his talents, thus demonstrating
that he has learnt to recognise morality and has acquired the imperial virtue of choosing
good ministers. Yanhui's example of sticking to his principles and not bowing, and then
suffering for it, is the catalyst for learning, helped along by wise advice. Simultaneously,
Taizu has moved from being an insecure despot who cannot cope with being crossed, to
being a true emperor who can see the point of standing on principle, is willing to learn
from his ministers, and who rewards merit. Ouyang Xiu was so firmly anti-Kitan that he
might well have been disinclined to allow the Liao ruler any such learning process. The
later writers, perhaps more resigned to having to accept the Kitan regime as a fact, may
have been trying to ameliorate the situation by showing the Chinese servants of the Liao
as civilisers of the barbarian, since they could not show the Central Plains emperors as
their conquerors.
In a situation where a ruler's own authority depended at least partly on his ability to
entice the followers of others into allegiance to him, preventing officials such as Yanhui
from changing sides was a difficult and delicate task, requiring the incentives of security
and a livelihood. Officials had a choice of master during the Wudai denied them in more
stable times and some of them used that choice to their advantage. Yanhui's QG
biography and the annals reiterate the TJ statement that Yanhui was made a planner
because such of his conduct were sought after there [in Liaol' 28 A valued minister could
exploit his rarity to gain better treatment or promotion. Yanhui, as we shall see, was
amongst those who benefitted from this situation.
All four accounts next describe incidents which are almost to continue the 'civilising'
theme. The XW talks of the suppression of tribal dissent to the rule of Abaoji
particularly the subjugation of the Dangxiang rE-A
 and Shiwei 174, planned by Yanhui
(§11, 13.) It is not clear what dating should be attached to these events. There appear to
be no Kitan attacks on the Dangxiang before 916:7 and none on the Shiwei between 909
and 965. 29
 This means there is a slight possibility that Yanhui was involved in attacks on
the Shiwei from later in 907, but this would require a very short period of pasturing
horses. In any case, Yanhui is said to have planned the campaigns, and the 907 attacks
come at the end of series, not the beginning. Subsequently, in 913:4, the Liao were
actually co-operating with the Shiwei.
28. This is not repeated in the LS versions, which do clearly derive from the TJ and/or QG. As in the QG, the
story appears in the LS both in Yanhui's biography and in that of the Shulti empress, but in this text the
compilations seem to have been done more independently of one another as the two biographies differ more,
each making different changes from the sources. (LS 71:1199-1200; 74:1231.)
29. See LS 1:4-8 for absence of attacks 911-3, WF chronology, pp.574, 575, 581 for convenient summary of
dates of known attacks.
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The possible datings are so far from correlating with our other information that we are
left with three unsatisfactory options. Firstly, we can assume that Yanhui planned minor,
early campaigns that were not recorded; but the LS OVes a detailed record of tribal
conquest, and 'subjugation' would in all likelihood be recorded. Secondly, we might
suggest that Yanhui was responsible for the plans which led to the later defeat of the
Dangxiang in 916, 920, 924 and subsequently," which would require us to assume that
this part of the account is out of sequence in all the texts, and thus functions as an
explanatory aside unrelated to chronological sequence. Unfortunately this does not work
at all for the Shiwei, as according to the attacks recorded in the LS, Yanhui could never
have planned even the later campaigns, as he died in 959 and the earliest of the later
attacks was in 965. Thirdly, we can take note that the TJ, followed by the QG reference
to Yanhui, mentions the subjugation of 'the various nations' in general, without naming
any of them specifically, and thus suggest that the names Dangxiang and Shiwei bear
little relation to the actual tribes and nations subdued. Whilst not denying that Yanhui was
involved in tribal pacification, it is possible that the extent of his role has been
exaggerated somewhat by an Ouyang Xiu aiming to make a moral point through his
story.
The other service described in this section of the texts is Yanhui's contribution to the
settlement of the displaced Chinese population recently acquired by Liao (§12.) This
could refer to the people coming to Liao as a result of Shouguang's misrule,' but it could
equally be those acquired before this as refugees, or through the usual methods of raid
and warfare. The TJ and QG place this activity before the subjugation of the tribes.
According to the TJ, he
{... was the first to urge the 1Citan to establish a royal court and to set up government agencies,}
he built city walls and delimited markets and residential areas in order to deal with the hanren
A)I , and caused each one to have a spouse, and brought abandoned fields under cultivation.
Because of this, the hanren were each provided with a living, and those who fled were ever fewer.
These two texts have built upon a relatively minor mention in the XW to show Yanhui as
a prime mover behind the supposed sinicisation of the Kitan and settlement of the
Chinese subject population. He is seen as a civiliser of the barbarian and a bringer of
stability to the people, providing for their welfare whilst at the same time reducing the
30. See LS 1:11; 2:16, 19 and passim.
31. It is so taken by most Chinese writers on the subject, eg. Song Dejin, Qidan hanhua lisu shuliie, Liao Jin
shi lun ji vol. 1 (1987), p.129; Yin Kerning, Qidan hanhua liiekao, Yugong banyuekan 6:3-4 (repr. 1988),
p.495.
115
Chapter 3 - Han Yanhui
numbers of refugees, which would in turn improve tax returns.' In short, he strikes the
ideal Confucian balance of nurturing the people and strengthening the state.
The LS reiterates all these things in an edited form, placing the subjugation of
Dangxiang and Shiwei first. It then goes further and on no less than three occasions
mentions Yanhui's role as systematiser of national finances, as responsible for
the overall management of the capitals and cities, the establishment of the various palaces, the
rectification of the (relationship between) ruler and ministers, the determination of position and
status, the systematisation of the laws,
and as the one who 'established the customary ways and set down the records' (§1416.)
The WDHY had noted that when
Yanhui was zaixiang	 [grand councillor], laws and regulations were made stern and fair, and
the various tribes all respected and yielded to them33
but this emphasis in the LS over and above the accounts in the earlier texts suggests that it
was in the interests of the Yuan, or their officials, to provide historical examples of
Chinese who worked wholeheartedly and contributed to the administration of a non-
Chinese state. Yanhui's manifest importance as the establisher of so much of the Liao
administrative system, as set out in the later texts, emphasises the oddity of his not
appearing at all in the JW.
The Liao were not ignorant of Chinese ways, having been in increasingly close
contact with the north China regimes since the seventh century, in which time they
accepted titles from the Chinese emperors and established a number of Chinese-style
bureaucratic posts piecemeal. When Taizu established the empire he soon acquired a
sedentary subject population which could not be treated in exactly the same way as
conquered tribes. At this point the borrowing of names ceased to be adequate, which is
why those such as Yanhui were so 'sought after.' The practical experience of people like
Yanhui was invaluable in this early stage of the Liao, as the LS itself points out_34
Yanhui demonstrated a willingness to take on a vastly increased responsibility and to
do what was required. He must have been a tremendously active initiator. If this was so
then Taizu had clearly demonstrated his imperial virtue of selecting good ministers, as
well as his ability to entrust his Chinese officials with important tasks. Furthermore,
Yanhui's enthusiasm in his work for Taizu suggests a transfer of loyalty on Yanhui's
part. From a purely practical point of view, this was a wise move. His previous master
seemed unlikely to survive much longer, so even if Yanhui had returned to the south the
32. Wittfogel and Feng translate the LS version of these events as even stronger praise for Yanhui's activities,
claiming that Yanhui 'taught (the submitted Chinese) cultivation' (jiao ken yi tgg) (WF p.240, my italics);
but a more likely meaning is that he 'encouraged (the Chinese) to open up new land for cultivation.'
33. WDHY 29:455, also found in CFYG 1000:11a-b, where it says the tribes 'all yielded from fear.'
34. LS 75:1243.
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best he could reasonably have hoped for was to avoid execution in the aftermath of
Shouguang' s defeat and to find employment with the victor. 35 As he was almost certain
to end up serving a new master anyway, it may have seemed most sensible to accept the
situation he found himself in and be thankful to have escaped the fall of Shouguang. We
should also remember that he was still only 30 and that to rise above the limited
promotion and opportunities available within a provincial administration, he would either
have had to move to an imperial court, or to have been lucky enough to serve a provincial
leader who won the empire. In Liao he found himself in demand and, apparently, in the
exciting position of being given free rein to design the institutional structures of a new
state more or less from scratch, which he seems to have had the ambition to tackle. As a
highly successful leader of tribal groups, Taizu clearly had qualities which made people
follow him. Judging from his treatment of Zhang Li, 36 he cultivated this capacity in order
to win over the many non-Kitan officials and generals who helped him to govern his
empire. From what we know of Taizu' s reaction to Yanhui at their second meeting, it
seems likely that the emperor would have done his best to court his co-operation.
Escape and return
Despite his achievements, his trusted position and any attaciunent to Taizu, something
was missing, for after the subjugation of the tribes and the settlement of the Chinese
population, Yanhui fled back south to the court of the prince of Jin, Li Cunxu, the future
Tang Zhuangzong Cunxu wanted to give Yanhui a senior post as a member of
his staff. This apparently aroused the animosity of Wang Jian, and Yanhui, fearing what
might happen, asked for leave to visit his family in Youzhou. He stayed for a while at the
house of Wang Deming .,15)] (Zhang Wenli 3002), who asked him what he would
do. Yanhui replied that he would return to Liao and did not fear to do so because he was
so indispensable to the regime. He was proved right by the emperor's delight at his
return, and received a number of senior posts (§I7-26.)
It is unclear exactly when Yanhui fled to Jin, although it must have been after Li
Keyong's death and Li Cunxu's succession in 908:2. He must have left again, in fear of
Wang Jian, before the end of 913, because Jian' s JW biography tells us that he was
killed by looting troops in 913:12, as he was taking the news of the capture of Youzhou
and Liu Shouguang back to Taiyuan-Jinyang 	 Yanhui's return to Liao may have
35. Almost all of Shouguang's retinue fled him before the end.
36. See Chapter 4.
37. The LS anachronistically says that Yanhui fled to (Later) Tang and the XW uses Li Cunxu's temple name.
Cunxu did not found the Later Tang until 923.
38. JW 60:806.
117
Chapter 3 - Han Yanhui
been almost immediate, or as late as 916. We know that Taizu declared himself emperor
in 916:2" and at this time gave Yanhui at least one post, so this is the latest he could have
returned. We should distinguish between Yanhui's departure from Jinyang and his return
to Liao, as he did not go directly from one to the other. Whilst Yanhui certainly left
Jinyang before Wang Jian died, if his return to Liao is placed after Jian's death, that is, in
around 9145, then that puts a rather different cast on Yanhui's departure. If he decided
to go back north after his enemy's death made it safe for him to stay in Jin, then this may
suggest that Jian's animosity was simply a convenient excuse for Yanhui to return to a
position of power and influence greater than he seemed likely to achieve under Cunxu,
who was still only the ruler of a minor state. Yanhui had energetically fulfilled his
responsibilities in Liao, and had left behind there a senior, if not the most senior, position
amongst the Chinese bureaucrats in the fledgling Kitan state. Assuming that his role was
as described in the later texts, he had the backing of Taizu to do whatever he believed
necessary to settle the conquered Chinese population and set up Chinese-style
administrative structures. Li Cunxu was still a good ten years away from founding his
own dynasty and it may be that Yanhui saw more opportunities against less competition
in the northern state.
There is also the question of Yanhui's own family. His son Deshu 04„tig was given
military posts by Taizong (acceded 926) at the early age of 15 sui a (14) which means
he could have been born no earlier than 912." Family members were often taken on later
missions from Song to Liao, but it is generally assumed that all of these would have been
sons or other male relatives,' making it unlikely that Yanhui took his wife and/or baby
son with him on his mission to the ICitan. This may suggest that he married in Liao and
began his family there. If this was the case, and perhaps especially if his son was born
during his time away from Liao, Yanhui could have been concerned that his family would
be used as hostages for his return. Another possibility is that Yanhui did not marry in
Liao but brought a new, young family back there with him when he returned from the
south. It could even be that he was married before he went north and that his son had
been born during his sojourn in Liao. Certainly it is likely that any wife and children that
Yanhui already had in the south would be living with Yanhui's mother, whom we are
told he visited. Unfortunately our texts are not in the habit of mentioning the movements
of their subjects' families.'
39. LS 1:10; QG 1:2.
40. LS 74:1232. As Yanhui was born in 882, Deshu was born when Yanhui was already no less than 34.
41. Herbert Franke, Sung embassies: some general observations, Rossabi, China among equals, p.124.
42. An exception: Zhao Yanshou kfigal left his wife behind him when he went over to the Liao and she was
later allowed to join him there, but she was a princess. JW 77:1018; 98:1311; LS 76:1247.
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More interesting is that the LS, having played up Yanhui's contribution to the Liao
state, also places more stress on his flight, citing reasons for it where the other texts give
none. The LS says that he 'sadly recalled his native place and composed poetry
expressing his feelings, then fled.' The LS adds the mourning for native place which was
by then conventionally expected of Chinese. By attributing Yanhui's departure to an
emotional attachment considered entirely acceptable, the historiographers have removed
any criticism of the Liao emperor which might be implied by the escape of such a senior
minister: there is no suggestion of poor treatment. Since they too served a non-Chinese
emperor, it may have been wise to avoid suggestions that it was inherently undesirable to
work for a foreigner. Furthermore, towards the end of the biography, the LS recounts
that when Yanhui fled,
Taizu dreamt that a white crane came out from inside his tent, and after flying around for a while,
went back into the tent again. The next morning, he spoke with the officials in attendance on
him, saying, `Yanhui will come back.' Afterwards, it was exactly as he expected.
This dramatises the incident by the addition of a supernatural element. Accordingly, its
significance is raised and the tensions at work are emphasised. Yanhui is depicted as a
Chinese properly missing his homeland and his value to his Kitan lord is stressed.
The TJ, followed by the QG, seems more concerned to show how Yanhui was valued
by other rulers. Both sources say that the prince of Jin 'wanted to appoint him zhangshuji
Sgi P,E (chief secretary) in his administration,' which also serves as an explanation for
Wang Jian's dislike of Yanhui, variously given as false words against him,43
detestation,' and a quarrel.' Wang Jian was currently Cunxu's chief secretary, and
obviously did not want to be replaced by a newcomer.46
These two sources also emphasise Yanhui's relationship with his mother. The XW
mentions that this is whom he asks for permission to visit, but the TJ and QG also say
that Yanhui completed his visit, showing his request as not purely a pretext to get away,
but as also containing some genuine filial regard. Later, when he has returned to Liao and
the emperor asks him where he has been, he says that he missed his mother but feared he
would not be given leave to visit her, and so left secretly. Whilst we may question the
absolute truth of this claim, the TJ compilers evidently believed that Yanhui could have
43. XW 72:890.
44. Ti 269:8810; QG 1:2; 16:160-161.
45. LS 74:1231.
46. The punctuation in the Zhonghua shuju edition of the TJ is misplaced here, implying that Yanhui was
placed in overall charge of the administration, and thus making it unclear why a relatively junior bureaucrat in
the retinue would be so upset and so dangerous to Yanhui. TJ 269:8810.
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felt such a claim was reasonable and that Taizu would accept it at least as a face-saving
explanation."
The LS makes the element of filial piety in the story rather more explicit. Yanhui asks
for permission to visit his parents, not specifically his mother. On his return to Liao he
explains his departure,
To forget your parents is not filial and to abandon one's master is not loyal. Although my body
got up and ran away, my heart was with your Majesty; and this is what made me come back
again.
The ancient tension between the demands of filial piety and those of loyalty to master is
thus explored. Filial piety is satisfied, but the ultimate choice is for loyalty to Yanhui's
master. It is no surprise that the LS compilers should emphasise such a decision. The
parallels with their own time would be obvious, and it may have been especially relevant
that the master in question was a foreigner and the servant a Chinese. The emphasis is
further made by a substitution in the LS. In the XW, TJ and QG, the emperor greets the
returned Yanhui with the exclamation that he has fallen from heaven. In the LS this is
replaced with an account that Yanhui was given a Kitan name, Xialie EN, meaning
'come back.' The sheer delight of the earlier sources is thus tempered by a more matter-
of-fact approach in the LS, almost as if Yanhui's return, though a reason for pleasure and
reward, was nevertheless not unexpected, as indeed is later to be indicated by the account
of Taizu' s dream."
As a final observation on this event, it is notable that of the potted biography which is
almost the entire entry on Yanhui in the XW, over half concerns the escape and return.
Ouyang Xiu, who wrote with such deliberate motives, clearly regarded this as the central
event of Yanhui's life. The XW gives no details of Yanhui's career in Liao, observing
only the posts he obtained upon Abaoji's elevation to emperor and his death in enemy
lands, along with a curious incident at the Liao court in which Yanhui's situation is
referred to but in which he takes no part himself." The numerous accounts of escape,
attempted escape, and return in the texts for this period appear tci be an important medium
for the articulation of the loyalty debate in the different periods when the various texts
were compiled.
Later service to the Liao
Following his return, Yanhui was given several posts, evidently part of the more
generous treatment noted by the TJ and QG (§27.) In all the texts except the LS, they are
47. It is an excuse also used by Li Huan Ket. LS 103:1450.
48. Already mentioned above, but placed at the end of Yanhui's IS biography.
49. The 'hat incident' see Chapters 4 and 5 for details and discussion.
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placed after Taizu's claiming of the imperial title in 916:2. The details of exactly which
posts were given vary from text to text, but all agree that he received the extremely senior
post in the then Chinese administration, of zhengshilinglzhongshuling 
(director of the department of administration/the imperial secretariat.) 50
 The XW and LS
also give him a literary post in the Chongwen hall '
-A-CM51 whilst the three earlier texts
make explicit statements that he became a grand councillor (xiang C.) The granting of
these posts would appear to be no more than the formalisation of Yanhui's apparent
position before his flight. If he really laid most of the institutional groundwork for the
Liao state before leaving for Jin, then to be made officially the head of it on his return
was no more than fair reward. There is everything to suggest that he continued with his
organisational work after receiving his new posts.
The TJ and QG next return to the theme of Yanhui missing home by describing a
letter he is claimed to have sent back to Jin via envoys from there, explaining his reasons
for flight (§28.) He had not felt the need so to do when he fled Liao; either he did not
regard it as necessary or it was only after his return that he was struck by the need to
explain his behaviour, having been required to do it once by Taizu. Or again, it may be
that the TJ/QG wish to show Yanhui as more concerned with his breach of loyalty to the
state which he would be serving were it not for his unfortunate quarrel. In any case, the
letter covers everything:
It is not that I do not feel a continuing attachment to my eminent master, nor that I do not pine
for my native place; the reason why I did not remain was just precisely because I feared the
calumniations of Wang Jian. Therefore I used my aged mother as a pretext.
and adds, 'While Yanhui is here, the Kitan will certainly not govern in the south.' This
last statement is backed up by the compiler's observation that it was indeed the case that
through the Tongguang HY6 era (923-926) the Kitan did not penetrate deeply into the
south, leaving Yanhui with all the credit for the territorial integrity of the south.52
We must not neglect the fact that Li Cunxu was not a 'Han' Chinese, but a Shatuo
Turk, but judging from his supposed letter, the ethnicity of the Jin ruler was not an issue
for Yanhui. What does seem important to Yanhui is his concern for the fortunes of what
he calls 'the south,' an interest which extends to a promise to use his influence to prevent
Liao encroachments into Jin/Later Tang territory. The issue of loyalty is clearly an
important element in this incident. We should note that here it comes up alongside the
50. These were two different names for the same post, used at different times. LS 47:774-5; WF p.485.
51. WF p.710 calls it a library.
52. An editorial note by the Yuan scholar Hu SanxingMEI-t (1230-1287) cites specific instances of Kitan
aggression and gives the strength of the Jin (Later Tang) army, rather than Yanhui's energies, as the reason the
Kitan were held back. TJ 269:8811.
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question of ethnicity, but that there is no link between the ethnicity of the master and the
loyalty considered owing to him.53
The whole passage concerning the letter and Yanhui's continued service to the
southern regimes is omitted from the LS. In its place are a number of references to
Yanhui's part in the subjugation of Bohai OA in 925-6 (§30-34.) These are in Yanhui's
biography, Kang Moji's NME biography and the annals. They relate the first campaign
of 925, on which Yanhui accompanied the emperor, and the Bohai prince, Da Yinzhuan
submitted. When Yinzhuan rebelled again, Yanhui was amongst the generals
sent against him, and who destroyed his city. For this Yanhui was made left puye fm-st
(vice-director of the department of state affairs.) Then, in an attack dated in the annals to
926:3, 6th April, Yanhui and Kang Moji, another Chinese, took Changling fu Kgg
from the Bohai, after which the army returned north. These incidents support the image
of Yanhui as the subjugator of tribal dissent and assistant in the task of consolidating the
Liao state.
Another omission from the LS account is of an incident recorded in the TJ and QG
involving an envoy from Later Tang, Yao Kun 	 (§35.) He came to report the death
of Zhuangzong and was questioned by Liao Taizu as to Li Siyuan's reasons for
setting himself up as Zhuangzong's successor, Taizu apparently being displeased at the
transfer of power.' When Taizu offered to suspend raids in return for territory, Kun
replied that this was beyond his brief. This angered Taizu, who imprisoned Kun for ten
days before summoning him again with a more modest territorial demand and a
requirement that Kun write to Siyuan (Tang Mingzong5t--; ) to request his agreement
to the proposal. When Kun refused, Taizu wanted to kill him, but the envoy's life was
saved by the intervention of Yanhui, who remonstrated with the emperor, presumably
reminding him that this was no way to treat an envoy. Kun was imprisoned again, and
shortly afterwards released to convey the news of Taizu's own death back to Tang.55
This brief mention of Yanhui again shows him working on behalf of those from the
south, both in terms of saving the life of an individual and apparently also preventing the
pursuit of the territorial demands of the emperor. This is the second time that incidents
showing Yanhui's attachment to the south have not been transmitted from the QG to the
LS, which suggests that they could have been omitted quite deliberately by the Yuan
compilers.
53. The distinction drawn between these two factors can also be seen in the accounts of Zhang Li's life.
54. The TJ dates the incident to 926:5, after 29th June, the QG to 926:7. The sincerity of Taizu's reactions to
the news borne by Yao Kun is doubted in a close comparative study of the texts for this incident by Yao
Congwu, Abaoji yu Hou Tang shichen Yao Kun huijian tanhua jilu, Wenshi zhe xuebao (1953, repr. 1988),
pp.315-37.
55. TJ 275:8993.
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Service after the death of Taizu
After the Shulii empress dowager ensured Taizong's succession in 926, the new emperor
made Yanhui director of the department of administration, which was effectively a
reappointment to the same job he had held under Taizu, now re-named (§37.) 56 The LS,
which appears to have standardised titles in this case, observes that he continued to be
director. It had said earlier that Taizu had only given him the post provisionally. The LS
adds that Yanhui also received the honorific noble title of Luguo gong gaia, (duke) in
this period. The catalogue continues with notes of his service as an envoy to the Later Jin
(§38.) It is likely that this was during Shi Jingtang's -v5asg war with Later Tang in 936,
or possibly shortly afterwards, but the outcome of the mission was evidently of
insufficient consequence to appear in the records. That Yanhui could be sent to the Later
Jin indicates how trusted he was in Liao, and despite his apparent pining for home, he
made no attempt to stay in the south. The changed relationship between the Liao and the
Central Plains following the foundation of Later Jin would have fulfilled Yanhui's stated
aim of keeping the Kitan out of the south. Although this was perhaps not on the terms
envisaged in Li Cunxu's time, Yanhui seems to have been satisfied, and neither is there
any record of objections by him to the planned conquest of Jin in 943.
As well as serving as an envoy Yanhui was also sansishi ::-.1=-GiEt (state fiscal
commissioner), continuing a line of work begun when he served as commissioner for
finances for Liu Rengong. 57 The sansishi was the senior official, responsible to the
central ministry of revenue, for the control and collection of taxation in the administrative
district of the Southern Capital, Nanjing *3'ff." That Yanhui was employed here shows
that later rulers were following Taizu's lead in making use of the experience that Yanhui
already had as a financial official. The capital Nanjing was the richest of the
administrative districts of Liao59 and it would be surprising if Yanhui's own remuneration
did not benefit from this appointment.
To complete the list of Yanhui's appointments under Taizong, the QG biography says
that while the empress was at court in the Huitong -mil era (938-947) Yanhui served
concurrently as shumishi	 Vt (commissioner of the military secretariat) and
tongpingzhangshi 	 (jointly manager of affairs with the secretariat and
56. See n.50.
57. See above p.109. The LS biography develops a picture of Yanhui as a financial administrator to an extent
which may have required early notice of his abilities or experience in that field, hence the mention of a financial
appointment in his youth.
58. LS 48:803, WF p.311.
59. WF p.311.
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chancellery),60 amongst the highest positions in the developing bureaucracy (§40.) The
Shulii empress had first recommended him to Taizu and there is no reason to suppose that
_.
her regard for him had waned. The likelihood is that she ensured Yanhui's appointment
to these senior posts through her influence over her son. 6 I
Although the LS and QG give what appears to be a comprehensive list of the posts
Yanhui held, how much real power he wielded in them is unclear. Nevertheless,
something of his importance and seniority, at least within the bureaucracy, is suggested
by an odd incident related in the XW (§39.) In this Zhang Li says that when Feng Dao
came to confer decrees of investiture on the northern court, which must refer to the Jin
mission of 938, he had bestowed only two official hats. From the details in the story,
these hats evidently indicated the highest of official ranks, though below that of a prince.
One hat had gone to Zhang Li and the other to Han Yanhui, whom Zhang Li calls
zaixiang 1 (grand councillor.) 62 The TJ lends further support to Yanhui's senior
position by observing, under an entry for 938:7, c.3 1st August, that Yanhui was one of
only two named Chinese ministers said to receive regular gifts from the Jin, alongside
other recipients who were all members of the imperial clans (§41.)
The three earlier texts give no details of Yanhui's activities between 938 and his death
in 959, but the LS fills in the account with a continuing list of posts. Yanhui appears to
have become some kind of elder statesman, taking little active part in major events but
continuing to work at setting up a Chinese-style administration. Under Liao Shizong
Mt*- (947-951) he was nanfu zaixiang iMV'13 (grand councillor of the southern
administration) and is said to have established the zhengshisheng RSt (department of
administration) and to have devised 'means of maintaining righteousness and to praise
officials who exerted their utmost' (§42.) This means that he played an important part in
the reorganisation of the Liao administration which followed the capture of the Later Jin
capital of Bian & in 947.6' In 951:6 he was commanded to devise a ceremonial for
conferring investiture decrees on the Northern Han in Hedong, and produced a ritual
following that used in an earlier, similar situation, when Taizong granted Ski Jingtang his
title as emperor of Jin in 937 (§43.) Yanhui is not recorded to have objected to this kind
60. The administrator post became a chief ministerial position in the Liao. See discussion in Chapter 4, p.150.
61. It is curious that the texts continue to show an association between Liao empresses and Chinese ministers.
Towards the end of the tenth century the career of the third generation Liao Chinese minister Han Derang Mt-M
benefitted from his association with the then empress to the extent that some historiographers hinted at a
romantic link. See LS 82:1296.
62. XW 72:898, see Chapter 4 for details.
63. The Liao bureaucracy is scantily described in our sources. It was divided into a northern and a southern
region (mian) and according to some scholars, the northern region was further subdivided into a northern and
southern division (yuan R.) (WF pp.435ff.) This view is challenged by Yang Ruowei, Qidan wangchao
zhengzhi junshi zhidu yanjiu (Ph.D. diss. 1991), pp.128ff, who says that these apparent distinctions were
simply alternative names for an administration split only into northern and southern and not subdivided.
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of subordination of north China powers, or to policies which aimed to remove the
incumbent Central Plains dynasty in order to replace it with a Liao ally. His pledge to
protect the south from Liao incursions had been made over 20 years before. Given the
benefits which must have accrued to Yanhui as a result of his seniority in Liao it is hardly
surprising that he should become forgetful of promises to the southern regimes.
In the meantime he had forged new links in Liao. It is possible that Yanhui's position
was more directly connected to the Shulii empress than the texts make immediately
apparent. The LS tells us that Yanhui retired during the Yingli BM era (951-968) (§44.)
It may be that this coincided with the death of his long-time patron, the Shulii empress,
now known as the Yingtian empress dowager jf,Ntfi, in 953. In 947 she had
attempted to prevent the accession of her grandson to be Shizong in favour of her choice
of her third son. After this she was sent into exile at Zuzhou 111:J1i, the settlement attached
to Taizu' s tomb." Han Yanhui does not appear to have been involved at all in the
succession dispute. At the time of Taizong's death he could have been with the emperor,
in the south, although we would expect this to be mentioned in his biography if it was the
case, or he could have been at Shangjing _EIT running the Southern administration. He
does not appear to have been tainted with suspicions of disloyalty as a result of the
attempts to prevent Shizong from acceding, but he might nevertheless have felt the death
of his old patron provided a good moment for his own departure from positions of
power.
Yanhui died in 959, aged 77 (§45-48.) His death is also noted in the KW and QG,
but he was not considered important enough, or the information was not available, for his
death to receive a notice in the TJ. He was given a posthumous title as shangshuling
	  (director of the department of state affairs), and was buried not in his native
place, even though that was accessible, but at Luguo ton, also in You. Presumably in
recognition of his services, his descendants were given the literary post of Chongwen
linggong g.-3c-A ../a, (manager of the Institute for the veneration of literature) which
Yanhui had himself held earlier. His son, Deshu, had already received special permission
to go east to visit his parents each year, and he was to go on to a creditable career of his
own.65
64. LS 5:63-4.
65. XW 92:890; QG 16:161; LS 74:1232.
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Yanhui's complete absence from the JW may speak as much for his relative lack of
contemporary importance as for lack of information. 66 If Yanhui was really considered as
important at the time as the LS would like us to believe, we might reasonably expect him
to be at least mentioned in the JW. Although he seems to have done little • of real note until
after he was detained in Liao, nevertheless he took part in enough incidents involving the
north China regimes for us to expect at least one of them to have appeared in the dynastic
history. Zhang Li's position was not as significant as the one claimed for Yanhui from
the Ti onwards, although they apparently served together, but there is far more
information on Li. Perhaps Sima Guang and his collaborators needed to write up
somebody as the bringer of light to the `barbarian;' a theme which it is likely that Ye
Longli would want to follow. By the time the LS was finally compiled, it would be in the
interests of the Mongol state to show as many Chinese as possible working as closely as
possible, and as early as possible, with the Kitan to whom they were compared, so a
character such as Han Yanhui would provide the regime with historical examples of early
and willing collaboration. Yanhui' s place in the record would thus have been assured,
though maybe for different reasons to those behind his recovery from the oblivion to
which the JW would have consigned him.
The clearest evidence we have of the kind of manipulation suggested appears when
we compare the accounts of Yanhui in the QG and the LS. Of the 28 items of information
on Yanhui in the QG, 17 have been transmitted to the LS, all but one to the biography. Of
the missing 11, three are extra details while the remainder relate to five distinct incidents
(these are struck through for easy reference in the table of parallel texts.) The last two of
these, describing Yanhui' s letter to Jin and his defence of Yao Kun, show a definite
attachment to the south, as discussed above. The second and third, in which the prince of
Jin offers Yanhui a job and Yanhui says that he misses his mother, are still related to
Yanhui' s association with the south, though less directly. The first shows Yanhui
disagreeing strongly with his lord (Liu Shouguang), as does also the Yao Kun incident.
This trait is stressed in the QG account but is absent from the LS version except in the
form of Yanhui's initial lack of obeisance to Taizu. Hence it appears that the LS has
omitted a number of incidents which might throw doubt upon Yanhui's loyalty to the
Liao emperors, whether by his continued concern for the interests of the south or through
his disagreements with the rulers.
That the LS gives reasons for Yanhui's flight appears to stress the incident and thus
contradict the conclusion that has just been drawn. However, an event so important that it
fills half of the earliest surviving account of Yanhui could hardly be ignored, and as
66. There is, of course, a small possibility that Han Yanhui's biography was in the original JW, amongst that
10-20% of the work which did not survive the loss of the original text. However, it is reasonably certain that we
do have the whole of the non-imperial biographies.
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discussed earlier, the apparent emphasis is stressing not the escape itself but that the
emperor is in no way responsible for it.
That the changes discussed were not made until the Yuan also indicates that whilst
these issues were evidently a concern to the Mongol emperors, they had not been matters
of concern before that point. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that in the tenth
century a much more tolerant view was taken of the question of loyalty and the changing
of masters than was possible in the fourteenth, when the official record was finally
completed. As a final curiosity, that record produces an overall picture of a Yanhui who
lived up to his name, 'extending excellence' in the Liao administration, while the
emphasis of the earlier sources on Yanhui's virtue and attachment to the south shows him
'extending honour.' The ambiguities in the meaning of Yanhui's name are echoed in the
different interpretations placed upon his life.
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Table 2 - Han Yanhui: parallel texts
References	 LS	 2:22; 47:774,777, 782; 59:926; 71:1199, 1200; 74:1230, 1231-2
(biography); 75:1243 (commentary)...
QG	1:2, 6; 2:11; 13:138; 16:160-1 (biography, commentary)
TJ	 269:8810, 8811; 275:8989, 8993; 281:9188
XW	 72:890, 898
JW	 60:805
CFYG	 1000:11 (WDHY 29:455)
Fengtian tong zhi (1934, 1982) 102:2330b; 138:3179b
LDN	 2, 3, 4
LSH	 shang:14a
LSJSBM 5:109-118
LSSY	 20:385
Notes
The table shows what information is found in which texts. Information is given in note form, but variant
wording is used in an attempt to give some indication of the differences between texts. Where there is
more than one version of an incident in the same text, all are given. Texts from left to right are in reverse
order of completion.
The first line(s) of each item (in smaller type) show the time marker or place, either as in the text
(with mistakes struck out), or where possible, more exactly.
The last line of each item (in smaller type) gives the Juan reference and page number in the modern
editions used here.
LS QG TJ X W
Cangming
A nci, Youzhou
74:1231 biog
Youzhou
16:160 biog
Youzhou
269: 8810
Youzhou
72:890 Kitan
father Mengyin
prefect: Ji, Ru, Shun
74:1231 biog
Rengong (c.895-907)
talented, made Youdu
wenxue, Pingzhou lushi
canjun, zhihou yuan
with Feng Dao,
Youzhou guancha
duzhishi
74:1231 biog
Shouguang (c.907-913)
canjun
16:160 biog
Shouguang (c.907-913)
canjun
72:890 Kitan
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LS
	
QG
	 TJ
	
XW
5
7
9
•	 -.
•
94+ 907? Shouguang emp
remonstrated, axe and
block, Sun He killed,
Yanhui escaped
16:160 biog
Shouguang shuai (c.907-
913)
mission, emp angered at
no obeisance, detained
74:1231 biog
Shouguang (c.907-913)
asked for Kitan help, no
obeisance, Taizu
angered,detained
71:1199 Shulii biog
? Shouguang's later years
asked Kitan for help,
emp angered at no
obeisance, detained
16:160 biog
? Shouguang's later years
canjun Yanhui asked for
Kitan help, emp angered
at no obeisance, detained
13:138 Shulii biog
(bef 913:12 (AV))
Ki tan gained Yanhui
1:2 annals
? Shouguang's later years
sent with respects to
Kitan, no obeisance,
Abaoji angered, detained,
would not release
72:890 Kitan
91C:12 (c.911-2)
canjun Yanhui asked for
Kitan help, emp angered
at no obeisance,
(detained)
269:8810
pasturing horses
71:1200 Shulti biog
pasturing horses in
wilderness
13:138 Shulii biog;
16:160 biog
pasturing horses in
wilderness
269: 8810
pasturing sheep and
horses
72:890 Kitan
intelligence and tact,
writings
1:2 annals; 16:160 biog
intelligence and tact,
writingsz,
269:8810
Shulii admonished,
grasps principles,
virtuous person, why
harrass and dishonour
74:1231 biog
empress said, sticks to
principles, virtuous
person, employ with
propriety
71:1200 Shulii biog
empress advised, can
stick to principles,
virtuous one of present
age, why dishonour as
herder, employ with
propriety
13:138 Shulti biog;
16:160 biog
Shulii advised, can stick
to principles, virtuous
one of present age, why
dishonour as herder,
employ with propriety
269:8810
after long time
Abaoji came to
understand talents,
72:890 Kitan
129
Chapter 3 - Han Yanhui: Table 2
LS
	
QG
	
TJ
	
X \V
summoned, talked, took
a liking, canjun shi
74:1231 biog
summoned, talked,
greatly delighted,
mouzhu
71:1200 Shulii biog
summoned, talked,
delighted, mouzhu,
conduct sought after
16:160 biog
summoned, talked,
delighted, mouzhu, later
famous minister
13:138 Shulii biog
talked, delighted,
mouzhu, conduct sought
after
1:2 annals
summoned, talked,
delighted, mouzhu,
conduct sought after
269:8810
summoned, talked,
amazed, mouzhu
72:890. Kitan
Dangxiang & Shiwei,
tribes to obedience
74:1231 biog
see below see below Dangxiang & Shiwei,
tribes obedient, planned
this
72:890 Kitan
city walls, division
markets & houses,
settled submitted
Chinese, spouses,
`taught' agriculture,
absconders few
74:1231 biog
urged establishment
court, govt agencies,
city walls, division
markets and houses, deal
with Chinese, spouses,
abandoned fields, those
fleeing fewer
1:2 annals; 16:160 biog
urged establishment
court, govt agencies,
city walls, division
markets and houses, deal
with Chinese, spouses,
abandoned fields, those
fleeing fewer
269:8810
see above subjugating tribes
1:2 annals; 16:160 biog
subjugating tribes
269:8810
see above
systematised national
finances
59:926 zhi
all things in early
stages, responsible for
organisation,
establishment,
codification
74:1232 biog
.
estd customary
regulations, set down
records
75:1243 comm
1
11
12
13
14
15
16
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LS
	
QG
	
TJ
	
XW
after long time
sad, missed home,
poetry, fled to Tang
74:1231 biog
shortly afterwards (bef
913:12 (JW))
fled to prince of Jin
16:160 biog
shortly afterwards
fled to Jin
1:2 annals
shortly afterwards bef
916:2 (913:12 (JW))
afterwards
fled home, served
Zhuangzong
72:890 Kitan
fled to Jinyang
269:8810
when fled
Taizu dreamt of white
crane & tent
74:1232 biog
aft 908:2
prince of Jin wanted him
in central post
1:2 annals; 16:160 biog
aft 908:2
prince of Jin wanted him
in central post
269:8810
Wang Jian quarrel, feared
trouble, visited parents,
Youzhou
74:1231 biog
thangshuji Wang Jian
detested him, uneasy,
asked to visit mother
1:2 annals; 16:160-1
biog
zhangshuji Wang Jian
detested him, uneasy,
asked to visit mother
269:8810
Wang Jian spoke falsely
against him, scared,
asked to visit mother
72:890 Kitan
hid with Wang Deming,
will return, not possible,
smiled, like L & R
hands
74:1231 biog
Zhending
stopped with Wang
Deming, must return,
choose death? like hands
& eyes
16:161 biog
Zhending
stopped with Wang
Deming, must return,
choose death? like hands
& eyes
269:8811
Changshan
hid with Wang Deming,
want to return, not
possible, like eyes or
hand & foot
72:890 Kitan
completed visit
16:161 biog
completed visit
269:8811
returned
unfilial, disloyal, heart
remained
74:1231 biog
(bef 916:2)
returned
1:2 annals; 16:161 biog
(bef 916:2)
returned
269:8811
returned
72:890 Kitan
emp pleased
Xialie meaning "come
back"
74:1231 biog
emp pleased, come from
heaven
16:161 biog
emp pleased, come from
heaven
269:8811
emp pleased, come from
heaven
72:890 ICitan
missed mother, emp
slapped back
16:161 biog
missed mother, emp
slapped back
269:8811
(c.916)
more generous treatment
1:2 annals; 16:161 biog
(c.916)
more generous treatment
269:8811
17
18
19
/0
11
22
23
24
25
26
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LS
	
QG
	
Ti
	
XV/
shou zhengshiling,
Chongwen guanda
xueshi, deciding all
matters
74:1231 biog
Taizu (c.916-926)
zhengshihng
47:774 zhi
Taizu (c.916-926)
Chongwen guanda
xueshi
47:782 zhi
Taizu emp (aft 916:2)
chief minister,
zhongshuling
16:161 biog
xiang, zhongshuling,
pingzhangshi
1:2 annals
later
famous minister
13:138 Shulii biou,
Taizu emp (aft..916:2)
xiang, zhongshuling
269:8811	 .
Abaoji usurped
xiang, title of
zhengshiling, Chongwen
linggong
72:890 1Citan
letter via Taiyuan
envoys, attachment,
missing home, dreaded
Wang Jian, mother
pretext, Kitan will not
govern South
16:161 biog
letter via Taiyuan
envoys, attachment,
missing home, dreaded
Wang Jian, mother
pretext, Kitan will not
govern South
269:8811
Tongguang 923-926
iCitan not deep into
South due to Yanhui
16:161 biog
Tongguang 923-926
Kitan made no deep raids
into South due to
Yanhui
269:8811
925
with emp v Bohai, Da
Yinzhuan submitted
74:1231 biog
Yinzhuan rebelled again
with generals destroyed
city
74:1231 biog
all gens ordered v.
Yinzhuan
74:1230 Kang Moji biog
for merit
made left puye
74:1231 biog
27
28
29
30
31
32
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LS	 QG
	
TJ
926:3, 16 April
with yilibi 1Cang Moji
attacked Changling fu
2:22 annals
with Kang Moji took
Changling fu
74:1231 biog
with Kang Moji
subduing Changling fu
74:1230 Kang Moji biog
...
return of army
74:1231 biog
,
926:7
Kun reporting
Zhuangzong's death,
angers Taizu, Yanhui
remonstration saves him
1:6 annals
926:5, after 29 June
Kun reporting
Zhuangzong's death,
angers Taizu, Yanhui
remonstration saves him
275:8989
(926)
death of Taizu
74:1231 biog
death of Taizu at Fuyu
Shulti ensured Taizong's
accession
2:11 annals
death Taizu 926:9, after
17 Oct
Shulii ensured Taizong's
accession
275:8993
Taizong (c.926-947)
Luguo gong, still
zhengshiling
74:1231 biog
Taizong (c.926-947)
made zhengshiling
2:11 annals
Taizong (c.926-947)
made thengshiling
275:8993
Taizong (c.926-947)
envoy to (Shi) Jin,
sansishi
74:1231 biog
Taizong (c.936)
Taizong assisted Shi Jin,
obtained You and Yan
16:161 biou
.
Taizong (c.937-947)
Zhang Li and Yanshou's
hat, Yanhui zaixiang and
hat-wearer
72:898 Kitan
empress regency (c.938-
947)
conc shumishi and
tongpingzhangshi
16:161 biog
3
3
35
36
37
38
39
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LS
	
QG
	
TJ
	
XW
938:7, c.31 Aug
received regular Jin gifts
281:9188
Shizong	 (c.947-951)
nanfit zaixiang, estd
zhengshisheng and
righteousness
74:1231 biog
951:6
ceremony for Hedong at
emp's command
74:1231-2 biog
(st.951-(959))
retired, Deshu had
permission to go east
each year
74:1232 biog
959
died at 78 sui
74:1232 biog
after a few years
died in Kitan
16:161 biog
later
died in enemy lands
72:890 Kitan
959
emp grieved,
posthumous
shangshuling
74:1232 biog
959
buried Luguo, Youzhou
74:1232 biog
descendants
Chongwen linggong
74:1232 biog
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
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Zhang Li 3K Ta.
Zhang Li held literary posts at the Later Tang court from the early 920's, serving as a
secretary on the 925 Shu -E campaign, and becoming a Hanlin academician tk#44±.
In 936 he was on the campaign against Shi Jingtang -vjopg and his Liao allies, and
entered Liao as part of the defeated Tang army. The Liao employed him again as a Hanlin
academician, but he tried to escape. After his recapture he served in increasingly senior
court positions, and went on campaign against Later Jin in the 940's. When Liao Taizong
died in 947, a ICitan nobleman with a grudge against Li threatened to kill him, and Li died
the same evening.
The sources for the life of Zhang Li are particularly abundant, as Li has full biographies
in three of the main sources used here: the LS, QG and JW, and receives fairly generous
mention in the TJ. (See Table 3.) In fact, we almost have four biographies, because two
different versions survive of the JW account. The first, and shorter, version is pieced
together from passages in the YLDD and CFYG. Although the Qing re-compilers of the
JW believed that the YLDD contained the full version of the biography, in the palace
edition they appended a second, slightly fuller, version to the first.' This fuller version
(referred to here as the JW appendix) contains the sole DAT account of much important
information about Li, including his escape attempt and the confrontation preceding his
death, but no sources are given for this extra material, save for a single section regarding
Li's recommendation of titles for Zhao Yanshou gma..3
Early life in Liang and Taiyuan Jin
Zhang Li' s given name means 'whetstone,' but his zi of Mengchen *Eq means
'dreaming of ministerial position.' We do not know when he was born, but he was from
Fuyang aph, in Cizhou 44'I (Table 3, §1.) Although a good deal further south than Han
Yanhui's ag* place of origin, by 907 frontier changes meant that although Cizhou
was part of Later Liang, it was within 110 km of the border with Zhao kd and only 50km
from the Taiyuan Jin border: Cizhou was still in a frontier region where much fighting
took place. Li's family was well placed to take advantage of both central and provincial
1. YLDD j.10,798 and 13,913; CFYG j.796.
2. JW 98:1319, n.7.
3. From the JW kaoyi.
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opportunities, but the JW appendix says that Li's ancestors were farmers (§2), and gives
no posts for either Li's father, Bao MW, or grandfather, Qing Mg. Given that Li is a
future official, it is said that when he was young he loved to study. The formula is
personalised with a note that Li 'had poetic language' (§3.) The JW appendix also gives
more specific information about the young Li, namely his early interest in legal matters,
which led him to report to the local official residence on disputes he observed amongst
the people (§4.) This probably made him known amongst the clerks, if not to the officials
themselves, and may be how got his break into the bureaucratic world.
The chance to start on the path of learning and an official career must have come when
Zhang Li, presumably while hanging around the local yamen, met Li Yu Li Yu
was of a family of scholars and his biographies emphasise his talents and Confucian
virtues.' According to Li Yu's JW biography, the 'provincial graduate (juzi *.T)
Zhang Li, was sponsored by him' (§5.) As a farmer's son, to find such a sponsor was
Li's only real hope of social advancement, and it must be assumed that it was chiefly Li
Yu who funded Li's education. The association with Li Yu must already have lasted
several years because of the time needed to study for the official examinations, and by the
time we learn of the relationship it must be 913 or 914, 'when [Li Yu] was in his first
court position' under Liang Modi. According to the strictures of Confucian morality, Li's
bond to Li Yu should have been a strong, respectful and highly personal one. Not only
does this appear to have been the case, but Li seems to have taken the sense of his
obligations to his first sponsor into all his subsequent relationships with other patrons, of
whom there were many. Li's sponsor was himself a person of upright character,
providing a moral exemplar for his charge, and perhaps Zhang Li, as a new and
enthusiastic arrival in the world of Confucian learning, was exhibiting the passion of the
convert. Whatever the reason it is certainly for his principled living by Confucian
standards that he is remembered in the texts.
It is therefore rather strange that the next reported action of Zhang Li is that during
Zhenming A E93 (915-921) he left Liang, and his sponsor, in order to pledge allegiance to
the Shatuo Turk Li Cunxu V.A, the future Tang Zhuangzong jgg,-T-:, currently ruler
of the Taiyuan Jin and the implacable enemy of the Liang. It appears that Zhang Li made
a conscious decision to change sides, and to a regime regarded as rebellious by the Liang.
As he immediately received a post in the Taiyuan administration, such a move could well
have seemed a sound career move for a young and ambitious provincial graduate. But
this is not what the text is trying to tell us. The point of the notice of Zhang Li in
somebody else's biography is to elevate the subject of that biography. In this case Zhang
4. JW 67:890-4; XV/ 54:620-2. Zhang Li does not appear in the XW biography.
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Li is an essential player because it is implied in the JW that it was largely due to his
efforts that Li Yu was given a court post under Zhuangzong after 923 and the foundation
of Later Tang. Li Yu' s biographer tells us just exactly.
 what we need to know about
Zhang Li in order to make sense of events. Li has apparently abandoned, and possibly
shamed, his erstwhile sponsor, who remained in Liang. But once Li was in
Zhuangzong' s service and clearly before the establishment of the Later Tang, Li
'circulated amongst the high and mighty, praising Yu' s probity' and telling the
'northerners' (beiren JtA. - in this case it must mean the Later Tang court) 5
 about Li
Yu's writings, three of which are named (§6-7.)6
 In the meantime, Li Yu was exiled from
the Liang court for speaking against Modi's
	
 V brother and was made panguan ng
(administrative assistant) of Deng M.' When Zhuangzong took the throne, Li Yu came to
the new Tang court, probably with the other officials of Deng, and was restored to his
old posts, including that of Hanlin academician. 8 It is questionable how much difference
the intercession of a minor official like Zhang Li would have made to Li Yu' s
reemployment prospects under the new regime, which was likely to have taken him on
anyway, but the point of the biography is that Li Yu was such a virtuous person that
those he had helped were willing to speak up for him. As a by-product, the story also
shows Zhang Li's personal loyalty to Li Yu. It is quite possible that Zhang Li's efforts
were intended to secure an invitation from the Taiyuan regime to bring Li Yu over to them
before the establishment of the Later Tang.
Despite his initiative in hobnobbing with the powerful, Zhang Li must still have been
a young man of little consequence, for it was only in around 923 that he became a jinshi
A± (§8.) Soon afterwards, and probably as a consequence of his graduation, he
received a minor literati post as left shiyi Tata (reminder, 8b1) with an additional posting
to the History institute (shi guan PIM (§9.) The reminders were responsible for
searching out what the emperor forgot, with the intention of improving the records and
thus benefitting the state. Whilst it was desirable that they should be wise, they were very
junior, and so were under the direction of appropriate historiographers. 9 The History
institute was, under the Tang, the office where information on events and the activity of
the emperor was collected, mostly via reports from the various administrative bureaux, to
5. This usage of the term reflects a fluidity in perceptions of ethnicity in this period which was not to last See
Chapter 9 for further discussion.
6. Zhongni yu ItlEA,Yan Hui shou MDA,Yi Qi fei e'ren A 4 4 x. NI 67:892.
7. XW 54:621.
8. JW 67:892; XW 54:621.
9. Des Rotours, Fonctionnaires, pp.151-2 & n.
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provide material for the compilation of each reign's shilu va. 10 In both postings Li was
working ultimately for the History institute, which could be a base for a high-flying
career." As it turned out, Li's promise was to be fulfilled in the Liao more than in the
Wudai regimes.
Service under the Later Tang
Nevertheless, Li's talent was quickly recognised. In the 925 Tang campaign against Shu,
led by the prince Jiji 	 	 , Zhang Li served with his old sponsor: Li Yu was dutong
panguan vs#-Ang (administrative assistant to the campaign commander) 12 and Li was
zhangshuji VIE (chief secretary) (§10), both senior bureaucratic positions on the
army's staff. However, in Zhang Li's own JW biography the connection with Li Yu is
not made" and Li is instead associated with Guo Chongtao n gtfg , the senior bureaucrat
on the campaign. The JW biography says it was Chongtao's request that Li be given the
chief secretaryship" in the army (perhaps at the recommendation of Li Yu, returning Li's
favour), suggesting that Li had caught the eye of senior officials. Certainly by the time it
came to writing the record of his life, it was in the interests of Li's image to posterity that
he be connected with the most senior figure possible. The QG is some senses takes this
to its logical extreme. In Zhang Li's biography, it is simply stated that 'when the Tang
prince Jiji subjugated Shu, at this time (Li) was chief secretary.'15
The point of the JW biography mentioning Guo Chongtao in connection with Zhang
Li is to show Li's virtue. After the successful campaign against Shu, Jiji, albeit
reluctantly, agreed to the demands of the empress dowager to have Chongtao killed, on
926:1, 21st February. 16
 Chongtao's retainers were afraid and fled, but Zhang Li went
alone to Jiji's residence (where the killing had taken place) and wept outside for
Chongtao (§11.) His point was doubtless to upbraid and embarrass Jiji for acceding to
the murder of a senior official in this manner. Worse, Jiji had argued with his officials
that he had no imperial warrant for the killing, but they had persuaded him that he should
do it anyway and had then forged an imperial document to assuage the expected wrath of
Mingzong*1=9] -4--7, . The YW comments that 'the people of that time {all} respected his
10. Des Rotours, Fonctionnaires, p.I99n. He includes a listing of several methods for conveying information
to the shi guan.
11. Wang, Chiu Wu-tai shih, pp.19-20.
12. JW 67:892.
13. Li Yu's biographies also do not mention Zhang Li's presence in the staff.
14. Here called by the alternative name of zhangjunshu SWS.
15. This is the first incident recorded in Zhang Li's QG biography.
16. JW 43:468, which says the incident took place at Xichuan III; TJ 274:8955.
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[Zhang Li' s] great righteousness.'" Li was fulfilling one of the functions of a good
Confucian official: that of remonstration with his lord over moral transgressions,
regardless of personal danger. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, it was Guo
Chongtao who had recommended Li's appointment to the army, so Li's relationship to
Chongtao was similar to the one he had with Li Yu, and once again he was putting
himself out to return favours received. In this regard we should note an error at this point
in the QG, 18
 which states that Zhang Li was under Jiji, and that it was Jiji who died and
for whom Li mourned; Guo Chongtao is not even mentioned. It looks as though Ye
Longli, who was trying to be as concise as possible, eliminated a key personality from a
story he wished to retain, and thus distorted the factual accuracy of his work. Although
the error is worthy of correction, the mistake in the object of Li's grief does nothing to
diminish the point being made in the biography. In one sense, it does not much matter
exactly who died, as in each case it is made clear that Li properly mourns the death of the
person stated to be his master and potentially risks his life on a matter of principle.
The next incident is found in the JW appendix and is thus unsubstantiated by the
YLDD or CFYG, although as a version also appears in the TJ we can be fairly certain that
the ultimate source is reliable (§12-14.) It picks up the story after Chongtao's death,
when Jiji was withdrawing his troops from Shu. Chongtao had been replaced by his
deputy, the fu zhaotaoshi {;! (deputy punitive commissioner) Ren Huan {EN.
Although Zhang Li had protested at Chongtao's murder he was nevertheless willing to
accept a position under his successor, with whom we now find him returning east. When
they reached Lizhou
	 Kang Yanxiao *M.1. rebelled in their rear. He was clearly to
be taken seriously because the army under Ren Huan turned back to occupy Hanzhou
where they seem to have remained until receiving orders from Jiji to suppress the
rebellion. It is Zhang Li who suggests setting an ambush of crack troops to the rear,
baited by the rest of the army, to which Ren Huan agrees. The outcome of the story is
couched in terms of hubris and virtue and strikes a blow for the military competence of
literary types. We are told that Yanxiao was a good general and Ren Huan a Confucian
scholar, and that when Yanxiao heard Huan had arrived and saw his own army achieving
success, he advanced 'without inhibition,' only to be defeated by the righteous army with
its Confucian commanders. Yanxiao was captured and appears to have travelled with the
army as it resumed its homeward journey. They reached Fengxiang NM on 19th May.
The person in charge of Fengxiang, the neiguan	 (centrally-appointed official) Xiang
17. This point is brought out explicitly by the Yuan editor Hu Sanxing. He observes Zhang Li's position as
zhangshuji to Chongtao, thus making the connection that Li and Chongtao are in a master-servant
relationship, and then says that history notes how dedicated Zhang Li was to his lord. TJ 274:8955.
18. This has not been picked up by the editors of the 1985 edition.
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Yansi nggg, took his orders from Zhuangzong, who ordered the execution of the rebel
Yanxiao. However, one of the local generals, the jianjun FrEM (army supervisor) Li
Yanxi gat%, had heard news of the rebellion which was to bring the accession of Tang
Mingzong, and detained Yanxiao in what appears to be protective custody. On closer
inspection this seems to be interpreted as an attempt by Yanxi to steal the credit for
Yanxiao's capture; the hint is the comment in the JW that 'it was also his intention to
damage Ren Huan's merit.' Huan evidently could not decide what to do about Yanxi's
action and it is Zhang Li's remonstration which makes his mind up. Li argues,
This rebel stirred up disorder and so has caused a delay in the triumphant return of the army; now
my lord has fought a bloody battle and captured the rebel, why go against orders and foster
calamity? This destroying of the cage and releasing of the tiger will leave behind trouble for
yourself. If you do not make a decision, I will personally kill this rebel.
And the text comments that Ren Huan 'had no choice but to execute Yanxiao.' In these
circumstances Zhang Li's actions are seen to be completely justified in the interests of
maintaining order in the state. The tale stands in contrast to that preceding, where he
mourns the unjust execution of a good minister, and shows another side of Li's morality.
He is still the fearless advisor of his superiors, but this time he is depicted as a
necessarily ruthless suppressor of rebellion.
Essentially the same story is related by the TJ, which dates the events to 926:2,
sometime after 12th April. However, the rebel is named as Li Shaochen ve g• 19 The
plan of action proposed by Zhang Li is identical in both accounts, as is the attitude of the
rebel to the scholars leading the opposing army. After this, the TJ makes no more
mention of Li until we find him on Zhao Yanshou's staff before Tuanboyu and
Li's arrival in Liao, discussed below.
In around 926, Mingzong, hearing of Li's reputation, made him a Hanlin academician
(§15.) During early Tiancheng fi2, perhaps between 926 and 928, it is reported in the
JW biography of Li Yi VT that Zhang Li and Dou Mengzheng WWWV° each composed
a standard fu at and shi to provide models for the candidates taking the jinshi exam
(M.) The zhongshu 1 :1 IT (imperial secretariat) had reported that they were lacking a
number of jinshi and had requested the Hanlin academy to supply the standard poems
required by the ministry of rites (libu 12%.) Along with Mengzheng, Zhang Li evidently
thought his skill at poetry was up to the mark, but the chief ministers of the secretariat
thought otherwise. They 'did not consider them to be appropriate,' and so requested that
Li Yi, another Hanlin academician, produce the exemplars. Li Yi, however, refused, on
19. This could not be confused with Kang Yarvriao through misreading, although transcription from a different
part of the text is possible.
20. And possibly others: XW 55:638 says 'Doti Mengzheng, Zhang Li and others.'
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the grounds that he had passed the jinshi only due to the kindness of others, and that his
abilities were insufficient to set standards for the talents he expected to follow him. His
statement shows honest recognition of his limitations, ill contrast to the pretences of Li
and Mengzheng, and thereby suggests the depths to which standards had fallen in
preceding years. All these people were Hanlin academicians; they were supposed to be
amongst the leading literati of the regime. Hence it is clear that Zhang Li's jinshi degree is
not necessarily indicative of his actual abilities, but is rather a reflection of the desperate
shortage of people wanting to take the examinations in the early 920's. The XV/ version
of this story specifies in what way the efforts of Li and Mengzheng were inappropriate.
They were `unskilful,' 21
 a change which only further emphasises the point of the story:
that standards were low.
Not long after this Li's career was interrupted by the death of his parents (§17),
mourning for which must have kept him out of active service for the next three years; he
is being written up as too much of a Confucian to avoid this requirement of morality. The
period of mourning must have expired around 931, at which time Li was restored to his
position in the Hanlin, in conjunction with appointments as libu and bingbuyuanwailang
%i4M-PF (bureau vice-director in the ministry of rites and the ministry of war,
probably 6b) whilst acting as zhizhigao ZSgi (participant in the drafting of
proclamations) (§19) 22 Shortly after that, Li' s father's concubine died, giving another
opportunity for Li's Confucian virtues to be demonstrated (§20.) Li had evidently been
very close to the concubine, to the extent that his children called her 'grandmother,' and
he clearly felt for her as if she were one of his parents, but he was unsure of his position
in terms of Confucian morality. Consultation with his colleagues brought no response, so
Li returned to Fuyang on a pretext and, although he did not practise official mourning,
lived a life of retirement for three years. This was apparently approved of by those who
knew him. This extreme filial behaviour contributes to the JW' s portrait of Zhang Li as a
highly moral individual, but it is not carried over into the later texts: it was too tangential
to the main action to warrant inclusion in either the XW or the TJ, which effectively
removed it from consideration for the QG and probably the LS. During Qingtai
(934-936) Li was again restored to his Hanlin academician position, along with his
drafting appointment, and was promoted to shangshu bibu langzhong Arittnasiqz
(director of the bureau of review in the ministry of justice in the department of state
affairs, 5b) (§21.)
21. Cf. the comment on Li's 'poetic language' in the .IW biography, noted above, p.136.
22. The functions of the latter post gave the holder greater access to high-level affairs than the concurrent rank
might suggest. From the annals (§18) we have a precise date for the appointment 931:11, 25th December,
which adds the function of qiju tang Egn (imperial diarist) but omits the ministry of rites appointment.
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It may be significant for the historiography of the reconstructed JW text that from this
point most of the story is also found in one or more of the other three main sources. This
is largely because the LS and QG understandably show little interest in Li's Wudai
career. However, it should be noted that after the account of Li's conduct of mourning,
the two versions of the JW biography diverge completely, (§21ff.) and it is the
information in the appendix which is picked up by the later texts. The final section in the
first version, taken from the CFYG, is known to contain mistakes, 23 and is somewhat
anomalous. The text notes baldly that Li became Hanlin academician to the 'ruler of the
barbarians (rongwang) (§26), which we know happened around 937, and then
jumps ten years. Li is said to have lived with the Kitan 'within the Nansong pass
MerT (§32), that is, on the 1Citan side, and appears to have been deeply involved in
official affairs there:
there were several interwoven strands to his official duties; in many cases he lit one candle after
another during discussions [i.e. worked long into the night], without giving any appearance of
being tired.
There follows a description of the things abandoned at the roadside when the Liao left
Bian for the north, with a note that the junior officials were also left behind, but this
appears to have no bearing upon Li at all. The final sentence brings us back to Li with the
observation that on the day he died his personal effects amounted to no more than
household goods, bringing him praise from those who knew him (§54.)
Arrival in Liao
Where the first version of the JRV biography simply observes that 'Li became Hanlin
academician to the ruler of the barbarians,' the second version gives the background to
this change of master (§22-26.)
When Gaozu [Shi Jingtang EVA, founder of Later Jin] arose (in rebellion) at Jinyang
Tang Modi )* ordered Zhao Yanshou to advance and suppress (him), and also ordered the
Hanlin academician He Ning filiM to go along together with Yanshou. Li had always regarded
Ning lightly, considering that he could not achieve anything, and for this reason he requested that
he personally go along; Tang Modi was ill and allowed him to go. When the Tang army was
defeated at Tuanboyu, he fell into the hands of the Khan along with Yanshou; the Kitan put him
in harness in his old appointment....
Shi Jingtang rebelled against Tang Modi in 936. With Kitan assistance, Jingtang defeated
the Later Tang punitive army under Zhang Jingda :gatt, and laid seige to him and his
forces in Jin'an zhai	 	  just to the south of Taiyuan-Jinyang. Zhao Yanshou was
sent to reinforce the relieving army under Zhao Dejun atta and Zhang Li was the
administrative assistant on Yanshou's staff.
23. Editorial note, .1W 98:1314.
142
Chapter 4 - Zhang Li
Zhang Li' s disparaging attitude to He Ning seems on the surface to show Li' s
confidence in his own abilities and willingness to take on the responsibilities that his
judgement of others demanded. However, given He Nin-i's reputation for scholarship,'
Li's objection to Ning is a further example of Li's elevated opinion of himself. The exact
reasons why Li was allowed to go on the expedition are obscured by ambiguous
wording. Although wei E is translated as 'ill' above, following the prince Chongmei' s
reference to Modi's 'eye illness,' 25 wei could also mean 'depressed,' which
would fit with the account of Modi' s state of mind shortly after the appointment of
Yanshou (and presumably his staff) on 12th October, when he is said to have retreated
into drink and singing laments. 26 Either way it seems there was a lack of enthusiasm for
Zhang Li's appointment. In contrast, the XW account says that Li was sent to 'oversee'
Yanshou's taking his army to Tuanbo. This makes sense as a reflection of the suspicions
at court over the intentions of the Zhaos, 27 and is a reminder that whilst Zhang Li' s
pretensions to scholarship might have inclined him to arrogance, he had nevertheless
demonstrated his capacity for various kinds of loyal behaviour, and could perhaps
therefore be entrusted with keeping an eye on a potential rebel. It is also possible that
Tang Modi had thought about what might happen to his 'plant' if Yanshou did turn
treacherous, and considered that it would be preferable to lose Li rather than He Ning. On
the other hand, although Li's post of administrative assistant was the most senior
bureaucrat on a governor's staff, and although in this case Li had technically been
appointed by the emperor, in practice his ability to operate according to court rather than
Zhao orders would have been severely limited, as we can see from Dejun's lack of
response to repeated edicts, direct from court, urging him to advance.28
In any case, Zhang Li' s appointment meant he would have been present when the
Zhaos met up at Xitang .Er429 on 22nd November. Their combined forces encamped at
Tuanboyu and did not move for over a month, until Jin'an fell and the Zhaos surrendered
along with their armies. One has to wonder why the virtuous Zhang Li did not give any
'correct' moral advice (as viewed with hindsight) in this case. Shi Jingtang was clearly
rebelling against the recognised central authority in north China, namely Tang Modi, and
furthermore had enlisted the aid of a foreign power in his quest for the throne. Surely an
24. As seen in his biographies: JW 127:1671-4; XW 56:639-40. The pictures given here can be tested against
his surviving writings in eg. QWDSB 11:191-9.
25. TJ 280:9150.
26. TJ 280:9152, which also supplies the date. Various other meanings of wei could also fit the context, but
two ambiguities are sufficient to make the point.
27. Discussed further in Chapter 5.
28. TJ 280:9153.
29. Ibid; the JW gives Xitang than 6ffig.
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upright official should have been urging Yanshou and Dejun to advance upon the rebels
as quickly as possible? And if Zhang Li really had been appointed to 'oversee' Yanshou,
surely he would have even greater obligations to argue with Yanshou for the proper
course of action? The situation was, however, confused by the contact between Zhao
Dejun and the Liao emperor, from whom Dejun was hoping to gain the position of
emperor of the Central Plains soon to be held by Shi Jingtang. This effectively made
Dejun almost as much of a rebel as Jingtang; the only difference was that Dejun pursued
his ambitions in a less obvious manner. However discreet Dejun was, Zhang Li's official
position made it unlikely that he would not have noticed Dejun's contacts with the Liao
camp. Although Dejun might have been able to send the odd messenger secretly, at one
point it is said that Yanshou himself went as an envoy, bearing generous gifts, and this
would have been hard to conceal." It may be that Li did give sound Confucian advice
and that no notice was taken of it, although advice approved of by the historiographers
but not followed at the time is often placed in biographies to show just the qualities which
Zhang Li is said to have had. If Li really was the good Confucian he is depicted as being,
he must have been in a terrible dilemma over what it was morally right for him to do. His
ultimate loyalty should have lain with Tang Modi, but his immediate master was probably
of more significance to him. We should also not forget that he had already transferred his
own allegiance once, from Liang Modi to Tang Zhuangzong, so a move of this kind was
not unprecedented. Being with the army led by the Zhaos, Zhang Li was in the spot
where everything was happening in 936. Perhaps he saw advantages to his own career of
a change of master at this point. If he did, he was right, for he rose fast under the Liao.
The phrase used by the JW biography for his arrival in Liao is xian yu rg,-T-, which
means either 'fell into the hands of' or 'was beguiled into.' It is one of the phrases
commonly associated with the arrival of the Zhaos in Liao. If Yanshou 'fell into the
hands of' the Kitan, then any officials with him in his entourage might be expected to
pass over in the same way. There seems to be a difference between this and 'captured,'
huo g, qin A, etc), and it is this which confirms our classification of Zhang Li as
crossing under duress (see Table 1, #57.) The Ti observes simply that Li 'entered (ru
Liao together with Yanshou and was restored to his position of Hanlin academician,
while the QG says that Zhang Li 'followed (sui Er Zhao Dejun in coming over to the
Kitan. The LS, however, does not mention here that Li came over in company with one
of the Zhaos, and it also uses as a time marker not their surrender, or the defeat of their
army, but the defeat of Zhang Jingda four days beforehand. Given the clarity of the
connection between Zhang Li and the Zhaos in the other sources, it could be that the LS
30. Ti 280:9155.
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compiler has made a choice here. Either the compiler felt that Jingda's surrender was
better known, and therefore more effective as a marker, or he was keeping the Zhaos out
of this, perhaps in order to protect Li from association with them.
Given that Li had shown on other occasions his willingness to hold out fpr principle,
we might think it more likely that he would be amongst those Chinese literati who
crossed to Liao but then refused to serve them. 31 In fact, the Kitan 'put [Li] in harness in
his old appointment and he served in successive posts....' Evidently he was not
unwilling to serve, and this may be the key, for we have yet to see Zhang Li turning
down a job. His move from Liang to Taiyuan, and his acceptance of a post under a
replacement after the murder of Chongtao, both give some indication that whatever
personal risks he might be driven to take, his desire for employment held primacy,
perhaps as part of a struggle to escape his farming origins; his zi, after all, meant
'dreaming of ministerial position.' Hence, whilst his crossing to Liao clearly happened
under severe limitations to choice, at some point Zhang Li must have made the pragmatic
decision to take the job he was offered.
In terms of his bureaucratic career, this would almost certainly have been to his
immediate advantage. As illustrated in the case of Han Yanhui, it seems that the ICitan
suffered from a shortage of officials to run their Chinese administration, and that those
who joined them were almost guaranteed at least their old position and the possibility of
swift promotion. This could have made service under the Liao more attractive for an
official like Zhang Li. Such a phenomenon would also fit into a wider pattern of shortage
of officials suffered by many regimes during the Wudai, as seen in the story of the model
poems discussed above. As that incident stresses the low standards of the time, it is
perhaps a backhanded compliment when the XW, reporting Li's arrival in Liao in the
Kitan section, says that `Deguang regarded his learning,' and kept him on as a Hanlin
academician?' Sources after the XW omit the stories which could cast doubt on Li's
abilities, and both the LS and the QG biographies observe at this point Zhang Li's
straightforwardness and willingness to speak his mind, and say that he was employed by
the Liao emperor because of them. The qualities which Taizong is said to have observed
in Li are conventional Confucian virtues of the format often to be found at the beginning
of biographies. Placing the note about them here gives Taizong the credit for noticing and
employing them, and thus shows him practising the conventional imperial virtue of
recognising and making use of talent.
31. Meng Guangyao, Shilun Liaodai Hanzu rushi de 'huayi zhi bian' guannian, Beifang wenwu 1990:4, p.63;
citing tomb inscriptions: QLW j.9, 11, for Wang Ze IX, Meng Youfu 	 Ski Xunzhi 5063A.
32. It also implies a low standard of learning at the Liao court.
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The escape attempt
Shortly after Zhang Li's arrival in Liao he attempted to escape back to the south (§27-28.)
The incident appears in all the sources, and is the only incident which survives into the
gazetteers, the Shengjing tongzhi gp-,-3.R, and Fengtiantongzhi 	 . gz. 33 The story
appears at the end of the JW account:
When he first fell into the hands of the Kitan he had turned his back on the Kitan and returned
south, but he was apprehended by pursuing cavalrymen. The ruler of the Kitan was angry and
said, 'Why did you abandon me and leave?' Li said, 'Li is a hanren MA and (Chinese) clothes
and food and drink are different to those here; living like this I might as well be dead and I request
that (I) may swiftly feel the edge of the knife.' The ruler of the Kitan looked round at the
interpreter Gao Tangying03, JWX and said, 'I have often cautioned all of you to treat this person
exceptionally well; that if he was caused to flee the fault would lie with all of you.' As a result
he had Tangying given a beating of a hundred strokes: this was how the ruler of the Kitan treated
people exceptionally well.
The main point of the story is to further illustrate Li's value to the emperor, hence it is at
this point that the TJ adds, and the QG annals reiterate, their observations of Li's
straightforwardness and outspokenness. Li's value to Taizong is emphasised because
rather than punishing Li, the emperor turns on the interpreter (tongshig..*) Gao
Tangyingm
 and blames him for allowing Li's flight to happen. Taizong makes it clear that
Gao had been responsible for the good treatment of Li and it is now therefore his fault
that Li has been unhappy enough to attempt escape. Gao's punishment is a beating; Li is
pardoned.' 5
There is another element to this story, focussing around Li's explanation for his flight
and the changes it undergoes in successive texts. The JW version:
'Li is a hanren, and (Chinese) clothes and food and drink are different to those here; living like
this I might as well be dead and I request that (I) may swiftly feel the edge of the knife.'
is repeated in the TJ and twice more in the QG. 36
 The XW version is condensed, as we
might expect, but retains the essentials of Li's complaint:
'I am originally a hanren, and (Chinese) clothes, food and drink, and language are different to
those here; now I think of my homeland but cannot get (there), living like this I might as well
be dead.'
33. Fengtian tongzhi 221:7b (p.4702b), which says the Shengjing tongzhi (90:7b), is the same.
34. The TJ and LS give Yanying
	 and the QG editors have corrected from Tangying to Yanying: hence
call him Gao.
35. This half of the story raises another set of issues. There were clearly already Chinese in Liao who were in a
position to act as interpreters. In the TJ, the Yuan editorial note attached to this story explains that the
interpreter was a position created to improve communications between the peoples. They were not simply
fluent in the appropriate languages, they also seem to have acted as cultural intermediaries. In terms of this
latter function, Gao (and his staff) had failed badly in their duty and perhaps in their understanding.
36. There is slight rewording and some detail is omitted.
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All these accounts convey essentially the same point: that Zhang Li, complaining about
the food, was suffering desperately from culture shock. If he had made it to the south, Li
would have had to serve the Later Jin, who now ruled the Central Plains, but it is implied
that he would have been happier to do this than to stay in Liao. In the LS, however, Li's
reply is,
'I am not used to the local customs of the north, to the food and drink or to the living
accommodation, so my thoughts are often pent-up with unhappiness, and it is simply for this
reason that I fled.'
This version is as close to its predecessors as they are to each other, except that, 407
years after the events took place, the record of what Li is supposed to have said, a record
of apparently spoken words, has been completely rewritten. The clear statement of ethnic
self-identity of the earlier texts is omitted, even though what comes before and after the
speech is effectively untouched.
We cannot reject the possibility that this was entirely deliberate. Although the final
compilation of the LS was done in a great hurry, this change was still made to a
biography which otherwise follows its immediate source very closely. The difference in
the recording of the incident is the precise omission of that, and only that, which could
have offended the Mongol emperors, who might take exception to any suggestion that the
value placed upon a Chinese official by his non-Chinese lord should not be positively
reciprocated. Hence it may suggest that the LS compilers did not want service to a non-
Chinese master to be regarded as anything out of the ordinary. That the change is made
emphasises that the official historiographers from the early Northern Song and right
through both Song dynasties, were conscious of an ethnic identity amongst the Chinese,
which was specifically linked with cultural differences related to the obvious variations in
food and drink as well as to the differences in dress observed in the classics.37
 That
consciousness must surely have remained during the Mongol regime, or otherwise there
would have been no need to change the reference to it. Whatever the case for the Yuan, it
is clear that Li identified himself as a Chinese, yet as we shall see, this did not prevent
him from giving ten years of faithful service to his new, non-Chinese masters. The
significance of this will be suggested in Chapter 9.
At the Liao court in Bianzhou
	 947
Probably within a year after this incident Li was restored to the position of Hanlin
academician, this time with the position of chengzhi iv. (recipient of edicts), which
37. For instance, in the story of Guan Zhong (Lunyu 14:16-17), who is praised for saving the Chinese
from having to fasten their clothing on the left; a practice said to characterise the 'barbarians.' The LS replaces
the reference to clothing with one to housing (or everyday life), perhaps reflecting Mongol sensitivities to this
ancient distinguishing mark.
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gave him a supervisory role over other academicians. In his JW biography it says that Li
was then successively promoted up to up to libu shangshu IT (minister of the
ministry of personnel, 3a) (§29.) 38 This unremarkable progress is matched by Li's
complete disappearance from all the sources for the next ten years.
He resurfaces in 946 because he was in the imperial campaign retinue at the end of the
Liao-Jin war, when he offered the emperor some advice quoted in the TJ (§32):
Today Great Liao has gained the tianxia, and as for the military and civil posts of the Middle
Kingdom, it is proper to employ people of the Middle Kingdom in them, it is not proper to
employ northerners [beiren] and the intimates and favourites of the emperor. If government orders
are contradicted or neglected, then the hearts of the people will not be obedient and even though
(you) have obtained (control over) them (now), you could still lose them in future.39
Despite Li's value to Taizong being made much of earlier in the TJ, the emperor on this
occasion ignores Li's advice. Given that the TJ tends to emphasise Li's virtues, it is no
surprise when his prediction comes true, and Taizong, having appointed the Kitan Xiao
Han as his vicegerent (liushou 'END , does indeed lose the hearts of the people, and
is forced to withdraw north less than six months after the triumphant entry into Bian. The
TJ version of the story is simply another case of a virtuous official being disregarded by
his ruler, then vindicated by events, but it was not allowed to remain so unexceptional in
the sources which drew upon it.
In the TJ Zhang U's advice is placed shortly after the surrender of the last Jin armies
under Du Chongwei thmg, and shortly before the surrendered Jin general Zhang Yanze
31_siT is sent with an advance party to take Bian for the Liao. The TJ goes on to relate
that after he had taken the city with scarcely a blow being struck, Yanze allowed his
troops two days of savage plunder." However, the biographies of Zhang Li in the LS
and QG both describe plundering by Kitan generals, and this incident is placed before
Li's advice (§31):
When Taizong entered Daliang )cA [Bian], there was one time when some of the foreign [fan
#] generals let loose their perverse cruelty, indulging (themselves) in killing and slaughter, and
(people) such as Xiao Han, Mada gm,'" Yelti Langwu 1113*P13H and their like allowed their
soldiers to kill and plunder to an even worse extent. [Mang] Li advised Taizong saying.....
38. According to the LS and QG, he received both his old academician position and the personnel posting in
938. As Zhang Li held these same positions when we next hear of him nearly ten years later in 946, the LS and
QG give the impression of a prolonged spell in the same jobs. If this were the case it would indicate a lack of
promotion speaking for a very serious lack of ability on Li's part. As this is not the overall impression given
in either text, it is probable that Ye Longli made a mistake, which was then transmitted into the LS.
39. There is an abbreviated version in the original JW biography: `(Since) these barbarians Ow 4g) use this
kind of military strategy and tactics, how can they control the capital for long?'
40. TJ 285:9322. Yanze was subsequently executed for this by Liao Taizong (§33.)
41. Han was a member of the Liao imperial consort clan, Math was a cousin of Taizu and was also known as
Yell! Balide
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This changed order of events thus implies that it was the plundering - by Kitan nobles -
which provoked Li to offer his advice on the undesirability of having northerners govern
the newly conquered lands. The linkage has the effect of showing a Zhang Li concerned
for his homeland and trying to defend it against the ravages of foreigners, and 'contributes
to the QG portrayal of his great virtue which is then carried forward into the LS.
A few days later, on 2nd February, Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou are noted in the NT
and TJ as promoting the career of Li Song zrg>, by recommending him for his talent
(§36-37.) They had apparently already praised this to Taizong to the extent that the
emperor was delighted to meet Song, and immediately gave him the post of taizitaishi
t-t0 (grand preceptor of the heir apparent, usually lb) acting as shumishi VIt
(commissioner of the military secretariat, lb.) 42
 According to Li Song's biography,
Taizong comments to his officials that in his conquest of the southern court, Li Song is
his only gain. Zhang Li had served together with Li Song for many years. On the Shu
campaign of 925-6, whilst Li was administrative assistant to Guo Chongtao, Song held
the same position under the prince Jiji. Zhang Li was a Hanlin academician from around
926, and Song joined him in the academy in around 933-4. It appears likely that Song's
sponsor was Fan Yanguang mgy6, because in the period when Yanguang was one of
the commissioners of the military secretariat in Later Tang, Song was appointed to a
clutch of literary positions. Yanguang's co-commissioner for much of the time was Zhao
Yanshou, which probably explains the latter's interest in Song's career. This incident
reads as another example of Zhang Li's virtue in working on behalf of those with whom
he has past associations. Given Li Song's many literary appointments under Later Tang,
it is likely that he had the talent that Zhang Li probably lacked. Thus it is rather odd - or
exceptionally virtuous - for Li to petition for Song's promotion over Li's head. On the
other hand, there is the possibility that Li and Yanshou were recruiting Song for a
particular purpose, as seen in the following story.
With Li Song now very senior in the administration as commissioner of the military
secretariat, he was in a position to return the favour which had brought his appointment,
and he found himself requesting the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom for Zhao
Yanshou (discussed in Chapter 5) (§39.) Evidently it was considered most efficacious
that Li Song should make the request on Yanshou's behalf, but after the failure of this
attempt, it was Zhang Li who proposed that Yanshou be given a series of four posts, one
can only assume as consolation for not getting the imperial title he desired. The emperor
clearly thought that this was too much, for 'he read the proposal, took tight hold of his
brush and crossed out, refusing to accept them' the last two of the posts Li had
42. According to .TW 137:1835, he was made xi ring shurnishi . Egi .get , a variant name for the post.
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suggested. However, Taizong did give Yanshou's son, Kuangzan kagr, the senior
regional post of Hezhong PI E:17 jiedushi. It is clear that by this time, ten years after his
arrival, Li holds whatever position he has in his own right, and no longer needs the
sponsorship of a senior figure such as Zhao Yanshou. Yet in making the proposal he did,
Zhang Li seems to be demonstrating a degree of loyalty to his old master Yanshou.
Indeed, the story virtually reiterates the loyalty to his immediate master that Li had shown
in working to obtain an appointment under the Later Tang for Li Yu. In both cases we
might have cause to reflect upon Zhang Li's evident persuasiveness and his considerable
ability in working situations not only to his own advantage but also to that of others, on
which we shall shortly comment further.
Although individual sources each provide a clear sequence of what happened around
the Liao entry into Bian, once one compares texts the exact dating and order of events
becomes unclear. It was around this time that Zhang Li received a number of posts about
which the sources also do not agree, but which seem to have included a chief ministerial
position. There are two sets of dates (§35, 40.) In the Kitan section of the JW and in the
LS annals, it says that Li was made zaixiang Irti (grand councillor) (TW) or
pingzhangshi 5-M. (manager of affairs) (LS) on 31st January, while his own JW
biography and the remaining sources describe his promotion to be right puye AV. (vice-
director of the department of state affairs), and concurrently menxia shilang MT-MO
(vice-director of the imperial chancellery, 3a) and manager of affairs .' The TJ dates this
set of appointments to about 22nd March.
The position of manager of affairs was originally given in the Tang, to provide the
emperor with chosen advisors who nevertheless did not hold any of the top posts in the
shangshu 11,`6 	LI 	 (department of state affairs), zhongshu 14 1 1 (imperial secretariat) or
menxia rir-f- (imperial chancellery), as these were often kept vacant to guard against
ministers acquiring too much power." The Liao adopted the post from the Wudai
regimes, and it appears that it came to carry the responsibilities of a grand councillor.45
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to suppose that the grand councillorship mentioned by
the JW was in fact this same post of manager of affairs. As to the discrepancy in dates,
the Kitan section in the AV notes that on 31st January, 947, Taizong came to live in the
palace in Bian and assigned posts to both old and new officials in the newly conquered
43. The JW omits vice-director of the imperial chancellery, and makes him da xueshi t‘a.± (grand
academician) of the Jixian dian XIWR (Academy of scholarly worthies) instead.
44. Des Rotours, Fonctionnaires, p.916.
45. Yang, Qidan zhengzhi zhidu, pp.150-2. She cites only the eleventh-century travelogue of Yu Jing M as
her evidence for the functions of the manager of affairs, so it is possible that in the tenth century the post was
not yet in its mature form.
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lands." Amongst the appointments were grand councillorships not only for Zhang Li,
but perhaps ironically, also for the person Li had not trusted to manage the relief of
Jin'an: He Ning. These appointments are followed, over three weeks later, by a further
court ceremony for receiving the congratulations of all the officials, at which Zhang Li
must also have been present, and it would seem that Liao Taizong held court in Bian
regularly until his departure for the north on 10th April. The compilers clearly condensed
records of court sessions which stretched across both dates, and their decisions have led
to the confusion between 31st January and 22nd March as the date of Zhang Li's
promotion. The only thing which really matters is that his appointments were made at the
Liao court of occupation in the Central Plains.
A further incident at court illustrates the strong position of Zhang Li, and of his ally
Zhao Yanshou (§34.) The story is found in the Kitan section of the XW, and is related
retrospectively as part of the thumbnail biography of Zhang Li which follows the notice
of his promotion.
(When) Deguang MYE was about to hold court [in 947], the [ritual] officials gave Yanshou a hat
with the marten tail and cicada wing ornaments of an imperial prince or one of the three dukes,
(and gave) Li the robes and hat of the third grade; Yanshou and Li were both unwilling to wear
them. Yanshou instead had made a king's hat in order to distinguish himself. Li said, 'When I
was in the upper kingdom, the Jin sent Feng Dao um. to confer decrees of investiture on the
northern court [938], (and) Dao bestowed two of these marten tail and cicada wing hats: one for
the grand councillor Han Yanhui to wear, and one ordered to be worn by me. Am I now going to
wear something of lesser rank!' and in the end, he wore the marten tail and cicada wing hat to
attend court.47
When Li says that he shares the privilege of wearing this kind of hat only with Han
Yanhui, Li implies that he also shared Yanhui's leading position in the bureaucracy, and
had done so since 938; a claim which is not borne out anywhere else, including in the rest
of the XW itself. More importantly, the positioning of the account is by way of
expansion upon Li' s promotion, and shows that there had been an earlier attempt to
devalue Li and Zhao Yanzhou. This provoked their sartorial defiance, and it is implied
that this protest was what led Taizong to promote Li. The story thus gives an
extraordinary picture of Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou being able to manipulate the
emperor and go against his wishes with impunity, even as he was apparently trying to
control them. This invites further exploration of the relationship Taizong had with his
Chinese ministers, but this cannot be tackled here.
It is worth observing that this Kitan section in the JW refers to Li as 'the Hanlin
academician recipient of edicts who had come north'(bei lai Hanlin xueshi chengzhi
46. JW 137:1835.
47. Abridged in LSJSBM 5:116, where the account is followed not by anything explaining the incident, but by
several long passages detailing the dress to be worn on different occasions by emperor and officials. Version
from Hong fian lu Vii50 (also found in DDSL) quoted in LSJSBM 12:289.
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t3tEnkm±* g .)48 The effect of this is to identify him as somebody who had
originally served one of the north China regimes and then entered service with the Liao.
As it is not clear why it should be desirable to point this out, it is possible that the phrase
bei lai Hanlinxueshi chengzhi was some kind of tag used to refer to Zhang Li at the time,
perhaps analogous to the ICitan name given to Han Yanhui after his return to Liao.
On the Liao retreat north, 947
The XW and TJ record that the emperor Taizong, on his homeward journey and
accompanied by several tribal and Chinese ministers including Li, saw for himself the
cities laid waste by the recent war (§42.) He says,
'Bringing the Middle Kingdom to this state of affairs is all the fault of the prince of Yan
[Zhao Yanshoul' He turned to Zhang Li saying, 'You also were instrumental in this.'
Taizong argues that it is partly Li's fault simply because he had gone south with
Yanshou. The implication is that Li, as a Confucian present in the military command,
should have prevented as much damage as he could. This is particularly telling when set
against the report earlier in the Ti (though not in the XW) of Li's advice to use Chinese to
govern the Middle Kingdom, on the grounds that they stood less chance of losing the
hearts of the people. Now Taizong, withdrawing north as the Middle Kingdom was
rising against him, turns Li's argument against him by blaming Yanshou and Li - Chinese
both - for the war. In the KW this incident ties in with the negative appraisal implied in
the story of Li's 'unskilful' poetry, but in the TJ it comes from an account which tends to
stress Li's usefulness to his Liao master. Considering the even more positive pictures of
Li found in the LS and QG, it is perhaps no surprise that this event does not appear in
those texts.
The record of Liao Taizong's death found in the LS annals may well be more
significant to Zhang Li than appears at first sight, because this is the only source to make
it clear that Li was with the emperor when the emperor died (§43-45.) So according to the
LS, this means firstly that Li is amongst those who could have received Taizong's last
will and testament, and secondly that he is dissociated from Zhao Yanshou and his claim
to the throne.' We know from the other sources that the new Liao emperor Shizong
tC-T-:- blames nobody but Yanshou for the insurrection, and pardons all those in
Yanshou' s retinue (save in the XW, where Li is chief amongst those removed from
office) (§46-47.) Li's most important part, however, is as the main person to whom
Shizong addresses his remarks on these events (§46, 4-8.) In the XW, Ti and QG,
though not in the LS, it is Li to whom Shizong initially explains himself, and again Li to
48. So does Zhao Yanshou's PM biography. JAV 98:1312.
49. See Chapter 5.
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whom Shizong speaks the following day (24th May), when he holds the ceremony
confirming his new status as emperor. On this occasion,
-.
laughing, he spoke to Zhang Li and the others saying, 'If the prince of Yan had really performed
this ceremony here, I would have used armoured cavalry to surround him and not a soul would
have escaped.'
In both cases Shizong seems to be making the point to Li that Yanshou's venture was
doomed from the start, giving the impression that Li was involved. Indeed, although it is
not made explicit anywhere, it does seem likely that Li was, if not Yanshou's right-hand
man, then at least his eyes and ears at court. This would make sense of many incidents,
starting with this most recent treatment of Li, and the XW note that Li was sacked. It
would also fit with the recent cooperation between Yanshou and Li at the Liao court in
Bian, and the blaming of those two for the despoliation of the Middle Kingdom.
Consequently, it may well be the case that Li, arriving in Liao on the staff of Zhao
Yanshou, remained more closely connected with him than the sources are willing to say
directly, and that he might have been the person who drew up the various ill-fated plans
for the fulfilment of Yanshou's ambitions, discussed in the next chapter. Given that the
LS presents a generally positive picture of Li, such an association with the usurping
Yanshou could be another reason why that source is careful to distance Li from the
connection by telling us that he is with the emperor when the emperor dies, and therefore
less likely to be plotting a coup with Yanshou. The further omission of the events around
Shizong's accession, even though these are in the QG annals, only contributes to the
sense of a cover-up by the LS.
Confrontation with Xiao Han E 1
Once Taizong was dead, and Yanshou disgraced, Li discovered that his outspokenness,
so approved of by the compilers, had made him enemies. It appears that when Shizong
headed north after his accession at Zhenzhou tVii, Li stayed behind, for he was there
when Xiao Han, whom we last met as a pillaging general in the LS and QG, surrounded
his residence with troops (§50-53.)" According to the JW,
At this time Li was ill and was just then prostrated on a pillow, Han saw Li and berated him,
saying, 'You advised the late emperor and told him that he should not appoint tribesmen as
jiechishi, and that if he did then the country would not last long; then when the late emperor came
he ordered me to settle things in the palace of Bianzhou, and you advised that this was not
permissible; again when I became jiedushi at Bianzhou and you were in the imperial secretariat,
for what reason did you send in memorials about me?' Li raised his voice in defence and replied
with words indignant and unyielding, Han then chained up Li and left. The jiedushi of Zhenzhou,
Mada, shortly afterwards released his chains but that night he died of his illness.
50. The LS and QG place Math with Xiao Han, but this is to make him more aggressive towards Li than the older
sources would have to be the case.
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This gives an impression that Li constantly proffered advice. If we combine it with what
we know and conjecture of his relationship with Yanshou, we might see an official
forever wheeling and dealing on behalf of his friends and to keep his enemies out of
office. As one of the direct targets of Li's memorialisation, Han is understandably upset
about it, even though it did not prevent his appointment. But the subsequent sources do
not leave it at that. The account in the XVnT is very brief, but the TJ adds yet more details
of Li's activities, for Han also complains that,
'Furthermore, you slandered me and Jieli NM to the late emperor, saying that Jieli loved to
plunder other people's property 51
 and that I loved to take away other men's women and children
by force. {Now} I will surely kill you!'
In addition, when Xiao Han ordered Li to be chained,
Li raised his voice in defence, saying, 'This is the moral standard of the entire country: I spoke
truly about it. (If you) want to kill me then kill me. How will chaining me up do that?'
and when Li dies, it is no longer of his illness, but 'of rage and indignation.' Hence to
the anger conveyed in the JW version has been added a contrast between Li's high
principles, for which he is evidently prepared to die, and the uncivilised behaviour of the
Kitan, along with an implication that they are responsible for his death. 52 This emphasis
is carried over from the TJ into the two later texts.
According to the JW biography Li had enough family with him in Liao for somebody to
cremate his bones and return the ashes for burial at his home town of Fuyang (§55), and
there is a final note on his essential character:
Li was honest and upright and had a limitless love of wine. .... 53 Throughout his life, Li
embraced righteousness and had sympathy for the talented, he was quick to commend the
outstanding and when he heard of the excellence of some person, he would be sure to leap to act
on their behalf, whilst when he saw the impoverishment of some person he would also empty
his chest to assist them, and it was for this reason that on the day he died, the officials of the
central court all sighed with regret over him.
Clearly this is what a biographer would be pleased to find in the life of a person perceived
to be of Confucian virtue, and given the extent of human frailty, when the
historiographers found somebody who really did fit the model of the ideal Confucian
junzi E-T, they would doubtless have pounced upon them as the much-sought good
exemplar. Yet we have seen that when examined closely, Li's life does not completely fit
this stereotype. Nevertheless, as we have been suggesting throughout this chapter, such a
51. According to his LS biography, Jieli had tried to prevent Zhang Yanze's plunder of Bian. LS 76:1245.
52. Ironically, Xiao Han later rebelled against Shizong and was executed in 949:1. LS 5:65.
53. This gap is filled with an account of the escape attempt.
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disjunction of ideal and reality did not prevent successive editors from 'improving' upon
what they had.
In the texts we can see a number of approaches to the problem of changing master.
Only the .TW observes Li's change of master from the Later Liang to the future Later Tang
emperor, and then with neither praise nor blame. Whilst we must remember that probably
only the Later Tang viewpoint survived, the event is conveyed as if such a change of
allegiance were a normal occurrence. It is also implied, by accounts of the escape attempt,
that it would have been perfectly respectable for Li to transfer his allegiance again from
Later Tang to Later Jin. Hence at the time it seems to have been considered normal and
permissible for an official to serve more than one regime. Not only that, but in Li's case,
even as he changed masters he was also praised for his loyalty, particularly in the QG.
This praise is bestowed on a loyalty to personality: to Guo Chongtao, Zhao Yanshou,
perhaps even Liao Taizong. This kind of loyalty is independent of the regime, race,
language, culture or lifestyle of either master or servant.
Yet the ethnic element was clearly there. When Zhang Li entered Liao service he
found himself in a strange world where he could not cope with the food, and in our
earliest text was moved to identify himself as a Chinese in order to explain his attempted
escape. Taizong understood, to the extent that he had already tried to make provision for
Li's needs. Taizong's concern seems to be to win his Chinese ministers to him personally
so that they will apply their talents in his state. To do this he seems willing to
accommodate continuing cultural differences, and to distinguish these from any
judgements upon loyalty. The evident necessity to remove Li's statement of ethnicity
under the Yuan suggests that by this time the question of loyalty had become inextricably
bound up with ethnic identity, and that as in the case of Han Yanhui, these matters which
were of concern in the fourteenth century had not been of such significance in the tenth.
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Chapter Five
Zhao Yanshou g_
Zhao Yanshou is the most famous of the five individuals considered comparatively here.
He was adopted by Zhao Dejun ttip.,3 when very young, and by the time he held his
first office was living under his fourth different regime. He married a daughter of Tang
Mingzong E9M- and achieved the highest office in the Later Tang. In 936 he went
along with his father's plans to gain imperial status and upon the failure of this plan was
taken to Liao. There he once again filled the highest offices open to a Chinese and
participated in the campaigns against Jin on the promise of the imperial title sought by his
father. After the fall of the Jin capital he attempted to usurp the Liao throne from its Kitan
heirs and it is likely that he died in prison.
Yanshou was involved at a high level in the most important events of his day: the Tang-
Jin transition of 936 and the Liao-Jin war of 943-7. Study of these events, and
accordingly of Yanshou, benefits from the relatively large amount of surviving material
from both sides. Yanshou has a biography in each of the main composite works, yet
despite his prominence is still omitted from the XW biographies. However, even Ouyang
Xiu could not ignore him altogether without omitting large and significant chunks of the
history of the period, and he appears extensively in the Kitan section and in the
biographies of others. Given that he held high office it is no surprise that he is also
extensively mentioned in the TJ and in the various annals. With such a wealth of material
there should be much of interest in a comparative analysis, but the quantity is such that
Yanshou cannot be dealt with in quite the same detail as has so far been the case. It
should also be remembered that where there is more information there is also more room
for contradictions, mistakes, biassed interpretation and quite possibly invention.
Earliest frontier crossings
Yanshou's given name means 'prolonged life.' His real father was surnamed Liu 111, but
his given name suffers from miscopying early on, changing from Yuan 5r..7 to Kang Al in
the journey from the JW/XW to the TJ. Liu was from Changshan g al/Hengshan 'ff LU
(§1-2.) These were the mountains to the north of Zhenzhou tAM, on the border with
Ding t, in the territory which changed hands probably more often than anywhere else in
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this period.' When we hear about him, Liu is in charge of Tiao rg, a county of Dezhou
tV11, just south of the frontline prefectures of Ying i a and Mo Yanshou was thus
in every sense a child of the frontier zone, as confirmed by his earliest recorded
experience.
In 898 Liu Rengong
	
took control of Dezhou, along with Cang and Jing
A, and installed his son Shouwen as Yichang g ig, jiedushi.2 Zhao Yanshou's
father would thus have been under the jurisdiction of Shouwen, and ultimately of
Rengong. In 907 Shouwen' s brother Shouguang gii y6 imprisoned their father.
Shouwen resisted this usurpation, but despite having ICitan help he was captured in battle
in 909. 3 Shouwen's commanders held out in Cangzhou until it fell to Shouguang in 910,
and it appears that Yanshou's father was amongst those keeping faith. Zhao Dejun, a
junior general under Shouwen, evidently was not so loyal, because he seems to have
joined Shouguang's party and been sent as part of the mopping-up operation ensuring
that all localities acknowledged the new governor. Tiao was evidently on his list, because
there Dejun captured Yanshou along with his mother, the lady Chong # (§3.) This
suggests that Yanshou's father died in the taking of Tiao and that Yanshou was at most a
very small child at this time. For reasons which are unknown Dejun adopted the boy, and
although no mention is made of what happened to his mother at this point, we know she
survived because she features in events towards the end of Yanshou's career. These
details of the story so far come from the JW, X W , and the LS. The latter abridges the
earlier accounts, leaving the reader uncertain as to exactly who is working for whom, for
there is no indication that Dejun's employer was ever Liu Shouwen. The confusion in the
lives of these individuals is a direct reflection of the volatility of the political situation as
expressed in shifts in the lines of frontiers.
Dejun had joined the victorious Liu Shouguang, but in 911 Shouguang declared
himself emperor of Yan and Li Cunxu of the Taiyuan Jin moved to crush
him. By the end of 912 it was evident to Dejun that Shouguang could not hold out even
with Liang assistance, so Dejun fled to join the Jin, where Li Cunxu gave him the
honorific name of Li Shaobin -2PNBA (§5.) Dejun took his family with him, making it the
second change of regime for Yanshou, who would have been still a boy.
1. The QG says Yanshou was from Xiangzhou M. Xian gzhou was the place of origin of Yanshou's adoptive
father Zhao Dejun, and Ye Longli omits to mention the adoption. Xiangzhou is not quite so directly on a
frontier as Changshan, but it lay midway between Zhaozhou and Bianzhou t1JM. and so was in an area
much fought over.
2. T.1261:8515.
3. See Chapter I, p.22ff and notes for context and references.
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Although Dejun himself is not noted for learning but for his horsemanship and
archery,' he appears to have provided a cultured environment for his charge, who is said
to have liked writing history and poetry (§4.) The formulae make no mention of
Yanshou' s interest being from an early age, suggesting that his literary talents were not
exceptional, but he nevertheless seems more the courtly, scholarly type of person than the
active frontier character, with military and political inclinations, that Dejun was.
According to a curious reference in the )(NV, when the Kitan prince Yelii Bei Iffi,
crossed to Later Tang with several thousand volumes of his library, Yanshou 'often
borrowed his heterodox books and medical classics, none of which existed in the Middle
Kingdom' (§15.) And despite Dejun' s own martial inclinations, he demonstrated his
pride in learning when in 929, he asked that his highly talented grandson, Yanshou's
son, should be allowed to take the official examinations at the age of 4 (§12.)5
By this time Yanshou was well-established, but his first appointment had been as a
sima MA (adjutant) at Bianzhou Mil, the former Liang capital (§6.) By the time he
received this post the Jin under Li Cunxu had overthrown the Liang and established the
Tang restoration (923-936), with control over most of north China, and the capital
returned to Luoyang 'A-M. This earliest position, though minor, placed Yanshou far from
the frontier, close to the court. It was perhaps around then that a prediction about him,
recorded in the CFYG, was made. This said that he would be
certain to have armoured troops and great power, and will be renowned amongst those in the
highest posi tions.6
At this point the family seems to have been part of the retinue of Cunxu's adopted son Li
Siyuan lirEffi, but Dejun and Yanshou had yet to make their reputations. The turning
point in their careers was the accession of Siyuan as Tang Mingzong in 926.
Mingzong's regard for the family was shown immediately upon his accession (§7.)
Dejun's original name was restored at his request, and at about the same time Yanshou
married the emperor's daughter, the Xingping princess Although Mingzong
had a lot of daughters - this was apparently his thirteenth' - the marriage was undoubtedly
an honour bringing tremendous advantages; and not just for Yanshou. It also brought
Dejun much closer to the centre of power, and he is variously said to have been
'entrusted with' or 'favoured for' employment. There was to continue to be a strong link
between the two men at crucial points in their subsequent careers.
4. JW 98:1308.
5. Mingzong admired the boy's talent and waived the examination, simply adding him to that year's list of
graduates. Cf. concern over the quality of graduates, Chapter 4, pp.140-1.
6. Quoted in LSJSBM 12:283. It continues with a reference to Yanshou's delicate good looks: 'Some others
(said), "This person is as pretty and tender as a girl, how can this be?" In the end it all came true.'
7. JW 49:678 editorial note, quoting the WDHY.
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Upon Yanshou' s marriage he became fangyushi 1W,Itt (defence commissioner) of
Ruzhou itcjii, neighbouring Luoyang, and then jiedushi of Heyang the capital
province. In 928 he was given the honorific title of fuma duwei RINSAI3a± (imperial son-
in-law) along with Shi Jingtang eolg, who had married Mingzong's eldest daughter.
The following year he was moved to govern Songzhou 7'"g4'isl, east of Luoyang (§8-11,
13.) While Yanshou' s orbit remained in the vicinity of the capital, Dejun' s was the
northern frontier. He had been made Youzhou giffi-Lulong jiedushi in 925 and
gave good service there for ten years, improving the defences and the lives of the
common people.°
At the Later Tang court
On 20th February, 931:2, Yanshou was transferred from the regions to court, receiving
the prestige position of zuo wuwei shang jiangjun ,a-r,CLX:YX (generalissimo of the
left guard, 2b) and a senior appointment as xuanhui beiyuan shi
(commissioner of the northern court of palace attendants.) A couple of months later he
was made libu shangshu mmat (minister of the ministry of rites, 3a) with an
appointment to serve as one of the two shumishi1' 16' (commissioners of the military
secretariat, lb) (§16-17.) 9 He thus reached the highest bureaucratic position at the Later
Tang court, but also opened an unhappy chapter in his life. The story so far has come
largely from the JW, 1 ° but at this point the Ti begins to take notice of Yanshou's career in
its own right, and takes over as the text providing the most detail about him.
The post of military secretary had had immense powers brought to it by previous
incumbents, notably Guo Chongtao %AM," and An Chonghui Yanshou's
immediate predecessor. Appointed by Li Siyuan shortly after his accession in 926:4, An
Chonghui had acquired what Wang Gungwu calls 'overriding powers,' but clashed with
the last remnants of eunuch power in the shape of Meng Hanqiong AFA, who
engineered his dismissal in 931:1. 12 Zhao Yanshou replaced Chonghui, but Meng
8. JW 32:445, 43:592, 98:1308-9; Ti 273:8930, 278:9076. In 929 he was made bei mian xingying
zhaotaoshi jtf3-;glagl-,M (expeditionary punitive commissioner for the northern region) (JW 40:550,
98:1309) but Dejun might also have used non-military means of handling the frontier situation. Two IS entries
for 932 talk of Dejun receiving rewards, and presenting 'the fruits of the season.' LS 3:33, 34.
9. Hereafter 'military secretary.' This translation is the standard one, but does not reflect the unspecified, and
potentially wide, powers of the shumishi under the Wudai. Limitation of authority was a development under the
Song. See Wang, passim, (describing the acquisition of powers); Worthy, Founding of Sung, ch.5, pp.212ff.
10. The later texts for this period of Yanshou's life all appear to derive ultimately from the .IW. The only
exception is the XW story of Yanshou borrowing writings from Yelti Bei.
11. Given control of military affairs under Tang Zhuangzong WS* (Li Cunxu, r.923-926.) Murdered in 926:I
as part of a eunuch attempt to recover powers lost to the emperor's retainers. Wang, pp.109-11, 150. Mourned
by Zhang Li 3RN.
12. JW 41:561-42:579; TJ 277:9040-63; Wang, p.155.
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Hanqiong took over Yanshou's former post of commissioner of the court of palace
attendants." Although Yanshou's post was theoretically the more senior, and one to
which great powers had accrued, nevertheless it is clear that the real holders of power
were Hanqiong and the concubine Wang igE, who 'stood alone in the centre and
managed things' (§18.) Yanshou served alongside Fan Yanguang z7gXYE, who had been
appointed to the shumiyuan (military secretariat) with An Chonghui in 930:9, and
continued in his post after Chonghui was dismissed." Neither Yanguang nor Yanshou
dared to comment upon governmental matters because of the power of Hanqiong and the
concubine, which 'everybody feared.' Hence, senior though the post of military secretary
was, it did not automatically bring power; that depended upon the character of the
holders. It is evident that although Yanshou, as a son-in-law of the emperor, was
extremely well-connected, he did not have the personal capability to withstand
opposition.
Another contender for control of the court was Mingzong's son Li Congrong4--c tt M,
prince of Qin 	 I. Yanshou had got on the wrong side of him, apparently through
association, however distant, with the fall of An Chonghui. Although Yanshou had not
helped to plot this, he had replaced Chonghui as military secretary and had not prevented
his execution.' 5 Congrong had apparently been full of respect for Chonghui, but perhaps
more to the point, Chonghui's position at court had ensured that Congrong's ambitions
were catered for. Now he could not be so certain of getting what he wanted, and is said
to have been contemptuous of Yanguang and Yanshou (§19.) Congrong had been given
the important post of pan liujun zhuwei shi fij-s-WMftg (controller of the six armies
and the guards) 1 6 in 929:4, and in 932:10 Shi Jingtang joined him as fushi Mt (vice-
controller), to give Congrong the benefit of his experience, and perhaps also to keep him
under control." Jingtang, because of the mutual antipathy between himself and
Congrong, did not want this posting and sought a transfer to a provincial (non-court)
13. On 10th June, 931:5. TJ 277:9059. Wang, p.153, does not know the date for this. Post known hereafter as
'commissioner of palace attendants.'
14. Yanguang had been appointed to the same post in 928:3 but was almost immediately sent out on a
provincial posting. After his reappointment in 930 he seems not to have done anything in the post until
Chonghui left to fight Shu .N) in 930:12. Wang, p.153n.
15. Fan Yanguang had at least spoken up on Chonghui's behalf. TJ 277:9045-6.
16. Controlling the only imperial army not under the emperor's personal command. Wang, pp.158-9.
17. Shi Jing,tang had previously helped Congrong's younger brother Conghou -2,1Eag (controller of the six
armies, 926-8) as vice-controller. The 932 appointment could have a similar intention, but the fear of
Congrong detailed in the TJ suggests that there may have been an ulterior motive. Jingtang was married to
Congrong's half-sister, who did not get on with her ambitious sibling. Ti 277:9078-79; Wang, p.159.
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appointment to get away from the prince. Yanshou and Yanguang were also trying to
leave court, but their requests were denied.' 8
Then, in response to a feared Kitan invasion, Mingzong ordered the selection of a
governor for Hedong (§20-22.) The two military secretaries said that only Shi Jingtang
or Kang Yicheng OSX could go. The emperor chose Jingtang but when Jingtang
found he had not been relieved of his six armies post, he declined to go. Kang Yicheng
was called to the palace,' 9 but no appointment was made and shortly afterwards, on 7th
December, Kitan encroachments provoked an order for a swift decision. Yanshou and
Yanguang now wanted to appoint Kang Yicheng, with Yanguang arguing that formerly
the emperor had not wanted to send Jingtang. Jingtang, though, still wanted the job. He
was supported by Li Song
	
then a quan shumi zhi xueshi
(provisional auxiliary academician in the secretariat of military affairs),' who persuaded
the committee to go along with him, and Jingtang was appointed on 9th December.21
Thus, Yanshou and Yanguang, holders of the highest posts in the land, could not
maintain their will against the suggestion of a lowly bureaucrat of their own commission.
Two days later Yanshou received the additional advisory position of tongpingzhangshi
Filg-tf: (jointly manager of affairs with the secretariat and chancellery), but it is not
clear whether this timing is significant.
There is a story about Yanshou hidden away in the TW biography of the minister Liu
Xu po] (§23):
[In 933] 22
 (Xu) was appointed .... manager of affairs. At the time that Xu came to court to give
his thanks (for his appointments), it happened that there was a great sacrifice, (and) Mingzong
was not holding court in the Zhongxing palace 1:Kialla. The memorial reception staff [gemen
rmr9} explained, 'Under the old rite, chief ministers who are giving thanks for benevolence must
communicate this in the appropriate palace, please wait a day or two.' The military secretary
Zhao Yanshou said, 'The decision on notifying (new) grand councillors [zaixiang 
	 ff1] has
already been out for three days, (when) coming to give thanks it is improper to miss the
appropriate time.' Because he immediately memorialised about this, (Xu) therefore gave thanks at
the Duanming palace MIME.
This is not an especially significant story in itself, save that it reinforces the suggestion
that Yanshou had a Confucian education, because this was evidently what influenced him
here. The curious thing is that Yanshou's willingness to speak up for ritual correctness is
not conveyed into the later sources, nor indeed into the JW biography, and thus a positive
18. They obviously want to get away from the court, but it is not clear whether this is out of fear of the other
palace commissioners, or due to the antagonism between Congrong and Shi Jingtang.
19. Yicheng was replaced in his provincial appointment by Zhu Hongzhao
	 • TJ 278:9079.
20. Amongst several other posts. JW 108:1420.
21. The dating gives an indication of just how urgent the discussions were.
22. This date comes from the version of the story by Song Bo 5lEl, quoted in TJ 275:8986.
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aspect to Yanshou's character remains relatively obscure. We shall see that this may not
be entirely coincidental.
Meanwhile, Congrong continued to be a worry and When, in 933:6, an exiled official
recommended that Congrong be made heir apparent (taizi the emperor interpreted
this as a request for his own abdication,' and consulted with his most senior officials
(§24-25.) No result is reported, but three months later Congrong came to reassure
Mingzong that he had no designs upon the throne, and received the enigmatic reply, 'It is
what the ministers want.' Congrong, believing he was about to lose his military
command, complained to Yanguang and Yanshou such that they, fearing his intentions,
'explained' to the emperor. One must assume that this means they told Mingzong that
because the prince controlled a large body of troops based in the capital, he had to be
pacified, but that this should be done in such a way as to remove the danger without
depriving him of military command. These must have been amongst the considerations
which led, three or four days later, to Congrong being given a title revived especially, the
high-sounding tianxia bingma da yuanshuai -N- _-,In7U-EN (grand commander-in-
chief of the empire.) A week later Yanguang and Yanshou were each given the extra
position of shizhong 14 14:1
 (director of the imperial chancellery, 2a), presumably as a
reward for their advice. They had again shown themselves talented not at the energetic
exercise of their powers, but at taking the line of least resistance commensurate with
protecting the immediate interests of the emperor, the state and themselves. Whilst we
might be unimpressed at the relative passivity of Yanguang and Yanshou, we might also
consider that the attempt to do much assumes a control over the course of events which is
rarely justified and is thus mined with tremendous risks, the more so in unstable times.
Yanshou has so far demonstrated no abilities beyond the ordinary; it may have been
wisest to do only the minimum necessary.
Unfortunately this meant that the problem of Congrong remained, for he was not
pacified. He began bringing armed troops with him to court, and told his intimates that he
would destroy the south. Yanguang and Yanshou were terrified and renewed their
requests to be relieved of their posts or transferred away from court (§26, 2829.)24 They
were not the only ones, and the emperor began to accuse his ministers of deserting him
because he was ill, implying that they were ungrateful as well as cowardly, and that if
they wanted to go, they should just go without having to ask for an imperial letter to give
23. 1-1u Sanxing helpfully comments that this resembles Tang Xuanzong's rg
	 words, 'If we set up an heir
apparent, then we become a retired person.' TJ 278:9087.
24. The SW and XNV say the former, the TJ the latter. The earlier texts do not record the previous transfer
request, and whereas they now express Yanshou's fear - he wants out at any cost - the TJ could be implying that
Yanshou was calculating to retain some kind of official position.
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them permission." Yanshou changed his tactics, exploiting his familial relationship by
sending his wife, the emperor's daughter, to work on the emperor in his private quarters,
explaining that Yanshou really was ill and could not stand 'these cunning affairs.' After
almost a week of this, Yanguang and Yanshou presented a revised requestfor transfer,
and after nearly a year of trying, Yanshou was finally posted away from court as
Xuanwu	 jiedushi, with his seat back at Bianzhou where his career had started.26
The XW does not record this appointment, but only his dismissal as military secretary. A
couple of months later Congrong rebelled."
As a regional magnate
In the Wudai a provincial posting was the prerequisite to insurrection and usurpation,
because the regional appointment giving freedom from direct court control could not be
obtained in the first place without the consent of the emperor. This made the court-
provincial structure of power one of delicate negotiation, good judgement and personal
relationships, which had to be renegotiated whenever any party to it was replaced. A new
emperor inheriting existing governors had to balance the possibilities and hope that the
benefits offered would be enough to retain the loyalty of the official, but he was always
taking a chance. The tense and uncertain relationships which could result are typified in
the new attitude to Zhao Yanshou as a regional magnate under successive emperors.
Congong's rebellion was crushed but Mingzong died a few days later in 933:12. His
son Li Conghou .fXW had reigned for about six months (temple name: Tang Midi
VM) before Li Congke Mingzong's adopted son, usurped power for himself
(temple name: Feidi )ff '11.i ) in 934:4. Yanshou evidently transferred his allegiance
smoothly from each emperor to the next because he was honoured as jianjiao taishi
1)045Zt (acting grand preceptor) under Mindi, 28
 and duke of Luguo kj by Feidi
(§30-31.)29
 However, not everybody trusted the provincial governors of the former
regime. When the Hedong jiedushi Shi Jingtang went to court upon the accession of
Feidi, one of the emperor's retainers advised Jing,tang's detention. Two other advisors
counselled against this, and Jingtang was allowed to return to his seat at Taiyuan. In the
XW the argument used is that Jingtang and Yanshou could not be detained because they
25. Mingzong was making a trenchant point: those who changed their master were not noted for asking
permission first.
26. His posts of military secretary and manager of affairs were given to Zhu Hongzhao, then a jiedushi.
Hongzhao also feared Congrong's wrath as he had helped to bring down An Chonghui, and therefore declined
the appointment.
27. JW 44:609-10; TJ 278: 9091ff.
28. 934:1, llth February.
29. 934:5, 21st June.
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are married to Tang princesses (§32.) In the TJ the counsellors say Jingtang should not
be detained 'because Zhao Yanshou is at Bian.' In other words, Yanshou might react
badly to such an expression of suspicion. This could be difficult as not only did Yanshou
have the forces of Bian at his disposal dangerously close to the capital, his father Dejun
also controlled a strong army at Youzhou, ideally placed for an alliance with Shi
Jingtang." Between the three of them, they controlled about half of the Central Plains
north of the Yellow River and had a foothold close to the capita1. 31
 Now Yanshou has
become one of those against whom the emperor's interests have to be protected.
Ten months later, in 935:3, Yanshou was moved south to be Zhongwu Fk,f4 jiedushi
and at the same time brought back to court as military secretary (§33-34.) Thus he
combined technically one of the highest court positions with another of the regional
commands neighbouring the capital. In fact, Yanshou's position was being undermined.
Zhongwu was strategically less important than Xuanwu, lacking the waterway
communications with the capital that Bian had, and the military secretary appointment
proved simply to be a means of getting him back to court where an eye could be kept on
him, for although his old worries Congrong and Meng Hanqiong were both dead,
Yanshou was still ineffective in the job. Meanwhile, increasing powers were accruing to
the commissioners of palace attendants. Liu Yanlang gig01 held both northern and
southern offices successively, whilst remaining shumi fushi 4, gr,vidit (vice-
commissioner of the military secretariat) under Yanshou and his fellow commissioner
Fang Hao gX. Hao had a habit of sleeping through meetings and going along with
whatever those with power or influence suggested. Liu Yanlang thus had significant
influence in the military secretariat and at the same time control over many minor officials
who performed important functions, such as carrying messages and serving as envoys.'
He was effectively in charge at court and also a notorious bribe-taker. Yanshou did little
to prevent this corruption or the loss of the military secretaries' powers, even though the
emperor's visits to Yanshou's private residence appear to speak for a close relationship.33
It is possible that Yanshou was simply not interested in court power, for when we next
meet him he is again trying to be relieved of the military secretaryship.
30. Cf. Wang, appendix: The alliance of Ho-tung and Ho-pei in Wu-tai history, pp.208-15.
31. The following month Dejun was made prince of Beiping i1 .41. JW 46:636. This did not give him any
extra territorial or military power, but it nevertheless served as a reward and encouragement to continue in his
allegiance to the new regime.
32. Wang, p.154.
33. This aspect of court life would repay further study, which cannot be undertaken here.
173
Chapter 5 - Zhao Yategwii
The war against Shi Jingtang ;EagY,
By 936:9, Feidi was four months into a struggle with Shi Jingtang for the empire.
Jingtang had turned to the Liao for help and their army had defeated the Tan
expeditionary force under Zhang Jingda 3Kag . This had been besieging .Jingtane§
base of Taiyuan-Jinyang PA, but was now itself placed under siege in its camp jug
 to
the south at Jin'an A relief force had to be sent and Lu Wenji Axle,
recommended that a 'close minister' be placed in charge of it (§39.) He was backed by
Zhang Yanlang 4kgpA, one of the few power-holders close to Yanshou. Yanlang, along
with He Ning fra proposed that Yanshou be the 'close minister' to be sent, as be
would then be able to join up with the Youzhou army of his father, Dejun, already
heading for Jin' an. Despite the obvious fears which such a familial concentration of
forces might have aroused, 'none dared to say anything different,' and on 12th October
Yanshou was given the temporary expeditionary post of dubushu pm,7, (chief
administrator of the imperial quarters), and ordered to Luzhou with 20,000 troops
(§40-41.) Just over a month later, between 17th and 20th November, Yanshou was
appointed nan mian xingying zhaotaoshi i*i .fri-tEs-illt (expeditionary punitive
commissioner for the southern region) 34 of Hedong dao td: (circuit), with Zhang Li 41RM
as his panguan fli tg (administrative assistant.) On 21st November Fan Yanguang was
given the punitive commissionership for southeastern Hedong, whilst Zhao Dejun was
placed in overall charge as zhu dao xingying dutong ron---mia (overall
expeditionary campaign commander.) The following day, the increasingly powerful
commissioner of palace attendants and vice-commissioner of the military secretariat, Liu
Yanlang, was made nan mian xingying zhaotao fushiW-fi
-MEitYliillt (deputy
expeditionary punitive commissioner for the southern region.) This placed him under
Yanshou's command, but would also have had the effect of enabling the power-holders
to breath down Yanshou's neck. Although his initial expeditionary appointment bespeaks
a victory for the court party which had adopted him, the present mistrust of Yanshou was
entirely in keeping with the attitude towards him expressed by those advising over the
detention of Shi Jingtang at court in 934. Both past counsel and present actions reflected
different approaches to the same concern: that Shi Jingtang and Zhao Yanshou, as
provincial magnates, were potentially dangerous. Whatever strategy was employed in
relations with them was driven by that essential fear.
Nevertheless, Yanshou was under orders to join up with Dejun, orders which had the
approval of at least some of the ruling group. He accomplished the link-up at Xitang
34. Northern Hedong was in Jingtang's hands.
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NA35 on 22nd November (§43), and from this point until Dejun's death, Yanshou is
almost constantly at his father's side. Whilst Yanshou is never mentioned as contributing
to the decision making, he at least went along willingly-With Dejun's plans. Dejun had
been trying to increase his forces over the last couple of months,' but was reluctant to
carry out his appointed task of relieving Jin'an (§44-46.) This hesitation sharpened the
concern of the court, which harassed Dejun to advance with successive edicts. It was not
until Dejun received his appointment as overall campaign commander - on the same day
that he met up with Yanshou - that Dejun showed willing by leading his forces north to
camp at Tuanboyu NM:6, 100 li south of Jinyang. There he remained, however, for
over a month, doing nothing to relieve the seige of Jin' an. At the same time he repeatedly
asked for Yanshou to be made Chengde atit jiedushi, ostensibly to look after Dejun's
affairs in Youzhou while he was away on campaign. Chengde was essentially the old
territory of Zhao kft, neighbouring Youzhou, and the appointment would have given the
Zhaos an extremely solid base in the north, with legitimately held titles. Feidi already
seems to have had his doubts about Dejun, which must have been confirmed by these
requests. In an angry outburst the emperor makes it clear that he suspects a plot with the
ICitan and predicts a disastrous end for it.37
It is not clear just when Dejun did start communicating with the Kitan, as the texts
suggest different timings, and all tend to inform their record with a strong sense of what
was to come (§47, cf. §37.) Yanshou maintains a low profile in this except in the Ti,
where he is named as the otherwise anonymous envoy on the decisive mission sent by
Dejun to the ICitan. According to the Ti's especially detailed account, Yanshou went to
the Kitan imperial camp sometime between 17th and 24th December, and offered there
everything that the Tang ruler had bestowed upon Dejun, along with first a false letter and
then a secret one containing Dejun's real suggestions, accompanied by further gifts of
gold and silk. Dejun requested Kitan sponsorship for the emperorship of the Middle
Kingdom, in return for the conquest of Luoyang and the south, and fraternal relations
with the new emperor - himself. In generous mood, he allows that Shi Jingtang could be
left with a permanent seat in Hedong. In making this suggestion at this point Dejun seems
to be about a month behind in his understanding of events. Shi Jingtang was already the
invested emperor of Later Jin and he had a brotherly agreement with the Kitan, supported
by the promise of a significant parcel of land, the Sixteen prefectures. Dejun's offer
seems badly timed and did not match the deal already struck with Shi Jingtang, but
35. Or Xitang dian
36. Liu Zaiming 211TE RA and Hua/Don,g Wenqi 	 / It joined him in 936:10; he tried to get Fan Yanguang
to join him the following month. JW 48:666, 98:1309, 106:1396; TJ 280:9152-3.
37. He refers to a story from the Zhanguo ce
	 50, in which the swiftest dog in the world chased the most
cunning hare in the world until they both dropped dead. TJ 280:9155.
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Jingtang feared a change of plan and sent Sang Weihan AM.,51 to defend the original
agreement (§48.)
Where the JW and XW take this as sufficient explanation, the TJ goes on to explain
that the Liao were indeed tempted by Dejun's offer, and quotes the debate between
Weihan and Liao Taizong. Weihan argues that the Zhaos are giving poor service to the
Tang; that they are incapable of loyalty and covetous to the last, thus negating any service
they may have rendered to their lord. Conversely, he says, the Jin will make generous
payments to the Kitan, implying that the Zhaos have little to offer in comparison.
Your great nation has raised a righteous army to help the unaided in danger, (and) in one battle
the Tang troops have fallen apart and withdrawn to defend a palisade, where their food is used up
and their strength exhausted. Zhao Beiping J..nz father and son are disloyal and untrustworthy,
[Hit Sanxing note: ....What is meant is that they are disloyal to the Tang and cannot be trusted
by the Kitan.] they fear the strength of your great nation but always harbour their own
ambitions, keeping back their troops and watching how the situation develops. They are not ones
who would serve their country to the death; they are not worth fearing and you should not believe
their lying, cheating words. They are greedy for the tiniest profit, and have thrown away the
merit they have gained (in the past)! However (if you) let the Jin gain the tianxia they will
devote the wealth of the Middle Kingdom to the service of the great nation; how can this be
likened to that small profit!
The argument is a complex one. Great emphasis is placed on the disloyalty of the
Zhaos. Sima and his colleagues detested disloyalty in officials and were unlikely to miss
such opportunities for comment as were provided by their sources. 38
 For Weihan,
though, it is a curious card to play, considering that his lord Shi Jingtang was himself a
former servant of the Tang, and had rebelled against them openly. 39 Weihan is obviously
not going to regard Jingtang's behaviour as disloyal, because he believes (and the
historiographers know) that Jingtang has the will of heaven on his side. In contrast, the
unfaithfulness of the Zhaos is stressed by Weihan, and can be stressed by the
historiographers, because it is believed by the one, and known by the others, that they
did not have the Mandate. On another level, Weihan is implying that the Zhaos are
generally unreliable, and thus likely to be no more trustworthy with the Liao than they
were with the Tang. That the Liao emperor subscribed to some such thinking is
suggested by numerous instances in which he shows respect for those who loyally held
out against him, and criticised or punished those who changed sides.' The second part
38. As pointed out by Chan, T'ung-chien, pp.17-18.
39. Weihan was a jinshi, and had been part of Jingtang's regional staff since around 931. (.TW 75:981,
89:1162; Wang, pp.157-8, 176.) As such, Weihan had in some sense transferred his loyalty from the Tang to
Jingtang himself.
40. The most immediate examples are Taizong's respect for the firm loyalty of the Tang commander in Jin'an,
Zhang Jingda, and his criticism of those who murdered Jingda in order to surrender to the Liao; and subsequently
Taizong's execution of the Kitan guards who had years before taken service with Zhao Dejun. TJ 280:9157-8,
9160; JW 137:1833, 98:1310; QG 2:17, 16:163; LS 3:39. The QG and LS retain the praise of Zhang Jingda
without the criticism of his murderers; the LS does not mention the killing of the Kitan guards.
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of Weihan's argument makes clear just how central were immediate, material benefits to
inter-state relations in this period. Clearly Jingtang and his advisors believed that the
Kitan would respond to the offer of 'the wealth of the Middle Kingdom,' but in fact this
does not work. Taizong apologises that although he has never reneged on an agreement,
he cannot ignore the advice of his military experts, who say there is no alternative but to
accept Dejun's offer. In the end though, Weihan does persuade Taizong to maintain the
original agreement.4'
It must have been only days after Yanshou returned from the Liao camp that events
climaxed. On 25th December, inside the besieged Jin'an, Yang Guangyuan 6)16 cut
off the head of the stubbornly loyal Zhang Jingda and surrendered the fortress to the
Kitan. Taizong buried Jingda with full rites, then made the delayed push south, with the
army now swelled by the surrendered Tang troops from Jin'an. On 28th December they
fought with the Tang army based at Tuanboyu, and led by Zhao Dejun (49-50.) The
Zhaos, father and son, fled before anybody else, and were then followed by others of the
high command, including Liu Yanlang, 42
 leaving their troops to be slaughtered to the
number of 10,000. 43
 The defeat of the 'northern army' had the desired effect in Luoyang
of creating panic and a mass flight from the city, while Dejun and Yanshou led the Tang
army's flight south to Luzhou. Gao Xingzhou A-fiN, a Tang general who had tried to
prevent the murder of Zhang Jingda in Jin'an, was now Zhaoyi Eua jiedushi under the
allies,' and Luzhou was his seat. Arriving there, he spoke to Dejun and Yanshou, up on
the defending wall, as a fellow Youzhou person. He offered his 'honest advice' that as
there was no food in the city, the Zhaos would do best to surrender swiftly to Shi
Jingtang, 'the emperor.'45
When Jingtang (Jin Gaozu) and Taizong reached Luzhou on 4th January, the Zhaos
surrendered (§51, 53.) Each account slants the information according to its own agenda.
In the JW, the Tang annals say that Gaozu was accompanied by the 'foreign king'
(rongwang and thus emphasise the non-Chinese alliance. The Jin annals make no
mention of a Kitan presence at the surrender, while the biographies of Dejun and
Yanshou, and the ICitan section, all declare that the surrender was to the Kitan.' Hence,
41. The Luozhong ji yi lu MAII2A0z, quoted in LSJSBM 12:286-7, contains a different ending to the story. In
this, Yanshou presents a counter-argument to Jingtang's objections, which results in Taizong burning
Jingtang's letter and appointing Yanshou to govern Youzhou.
42. At this point it seems that none of the leaders submitted to the enemy; we know that the Zhaos did not
because we are told later of their surrender.
43. This could simply be a nominal figure, meaning 'very many,' but it makes the point.
44. TJ 280:9157-58. Once Jin'an fell, Xingzhou had himself changed sides.
45. There may be an edge to Xingzhou's advice in that it had been Dejun who had sponsored Xingzhou's early
career in Tang, recommending him to the youthful Li Siyuan (Mingzong.) JW 123:1612.
46. Dejun's biography adds that Gaozu arrived later.
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however much the southern annals might stress the role of Gaozu in the surrender, to the
biographers of the Zhaos, their later departure to the northern court outweighed any
Chinese involvement. The TJ relates the complete submi§sion of the Zhaos, who do not
wait for the two emperors to arrive, but go out to meet them at Gaohe i iff. As in the JW
biography, the TJ has them meeting Gaozu 'at the head of his horse;' in other words,
they bow to him before he even has time to dismount, a formula used to indicate great
respect and submission. The LS, now evidently drawing on independent information,
tells a quite different story, saying that Dejun and Yanshou were still in flight, and
surrendered when the Kitan caught up with them. This removes the gentlemanly feel of
the surrender conveyed by the other sources, and does not allow for Gao Xingzhou's
advice. It also greatly reduces the element of volition in the Zhaos' crossing, so that,
according to the categories defined in Chapter 2, what had been a voluntary crossing
becomes one under so much duress that it could almost be classified as involuntary.47
Dejun's JW biography relates that, although greeted respectfully, Gaozu treated Dejun
without any courtesy, while Taizong had Dejun's Kitan guard killed." The Ti makes
more of the meeting. Taizong is said to have given the Zhaos a 'consolatory edict' and
this generosity contrasts with Gaozu's reaction to them during their audience, provoked
by their behaviour:
going into an audience, they said, 'After we part will there be good fortune or bad?' The emperor
did not turn his head and also did not speak to them. [Hu Sanxing note: Because they wanted to
compete (with him) to be emperor, he resented them.]
It is not clear exactly to what this refers, but it may be a request by the Zhaos to know
their fate. Gaozu's reaction indicates that they are unlikely to find favour under him, and
this is evidently why Dejun and Yanshou are taken into service by the Liao instead. All
sources except the LS" say that they were chained before they were taken away, which is
odd as one would expect such treatment to be more likely for those surrendering on the
battlefield than for those submitting more freely, but it could be that this was a reflection
of Gaozu's mistrust, transmitted to his Liao ally.
As a servant of the Liao
Dejun died the year after arriving in Liao, 5° which would be in early 938. Yanshou then
47. The problems created by the case of the Zhaos are reflected in the different phrasings found in the sources,
and even in different versions of the story in the same source, which between them place the Zhaos in all the
categories distinguished in Chapter 2. See Table 1, #55, 56.
48. A reflection of the Kitan attitude to taking service against one's original master.
49. This instead provides a unique note that Taizong inspected the camp of the surrendered army as he began his
journey back to the north.
50. It is implied he dies from shame, as a result of an interview with the Shulti empress dowager tM± in
which he offers her his lands in Youzhou. She points out that the Liao already hold these at the gift of Ski
Jingtang, and therefore Dejun is presumptuous indeed to present them again to their owner. JW 98:1310; XW
178
Chapter 5 - Zhao Yanshou
succeeded to Dejun' s old position of Youzhou jiedushi, and was made prince of Yan
(§54, 56.) In 938:11 Taizong declared the Huitong reign era and made many
administrative changes, including the promotion of You-ihou to be Nanjing, making a
third capital. People from the Middle Kingdom were given employment alongside Kitan,
and Yanshou was among them. He became military secretary, and was thus restored to
his Later Tang post, at least nominally. The job of military secretary under the Liao,
whilst important, could not have quite the significance that had been possible under the
Wudai regimes, because in Liao the office was still only a bureaucratic position
subordinate to a ruling group comprised largely of imperial clan members." According to
the LS, Yanshou was not made military secretary for some years yet (§102), and in 938
became instead liushou (vicegerent) of the new capital Nanjing as well as being put
'in charge of all affairs south of the mountains' (zong shannan shi #1111-1-1A*-)
Whatever the posts he held, there are several indications that Yanshou was highly
placed and highly regarded by the Liao. The envoys from Jin always brought rich
presents for
the Yingtian empress dowager fitst e, the yuanshliai Tail] [marshal]-heir apparent, the prince
of Wei
	 the two princes of the north and south [74k=7., Han Yanhui Witt Zhao
Yanshou and all the other great ministers (§57.)
The envoys were Chastised if the presents were not rich enough. Han Yanhui and Zhao
Yanshou are the only Chinese mentioned by name in this list. The people who precede
them are all senior members of the Kitan power structure and imperial clan. Yanshou
must have been one of the most prominent Chinese servants of the Liao at this time. As a
mark of the regard in which he was held, we may note that a little while after his
appointment, an envoy was sent to Luoyang" to collect Yanshou's wife, who had been
left behind when Yanshou was sent north (§58.) Whilst the JW annals record a gift of
horses given by Yanshou in thanks for this, the LS says that he repaid the gesture by
giving his all in the service of Liao Taizong, suggesting he had been done a great favour.
Presumably the recovery of Yanshou's wife, though probably a formality between allies,
was nevertheless eased by imperial intervention."
It was also doubtless a mark of seniority that, in the LS for 940, Taizong not only
paid a visit to Yanshou's residence, but also held court there (§60.) Here, amongst other
72:894; TJ 280:9160-1; QG 2:18, 16:163. From Dejun's JW biography and the QG annals it appears that
Yanshou was present at this interview, but Dejun received all the blame.
51. There is insufficient information to be entirely sure how even the mature Liao administrative structure
worked, let alone to explain its development. In this period it seems that there was only a single shumiyuan,
although there do appear to have been two shumishi in charge of it. Yang. Qidan zheng,zhi zhidu, p.134.
52. No longer the capital, which was moved to Bianzhou.
53. The need for imperial intervention may speak for the extra control which could be exercised over a frontier
between allies, see Chapters 1 and 9.
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activities, he made Yanshou zhengshiling gt -S-A.- (director of the department of
administration), reverting to an older name for the function and position of zhongshuling
1 :1 1t4- (director of the imperial secretariat.) 54
 This official was the other leading
bureaucrat in the Liao regime, alongside the military secretary. 55
 According to the other
sources Yanshou was granted this position concurrently with his military secretaryship
and jiedushi posting, making him effectively in charge of southern affairs. As the LS has
already noted that Yanshou was placed 'in charge of all affairs south of the mountains' in
938, it is possible that granting the title of director of the department of administration
was simply an adjustment of terminology to match Central Plains usage more closely,
and involved no change in responsibilities.56
Yanshou and the Liao-Jin war
Yanshou did nothing remarkable for the next four years. Then, after the death of Jingtang
and the succession of his son (temple name: Chudi fEf-ffi'') in 942:6, relations between
Jin and Liao rapidly deteriorated as Chudi repudiated the subordinate relationship his
father had had with Liao Taizong, thus provoking the wrath of the Kitan. 57 This story
cannot be found in the JW annals, but comes chiefly from the biography of the main
power at court at the time, Jing Yanguang AgA. 58
 It is ignored by the XW, but picked
up by the Ti, which is also the first to record that in 942:12, Yanshou advised an attack
on the south, because he 'wanted to replace the Jin as emperor of the Middle Kingdom'
(§62.) On hearing that the Kitan were about to invade, Chudi prepared his defences
whilst continuing to talk and the situation remained static for nearly a year. Then, in
943:9, the Qiao Rong r4. -A incident (§63) provoked Taizong beyond patience and, by the
by, gave Yanshou the opportunity it is claimed he was waiting for.
Qiao Rong was a Liao trading official. According to Jing Yanguang's JW biography,
when the Liao protested that Chudi did not call himself their subject, Yanguang sent a
message via Rong saying that as Chudi, unlike Gaozu, had not been set up by the Liao,
there was no reason for him to subordinate himself. He also added an explicit military
challenge, saying,
54. The post was called zhengshiling before 926, then zhongshuling until Yanshou's appointment According
to LS 47:774-5, this was in 942, not 940. Also WF p.485.
55. Yang, Qidan zhengzhi zhidu, pp.143ff.
56. The post of director of the imperial secretariat under the Liao appears to have involved certain ritual duties
which were not part of the job in the Central Plains. (Yang, Qidan zhengzhi zhidu, p.144.) This is the only
obvious potential change to Yanshou's responsibilities.
57. TJ 283:9242-3; LS 4:52; JW 88:11-14.
58. JW 88:1044. The annals give the impression that the war was a result of Yang Guangyuan's rebellion and a
Kitan invasion. JW 81:1068-82:1085.
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If the grandfather [Liao Taizong] gets angry, then let him come and fight; his grandson [Jin
Chudi] has 100,000 naked swords: enough to receive him.
The TJ makes a great deal more of the story, describing how Yanguang had previously
advised the imprisonment of Rong and the killing of the Liao merchants in Jin, and it
turns the report of the message into a full-scale interview between Yanguang and Rong.
This adds to the JW account, including the following,
The emperor of the northern court should not believe Zhao Yanshou's deceits and beguilements
and insult the Middle Kingdom. The soldiers and horses of the Middle Kingdom, you have seen
with your own eyes.
This specific attack on Yanshou shows that Yanguang, at least, perceived Yanshou to be
powerful in the Liao regime, and a traitor. The TJ has told us that Rong had come over to
Liao with Yanshou, so Yanguang is insulting Rong's old master, but it seems odd that
Yanshou's name should be mentioned at all. Yanshou is not of direct relevance at this
point, and it is unlikely that Yanguang could have known that Yanshou was pressing for
an attack on Jin, even if it was true. It is, we recall, the TJ which tells us this. Aside from
contributing to the Tr s negative picture of Yanshou, the mention of his name places in
the same passage the single minister on each side who is said to have pressed hardest for
war. Left to himself, it is possible that Chudi would not have acted so provocatively, and
it does seem that Taizong was not as enthusiastic as he might have been. Hence the
responsibility for the 943-7 wars is shifted subtly from the emperors to their servants.59
Where the LS merely says that Taizong went to Nanjing to discuss punishing the Jin -
leaving us to work out that he was probably consulting Yanshou 6° - in the TJ Yanshou is
said to 'urge' an attack (64-65.) He was placed in charge of the armies and the planning
for the campaign, and was offered the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom if he
succeeded in its conquest (§66.) As a result of this, in the Central Plains sources though
not the LS, Yanshou is said to have become extremely diligent in his service of the Liao.
As far as Yanshou was concerned he was only claiming what had been promised to his
father, and was thus rightfully his. He does not seem concerned about turning to a
'barbarian' ruler for his ultimate sanction and legitimation. Since the failure of Dejun's
bid for empire in 937, the Zhao family had not had the independent control of armies
sufficient to set itself up again at the top level of territorial politics. But now Yanshou was
the legitimately appointed official of the most powerful regime of his day, conducting
what was considered from the north as a punitive invasion of a quasi-rebellious
59. The TJ makes it clear that Chudi acted under the influence of Yanguang. If Taizong was keen to fight he
would surely have pressed ahead his attack at the beginning of 943 and not continued to negotiate through the
autumn. Blaming the ministers may reflect the line that Sima and his kind were obliged to tread at the Song
court, where criticism of the emperor was not always easy and powerful ministers directed policy and were thus
the legitimate objects of criticism. See Chan, Official historiography, pp.19-25.
60. Vicegerent of Nanjing.
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subordinate power. Yanshou was in charge of a large army again. Any gains for himself
were underwritten by the backing of the Liao emperor 61
 which placed him in a strong
position vis-a-vis any potential rivals for control of the Central Plains, including the Jin
house itself. As the Wudai period showed time and again, sustaining autonomous
operation required the utmost in skill, military power and ability, pragmatism,
imagination, talent and luck. Yanshou's earlier career shows that he was lacking in at
least some of these areas and in any case, the situation was, relatively speaking, a lot
more stable than it had been even five years before. Greater stability meant fewer
opportunities for autonomous powers to arise, and the Liao military system did not
provide the same potential as the Central Plains regimes for establishing regional power
bases. Tenth-century dynastic founders all began as servants of the previous regime; in
persevering in gaining imperial backing for his desires, Yanshou was following old
patterns.
The campaign began well with a drive deep into Jin territory which captured Beizhou
141 without a pitched battle (§67-71.) As Liao supporting attacks hit all across the north
of Jin, 62 the vanguard camped at Yuancheng 5-Eti in Weizhou 41'1 in 944:1, preparing
to cross the Yellow River. There Yanshou was made WeiBo riljiedushi and prince of
Wei EtL recognising the achievements so far. The LS biography reinforces these by
telling of a Jin defeat by Yanshou, who captured the general Sai Xiangyu al.R, 63 and
continuing,
.... the Jin generals Li Shouzhen
	 and Gao Xingzhou led their troops to come and give
battle, (and) they were destroyed (by Yanshou.)
Or at least, that is what it appears to say. In fact, every other source, including the LS
annals, makes it quite clear that it was Shouzhen who defeated the Liao (at Majiakou
14M1E1), and that the Liao commander on this occasion was not Yanshou, but the Kitan
general Mada M.M. The sentence in the LS biography is written with just sufficient
ambiguity that, following on from the previous mention of the capture of Sai Xiangyu, it
converts defeat into victory and changes the identity of a general. Such skilled
construction suggests that the ambiguity was deliberate." We might expect Yanshou's
61. As had been those of Shi Jingtang.
62. JW 82:1085; Ti 283:9261-2; XW 9:93; the LS (4:53) puts events in a more logical order, placing some of
the northern attacks before the advance to Beizhou.
63. It seems probable that the incident described in the LS biography refers to the pre-battle skirmish on the
Yellow River at Majiadu g*S recorded in the JW and TJ, in which a Jin general named as Cal Xingyu gfilg
was captured (Table 1, #74.) From the circumstantial and phonetic similarities it is possible that he and Sal
Xiangyu might be the same person. There is little chance of confusing the characters for the two names, and
clearly pronunciation has changed since the tenth century, but if the two generals were to be identified as one,
this could suggest some element of oral transmission at some stage in the historiographical process.
64. A further example of this is the implication in the LS annals for 946:9 that Yanshou defeated Zhang Yanze
ILI at Dingzhou, when the other sources all report a Kitan defeat with no mention of Yanshou.
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LS biography to be friendly towards him, but that it was felt necessary to make such a
drastic change to events rather than simply ignoring them suggests a biographer
scratching about for positive material.
After about five weeks in camp, Taizong tried to lead the Jin into an ambush, but the
Jin were stopped by heavy rain, leaving the ambushing force in place for ten days with
hunger and fatigue sapping their morale. It is apparently in response to this situation that
Yanshou suggests taking the bridge at Shanzhou /1-4,1,1 65 in order to pacify the tianxia
(§73-74.) Yanshou's grasp of strategy was sound: the capture of Shanzhou would
provide a bridgehead across the River into the heart of the Central Plains, and expose the
capital, Bian, but in the battle at Qicheng gig which followed on about 27th March, Gao
Xingzhou led an unexpectedly strong Jin defence. The Central Plains sources describe a
Kitan withdrawal, while the LS, in both annals and Yanshou's biography, claim a Jin
defeat. Whatever really happened, this battle ended serious campaigning for the season,"
and the Liao lost the foothold they had gained at Beizhou.
Nine months later in 944:intercalary 12, Yanshou led another major attack on Jin, but
it was only brief. Sources from the XW onwards add to the unexceptional account of
military advance in the JW with notes of pillage; a small point, but one implicating
Yanshou in the destruction of his homeland (§77.) A battle between scouting forces near
Xiangzhou tIP1s1 at Yulin dian #11fIzJ led Taizong to withdraw northwards, while the
defenders pulled back from Xiangzhou to Liyang V zr , leaving Fu Yanlun T.Iff{A with
500 troops to defend the bridge over the AnyanggZ-I '4*. Rather than trying to hold the
bridge, he fortified Xiangzhou itself, and confronted a force of Kitan cavalry with a show
of good morale on the city walls (§78.) The Liao then prepared for battle, so Yanlun lined
up his 500 troops against them, at which the Liao moved off as he had predicted. The DAT
says there were 'over 10,000' Kitan cavalry, but the TJ claims 'several tens of
thousands,' and that they were led by Yanshou. 67 The increased enemy numbers
emphasise the courage of the defenders, whilst the involvement of Yanshou is another
reminder that he is a traitor to the Middle Kingdom.
The Jin now took the offensive. 68
 Yanshou led the Liao army north via Hengzhou
Mil, and reached Qizhou njii in late March or early April 945 (§80.) The prefect (cishi
Iiis), Shen Yun ttW, attacked them, only to lose the gates of his city to the elite Kitan
cavalry. Yanshou knew Yun and tried to persuade him to surrender:
65. Shanyuan ail; Shanzhou is not on the River. Place-names are frequently used rather loosely in the texts.
66. Skirmishes continued. JW 82:1088-83:1098; Ti 283:9268-284:9279; LS 4:54-5.
67. It also adds that Yanshou first bypassed Xiangzhou, then turned back there for fear of being caught in the
rear by a Jin army under Zhang Yanze. Ti 284:9282.
68. JW 83:1100-1; TJ 284:9283-4.
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Shen Shijun fEtS [serving his lord] is from the same hometown as me. If you can choose your
misfortune, it is better to choose the lighter; if you bring your city to surrender sooner (rather
than later), you will bring no disgrace to yourself.
But Yun responded by berating Yanshou from the top of the city wall:
[You and your father] miscalculated and fell into the hands of the Kitan, you have mercilessly
brought the hosts of the sheep-reeking tents to destroy the homeland of your father and mother,
and you do not feel ashamed of yourself; on the contrary you have the appearance of somebody
pleased with their virtuous behaviour. Shen Yun would rather die for country and family, and
certainly will not imitate what you have done.
Yun does indeed die for his defiant loyalty (by his own hand), but this passage
encapsulates the dilemma faced by Wudai officials by presenting the two main viewpoints
and options in a single exchange. Who is the better off: the loyal suicide, going to his
grave with an easy conscience and confident that he will be remembered as an adherent to
the virtuous path; or the living frontier-crosser, ambition yet unsatisfied, who, even if his
own conscience is clear or non-existent, may well be remembered to posterity as a
wicked man? The exchange appears in all the texts except the LS, 69
 so Shen Yun' s
viewpoint is not simply a neo-Confucian emphasis. Nevertheless, the Ti editors could
not have hoped for a better contrast to Yanshou's approach.
In 945:3 the Jin counter-attack drove into Liao territory and heavily defeated the Liao
army at Botuanwei cun *Mt, near Dingzhou (§82-84.) Taizong ordered all his
chieftains to be beaten in punishment for the defeat, sparing only Yanshou, perhaps
because he had been promised the emperorship. A couple of months later the LS annals
have him reporting that one of his generals drove off a Jin attack on Gaoyang j . It
seems that just before Botuanwei cun, the Jin had written to Yanshou inviting him to
return to Jin allegiance, and as Yanshou appeared interested, the invitation was repeated
on subsequent occasions." In 946:7, after another year of inconclusive fighting,'
Yanshou was approached again (§85-90.) He said that he 'would like to come home to
the Middle Kingdom,' 72 and would do so if an army was sent to meet him, and this was
eagerly arranged. Thus, according to the LS, Yanshou was able to trick the Jin out of
their strongholds as a large army was sent out under Du Chongwei fiRJA and Li
Shouzhen. After some skirmishes, Chongwei fought his way to possession of Zhongdu
cpg, but the Liao cut his supply lines and began to starve him out." The LS, unlike the
other sources, is careful to note Yanshou's active involvement in the fighting (§86.)
69. In the JW and XIN it is in Shen Ytuis biography, not the annals.
70. The sources are not clear as to the exact sequence or dating of the letters. See esp. PAT 84:1118.
71. JW 84:1110-16; TJ 284:9293-285:9306; LS 4:56-7.
72. The LS gives a sentence in which the meaning of fling 7% is ambiguous: 'I fell into captivity a long time
ago, how could I [or: I prefer to] forget the country of my parents.' The effect on the Jin is the same in each case.
73. JW 85:1121-3; TJ 285:9312-18; LS 4:57-8, 76:1248.
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Chongwei surrendered on 4th January, 947, having sounded out the Liao in advance
(§9I-92.) Taizong gave encouragement by offering him the emperorship of the Middle
Kingdom in place of Yanshou. According to the TJ, faizong said this was because
Yanshou' s
prestige up to the present has been slight, (so) I fear he is not able to be emperor over the Middle
Kingdom.
In fact, there was no intention whatsoever of giving Chongwei the emperorship, but
neither does it seem that Taizong was willing to give it to Yanshou. Both contenders were
given red robes in which to go to the Jin camp, and Taizong handed the defeated army
over to Yanshou, saying, 'They're all yours;' 74
 but it was Taizong, not Yanshou, who
entered Bian 'in all things as an emperor,' who received the surrenders of the Jin court
officials, and who held court."
During this court session Yanshou, with Zhang Li, was involved in the 'hat incident,'
and in recommending the former Jin minister Li Song for office (§94-95.) These were
discussed in the previous chapter, where it was suggested that self-interest was an
important factor in the recommendation. However, there are also stories from this period
showing Yanshou in a more altruistic light. The first is a tiny mention in the JW
biography of Feng Dao Mt_g
 (§93), who led the Jin officials to surrender to the Liao. At
court in Bian, Feng Dao advised Taizong that only the emperor could help his people.
After that the officials did not come to any harm, and this was all achieved through the protection
and patronage of them by Dao and Zhao Yanshou.
Another story comes from the DDSL:
Liu Wensou gala served the Jin as a Hanlin scholar. When the Kitan took the capital,
Wensou was afraid to follow the Kitan and move north. Along with the chengzhi g [recipient
of edicts] Zhang Yun 311C he begged to be relieved of his post. The Kitan ruler was angry, and
wanted to demote them to be county magistrates. Zhao Yanshou said, 'The scholars are not
competent in their posts and are begging to be relieved of their difficulties, it is appropriate to
remove them from their positions.' He managed to get them off being demoted.76
However, the most famous incident is Yan.shou's rescue of the Jin army from massacre
(PT)
Du Chongwei's troops had not wanted to surrender, but had wept and ground their
teeth." Taizong was so worried that they would rebel that he wanted to exterminate them
74. This is the TJ version; the PN biography says, 'The Chinese troops are all in your possession, you had
better go in person to sort them out.' There is no such comment in the other sources. The LS annals say that the
surrendered army was split between Yanshou and Chongwei.
75. JW 85:1126, 137:1835; TJ 286:9327-30; LS 4:58-9.
76. Quoted in the LSSY 20:387-8.
77. TJ 285:9318-9; also Du Chongwei's JW biography, 109:1435.
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and be rid of the problem. The sources record a long conversation in which Yanshou is
cast in the role of wise minister advising the emperor.. He says,
'I have seen that before today the emperor has been in many battles and on many campaigns and
only now has taken the state of Jin; (but) I don't know if the emperor wants to govern it (Jin)
himself, or (if he conquered it) in order that others may take it?' The (emperor) coloured in anger
and said, `.... You had better tell Us quickly what you are trying to say!'
Yanshou then points out the danger from the states of Wu 54 and Shu -E in the south,
and the need for defences. He offers to organise these and suggests that the troops at
Chenqiao 11
 are ideal for the purpose. The emperor raises an objection, but Yanshou
has a ready solution, prompting the emperor to exclaim, 'Excellent! Only a great prince
could have managed it like this!' 78 All the elements of the formula appear in this passage:
the minister says something enigmatic which provokes the emperor's anger but also his
curiosity, and the minister then explains some clever course of action which resolves the
emperor's problem in an imaginative way and is an improvement, morally, on the
original plan. Although the TJ has so far been somewhat negative towards Yanshou it
does not detract from his behaviour on this occasion, 79
 and the commentary to Yanshou' s
biography in the QG goes so far as to say that it shows his loyal and honest disposition.
However, later in the same month (947:1) the Ti records that Yanshou's request for
supplies for his Liao troops was refused with the explanation that the Kitan did not have
this custom, after which the Liao indulged in a period of pillaging called 'smashing the
pasture and grain' (§99.)8° It is unfortunate for Yanshou that he is thus associated with an
act which seems designed to demonstrate the barbarity of the invaders, and this is
followed up when during the TJ account of the Liao withdrawal north even Taizong turns
on Yanshou to blame him for the destruction caused by the war. 81
 It was also the TJ
which first mentioned Yanshou's enthusiasm for the war.
Imperial ambitions
Yanshou had not forgotten that Taizong had promised him the emperorship, and with
nothing forthcoming, finally in 947:2 he got Li Song to make enquiries on his behalf
(§101.) It was suggested in Chapter 4 that Song had been in some sense set up for this
purpose, and the JW and Ti reinforce this by saying that Song 'could not but' do as
78. The previous passage is quoted from the JW biography, but this sentence is from the Ti, as the rewrite
found there is clearer in meaning. The TJ has heavily edited this whole passage for style, but the emphasis does
not appear to have been changed.
79. In contrast, Hu Sanxing's note states that Yanshou acts not for any laudable reason, but simply in order to
sound out Taizong's intentions regarding his promise to make Yanshou emperor in the Central Plains. TJ
286:9331. To sustain this interpretation takes too much effort for it to be credible.
80. The Kitan troops foraged for themselves and did not rely upon supplies provided centrally. WF p.560n. See
Zhao Guangyuan, Da caoyu.
81. Zhang Li was also implicated, see Chapter 4.
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Yanshou wished, which was to ask that he be made heir apparent. When this is rebuffed,
Zhang Li proposes that Yanshou be given four more posts: vicegerent of Zhongjing
dachengxiang )_.tEl (grand counsellor), lu shangshu shi Ai as (overseer of
the department of state affairs) and dudu zhongwai zhu junshi gyarvim-,-;,-m*
(supreme commander-in-chief of the affairs of all the armies), and that he should remain
military secretary and prince of Yan as before (§102.) Although Taizong appears to have
seen value in mollifying Yanshou with the prestige title of grand counsellor, he was not
about to surrender all military control to him, and accordingly he denied Yanshou the last
two posts on Zhang Li's list.
Nevertheless Yanshou's position remained very powerful, and one crude index of
this is the story of his second marriage as related in the JW biography (§103.)
While Yanshou was at Bianzhou, he married another of Mingzong' s younger daughters, as his
previous wife had died. Before this the Yanzhou Mfli jiedushi Zhou Mi JJ J had (arranged for)
her to marry his son, Guang Ig; the presentation of betrothal gifts had already been completed
and the date of the wedding had been set, and at this point Yanshou wrested (her) away.
It is curious that the later sources make no mention of this thieving abuse of position, but
record the same incident with reference to Taizong's treatment of the bride's mother-
surrogate, the concubine (dowager) Wang.'
Powerful position and generous reward were still not the emperorship, but when
Taizong died near Zhenzhou-Hengzhou, Yanshou took the opportunity and claimed
provisional control of the south until he was imprisoned by the successful claimant to the
throne, Taizong's son Wuyu Ea' (temple name: Shizong (§106-111.) The TJ
makes a great deal more of this story. According to Sima, once Taizong was well on his
way home Yanshou became disenchanted, declaring that he would not go back to the
north. There was not time for the immediate intentions behind this remark to become clear
before Taizong died, at which Yanshou marched on Zhenzhou, ignorant that the Kitan
generals had already decided to serve Wuyu. While Yanshou claimed the emperor's
dying instructions as his mandate, Wuyu had also reached Zhenzhou and was able to
deny Yanshou the keys of the city. As Wuyu' s position rapidly became unassailable, it
was only the remonstrations of Li Song which prevented Yanshou from trying to hold a
ceremony of receiving congratulations as emperor.' The simple imprisonment noted in
the JW is turned by the TJ into a piece of theatricality which creates a tense atmosphere
for Yanshou's arrest and provides Wuyu with opportunities to make pointed remarks to
82. She had been Tang Ming,zong's concubine and had brought up the princess. Because Mingzong was older
than Liao Taizong, Taizong treated the concubine as the wife of his older brother. According to the XW, he
'joked with her that (according to the Kitan practice of levirate) this meant she was now his wife.
ffi. The NI annals record official appointments apparently made by Yanshou.
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Zhang Li. 84 The TJ once again shows Yanshou eager for power but incompetent to
achieve it. According to this version, Yanshou was out of his depth, and to an extent that
strongly suggests that despite all his titles to power, he still remained excluded from the
real political decision-making and intrigue at the Liao court. As Yanshou seems definitely
the most important Chinese in Liao service at this time, we might extrapolate that this
shows the distance at which the Chinese were still kept from positions of actual contro1.85
Tellingly, the LS omits any reference to Yanshou' s bid for the throne, 86 and even
declares that Shizong made him military secretary for his 'merit in assisting and
supporting the emperor' (§112.)
This was the end of Yanshou's career, and according to the LS annals he died about
eighteen months later in 948:10 (§117.) Earlier in that year (948:1), Yanshou' s son
Kuangzan E crossed from Liao to Liu Zhiyuan's gmfa Later Han, advised by an
old servant of Yanshou's called Li ShuV z3 (§116.) Arguing in favour of allegiance to
Han, Shu says, 'As to the prince of Yan entering (the foreign) court, how could this be
something that he wanted!' In other words, he believes that the compulsion practised
upon Yanshou will excuse his service to the Liao in the mind of the Han ruler, and thus
improve Kuangzan' s chances of acceptance. Liu Zhiyuan does indeed accept the
submission, but is cautious enough to order that an eye be kept on Kuangzan.
The fleeting impression given by Li Shu of a Yanshou reluctant to serve the Liao
cannot overturn the evidence to the contrary. Yanshou might complain that he has not
received the rewards he expected and might work to help save Chinese lives, but he never
expresses any regret at taking employment with the Liao, nor any but a false desire to
return to the south. This is true even in the only surviving work by Yanshou's own hand,
a poem recorded in the Taiping guangji. For hundreds of years poetry had been the
ultimate outlet for unhappiness or protest, 87 but this one expresses none of that:
Yellow sand is gathered in curls by the wind and abandoned in mid-air.
Clouds are layered over Yinshan r4[11 and snow fills the outskirts of the-city.
People return from their search for water and, moving their tents, head off.
He shoots at a hawk, the arrow falls and, carrying his bow, he goes to retrieve it.
A bird comes across frosted fruit and in its hunger pecks at it.
A horse crossing a frozen river, feeling thirsty, paws the ice with its hoof.
Occupying the plentiful grasslands of the high plain.
84. See Chapter 4, pp.152-3.
85. This contrasts with the genuine power of later generations, notably Han Derang Wf,O. LS 82:1289
86. Although it does mention the challenge from Wuyu's uncle, Lihu 2401 is 5:63
87. See, for instance, Laurence Schneider, The madman of Ch'u: the Chinese myth of loyalty and dissent
(1980), passim.
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In the deep night we break forest twigs to light a fire.88
If anything, it give the impression of a calm, if wistful, contentment.
It is perhaps Yanshou's lack of remorse, even when his dreams are in tatters, which
fuelled the Chinese response to him. 89 It has been observed throughout this chapter how
the TJ not only adds information not found in the JW, but also structures it in such a way
as to indicate overall disapproval of Yanshou. He also appears to have been a convenient
target for antipathy in the contemporary Central Plains. There is a story in Shi
Hongzhao's	 biographies (§96)9° that under the Han, a disgruntled servant
accused his master He Fuyinff]4- 111 0 of once having carried a token of sincerity from
Yanshou to the Wu regime in Huainan am. No such incident is recorded anywhere
else, and the point of thus taking Yanshou's name in vain is seemingly to compound the
sense of He Fuyin' s treacherous behaviour by association with a minister whose record
suggests he would turn anywhere for profit.
It is left to the LS to redress this balance, which it does with a generally upbeat
account, perpetrating reverses of military fortune, and backed up in the Yuan commentary
with talk of Yanshou's 'great achievements.' This account omits the attempted usurpation
altogether, although the commentary finds the request to be heir apparent embarrassing
enough to need justification, excusing it by saying,
If this then becomes a fatal flaw which detracts from his great achievements, .... how ridiculous
that would be!
The efforts to which the LS feels obliged to go in defence of Yanshou' s reputation are
suggestive of just how negative a picture of him had formed in China by the fourteenth
century.
88. Taiping guangji 200:1508; QWDSB 9:155; QLW 4:69. The QWDSB gives the poem a title, 'On the
frontier; Chen Shu's QLW calls it 'Disgrace,' but says that it sings of the Kitan landscape.
89. Chinese secondary works continue to regard Yanshou as nothing more than a traitor, when they mention
him at all.
90. JW 107:1404; XW 30:331.
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place of origin
Hengshan
76:1247 biog
place of origin
Xiangzhou
16:163 biog
place of origin
Changshan
72:893 Kitan .
place of origin
Changshan
98:1311 biogb
father
Liu ICang, in chg of
Tiao
76:1247 biog
father
Dejun, Tang Lulong
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16:163 biog
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father
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Changshan, in chg
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LS
	
QG
	
TJ
	
XW
	
JW
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
early 1Caiping, c.910
Tiao taken, Dejun
adopted Yanshou
76:1247 biog
Shousven tk Tiao
Dejun obtained
Yanshou & mother
Chong, took them
in
72:893 Kitan
early Kai ping, c.910
Shouwen took Tiao,
Dejun captd
Yanshou & mother
Chong, adopted Y
98:1311 biog
character
good-looking, loved
writing history
76:1247 biog
character
handsome, gentle,
liked to write history
72:893 Kitan
character
handsome, gentle,
liked to write
history, receive
guests, could write
poetry
98:1311 biog
912:11,3 Jan (913)
Dejun fled Yan for
Jin
28:381 annals
Jin crushed Youzhou
Dejun certain of
defeat, fled to
Zhuangzong
98:1308 Dejun biog
bef 926:4
Bianzhou sima
98:1311 biog
bef Ivlingzong acceded
Mingzong m a
daughter to him
76:1247 biog
926:9, 28 Oct
Dejun' s name
restored, Y m
Xingping princess,
Dejun favoured for
jobs
275:8992
Tang Mingzong m
Xingping princess to
him, Dejun trusted
72:893 ICitan
Y of age
m Xingping princess
98:1311 biog
Mingzong accession
c.926:4
m Xingping
princess, Dejun
entrusted w imp jobs
98:1308 Dejun biog
. Ivlingzong accession
c.926:4
Ruzhou prefect
98:1311 biog
927:9, 15 Oct
Ruzhoufangyushi;
md Heyang jiedushi
38:527 annals
md Heyang jiedushi
98:1311 biog
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XW
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Mingzong accession
c.926:4
mdfuma duwei
76:1247 biog
-	 _ . 928:5, 24 May
mdfuma duwei w
Jingtang
39:538 annals
928:9, 10 Nov
md jianjiao situ
39:542 annals
929:1, 13 Feb
Dejun memo on
gson Zan
40:547 annals
929:4, 24 May
md Songzhou
jiedushi
40:549 annals
md Songzhou
jiedushi
98:1311 biog
930:10, 28 Oct
emp ordered sending
of apptmt of
Xingping gongzhu
to Y's private
residence
41:569 annals
Tuyu arrived 930:11
borrowed writings
Mid Kdm didn't have
73:901 Kitan
-
931:2, 20 Feb
md zuo wuwei shang
jiangjun, conc
xuanhui beiyuan shi
42:575 annals
entered crt as sizang
jiangjun, serving as
xuanhuishi
98:1311 biog
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QG
	
TJ
	
XVJ
	
JW
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Miftreitg-eieeel4etti.
e.926:1-
931:4, 6 May
xuanhui beiyuan shi;
md shumishi
277:9058
931:4, 6 May
xuanhui beiyuan shi,
zuo wuwei shang
jiangjun; md	 .
shumishi
6:63 annals
Mingzong c.926-33
was shumishi
72:893 1Citan
931:4, 6 May
mdjianjiao taifu,
managing/ibu
shangshu, serving as
shumishi
42:577 annals
md shumishi
76:1247 biog
931:5, 10 June
w Fan Yanguang,
feared Meng
Hanqiong &
concubine Wang
277:9058-9
932:10, aft 24 Nov
Congrong contempt
for shumishi, Y
sought transfer
278:9079
932:10, aft 24 Nov
Ki tan invasion
threatened, w
Yanguang advised
only Shi Jingtang,
Kang Yicheng cd go
278:9079
932:11, 7 Dec
discussion of gens,
w Yanguang wanted
Kang Yicheng, Li
Song suggn adopted
278:9079
tribal invasion, 932
Jingtang finally
apptd
8:78 annals
Changxing 930-4
w Yanguang wanted
Kang Yicheng, Li
Song suggn adopted
57:654 Li Song biog
932:winter
empdemanded
decision on gens, w
Yanguang wanted
Kang Yicheng, Li
Song suggn adopted
108:1420 Li Song
biog
932:11, 11 Dec
md
tongpingzhangshi
278:9080
932:11, 11 Dec
md
tongpingzhangshi
43:596 annals
933
on giving thanks for
office
275:8986 (Song Bo)
St. 930-934
on Liu Xu giving
thanks for office
89:1172 Liu Xu biog
193
Chapter 5 - Zhao Yanshou: Table 4
LS
	
QG
	
T.1
	
XW
	 JW
933:8, c.27 Aug-19
Sept
request for Congrong
to be heir app, his
complaint via
Yanguang, Y
278:9087
933 _.
request for Congrong
to be heir app, his
complaint to	 .
Yanguang, Y
15:164 Congrong
biog
933:9, 26 Sept
w Yanguang md
conc shizhong
278:9087
933:9, 26 Sept
w Yanguang prom
shizhong, contd in
crt offs
44:606 annals
933:9, aft 8 Oct
Congrong danger, w
Yanguang requested
postings from court,
emp angry, princess
intervened
278:9088
933
w Yanguang begged
to stand down	 •
15:164 Congrong
biog
Congrong trouble, W
Yanguang begged to
leave, emp angry, Y
sent wife to speak
for him
27:290 Zhu
Hon2zhao biog
begged for removal
51:578 Fan Yanguang
biog
933
Congrong rumours,
w Iangtvatg, 40tgged -
to leave, emp angry,
Y sent wife to speak
for him
66:877 Zhu
Hon gzhao biog
933:9, 10 Oct?
lady Zhao md Qiguo
gongzhu
44:607 annals
933:9, 14 Oct
Yanguang, Y
compromise accepted
278:9088-9
Congrong defiance
asked for prov
posting to escape,
md Xuanwu jun
jiedushi
76:1247 biog
933:9, 16 Oct
md Xuanwu jiedushi
278:9089
933:9, 16 Oct
removed from post
6:65 annals
dismissed as shumi
72:893 Kitan
933:9, 16 Oct
md Bianzhou
jiedushi
44:607 annals
933
to gov Bianzhou
66:877 Zhu
Hongzhao biog
24
25
26
27
28
29
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—.
•
934:1, 11 Feb
prom jianjiao taishi
45:616 annals
c.934
prom Luguo gong
76:1247 biog
934:5, 21 June
md Luguo gong
46:635 annals
934:5, aft 21 June
Jingtang at crt, fear
of him, Y, Dejun
279:9119-20
w Jingtang cdn' t be
detained bcs m to
princesses
27:292-3 Liu Yanlang
biog
c.934
again shumishi,
govd Xuzhou
76:1247 biog
935:3, 12 April
md Zhongwu
jiedushi conc
shumishi
279:9128
935:3, 12 April
Zhongyi jun
jiedushi; md
shumishi
7:73 annals
under Feidi
shumishi
72:893 Kitan
935:3, 12 April
md Xuzhou jiedushi
conc shumishi
47:644 annals
trans to shumishi
conc govd Xuzhou
98:1311 biog
Modi acceded c.934:4
joint shumishi w
Fang Gao
96:1277 Fang Gao
biog
935:9, 17 Oct
Fang Gao, Y w little
real power
279:9133
935:10, 11 Nov
emp to Y' s, Zliang
Yanlang's residences
47:653 annals
936:1, 10 Feb
Lantern Festival
emp held feast at Y' s
residence
48:657 annals
936:7, c.18 Aug
Dejun sent envoy to
Liao court
3:38 annals, cf below
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
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38
39
40
Jingtang rebn
Dejun to relieve
Jingda in Hedong
76:1251 Zhang Li
biog
Jingtang rebn
Dejun to attk Ki tan
rear
16:163 biog
Jingtang rebelled
Dejun md xingying
zhaotao
16:161 Zhang Li biog
936:9, 6 Oct
relief of Jin' an inc
Dejun to cut off
Ki tan rear
280:9149-50
bef 936:10
Dejun plans, asked
to relieve Jin' an &
take 3000 Khan gds
280:9152
Gaozn rebn
Dejun suspected,
sent to attk Kitan
rear, went S
72:893 Kitan
936:9, 6 Oct
relief of Jingda inc
Dejun to enemy rear
48:665 annals
936:9
Dejun to attk enemy
rear, Dejun took
3000 Kitan gds
98:1309 Dejun biog
936:9, 11 Oct
advice that Y should
join up w Dejun
280:9150-1
936:8
memorial, Y ordered
N
127:1668 Lu Wenji
biog
Jin'an siege, 936:9
+20,000 at
Tuanboyu, Fan
Yanguang +20,000
at Liaozhou
3:38 annals
Jin' an siege
Zhaos to relieve
76:1247 biog
936:9, 12 Oct
as sui jia zhu Jun
dubushu w 20,000
to Luzhou
280:9151
bef 936:10,4 Nov
Fan Yanguang w
20,000 to Liaozhou
280:9152
•
Jingda besieged
& Fan Yanguang to
help
33:360 Zhang Jingda
bio a
Fan Yanguang w
20,000 to Liaozhou,
w Y defeated enemy
51:578 Fan Yanguang
biog
sent v Jingtang
72:893 Kitan
936:9, 12 Oct
ahead to Luzhou
48:665 annals
936:9, 13 Oct
to put 20,000 under
Dejun, Fan
Yanguang w 20,000
to Liaozhou
75:985 annals
936:9
shumishi w army to
Shangdang
98:1309 Dejun biog
Gaozu rebelled
Fan Yanguang w
20,000 to Liaozhou,
w Y defeated enemy,
joined forces
97:1286 Fan
Yanguang biog
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Jin'an siege, 936:9
Dejun +10,000 from
Shangdang to join Y
3:38 annals
936:10, st 25 Oct-3
Nov
Dejun said needed
more trps, hurried to
Luzhou
280:9152
-•
936:10, 4 Nov
Dejun +2000 cav &
Dong Wenqi, hurried
. to Luzhou
48:665 annals
936:10
Dejun +10,000 to
join Y at Tuanyukou
75:985 annals
936:9
Dejun w Hua Wenqi
hastened to Zhaoyi
to meet Y at Xitang
dian
98:1309 Dejun biog
936:11, 19 Nov?
md Hedong daonan
mian xingying
zhaotaoshi under
Dejun as c-in-c
280:9153
md Taiyuan nan
mian zhaotaoshi
under Dejun as c-in-c
72:894 Kitan
936:11, 19 Nov
md Hedong dao nan
mian xingying
zhaotaoshi under
Dejun as c-in-c
48:666 annals
936:11
md Taiyuan nan
tnian ,Jzaotaoshi
under Dejun as c-in-c
98:1309 Dejun biog
936:11, 22 Nov
met Dejun at
Xitang, placed trps
under Dejun
280:9153
_
met Dejun at
Xitang, placed trps
under Dejun
72:894 Kitan
936
met Dejun at Xitang
dian
98:1309 Dejun biog
936:11, 1 Dec
Dejun repd army to
Tuanboyu, killed
500 enemy cav
48:666 annals
w Dejun from
Luzhou to Tuanboyu
98:1309 Dejun biog
4]
42
43
44
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936:11
Dejun wanted Kitan
to take Mid Kdm,
stayed at Tuanbo
over a month, 100 /i
from Jin' an, no
comms
280:9155
_.
didn't intend to help
Jingda
33:360 Zhang Jingda
biog
w Dejun wdn' t
relieve Jingda
72:893 Kitan
936:11, 3 Dec
Dejun repd army left
valley, enemy
retreating
48:666 annals
936:10
w Dejun etc, at
Tuanyukou 100 Ii
from Jingda for 1
month, comms cut
75:985 annals
936:11
Dejun asking for Y
to be Chengde
jiedushi, reasons
given, emp' s
response
280:9155
Dejun asked for
Zhenzhou govship
for Y, emp' s
response
72:894 1Citan
936:11, c.3 Dec
Dejun asking for Y
to be Zhenzhou
jiedushi, emp' s
response
48:666 annals
936
Dejun asking for Y
to be Thenzhou
jiedu, emp' s
response
98:1309 Dejun biog
936:7, aft 18 Aug?
Dejun envoy to
Kitan
3:38 annals, cf above
bef 936:int 11
Dejun secret envoy
to Kitan asking to
be emp
2:18 annals
Dejun secret
agreement w Kitan,
asked to be emp,
Kitan tempted
16:163 biog
936:int 11, st 17-24
Dec
Y sent as envoy to
Kitan, w gifts,
asking for Dejun to
be emp, Kitan
tempted
280:9155-6
envoys urged
advance, respects to
1Citan asking to be
emp
72:894 Kitan
•
936
edicts urged advance,
Dejun sent envoy to
Kitan presenting
gold, asking to be
emp
98:1309-10 biog
at Tuanboyu, 936
Dejun envoy asking
1Citan to mk him
emp
137:1833 Kitan
Jingtang rebn, 936
Dejun envoy w
respects to Kitan
89:1162 Sang
Weihan biog
45
46
47
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936:7, c.18 Aug?
Hedong sent Sang
Weihan urgently
3:38 annals, cf above
(936)
Gaozu urgently sent
Weihan to Taizong,
Taizong stuck to
deal
16:163 biog
bef 936:int 11
Taizong stuck to
deal
2:18 annals
936:int 11, St 1-24
Dec
Jingtang urgently
sent Weihan, said
Zhaos disloyal,
dishonest, etc,
Taizong stuck to
deal
280:9156
_.
Taizong stuck to
deal
72:894 Kitan
	 .
Jingtang rebn, 936
Gaozu feared chg of
plan, sent Weihan to
expin pros & cons,
Jingtang-Ki tan agrnt
confirmed
89:1162 Sang
Weihan biog
936
Kitan didn't agree to
Dejun's proposals
98:1310 Dejun biog
at Tuanboyu, 936
Taizong stuck to
deal
137:1833 Kitan
w Dejun heard Jin' an
fell, to Tuanboyu
76:1247 biog
936:int II, 31 Dec
Dejun etc escaping,
pursued, 10,000+
surrendered
3:39 annals
936:11
Jin' an fallen, Gao
Mohan reached
Tuanbo, fought
Tang, army
scattered, 10,000
deal
2:17-18 annals
936:int 11, 28 Dec-
c.2 Jan
Jin' an fallen, Gao
Mohan reached
Tuanbo, fought
Tang; w Dejun, gens
fled, soldiers
scattered, 10,000
dead, w Dejun S to
Luzhou, army
straggled after
280:9159
936:int 11, 28 Dec
Jin' an fallen, w
Dejun, gens fled S
from Tuanboyu, trps
crowded into defile
48:667 annals
Jin' an surrender, 936
Zhaos, S bk to
Luzhou, 10,000
died, survivors
gathered at Luzhou
98:1310 Dejun biog
936:int 11, aft 2 Jan
(937)
Gao Xingzhou to
Luzhou, advised sun
280:9160
Gao Xingzhou to
Luzhou wall, advised
sun, offering terms
98:1310 Dejw:r. biog
48
49
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936:int 11, c.1 Jan
(937)
Kitan army caught
Zhaos; led trps to
MT
3:39 annals
at Tuanboyu
Taizong caught
Zhaos; surrd
76:1247 biog
936:11
at Luzhou, Zhaos
surrd, chained, sent
away
2:18 annals
Taizong reached
Luzhou, Zhaos to
meet him at Gaohe,
chained, sent to Liao
16:163 biog
936:int 11,4 Jan
(937)
Jin emp, Kitan ruler
reached Luzhou,
Zhaos met them at
Gaohe, Kitan ruler
kind, Zhaos asked
for reward, Jingtang
resented persistence,
Zhaos chained, sent
to Liao
280:9160
936:int 11, 4 Jan
(937)
Zhaos rebd v Tang,
came to sun-, taken
N
8:78-9 annals
Y surrd, only Fan
Yanguang didn't
51:578 Fan Yanguang
bio a0
Deguang chained
Zhaos, took them N
w him
72:893-4 Kitan
936:int 11, 4 Jan
(937)
Jin Gaozu, foreign
. king reached Luzhou
48:668 annals
936:int 11, 4 Jan
(937)
Jingtang to Zhaoyi,
tk SUIT of Zhaos
76:992 annals
Zhaos came to sun
to Kit, welcomed
Gaozu, G not polite,
Zhaos chained, taken
to foreign parts
98:1310 Dejun biog
Gaozu to Luzhou, 936
Zhaos captd by
northern court
98:1311 biog
Zhaos came out of
Luzhou to sun to
Ki tan, chained,
ordered to follow in
retinue
137:1833 Ki tan
936:11?
emp dow interview
2:18 annals
in Liao?
emp dow interview
16:163 biog
936:int 11,c.4 Jan
(937)
emp dow interview
280:9160-1
emp dow interview
72:894 ICitan
mother of the nation
interview
98:1310 Dejun biog
936:12, 22 Jan (937)
overnight at Xihe,
examined Thaos &
surrenderedarmy
3:40 annals
after Dejun's death
md Youzhou
jiedushi, prince of
Yan
76:1247 biog
after Dejun's death
released, given job
2:18 annals
after Dejun's death
released, given job
16:164 biog
Dejun's death
md Youzhou
jiedushi, prince of
Yan
72:894 Kitan
after arrival
md Youzhou
jiedushi, prince of
Yan
98:1311 bioo
.
51
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aft 937
md Liu Jing Youdu
adminwenxue
86:1322 Liu Jing
biog
-	 -.
c.938
Youz.hou chgd to
Nanjing, Y bec
liushou, md zong
shannan shi
76:1247 biog
c. 938: 1
Mid Kdm people
employed, Y md
shumishi
2:20 annals
Huitong c.938
employment for
foreigners & Ch, Y
md shumishi
16:164 biog
937
Mid Kdm people
employed, Y md
shumishi
281:9185
then
md shumishi eene
z4tengghi1ing-
98:1311 biog, cf.
below
938:11
new reign era, Y md
shumishi, Youzhou
md Nanjing, Zhao
Siwen md Nanjing
liushou
137:1833 Kitan
938:8
Jin gifts for imp fam
2:21 annals
938:8, c.31 Aug
Jin presents for imp
lam, Han Yanhui, Y
281:9188-9
St. 936:2-938:11
Y's wife fetched
from Jin
76:1247 biog
c.937: 1
Liao envoy to
Luoyang to collect
Y's wife
2:20 annals
Liao envoy to
collect Y' s wife
16:164 biog
938:9, st.4-13 Oct
Kitan envoy to
Luoyang to collect
Y's wife
281:9190
938:9, 17 Oct
Khan envoy to
Luofing to collect
lady Zhao
77:1018 annals
St. 936:2-938:11
passionate to repay
generosity
76:1247 biog
938:9, 23 Oct
gave horses in
thanks
77:1018 annals
55
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940:4, 19 May-4June
emp to Y's
residence, held crt
4:47 annals
c.940
emp md formal visit
to Y' s residence, md
him zhengshiling
76:1247 biog
942
zhengshiling
appointed instead of
-,:hongshuling: Y
47:774-5 zhi
c.937: 1
md conc
zhengshiling
2:20 annals
Huitong c.938
md cone
zhengshiling
16:164 biog
aft 937:12, 2 Feb
(938)
md conc
zhengshiling
281:9185
-.
then
md conc
zhengshiling
98:1311 biog, cf.
above
942:3, 31 Mar
empress wept for d
of sister, Y's wife
80:1058 annals
942:6
Lulong jiedushi,
advised attk on Jin
2:22 annals
c.942
advising attk on Jin
16:164 biog
943
942:12, Jan (943)
Lulong jiedushi,
advising attk on Jin
283:9243
(912)
fftl-L-tilefvg--jie4u.shi-
cf.1C: 1C1 bio,,,
tillevt-
912:7 943:9
Y' s
 
man Qiao Rong
& Jing Y an guang' s
speech
2:23 annals
943:9, c.14 Oct
Y's man Qiao Rong
& Jing Yanguang' s
speech
283:9253
c.Shaodi accession
Jing Yanguang' s
memo to Qiao Rong
88:1144 Jina
Yanguang biog
Qiao Rong & Jing
Yanguang' s speech
4:52 annals
943:12, 1 Jan (944)
emp to Nanjing to
discuss punishing
Jin
4:53 annals
943:12
Yang Guangyuan
info for attack, Y
urged this
2:23-4 annals
943:12, c.8 Jan (944)
Yang Guangyuan
info for attack, Y
urged this
283:9256
60
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943:12, c.1 Jan (944)
Y etc formed great
army, advanced
4:53 annals
943:winter
formedvanguard
76: 1247 biog
943:12
led 50,000 Liao trps,
planned conq on
promise of empship,
served w all might
2:24 annals
led 50,000 trps,
planned conq on
promise of empship,
told Jin Y their
master, Y served w
all might
16:164 biog
943:12, c.8 Jan (944)
led 50,000 Mid Kdm
trps, planned conq
on promise of
empship, told Jin Y
their master, Y
served w all might
283:9256
_. c.944
sent to manage S
affairs on promise of
,empshp, led frontier
expansion campns
98:1311 biog
944:1, 28 Jan
w Zhao Yanzhao led
vanguard to Renqiu
4:53 annals
944: 1
w Zhao Yanzhao
heading for Beizhou
2:24 annals
94-5- (9-14)
w yeerigef-brethep
Yanzhao led 50,000
to take Beizhou
16:164 biog
944:1, 29 Jan
frontier posts repd
Y, Yanzhao +50,000
heading for Beizhou
283:9260
944:1, 29 Jan
4 prefs repd Y,
Yanzhao +50,000
cav coming to
Ganling to help
Yang Guangyuan
82:1084-5 annals
944:1, 2 Feb
surrdd Beizhou, Shao
Ke let Liao in, Wu
Luan drowned self
4:53 annals
aft 943:winter
took Beizhou
76:1247 biog
c.9'44:1
Shao Ke let Liao
into Beizhou, Wu
Luan drowned self,
10,000 killed
2:24 annals
94-5.
944:1.2 Feb
Shao Ke let Liao
into Beizhou, Wu
Luan drowned self,
10,000 killed, Kitan
advanced
283:9261
w Deguang took
Beizhou
72:895 Kitan
944:1,2 Feb
Kitan tk Beizhou,
Wu Luan killed self,
Kitan advanced
82:1084-5 annals
(944)
Wu Luan died,
10,000 killed
16:164 biog
Y acquired Tang
Jingsi when Beizhou
attkd	 -
49:557 Tang Jingsi
biog
Tang Jingsi captd
when Beizhou fell,
Y knew name, took
him on
124:1635 Tana
Jingsi biog
66
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944:1, 12 Feb
emp at Yuancheng,
Y md WeiBo etc
jiedushi, prince of
Wei, camp at Nanle
4:53 annals
943:winter
md WeiBo etc
jiedushi, prince of
Wei
76:12-18 biog
c.944: 1
Liao emp camped at
Yuancheng
2:24 annals
94
944:1, c.11 Feb
Ki tan ruler at
Yuancheng, Y at
Nanle, md WeiBo
jiedushi, prince of
Wei,
283:9263
944:A; 14 Feb
Ki tan at Yuancheng,
Y raided Nanle
9:93 annals
944:1, 14 Feb
30-40,000 Ki tan cav
at Yuancheng; Y md
WeiBo jiedushi,
prince of Wei; daily
displayed banners
82:1085 annals
(944)
Taizong at
Yuancheng, Y at
Nanle, md WeiBo
jiedushi, prince of
Yan
16:164 biog
943:winter
defd Jin at Nanle,
captd Sal Xiangyu
76:12-18 biog
944:1, c.24 Feb
Cal Xingyu captured
in battle
283:9264
944:2, c.27 Feb
Cal Xingyu sent v
Kitan, ambushed,
captd at Majiadu
82:1086 annals
944:2, aft 27 Feb
Li ShouLhen etc defd
Kitan Mada's army
at Majiakou
4:54 annals
camped at Yuancheng
Li Shouchen, Gao
Xingzhou fought,
Kitan defd them
76:1248 biog
944:2
Li Shouzhen defd
Liao (Mada)
2:24 annals
944:2, 2 Mar
Li Shouzhen defd
Kitan (Mada) at
Majiakou, didn't dare
come E
284:9266
944:2, 2 Mar
Kitan at Majiadu
destd by Li
Shouzhen
82:1087 annals
944:3, 27 Mar
plan
4:54 annals
Liao army at Dunqiu
rainstorm, about to
wdraw, Y plan
76:1248 biog
944:3
Liao feigned
abandonment of
Yuancheng, ambush
at Dunqiu, rain
stopped them,
morale low, Y plan
2:24-5 annals
944:2, c.18 March
Kitan feigned
abandonment of
Yuancheng, ambush
at Dunqiu, rain
stopped them,
morale low, Y plan
284:9267-8
944:2, c.18 Mar
Kitan falsely
abandoned
Yuancheng, cav
ambush at Dunqiu,
morale low, Y plan
followed
82:1088 annals
944:3, c.27 Mar
w emp heavily defd
Gao Xingzhou at
Qicheng
4:54 annals
led light inf v Gao
Xingzhou, enemy
scattered
76:1248 biog
944:3
Liao emp fought
Gao Xingzhou,
Kitan wdrew
2:25 annals
944:3, 27 Mar
Kitan ruler fought
Gao Xingzhou S of
Qicheng, Kitan
wdrew 30 li
284:9268
' 944:3, 27 Mar
w emp fought Gao
Xingzhou S of
Qicheng, Kitan
wdrew 30 Ii
82:1088 annals
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944:3, 5 April
Zhao Yanzhao left to
defend Beizhou
4:54 annals
army returned
*left to patrol Bei,
Ji, Shen
76:1248 biog
944:3, c.29 Mar
Zhao Yanzhao left at
Beizhou
284:9268
(944:5, 13 June
fled
284:9272)
-.
944:3, 7 Apr
Kitan emp left Zhao
Yanzhao to defend
Beizhou
82:1089 annals
(944:5, 13 June
fled
82:1090 annals)
944:3
w Mohan discussed
helping Qianning
jun, good omen
76:1249 Mohan biog
944:int 12, 27 Jan
(945)-945:1, 17 Feb
Liao surrounded
Hengzhou, took its
9 counties, pillaged
4:55 annals
944:int 12-945:1
Liao again in force
to attk, Y led vangd
ahead to Xingzhou,
Liao burned crops
2:26, 3:28 annals
944:int 12, c.14?-17
Feb (945)
Liao again in force
to attk, Y led vangd
ahead, to Xingzhou,
Kit pillaged
284:9280
94-5- 944:int 12
w Deguang, whole
army invaded, surrdd
Hengzhou, tk
counties, vangd to
Xinazhou
83:1098-9 annals
Ki tan invdd, Y's
vangdsurrdd
Zhenzhou, pillaged,
tk counties, S to
Xingzhou
47:532 Huangfu Yu
biog
945:1, 1-3 Mar
Fu Yanlun +500 Jin
outfaced Y' s huge
retreating army
returning to
Xiangzhou
284:9281-3
945:1, 1-2 Mar
Fu Yanlun +500 Jin
outfaced large Kit
retreating army at
Xiangzhou
83:1100 annals
945:2
letter inviting Y,
false response
84:1118 annals
945:3, 16 April
tk Qizhou, killed
Shen Yun
4:55 annals
945:2
at Qizhou, Shen
Yun accused Zhaos
of treachery
3:28 annals
945:2, St 28 Mar-3
Apr
at Qizhou, Shen
Yun accused Zhaos
of treachery, Qizhou
fell, Yun suicide
284:9284
944
at Qizhou, Shen
Ytui accused Zhaos
of treachery, Qizhou
fell, Yun suicide,
family captured
33:362-3 Shen Yun
biog
94+ (945): winter
at Qizhou, Shen
Yun accused Zhaos
of treachery, Qizhou
fell, Yun hanged
himself, family
captured
95:1266-7 Shen Yun
biog
945:3, 16 April
ICitan took Qizhou,
Shen Yun died
83:1101 annals
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945:4
Jin tk Suicheng,
surrd Y trps scared
Du Wei, retreat to
Yangcheng
3:29 annals
945:3, 3-4 May
Jin tk Suicheng,
surrd Y trps scared
Du Wei, retreat to
Taizhou
284:9288
•	 -.
•
945:3, 3-5 May
Du Wei retk
Suicheng, to
Taizhou bcs of surrd
Y tips info
83:1102 annals
945:3, 6 May (30
April?)-11 May
led vanguard to
Taicheng, battle of
Botuanwei cun, Kit
wdrew
4:55-6 annals
945:4
Liao arrived in force,
battle of Botuanwei
cun, Kit heavily defd
3:29 annals
945:3,6-11 May
Kitan vangd arrived,
battle of Botuanwei
cun, Kit wdrew
284:9288-9
945:3,6-11 May
Kitan vangd arrived,
battle of Botuanwei
cun, Kit wdrew
83:1102-3
945:4,1 June
Liao who hadn't
fought well beaten
4:56 annals
945:4
Liao chieftains
beaten bcs of defeat
3:29 annals
945:3, c.11 May
Kitan chieftains
beaten bcs defeat,
only Y spared
284:9290
945:1
Deguang beat
chieftains, only Y
escaped
72:895 Kitan
945:3
Deguang beat offls,
only Y escaped
137:1834 Kitan
945:6, 3 Aug
repd gen drove off
Jin attk on Gaoyang
4:56 annals
945 besieging Zhen
Jin sent Y' s relative
Zhao Xingshi w
invitation, Y tricked
Jin from strongholds
by saying wd come
home if they sent an
army
76:1248 biog
946:7
Youzhou peop said
Y wanted to come
home, believed, Y
asked for army to
meet him, Xingshi
to fix time
285:9306
letters enticing Y,
Jin to send army to
meet him
72:896 Kitan
letter enticing Y,
offered to sun- if Jin
brought army
52:595 Li Shouzhen
biog
946:3-7
Du Wei & Zhao
Xingshi letters
enticing Y, Y asked
to be met w army,
crt gladly believed,
Xingshi to fix
meeting place
84:1118 annals
946:9
defd Zhang Yanze at
Dingzhou
4:57 annals
946:8
Mang Yanze defd
Liao N of Dingzhou
3:30 annals
946:9, 4 Oct
Zhang Yanze repd
defd Kit N of
Dingzhou, Taizhou
285: 9310
946:9, 9 Oct
Zhang Yanze repd
destd for bandits at
Dingzhou border
84:1117 annals
946:9, c.26 Oct
Feng Yu, Li Song
wanted to send army
to welcome Y, Liu
Yanzuo
285:9311
Li Song believed Y
57:654 Li Song biog
c.946-7
Li Song, Feng Yu
discussed sending
army to meet Y
89:1170 Zhao Ying
biog
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945
Du Chongwei sent
w army to meet y
76:1248 biog
946:10
Du Wei etc led army
v Liao
3:30 annals
946:10, 10 Nov
Du Wei etc md
campn cdrs
285:93 12
-.
•
946:10, 10 Nov
Du Wei etc md
campn gens
. 85:1121 annals
946:11,27 Nov
Liao emp surrdd
Zhenzhou
4:57 annals
946:11, c.5 Dec
Du Chongwei etc
defending Zhongdu
fortress v Y etc
blockade
4:57-8 annals
945
tk Zhongdu qiao,
killed Wang Qing,
held bridge
76:12-18 biog
946:12
blockade to prevent
Jin joining w
Hengzhou forces, Jin
comms cut
3:30-1 annals
946:11, 23-30 Dec
Kitan holding
Zhongdu qiao, Yanze
attkd, Khan burned
bridge, retreated,
blockade to prevent
Jin joining w
Hengzhou forces, Jin
comms cut
285:9315-7
946:12,4 Jan (947)
Du Chongwei etc w
200,000 to sun
4:58 annals
945
Du Chongwei surrd
76:1248 biog
946:12
Du Wei etc planned
SIM', emp offered
empship, Wei surrd
3:31-2 annals
946:12, 2-4 Jan (947)
Jin cut off, Du Wei
etc planned sun,
emp said Y no gd,
offered empship,
Wei surrd
285:93 18 -9
16:7e.9 946:12, 10th (4 Jan,
947)
Du Wei, Li
Shouzhen led armies
to sun to Kitan
85:1123 annals
Jin cut off, Du Wei
etc surrd
72:896 Khan
945
emp gave Y red robe
to deal w army,
greeted at camp
76:1248 biog
946:12 (947)
shared surrd trps w
Du Chongwei
4:58 annals
946:12
in red robe to camp
to deal w army,
Wei' s red robe a
sham
3:32 annals
946:12, 4 Jan (947)
in red robe to camp
to deal w army, his
affair, greeted, Wei' s
red robe a sham
285:93 19
1G.7c.9 Jin sun at Zhongdu
to deal w army,
given gown, troops
are yours etc, greeted
98:1311 biog
Y given Ch & red
gown to deal w
army, Wei given
gown
72:896 Khan
entered Bian 947
w Feng Dao
protected officials
126:1660 Feng Dao
biog
Deguang about to
hold court, (947:2?)
hat incident
72:898 Kitan
88
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947:1, 2 Feb
recommended Li
Song's talent
286:9330
entered Bian 947
had praised Li Song
57:654 Li Song biog
entered Bian 947
praised Li Song's
talent
108:1421 Li Song
biog
jade pillow said to
have been sent to
Wu
30:331 Shi Hongzhao
biog
entered Bian 947
said to have sent He
Fuyin w jade pillow
to show sincerity to
Huainan
107:1404 Shi
Hongzhao biog
947:1
urged using Jin army
on frontier, they
avoided execn
3:35-6 annals
94&(947)
argued for lives of
Jin army at
Chenqiao, use on
frontier, avoided
repeated massacre
16:164-5 biog
(shows loyal, honest
disposn
16:165 comm)
947:1, c.2 Feb
argued for lives of
Jin army at
Chenqiao, avoided
execn
286: 9331
entered Bian 947
argued for lives of
surrd trps at
Chenqiao, use on
frontier, avoiding
repeated massacre
98:1312 biog
947:1, c.14 Feb
son Kuangzan md
Huguo jiedushi
286:9333
947:1
was denied food
supps for trps, Kitan
plundering
3:36 annals
947:1, c.16 Feb
was denied food
supps for trps, Kitan
plundering
286:9334
947:1
Y' s mother brought
food to Jin emp
85:1127 annals
947:1, 25th (18 Feb)
gave Zhao Siguan
+units to son Zan
109:1441 Zhao
Siguan biog
Dian conquered 947
got Li Song to ask
for y to be heir app,
Y promoted
76:1248 biog
_
947:2
felt Kitan ruler
reneged, requests to
be heir app,
promoted
3:36 annals
_
947:2, c.24 Feb
felt ICitan ruler
reneged, Li Song
requested Y to be
heir app, promoted
286:9339
Bian conquered 947
got Li Song to ask
for Y to be heir app,
transferred
72:897 Kitan
at Bian long time
Li Song requested Y
to be heir app,
increased favour
98:1312 bio.
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Bian conquered 947
Zhang Li request for
4 new posts, given 2
76:1248 biog
947:2, 1st day
md dachengxiang
conc zhengshiling,
shumishi,
Zhongjing liushou,
giver of titles
4:59 annals
947
dachengfiang
appointed: Y.
md Zhongjing
liushou at Zbenzhou
47:775, 48804 zhi
947:2
Zhang Li request for
4 new posts, given 2
3:37 annals
947:2, 1st day
Liao emp wanted
single overseer
3:37 annals
947:2, c.24 Feb
Zhang Li request for
4 new posts, given 2
286:9339
aft Jin .conqd, c.947
Zhang Li request for
4 new posts, given 2
72:897 Kitan
Zhang Li request for
4 posts, given 2,
Kuangzan Hezhong
jiedushi
98:1312-3 biog
947:2, 1st day
md da chengxiang,
conc zhengshiling
appointed shumishi
conc Zhongjing
liushou
137:1835 Kitan
947:2, c.22 Mar
m Mingzong' s
daughter, treatment
of concubine Wang
286:9346
Kitan in capital 947
wife died, given a
sister, concubine
Wang at marriage
15:160 Wang biog
while at Bianzhou
stole another
daughter of
Mingzong as wife
98:1313 biog
emp at Xingzhou
prom above Kitan
L&R chief mins
98:1313 biog
947:4, aft 1 May
w Zhang Li blamed
for wasted cities
286:9352
returning N, c.947
w Zhang Li blamed
for wasted cities
72:899 Kitan
947
resented broken
promise, said wdn' t
go to Longsha again
16:165 biog
947:4, c.14 May
resented broken
promise, said wdn' t
go to Longsha again
286:9356
947:4, day emp died
resented broken
promise, trps to
Hengzhou, didn't
know Wuyu accepted
4:42 annals
947:4, c.14 May
trps to Hengzhou,
acknowledged Wuyu,
hadn't known Wuyu
accepted
286:9356
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947:4
claimed chg of S.
told circuits, treated
Wuyu as a gen,
Wuyu had keys, Y
advised to plan for
trouble
4:42 annals
Taizong died (947:4)
falsely claimed chg
of S
16:165 biog
947:4, c.14-15 May
claimed chg of S,
told circuits, treated
Wuyu as a gen,
asked for keys, didn't
know of preps, Y
advised to plan for
trouble
286:9356-7
Deguang died 947:4
claimed chg of state,
asked for keys, Y
advised to plan for
trouble
73:901 Kitan
947:4, c.14 May
at Zhenzhou,
declared self in chg
of state affairs
99:1329 annals
death of emp 947:4
told circuits was in
chg of S
98:1313 bio a
.,
947:4, 19 May
making
appointments
99:1329 annals
947:4
Li Song argued
against receiving
congrats
4:42 annals
947:4, 21 May
Li Song argued
against receiving
congrats
286:9357
merit manifest,
mistaken to covet
throne
76:1253 comm
947:5
summoned by
Wuyu, arrest, no
will
4:42-43 annals
c.947:4
Wuyu locked Y up
16:165 biog
947:5, 23 May
summoned by
Wuyu, arrest, no
will, pardoned Y's
party
287:9358
947:5, 23 May
summoned by
Wuyu, arrest, no
will, Y interrogated,
property confiscated
73:901-2 Kitan
947:5, c.23 May
imprisoned by
Wuyu, forged will
100:1331 annals
947:6, 1st day (2
July)
locked up by Wuyu,
property divided
98:1313 biog
Shizong acceded
947:5
md shumishi for
merit
76:1248 biog
947:5, 8 June
envoy to tell
Kuangzan his father
in prison
287:9362
947:6, 22 June
Kuangzan restored as
Hezhongjiedushi
100:1332 annals
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947:7, c.31 July
rumoured dead,
advised trans Huguo
jiedushi Kuangzan,
md Jinchang jiedushi
287:9368
-.
.
_947:7
(Kuang)zan md
Jinchang jiedushi
100:1334 annals
947:7, c.31 July
Du Chongwei hoped
to use 2000 Y trps
in rebn, failed
287:9369
948:1, c.17 Feb
old Y servant advised
Kuangzan not to
join Shu, submit to
Han, saying Y didn't
choose to join Kitan
287:9382
948:10, 8 Nov
died as Nanjing
liushou, prince of
Wei
5:64 annals
948
died
76:1248 biog
2 yrs after 947:5, 949
died amongst Kitan
16:165 biog
2 yrs after 947:7, 949
died
287:9368
died amongst 1Citan
98:1313 bio a,,
Kuangzan served
Han and Thou
98:1313 biog
114
115
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Chapter Six
Li Huan /1--- Xrt -
Although Li Huan is not one of the earliest arrivals in Liao, information on him is
scattered and confused, as can be seen in Table 5. We can only be reasonably certain of a
small amount of information. He served the Later Tang and was on the staff of prince
Congrong ?EM when he rebelled. Huan was of a literary persuasion and held several
scholarly posts, several of them as a member of the Hanlin, both before its abolition by
Jin Gaozu and after its re-establishment. He must have been in Bian when it fell to the
Liao in 947, and was one of a group of Jin officials who, when most of their colleagues
were left behind at Zhenzhou tA ffi, were taken north to Liao. There he received
employment, and seems to have acted as some kind of spy and fifth columnist for the
southern regime of Thou, where his older brother was an official. Probably as a result of
this, he tried to escape to the south. He died in Liao in 962.
None of the accounts discussed here are clearly derived from any single one of the
others, with the exception of the sole, scant mention in the QG, which, as usual, follows
its parallel passage in the TJ with a few insignificant changes. It is clear that some of the
later sources have made use of some of the earlier ones in compiling their own versions
of Li Huan's life, but this usage is inconsistent. Information is taken in a haphazard way,
seemingly from a number of different sources, and then recombined with a great deal of
rewriting and apparent alteration. The close borrowings amount to only a few sentences
at most, in contrast to the lives of earlier, and perhaps more important, figures. This
means that differences between texts are more likely to be the result of differing source
material than of editorial input. Whereas the filiation of the LS from earlier major works
has allowed us to draw inferences from the adjustments made to successive texts, it is
less possible to do this for the SS.
Li Huan is the earliest of the case studies to have a biography in the SS. This was
compiled separately from the LS,' and its independence means that for the first time we
have a control for the story provided in the LS. The material in the SS on Li Huan is
likely to have come into the archives via Huan's older brother Tao N, who always
served southern regimes. Probably Tao's family records provided the information for the
more detailed picture of Huan's early life given in the SS, and Tao's continuing links
1. See Introduction.
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with his brother are the likely source of the information for the SS version of Huan' s
espionage activities.
Materials additional to those found in the standard histories are unusually plentiful for
Huan. They are also especially important, as much was not transmitted from these to the
official works, leaving a number of incidents which do not appear in the standard
histories. Most of these materials are collected in the LSJSBM, but the LSSY and
LSSYB, upon which the LSJSBM drew, contain rather fuller versions of some incidents,
which the LSJSBM has edited down. These extra incidents are not included in Table 5,
but they are discussed in the text here. Unfortunately although Huan's own writings were
collected into the Dingnianji TiK after his death, we cannot compare these with the
official record as the Dingnianji does not survive. On the other hand, we do apparently
have the text of three of the letters sent by Huan in his role as a spy. These are preserved
in the CFYG and have since been collected into the QTW, the QLW, and other works.
There is also one poem written at the Jin court, preserved in the Yuhu qinghua
IaAt-it, 2 and now found in other collections. Finally, the Siku tiyao and the QTS
claim that this Li Huan was the author of the Meng qiu ;I*, a children's primer.
However, Song writers credited the work to a Li Huan who lived under the Tang, and
this attribution has been proved by the discovery of a Japanese copy of the Meng qiu with
Tang colophons, and another work with the same colophons at Dunhuang iRd.3
Early career and reputation
Huan's name means 'to wash,' or 'purify.' His zi, Rixin Hgi, means 'daily renewal' or
'constant progress.' From the TJ (Table 5, §1) we learn that he was the great-grandson
of Li Hui
	 a zaixiang $C (grand councillor) under Tang Wuzong 	
(840-846.)4 Hui was a distant descendant of one of the cadet branches of the Li house
which founded the Tang, so Huan had in his veins some tiny proportion of imperial - and
probably of Shatuo - blood.5
From here the SS takes over to provide the fullest account of Huan's early life (§2-7.)
Being of a literary bent he is conventionally described as being a bright youth. The
formula is sustained by his having been said to have imitated Wang 	 Yang 6, Lu
and Luo in his essays. This refers to the Chu Tang sijie	 IEM or Four Worthies
of early Tang: Wang Bo it, Yang hong fgq, Lu Zhaolin 2PgQ and Luo Binwang
2. Full references are given in the relevant discussions below.
3. Bi Suojuan, Shi shuo jinjian de Liaoban shuji - 'Meng qiu,' Wenwu 1982:6, pp.20-8.
4. Hu Sanxing's note tells us who Li Hui was; he has a biography in JTS 173:4501, but none in the XTS.
5. See Chapter 9, n.10.
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gmi, whose pianwen 3C style was the standard for court documents. 6 According to
the early Song writer Su Yijian
Huan used ornate language which was especially beautiful, he was foremost in superior talent7
and this view is echoed in several of the additional sources. Huan's emulation of famous
writers in the court style suggests not only his talent, but that he had court ambitions.
He was evidently already in the capital, and his talent already recognised at a senior
level, by about 932. In that year the king of the southern state of Wuyue AM, Qian Liu
00, died,8 and the bingbu shilang -Afefif4PIC (vice-minister of the ministry of war)
Yang Ningshi GRA was ordered to write the memorial tablet for the spirit road (§3.)
According to the JW, Ningshi was in fact zuo sanqi changshi ftStilgf:4 (left policy
advisor) at this time, a chancellery post with responsibilities including constant
availability to answer the emperor's questions. 9 It was perhaps his workload which
prompted him to order Li Huan to draft the memorial tablet for him. This ran to over
10,000 characters and 'was elegant and vigorous and much praised by the capable people
of that time.' How Ningshi came to know of Huan and his talent is unknown. It is also
unclear whether it was right for Ningshi to delegate in this way, and whether it was
Ningshi or Huan who took the credit for the tablet. That Ningshi's behaviour was not
quite proper is suggested by the version of the story in the Wudai shi bu.
Yang Ningshi once received an edict to write a memorial tablet for Qian Liu. He considered that
his own writing was not up to that of Huan and so he bought a lot of excellent wine and
summoned Huan to drink. As soon as he got drunk (Ningshi) made (Huan) write (the tablet) for
him, and in the course of the night it was completed. Altogether it was 15,000 characters long,
and at no point were the phrases not reasoned or the allusions not plentiful. Ningshi praised and
admired it for long time.i°
This account does not reflect so well on Ningshi, whilst linking appreciation of Huan' s
talent with his reputation as a great drinker, of which we will hear more.
Vicissitudes in official service
It could have been Yang Ningshi's sponsorship which swiftly brought Huan what
appears to be his first official posting, to the staff of Tang Mingzong's son, the prince of
Qin 	 I, Congrong. A passage in the SS biography of Zhao Shangjiao kg_E.5F_ tells us
6. See William Nienhauser, 'Prose,' Companion to traditional Chinese literature, ed. Nienhauser, esp.
pp.105-8.
7. Su Yijian (958-996), Xu Hanlin zhi Ofattz, L , quoted in LSSYB 5:123; LSJSBM 18:346.
8. Probably 932:7, 5th August. JW 43:592. TJ 277:9065-6 gives the date of his death as 932:3, 6th May.
9. Ningshi received this post on 931:intercalary 5, 8th July (JW 42:579) and was promoted to gongbu shilang
EI,31913 (vice-minister of the ministry of works) in 932:11. At this time he is said to have been right policy
advisor, probably a mistake (.TW 43:596.) Details of the post in des Rotours, Fonctionnaires, pp.141-2 &n.
10. WDSB 3:6a-b.
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that Huan, along with Zhang Hang 3.RV-1- and Yu Chongyuan #a AA, was a new jinshi
(boyi lEr)ii in Congrong's administration, and that these people were friends with
Shangjiao. Shangjiao himself fell foul of Congrong and so was posted away from the
capital. The name he thus made for himself seems to have saved him when the prince
made his coup attempt in 933:11, for Shangjiao was spared the trial and exile which faced
most of his colleagues. Huan was evidently included in this punishment as his own
biography notes he was forced to return to his place of origin. It is clear from Zhao
Yanshou' s AtE-.1 pleadings in the previous chapter how dangerous it had been
considered to be in the vicinity of Congrong and his activities, let alone to serve under
him. Yanshou had the leverage to be able, eventually, to get away from court, but a
provincial posting was no haven for lesser officials: the TJ tells us that at the time of his
banishment' Huan was xunguan gig (inspector) of Henan 171JM (§5.) It also tells us
that he was one of a total of six thus banished, and it is tempting to think that these might
have included Huan's colleagues Zhang Hang and Yu Chongyuan.
The SS resumes that after 'a long time' Huan was made jiaoshulang ,V-,P13 (editor in
the palace library, 9a1) and Jixian jiaoli -X.HJI (sub-editor in the Academy of
scholarly worthies, unranked.) The latter post was a Tang creation revived under the
Later Tang restoration by Mingzong' s successor Midi FAMV (933:12-934:4),"
implying that Huan was another beneficiary of the favour distributed by new emperors
immediately upon taking the throne. It has already been noted that Zhao Yanshou added
to his titles in this transition: 4 but for Huan his new appointments would have meant
much more: they brought him out of disgrace and back to the imperial court. Without the
transfer of power, there is no telling how long he might have remained in provincial
obscurity. There is no mention of Huan under Tang Feidi wgv, but he was evidently
re-employed by Jin Gaozu, as during the Tianfu TITEi era (936-944) he was made you
shiyi ttat (right reminder, 8b), responsible for amending the omissions in the
emperor's conduct, and shortly after that became a Hanlin academician ***±. The
Hanlin appointment is the first information provided about Huan in the JW, which dates
it to 937:11, 26th December (§8.) Like Midi, Jin Gaozu made a mass of appointments
and reorganised the bureaucracy in order to help consolidate his position on the throne,"
and Huan's career was again the beneficiary of the prevailing situation. He must have
11. Boyi was an unofficial reference to new jinshi of especial promise.
12. Dated to 933:11, 14th December.
13. WDHY 18:305-6.
14. He was given the honorific position of jianjiao taishi1041±O (acting grand preceptor.)
15. There are pages of appointments: JW 76:993-1000.
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come to the attention of the emperor, because only a few months after his Hanlin
appointment, on 14th March, 938:2, the JW observes that Huan 'was granted scarlet
robes and a fish tally' (§9.) The fish tally was the badge of rank worn at the waist by
officials of the fifth grade and above, but it appears that the tally and dress accorded to
this rank could be bestowed extraordinarily by the emperor.' 6
Then, on 17th October, 940:9, the JW, XW and TJ (§10-11) record that Jin Gaozu
abolished the Hanlin academicians and transferred their duties to the zhongshu sheren
Eri rr* X (secretariat drafters.) According to the TW, the next day Gaozu gave new posts
to several former members of the Hanlin, including Li Huan. Huan had been zuoyou
buque 	 	 MIN (rectifier of omissions, 7b1)'' and was now made a libu yuanwailang
M-PF (bureau vice-director in the ministry of personnel, usually 6b), a post in the
six ministries. The XW adds that not only were the academicians of the Hanlin abolished;
those in the Duanming palace t/6" BAK and the military secretariat (shumiyuan WA; rE)
also disappeared. This is not the place to try to explain the real motive behind the
abolition,' but in the X-W and TJ a somewhat dubious reason is implied.
Both the XW and TJ immediately precede their brief notices of the abolition with
remarks that Li Huan was fond of drink and that Jin Gaozu disapproved of this. Ouyang
says that Huan
often drank to excess, and Gaozu considered him frivolous. In [940]:9, he ordered the
abolition....;
the TJ that Huan
was irreverent and flippant, and often did things under the influence of strong drink; the emperor
detested him, (and) on 17th October discontinued the office....
The proximity of these comments to the abolition implies a causal relationship, although
there is nothing in the Chinese to make this explicit.' 9 A further suggestion that aspects of
Huan's behaviour might have been unacceptable comes from Chen Jiru's IWZN Gujin
shi hua t4-Welt, quoted in the LSSY.2°
16. A similar case of a Hanlin academician given this honour (for his sincerity) is noted from the Tang by Han
Yu Of r„ , in his Dong gong xingzhuang N(L\,,,f-M, quoted in the Hanyu da cidian APitiN4, vol.9, p.888.
17. Huan seemingly held both left and right posts, the left under the menxia rilT (imperial chancellery), the
right under the zhongshu IPS (imperial secretariat.)
18. Although Wang discusses the bureaucrat-retainer power struggle at the Later Tang and Jin courts (ch.6,
passim), he does not consider this abolition or its significance. See next note for a Yuan view.
19. The Yuan commentator Hu Sanxing assumes that Huan's drunkenness did indeed have a causative effect
regarding the abolition. Hu notes that as the academicians of the chancellery had already been discontinued,
only the Hanlin academicians remained as Confucians (rusheng f5A) close to the emperor. By further
contrasting the correctness of stopping Huan's drunken actions with the incorrectness of abolishing all the
academicians because of the intemperance of one, Sanxing implies that Huan's drinking was just an excuse for
Gaozu to remove the last representatives of the 'Confucian' interest from his close circle.
20. Chen Jim KIM (1558-1639.) LSSY 21:399, also an abridged version in LSJSBM 18:346.
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When Huan graduated as a jinshi, he was examined by He Ning frri.M. Later he served with the
official in charge of the examinations [He Ning], both as (Hanlin) academicians. When Ning was
made a grand councillor, Huan became a chengzhi [recipient of edicts], with responsibility for
commenting on edicts. The next day in (He's) private residence, (Huan) opened up grand
councillor He's cupboards without permission, took all the books and objets d'art and went off
with them, and left a poem on the bed which said,
The official in charge of the examinations has risen in his employment and ended up in
the phoenix palace,
(But) your disciple who is commenting upon edicts was the top graduate.
In the cupboards of your private residence there are many precious objects;
These can be gifts in gratitude for my literary efforts, can't they?
People all laughed at his presumptuousness.
As this passage comes from the Ming E91 it must be treated with greater than usual
caution, but we can probably date the incident to He Ning's appointment as zhongshu
sh ilang pingzhangshi qzgqnTVT (manager of affairs and vice-director of the
imperial secretariat) in 940, 21 and accordingly it is tempting to see an intemperance in
Huan's behaviour that matched his intemperance in drink, contributing further to turn
Gaozu off him.
Gaozu's successor Chudi ffl • -• re-established the military secretariat and the Hanlin
academicians during the Liao-Jin war, 22 but apparently the people who got the posts were
all his 'intimates and long-standing officials.' This group seems to have included Li Huan
as according to the JW and TJ he was amongst a number of officials appointed or
restored as Hanlin academicians four days after the re-establishment, on 20th July (§13.)
The JW says that at the time he was a libu langzhong VIM c1=1 (bureau director in the
ministry of rites, 5a) and was now also made zhizhigao --1-tpitt (participant in the
drafting of proclamations.) Exactly one year later, on 20th July, 945:6, he was made a
secretariat drafter.
Arrival in Liao
This is where the LS begins its account (§16-19.) The first entry in Li Huan's biography
states that earlier he had served the Jin as secretariat drafter and that he 'pledged
allegiance' (gui n) to the Liao when Jin fell. As the SS says that Li Huan 'fell into the
hands of the enemy' (xian 13'6) along with Xu Taifu -WEM at the fall of Bian, it is
evident that Huan, serving in his posts as a court literatus, was amongst the Jin officials
in the capital who surrendered en masse to the Liao emperor. He and Taifu were then
taken 'north of the border' (saibei &J.L) with the LS annals noting that they were in a
party including Feng Dao Wt. , Li Song zpv., He Ning, and Zhang Li 3Kia, which
21. JW 127:1672.
22. In 944:6, 28th June and 16th July respectively.
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accompanied Liao Taizong as he began his return from Bianzhou to the north on 24th
April. Zhang Li had been in Liao for ten years by this time, but Dao, Song and Ning
were all senior bureaucrats who had survived the conciliest. The critical factor in this
group, however, seems to be not so much their seniority in Jin as their established
administrative or literary talent,' and it is presumably for this that the relatively junior
Taifu and Huan were picked out.
This group of officials were with the emperor up to his death near Zhenzhou on 15th
May, and remained there during the short period of confusion as Zhao Yanshou and
Taizong's son Wuyu 7EV,' converged on Zhenzhou to claim the throne. Feng Dao, Li
Song and He Ning are named amongst the officials summoned to the drinking party at
which Wuyu had Zhao Yanshou arrested, 24 but when the new emperor (Shizong
departed north, he left behind these ministers, who returned their allegiance to the
south.25 Shizong did, however, take Xu Taifu and Li Huan north with him, along with
Jin Chudi's harem, his eunuchs and the college of musicians. 26 According to the WDSB,
at this point Huan was 'specially detained because of his talent,' 27 but given the company
he was keeping we might wonder whether this refers to his talent for writing, or for
drinking. The imperial entourage headed first to Nanjing *3#1 . (Youzhou igg4 ,1) and then
on to Shangjing _EA- , a route reiterated in Li Huan's LS biography. There we also learn
that Gao Xun AN] was in the same party, which will turn out to be important later on.
The biography continues that once in Shangjing, Huan was once more made a Hanlin
academician, and the baiguan zhi notes a move to the Xuanzheng palace VIM
after the accession of Liao Muzong Mg*. in 951:9. The SS dates the Xuanzheng
appointment to Shizong's accession, apparently confusing emperors (VW
Muzong also gave Huan the post of gongbu shilang VIZI-41 (vice-minister of the
ministry of works, 4a.) This turned out to be the culmination of successive promotions,
making him second-in-command of one of the six ministries 28
 and raising him above the
directorship of a sub-bureau which he held in the Jin. However, promotion at this
23. As noted in biographies, and evidenced in surviving works: Feng Dao, JW 126:1655-66; XW 54:612-5;
QWDSB 9:150-1; Li Song, 108:1419-21; XW 57:653-5; He Ning, JW 127:1671-4; XW 56:639-40; QWDSB
11: 191-9.
24. Only the TJ mentions He Ning. TJ 287:9358; QG 4:42, cf. JW 100:1331.
25. In 947:9, TJ 287:9377. Shizong left behind almost all the people whom Taizong had been taking north.
26. This is the only event recorded by the QG about Li Huan. It is not clear what Shizong's rationale was in
choosing this particular set of people to take north, because Taizong had complained about the idleness of the
lesser Jin officials (LS 4:60), and had previously followed advice to take those in the most senior positions
first (TJ 286:9348-9.) Shizong's choices seem even more extraordinary given that the Liao could now pick and
choose from almost the entire Jin official body.
27. WDSB 3:6b.
28. LS 47:779. This follows the Tang system.
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unexceptional rate was not enough to win Huan over, for the remainder of the accounts in
both biographies are concerned with Huan's spying and subversive activities.
Espionage
Given that we would expect spying to be top secret, we have a remarkable amount of
information on these matters. This runs to seven accounts in various sources." All the
main texts we have been using here give abridged versions of the story, explaining only
part of what happened and creating great confusion when the texts are compared. This is
despite the fact that the CFYG (as quoted in the LSJSBM) 3° gives a coherent account of
the story, including, apparently, the texts of all three of the letters mentioned.' The
inaccessibility of the CFYG was enough to deter even Sima Guang from using it, leaving
it to the SS biography to provide the next fullest account, presumably from information
held by Huan's brother Li Tao and within the Li family's close circle. 32 The TJ account
remains scanty, while the concentration of the LS on the events following the discovery
of the conspiracy suggests that its full extent may never have been known to the Liao.
The following chart expands upon entries §23-29 of Table 5 with the addition of the
CFYG account.
Table 5a - Li Huan's espionage activities
(B) a
(23) b
SS LS TJ CFYG
(LSJSBM 18:346)
JW
d Wuyu 951
on good terms w
Xiao Haizhen
262:9063 biog
bef 952:6, 12 July
good rels w Haizhen,
spy w letter
290:9479
Y ouzhou jiedushi
Xiao Haizhen got on
well w Huan
dWuyu 951
taking opportunities,
persuaded Haizhen to
give allegiance to S
262:9063 biog
bef 952:6, 2 July
w Xiao Meigude
(Haizhen) planned to
flee S
6:70 annals (cf. §k)
bef 952:6, 12 July
persuaded Haizhen to
come to allegiance
290:9479
talked about Mid
Kdm, Haizhen
admired it/desired (to
go)	 -
29. There are two different versions in the LS, accounts in the JW, Ti and SS, and in the CFYG and Ti gangmu
. The last two are quoted in LSJSBM 18:345-6.
30. The inaccessibility of the CFYG, the lack of references in the Chinese works which quote it, and time
pressures have precluded a search for the original story. In this case, the LSJSBM version is more than
sufficient to provide a framework for accounts in the main texts with which we are concerned here. It is hoped
that in future, use can be made of Hiraoka Talceo's chronological arrangement of the CFYG at Kyelto University.
31. Collected in Miao Quansun, Liao wen cun, 3:4b, 7b-8a, 5:10a, and in QLW 4:72.
32. Biographies were usually based heavily upon the vita written after the subject's death by a family member
or close associate. See Twitchett, Writing of history, pp.66-70.
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SS
	
LS
	
TJ
	
CFYG	 JW
952
secret report of Kitan
weakness via Sun
Fangjian of
Dingzhou
262:9063 biog
Ding.spy Tian
Chongba arrived,
involved in secret
plans, Huan letter to
Ding leader
(Sun Fangjian)
952
praised by Zhou
Taizu
262:9063 biog
Zhou Taizu heard of
this matter
952
Zhouzu sent spy w
rescript, asked for
more information
262:9063 biog
Taizuordered
Chongba to present
a rescript
Tao a Hanlin scholar
in Bian, sent secret
invitation to Huan
103:1450 biog
Taizu ordered Tao to
send secret family
greetings to Huan
Huan sent letter of
thanks
Letter 1
bef 952:6, 12 July
sent Ding spy Tian
Chongba w report
290:9479
Huan also reported
on secret matters
Letter 2
952:6, bef 12 July
report on classified
matters, Haizhen to
come to allegiance
112:1482 annals
report urging
invasion
262:9063 biog
bef 952:6, 12 July
letter to Tao urging
invasion
290:9479
Huan also wrote to
Tao urging action
Letter 3
952
Mid Kdm too busy
262:9063 biog
952:6, 12 July
spy reached Daliang,
Mid Kdm too busy
290:9479
952:6, 12 July
report arrived,
congratulations
112:1482 annals
(bef 952:6, 2 July
w Xiao Mei gude
(Haizhen) planned to
flee S
6:70 annals (cf. §b)
(23)c
(24)d
(25)e
(2f
(27) g
(27) h
(27)1
(28)j
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SS	 LS
	
TJ
	
CFYG	 JW
(29) I once excuse of needing
fled treatment in
262:9063 biog Nanjing, escaped
103:1450 biog .
952:6, 2 July
plan discovered, edict
6:70 annals
The basic story is that Huan convinced the Kitan Xiao Haizhen no.a that he should
cross to the Central Plains, and that in connection with this there was secret
communication between Huan and the south. What each recorder brings to the story, and
what each text does with it, varies far more than has been the case with our earlier
spb j eds. There is less overlap in the knowledge shared by every text, reflecting the wider
range of original sources for the texts which are left to us. It may also give some
indication of just how secret clandestine operations could be.
The .TW account, found in the annals, is short and to the point:
(On) 12th July, the former Hanlin academician Li Huan sent up a report from within Kitan
setting out a memorial on urgent and secret matters, and also saying that the false Youzhou
jiedushi Xiao Haizhen wanted to plan to come to allegiance; the emperor deeply commended him
[Huan.]
This notice is greatly expanded in the CFYG, which gives details of the covert
discussions and communications which led up to the overt event recorded in the annals
(Table 5a, §a-h.) This account relates how Xiao Haizhen got on well with Huan, and
how in the course of conversation Haizhen expressed his admiration of the Middle
Kingdom, and perhaps his desire to go there. 33
 It appears that it was only when the spy
Tian Chongba FILM arrived from Ding t, apparently quite by chance, that these
conversations were turned into 'secret plans.' Huan wrote to Chongba's master in Ding,
who evidently informed the Zhou emperor, and thereafter Huan's communications,
whilst still sent via Chongba, went straight to the southern court. Zhou Taizu encouraged
Huan by sending him a rescript and instructing Huan's older brother Tao, a Zhou
minister, to send 'family greetings.' Huan's three letters in reply are quoted in the CFYG
(§g-i): a simple letter of thanks for the emperor's generosity, a 'Report to the throne on
secret matters' detailing the manoeuvring that had been necessary to negotiate Haizhen's
crossing, and a reply to Huan's brother urging swift action to secure the best outcome for
the Middle Kingdom:
33. Mu 41 can mean 'desire' as well as 'admire.'
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The present emperor is proud and foolish, he loves nothing but playing polo; he is addicted to
his wives and concubines, and he certainly does not have an overall ambition. Looking at the
general course of events, it is not like it was before; his intimates and senior ministers also
harbour rebellious intentions, (and) accordingly (one can) recognise (his) [the emperor's]
weakness. .... You (should) take advantage of this time when they are in disorder and weakness to
plan for peace. If it is decided to come with a punitive expedition, just be quick; if it is rather
decided to make peace, then also just be quick. In the future it will certainly not be possible to
help Hedong (so) much (as now.)34
The background to these events was the rivalry between the Zhou and Northern Han,
and the Liao support for a failed Han attack on Zhou in 951:9. 35
 Xiao Haizhen was a
member of the consort clan, and the brother-in-law of the former emperor Liao Shizong,
who had married Haizhen's older sister. The brief records of this incident are all we
know of Haizhen, 36
 so we cannot speculate far upon his motivation. It is unlikely to have
been related to the political situation in Liao, as according to the SS, it was the current
emperor Muzong who appointed Haizhen to the Youzhou governorship. This suggests
that Haizhen was in favour, not danger. The CFYG says that he 'admired' the Middle
Kingdom, but this seems an inadequate reason for such a highly placed Kitan nobleman
to change allegiances; even the sinophile Yelii Bei 1[IMffi had not fled until his life was
threatened.37
 Like Bei, though, Haizhen's province of Youzhou was on the border,
neighbouring Dingzhou, which was under the control of Sun Fangjian Fangjian
was originally a petty leader whose choice of Liao suzerainty had brought him the
governorship, which he then retained upon his return to Central Plains allegiance."
From the CFYG, it appears to have been Fangjian's sending of the spy Tian Chongba
which prompted Huan to move on a stage from talking about the Middle Kingdom, to
start communicating with the south. Fangjian, in his frontier location, was acting
independently from the court as frontier governors had been doing for years, and as he
had himself done several times within the last six years in order to attain his current
position. However, it is clear that he was not now as autonomous in fact as his
predecessors, or he himself, had only recently been, for he very quickly referred the
matter of Xiao Haizhen upwards to the court. Although he was able to act on his own
initiative, he did this not on his own account, but as a representative of the Zhou
emperor.
As for Huan, he shows every sign that he is maintaining a loyalty to the southern
court. His letter to his brother shows Huan's evident desire for the Middle Kingdom to
34. Yu xiong Tao shu g4R,Ag, quoted in Liao wen cun 5:10a, and QLW 4:72. Also found in QTW 861:13a.
35. See Chapter 1, p.46.
36. Also known as Meigude Et1-4.
37. See Chapter 1, p.31.
38. See avaptex 1 and 'Tante 1, #84.
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recover the northern prefectures, and his enthusiastic embrace of 'secret plans' to subvert
Haizhen is just one practical way of trying to realise this desire. Huan's 'Report to the
throne on secret matters' is not easy to follow in detail, but does convey the depth of
Huan's involvement. It suggests that Haizhen was not prepared simply to hand himself
over to the Zhou, but wanted first to be sure of the terms under which he would be
received. Haizhen says he has
decided to send somebody to take a silk (secret) letter up to the emperor of the southern court to
ask him to mobilise troops to come here,
and that he has the reports of the detained Zhou envoy Yao Hanying ktiCC 39 implying
he could hand these over as evidence of his good faith. But he seems hesitant to actually
send his letter, apparently because he lacks any response from the Zhou court. It is
Huan's action at this point which encourages Haizhen to continue with his plan.
It seems that Huan had been expecting a Zhou imperial rescript for Haizhen. When
the spy Chongba arrived bearing only Li Tao's 'family greetings,' and without any
rescript for Haizhen, he (Chongba?)
did not dare to make this known (to Haizhen), and [Huan] was on the point of sending Tian
Chongba back again.
Huan recognises that without written acknowledgement from the Thou, Haizhen might
change his mind. Meanwhile, the messenger carrying Haizhen's draft invitation (to show
Huan) was terrified about the situation, so Huan offered reassurance by showing him,
apparently, an imperial rescript. It is not clear what this document is or why seeing it
would have eased the messenger's mind, but when Haizhen heard about this he was
delighted, and summoned Chongba for a series of talks. Haizhen still wanted written
acknowledgement of Zhou good faith, but despite the earlier fears, was in fact willing to
discuss detailed terms with Chongba first. The 'Report' demonstrates that Huan was
working hard to bring about Haizhen's crossing, in order to serve what he believed were
the interests of the Thou.
The account in the TJ condenses the story (§b, h-i.) Rather than detailing intrigue, the
TJ notes only that Huan 'persuaded Haizhen to come to allegiance.' It says that Huan
sent a report via Tian Chongba and a letter to his brother, but quotes only the latter. It
does, however, tells us one outcome, which is that
(On) 12th July, Chongba reached Daliang k, but it so happened that the Middle Kingdom had
many concerns and was not able to proceed in this matter.
As the LS annals record that on the very same day the Zhou launched an attack on
Northern Han," it is hardly surprising that the Zhou were distracted. In fact, this
39. Table 1, #149.
40. LS 6:70.
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particular attack is not confirmed by the other sources, and it is likely that the distractions
were more to do with the rebellion of Murong Yanchaor-fic:0- 6. and Han attacks on
Zhou, rather than the other way round.' This is not to say that Zhou Taizu would not
have been pleased if Haizhen had brought Youzhou over on his own account, but to send
an army to help him would have meant fighting on another front, and the Zhou were too
busy struggling to establish themselves to indulge in such risks unnecessarily.
This result is picked up by the SS (§i), which also, like the CFYG, gives details of
the events between Haizhen's decision to cross and Huan's recommendation of swift
action. The SS version emphasises how proactive Huan was in this matter (§b-c.) He
seized the opportunity to sweet-talk Haizhen with a plan to return to the south, and Haizhen
accepted it. In 952, Huan, by means of Sun Fangjian of Dingzhou, secretly reported on the
weakened state of the Kitan ....
Where the CFYG has been taken to imply that Huan did not turn conversation into action
until the arrival of Sun Fangjian's spy, the SS biography gives the impression that Huan,
having already primed his target to switch allegiances, was casting around for ways to
bring the Zhou in on the scheme.
In return for his situation report, Huan received a rescript of 'comfort' carried by Tian
Chongba, who also brought a request for Huan to continue providing information (§d-e.)
It is this request which produces Huan's report on the self-indulgence of the Kitan ruler,
and the rebelliousness of his ministers, along with the recommendation that a swift attack
will bring peace. However, as was noted in the TJ, 'the Central Plains had many
concerns and could not make use of his information.' As a final point, the SS mentions
that,
(w)hen Huan was in Kitan, he once fled back home and was captured by them, (so) he was
guarded with total watchfulness (at all times.)
It is this aspect upon which the LS alone expands (see Table 5, §30-36), in two versions
of the story which give different details.
It is not at all clear how the two versions fit with each other, or with the events in the
other sources. Huan's LS biography observes that at some point after Muzong's
accession, Huan's brother Li Tao sent him a secret invitation or summons: a
communication which we can equate with the 'family greetings' mentioned in the CFYG.
The biography says that 'when Huan received the letter,' he tried to escape, and then
details his consequent actions, to which we shall return.
Meanwhile, the annals relate that on 2nd July, 952:6, Huan, along with the
zhengshiling a*A (director of the department of administration) Xiao Meigude
ridtv4 (Haizhen's Kitan name) and others, 'planned to flee south.' There is no doubt
41. Murong Yanchao rebelled in 951:12. TJ 290:946911; JVV112:1479ff.
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here that what Haizhen and Huan had planned was an escape. This is in contrast to the
suggestion in the southern sources that the plan was for a transfer of territory or internal
support for a southern attack. Both of these latter had the most serious political
connotations at the highest level, whereas a plan 'to flee south' merely involved a few
individuals. The disparity in what was seen to be at stake could suggest a damage-
limitation exercise at some point in the compilation of the LS, in which the seriousness of
the incident was scaled down. A more intriguing possibility is that although 'the matter
was discovered,' the Liao may simply have been unaware of the full extent of the plot. If
Huan and Haizhen were expecting a positive response to their offerings it would not
make sense for them to flee, because they would be waiting for a Zhou army to march
north. This suggests that fleeing south was the conspirators' Plan B, undertaken as a
result of the Zhou inability to launch such an attack (see Table 5a, §k.) It is also logical to
suppose that it was Huan's failed attempt to escape, recorded in his biography, which led
to the discovery of Haizhen's involvement in what appeared to the Liao to be a high-level
escape plan, as recorded in the annals. The possibilities are endless, but it is not the plot
to which the LS biography pays most attention, but the aftermath of the escape which it
produced.
Huan's attempt to flee was well-planned.
When Huan received the letter [from Tao], he used a pretext to request medical treatment in
Nanjing, changed his clothes and slipped out at night, wanting to escape back to Bian.
Judging from his appointments as academician and vice-minister in one of the six
ministries, he was probably based in Shangjing. By contriving an excuse to get to
Nanjing, he shortened the distance to the frontier without arousing suspicion. It was still
about 150Icm, and Huan only got halfway, to Zhuo tg , before he was captured by a
frontier patrol. This raises questions about the consistency of border surveillance, for
although it indicates that there were established patrols, we have to set that against the
movements of the spy Tian Chongba, who crossed the frontier at least three times in
pursuit of his mission, apparently without let or hindrance, and travelled at least as far as
Nanjing, if not to Shangjing itself, all without detection.'
Having captured the fugitive, the patrol escorted Li Huan back to Nanjing, where he
was demoted to the minor ranks. Then,
42. There is also a problem regarding the location of the action. Huan's posts and the LS imply that everything
happened in Shangjing, but Haizhen's appointment and the mention of 'official quarters' in Huan's 'Report'
suggest Nanjing, and the shorter distance from the frontier would have made this easier for Chongba. This
possibility is supported by the presence of an official establishment at Nanjing for running the Chinese part of
the empire, but it is not clear whether Huan's positions would have allowed him long-term residence there. It is
perhaps most likely that the action was split between these two capitals, a possibility reinforced by the
peripatetic nature of the Liao court.
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Huan watched until his jailers were sound asleep, then used his belt to hang himself. However,
he did not die and he was guarded even more closely. He was fettered to go to Shangjing, and
threw himself into the middle of the stream of the river Huang i caN*, but a cable restrained him
and again he did not die.
Although two out of three subjects of the preceding case studies also made escape bids,
the relative ease of their return to Liao stands in contrast to Huan's repeated attempts at
suicide. The immediate spur for these was evidently his failure to escape, but there is
nothing to tell us why he felt that his last remaining option was to kill himself. He could
have regarded it as the honourable course of action now that he was unable to return to
the south, but on a less rational level, he could simply have feared the wrath of the
emperor and seen suicide as his only way out. Once Huan had faced the emperor, he did
not try again, so it is the latter explanation which makes most sense of his actions.
In fact, the emperor wanted to execute Huan, but he was saved by another Liao
Chinese acquired in 947, Gao Xun. Xun had been a gemen shi lit (commissioner of
memorial reception staff) serving in Du Chongwei's armies t±M)A,' and not directly a
colleague of Huan's, but since the LS notes earlier that Xun and Huan were together in
the party of selected officials sent north by Liao Shizong, it is implied that they got to
know each other then. Xun rose fast under the Liao and was now commissioner of the
military secretariat (shumishi ligVt) In repeated representations to the emperor, Xun
argued,
Huan is not essentially ungrateful for the generosity he has received, but because his mother is
eighty years old, his worry about visiting her has brought him to his misdeeds. Moreover, Huan
is rich in his capacity for literature, and at present there are few who could compare with him,
and if he were kept to supervise the wording of edicts, he could glorify the national prestige.
The emperor lifted the death sentence on Huan, and we can date this to 952:8 because it is
at this point that the annals account slots back in (§36.) According to this, in 952:7, four
Kitan ministers who had 'planned disorder' were arrested, and the month after that were
executed, along with Xiao Haizhen. At the same time Li Huan was merely beaten and
released, apparently the only conspirator to survive. That Huan was also the only
Chinese named as being involved might have said something about the general treatment
of Chinese officials at this point in the Liao dynasty, but from the biography it is
evidently more of a reflection on the continuing need for sponsorship amongst the
Chinese bureaucracy, whichever regime they were in. It has already been shown how
sponsorship, given and received, affected the careers of all three of the preceding case
study subjects.
On the face of it, the LS version of this incident is a curiously equivocal account. It
does not mention any espionage or subversive activities, whilst Huan's reluctance to
43. Table 1, /01. Biography at LS 85:1317.
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serve Liao is given far more stress than in the other texts, amongst which only the SS
mentions the escape attempt at all. As already noted, this could be mostly a matter of what
was known to the respective recorders, but even if this were the case, it still seems
strange that so much emphasis should be given to a story reflecting so badly upon the
Liao emperor. In fact, though, Liao Muzong is treated without sympathy in the LS,
which, detailing his excesses, prompts the Yuan compilers to comment that the rebellion
against him 'was indeed proper!'" Huan's suicide attempts, made out of fear, contribute
to this negative image of Muzong, but on the other hand, the mercy and openness to
reason elicited from him by Gao Xun suggests both a more human side and the good
influence of Chinese ministers upon non-Chinese rulers.
This version of the story also shows most clearly a Li Huan subject to the demands of
filial piety. First he responds to a 'summons' to return south from his older brother, to
whom, according to the Five relationships, he owes obedience. 45 Later Gao Xun argues
under the same rubric to save Huan's life, playing on the filial attachment of son to
mother, and an aged mother at that, to excuse Huan's behaviour. This is set against
Muzong's interpretation of Huan's actions as ungratefulness - tantamount to disloyalty -
and so reworks the theme of the tension between loyalty to family and loyalty to ruler.
Although Huan survived the wrath of Muzong, he was confined at the Fengguo temple
4,46 surrounded by mountains, suffering 'all forms of privations and hardships.'
Six years later it was again Gao Xun who came to his rescue, recommending that nobody
else was capable of writing the planned commemorative tablet for Liao Taizong. Huan
was freed and made libu shangshu .1IP3 Art (minister of the ministry of rites, 3a) and
academician of the Xuanzheng palace Viga.1-V-±. He died shortly afterwards;
according to the SS, in 962:6 (§39.)
The SS tells us that Huan's brother Li Tao gathered his writings into the Ding nian ji,
a work named with reference to the Han X official Su Wu	 (c.143-60 B.C.), who
had received his first commission in the year he came of age (dingnian Su Wu
was sent as an envoy to the Xiongnu .qta and was held for nineteen years without
submitting to them, thereby becoming a watchword for continuing loyalty to the south.
The Dingnianji must have been incomplete; it is most unlikely that Tao could have had
access to Huan's works produced in Liao, which would have included the
commemorative tablet to Liao Taizong.
44. LS 6:77-7:87.
45. He maintains this despite Tao's improper behaviour with Huan's new wife. WDSB 5:8a; abridged in LSSY
21:399; LSJSBM 18:346.
46. This temple survives, although much of it was rebuilt during the Jin 	 at Yixian ARA in Liaoning
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It is a shame that this does not survive, as Huan's draft for it was probably the most
important piece he ever wrote: according to the LS it was not until the emperor had
approved the text that Huan was released. Hence it is seen to be Huan's own talent which
ultimately brought him freedom, although he needed a sponsor in order to get the chance
to exercise his skill. This is the only mention of Huan's literary abilities in the LS, as that
work chiefly concerns itself with his reaction to recapture, but the effect of the remark is
to reinforce the importance of learning, a skill appreciated in every regime. This comes at
the end of an account which otherwise, in contrast to the southern sources, does not
mention Huan's talents. There are shades here of the Confucian idea that wen could
civilise the barbarian, but these are perhaps more a reflection of the subconscious minds
of the various historiographers than the conscious decisions of the actors themselves. In
recommending Li Huan's literary talent it seems unlikely that Gao Xun thought much
beyond the desire to give Huan a chance to redeem himself: the edification of the Kitan
would surely come a very poor second to the practical concerns of individuals.
It seems characteristic of Huan that he was unlucky in being frequently in the wrong
place at the wrong time. His life seems mostly one of uncertainty, misfortune and
hardship, and his greatest achievement was probably to survive at all. His career perhaps
shows something of the less successful end of official service in tenth-century north
China, and given the praise he received for his compositional abilities, we might wonder
what he would have achieved if he had been born in the more stable times which
followed his death. More importantly for our purposes here, though, Huan's experience
reflects at an individual level the changing circumstances brought by the political
developments of the first half of the century. There was no longer such a shortage of
Chinese bureaucrats in the Liao regime, and the work of establishing a bureaucratic
administrative apparatus for which the earliest arrivals were enlisted had been more or
less completed by 947, with such success that an ineffective and unpopular emperor
could hold the throne for 18 years without the state collapsing. This (and Muzong's
temperament) meant that escapers could no longer be certain of generous treatment.
Meanwhile in the south, the trauma of the Liao conquest added impetus to the recovery of
central power by helping to start the polarisation of the Central Plains and Liao into two
clear groups demanding an unequivocal choice. Huan's extremely active expression of a
continuing loyalty to the Central Plains contrasts markedly with the behaviour of our
earlier subjects, but even so, he accepted the opportunity for rehabilitation offered him by
Gao Xun, and returned to Liao employment. In turning down the chance to refuse office
and thereby display his continuing loyalty to the south, Huan ultimately rejected black-
and-white morality in favour of a practical shade of grey.
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Chapter Seven
Wang Jizhong  1r
Wang Jizhong is best-known as a negotiator of the treaty of Shanyuan ittfi. He was a
military man who served Song Zhenzong 5gA'Pss: , man and boy. He took his first
substantive office in Zhenzong's heir apparent establishment, and then at the imperial
court served in the palace armies and in northern regional posts. He was captured in battle
fighting the Liao in 1003, accepted employment under Liao Shengzong and
became so trusted that he was able to push for peace. After the conclusion of the treaty
Jizhong was treated generously. He continued to serve Liao in senior regional posts and
as a campaign general against Koryo ;'k= . He retired in 1022 and died the same year,
after 19 years of service to Liao Shengzong.
Although Jizhong fits the criteria of having biographies in both the LS and the
southern sources, his case is anomalous. His crossing took place over half a century after
the others examined in these case studies, and in a world much changed. By 1003 the
Song had ruled in the south for more than forty years, so Jizhong knew no other regime
and had experienced none of the transitions of power common to our earlier cases.
Instead of seeing a number of powers, of various origins, competing for control of the
Central Plains, Jizhong grew up in a period when the Song had become the undisputed
masters of both north and south China, and the Liao were the only other serious power in
the region. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, in this changed environment cases such as
Jizhong's were very unusual, and indeed his was one of the last before the treaty of
Shanyuan effectively prevented any further crossings. He was also the first to feel the
concrete effects of this treaty, as his request to be recalled south was denied. As a figure
thus straddling the transition from one 'world order' to the next his case illustrates how
far and in what aspects the definition of the frontier had changed, for he stands at the end
of the process we saw beginning with Li Huan Accordingly, our discussion of
Jizhong here will not attempt to cover the whole of his life in detail, and in particular will
not dwell upon the sequence of events leading to Shanyuan, 1 but will focus instead upon
how his story resembles and differs from those of his predecessors.
The texts for Wang Jizhong suffer from the same problems of scattered filiation as do
those for Li Huan. 2 Jizhong has a biography in each of the LS and SS, which show no
1. Jizhong's role in the negotiations which resulted in the treaty of Shanyuan is given detailed analysis by
Christian Schwarz-Schilling in his Friede von Slum-Yuan (hereafter Schwarz-Schilling), esp. pp.40-50. It
would be superfluous to duplicate his work here.
2. See Chapter 6.
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sign of consultation between the compilers. The QG is not a source for the LS in this
case, as Jizhong does not warrant a QG biography of his own, being mentioned only in
the annals and in the biographies of others. As for the SS, although it is said that the
DDSL and LPJ are not major sources, 3 in this case the parallel passages are closely
derived from the earlier works to the later, with the DDSL being so close to the LPJ as to
warrant them being treated here as a single work. The SHY gives extensive coverage to
the communications which preceded Shanyuan, but as these are not of direct concern
here, the SHY has not been used.'
Career in the Song
As already hinted, Jizhong's early life differed markedly in some respects from our other
subjects, and especially from those of the first three case studies. To begin with, his
origins lie a good deal further south. Han Yanhui ogg, Zhana Li :RTR and Zhao
Yanshou itgg all hailed from the northern frontier region, but according to the
southern sources, Jizhong was from Kaifeng put, where the court was based (l.)
also acquired his first post in a rather different manner. Whereas the sources are clear that
Yanhui, Li and Huan were all given their first appointments on their own merits, Jizhong
received his initial posting by virtue of his father (§2-3.) From the SS we learn that Wang
Chong	 was a commander of cavalry (wuqi zhihuishi asvgatt) stationed at the
strategic pass of Waqiaoguan •fru and died there, leaving Jizhong an orphan.
According to the DDSL/LPJ, it was in recognition of this that Jizhong, at the age of 5,
was given a sinecure appointment in the palace as a minor attendant. 6 The position of his
father now placed Jizhong within a circle of official privilege, based upon the imperial
court, that had not been available to our earlier subjects. It is clear from cases such as that
of Zhang Li, the farmer's son, that patronage flourished at every one of the regional
courts of the first half of the century, but by the end of the century the erosion of regional
power left the emperor as the only source of favour.
A feature remaining from earlier decades is the importance of the pre-accession
household of the ruler-to-be.' Jizhong's first real recorded posting was as a jishi zuoyou
3. J. Haeger in Hervouet, Sung bibliography, p.90.
4. Schwarz-Schilling naturally makes full use of the SHY material.
5. The LS says that Jizhong's place of origin is unknown. Li Huan was also based at court, but acquires a link
(admittedly a tenuous one) with the frontier region through his distant association with the Tang royal house,
which came from the north.
6. The DDSL/LPJ call him simply a dianzhi(shi} FRA (14) (palace attendant), the SS gives his title as
dongxiban dianshi Alliblg* (palace attendant in the companies of the east and west.) In the SS the causal
relationship between his father's death and this appointment is not made explicit.
7. See Wang, passim, on the prominence of former gubernatorial retinue officials at the courts of their
governor-turned-emperor.
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M- St (executive assistant-attendant) in the heir apparent establishment of the future
Song Zhenzong. According to the SS Jizhong's prudence and virtue won him the
personal confidence of the prince, and when Zhenzong came to the throne in 998,
Jizhong accompanied him to Kaifeng with the position of neidian chongban Nra-W,H
(imperial palace warder) (§4-6.) Just as Li Siyuan RN brought his retinue officials
Zhao Yanshou and Dejun kg.e.,p to court with him when he became Tang Mingzong, so
Jizhong was given court positions when his lord acceded. The difference was that
Yanshou and Dejun could have had no idea that they were serving a future emperor,
because Siyuan was not in line for the throne, whereas there was more certainty that the
Song heir apparent would indeed become emperor in his turn. Neither was Jizhong faced
with serving an heir apparent who was regarded as a danger to his predecessor, as Li
Congrong 2. had been, so he had no need to escape his posting or suffer the
consequences as Zhao Yanshou and Li Huan had done.
Jizhong's career showed rapid promotion on an overtly military track. The CB tells us
that by 1001 at the latest he held the regional post of Yunzhou i
 ft1 guanchashi MC'M
(surveillance commissioner), but it seems unlikely that he spent much time there because
he always held concurrent positions in the imperial armies, with expeditionary duties
which took precedence over everyday administration. The sources do not agree exactly
on which posts he held when, but the CB, SS and LS all give him the rank of dianqian
duyuhou rallimaa (inspector-in-chief of the palace armies.) The CB, followed by the
SS biography, gives him the expeditionary position of fu dubushu gamiz (vice-
administrator of the imperial quarters) of first Gaoyangguan EstIM and then of
Dingzhou ,J+1, but these are his most senior appointments, coming at the end of about
three years of transfers between various northern and expeditionary posts, listed in Table
6, §7-10. By this time it was unusual for a Central Plains emperor to go on campaign in
person, and with the increasing separation of civilian and military responsibilities, it was
also unusual for senior court officials to do any fighting.' This contrasts with the
situation in which Zhao Yanshou, as military secretary, led an expeditionary force against
Shi Jingtang MIZffg. Hence the people commanding the armies of the frontier region
were no longer a mixture of military-minded frontier officials and bureaucratic staff, but
were now largely military types, like Jizhong. It was a great deal harder for bureaucratic
figures such as Han Yanhui or Zhang Li to find themselves in a situation where they
could be faced with the option of crossing the frontier, and this is one factor behind the
great reduction in individual crossings noted in Chapter 2 for the period after 947.
8. Trends started by Song Taizu 5jc±411; see Worthy, Founding of Sung, pp.66-7, 195ff, 238ff.
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Arrival in Liao
Jizhong's arrival in Liao is detailed in two completely different views of the same event
(§11-16.) The northern source, the LS, gives a simple, -downplayed description of his
capture.
In 1003 the Song sent Jizhong to camp with his troops at Wangdu MN in Ding. With his light
horse he went scouting against our [Liao] army and met the nanfu zaixiang MR;Iti [grand
councillor of the southern administration] Yelii Nugua IIIMV)1( and others, who captured him.
The southern sources forswear such a dispassionate account. Having stressed that the
Liao 'invaded' the northern borders of Song, they move on to Jizhong's part in the
defence, which becomes more dramatic with each retelling.
The DDSL/LPJ imply great praise for Jizhong's courage. Whereas we know that
Jizhong was part of an army led by Wang Chao .TE, Sang Zan AN and Thou Ying
NI, these two sources do not mention the presence of either the main Song defending
force or its senior generals. According to them, Jizhong, apparently alone, led the local
military to fight the Liao.
At the end of Xianping [c.1003] the ICitan invaded. Jizhong led the military of Ding out to
fight to the north of Wangdu. Because of the generosity of the favour he had received, he fought
hard in his efforts to repay this, but his dress was a little unusual, (so) the Kitan, recognising
him, fought with him in one place after another for several days. The relieving force did not
arrive and so he fell into the hands of the Kitan. The court assumed he was dead and gave him the
posthumous title of Datong cp,i jiedushi.
The CB account is more detailed again, and the QG copies it word for word, with two
alterations (the QG version shown within [] brackets), and extensive cutting (shown in
{} brackets)?
[On] 20 May the Kitan invaded. The Dingzhou administrator of the expeditionary imperial
quarters Wang Chao {sent an envoy to summon} Sang Zan of Zhenzhou OM and Zhou Ying of
Gaoyangguan {each to bring the troops under their command to assist. Chao sent 1500 infantry
ahead to} oppose (the Liao) at Wangdu xian ig; the next day, arriving 6 Ii south of the town,
{they met the enemy, and many were killed.} The vice-administrator of the imperial quarters,
{inspector-in-chief of the palace armies and Yunzhou surveillance commissioner} Wang Jizhong,
{because he had often met with great generosity, longed to exert himself and was willing to give
his all; he fought with the enemy at ICangcun ft from sunset until the second division of the
night, and the enemy force retreated a little. At daybreak they fought again; the whole enemy
host attacked the east flank, they went out behind (the Song) lines and fired the supply route,
cutting it off. Jizhong} led the troops under his personal command to {gallop there at full speed}
[fight to their last breath], {he} generally displayed himself in ritual clothing (so) the enemy
recognised him and surrounded him several tens deep. {His soldiers were all badly wounded, (but)
fought to their last breath}, alternately fighting and pulling back; close to Xishan [if they
(turned) north; when they reached Baicheng etil, they {fell into the hands of the enemy. [were
captured by the Kitan.] Chao and the others accordingly led his troops back to Dingzhou, and
sent envoys to report to the court.}
9. English grammar cannot always be preserved when showing the alteration of the text.
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The CB has no stake in emphasising Jizhong's role: it makes clear that he was only one
member of a much larger force, and makes no explicit suggestion that reinforcements
might have been expected. On the other hand, the details given of the battle show that
Jizhong faced overwhelming odds, and thus bring out his courage and imply his loyalty.
The abridged QG account again clearly places Jizhong as a less senior member of a larger
force, but the first phase of the battle is dropped, leaving the more dramatic second phase
as ample demonstration of Jizhong's courage.
The SS biography quotes sections of the CB version word-for-word, but also
embellishes. It introduces the incident with the vision of a huge Liao invading army, and
makes Jizhong the first Song leader to meet the Liao force.
In 1003 several tens of thousands of Khan cavalry invaded south, they reached Wangdu [in Ding],
and Jizhong and the great general Wang Chao, along with Sang Zan and others, led troops to
assist it. Jizhong reached Kangcun and fought with the Kitan....
After the Liao cut the Song supply line,
Chao and Zan were both frightened and pulled back their troops, and did not, in the end, go to
assist. Jizhong alone, with the troops under his personal command, galloped there at full
speed....
The cowardice of the other generals in simply abandoning Jizhong to his fate makes his
heroism as he 'galloped there at full speed' that much the greater. The heroic picture is
maintained by the suppression here of the information found in the CB (a direct source)
and the SS annals that the Song emperor 'sent an edict dispatching 15,000 troops (from)
Hedong .... to relieve (Jizhong)' (§15.)"
This increasingly admiring view of Jizhong contrasts with the measured Liao account
in which he was simply captured while on reconnaissance. There is no suggestion in the
LS that Jizhong fell into enemy hands only after a hard-fought melee, or of any serious
resistance on his part. It could even be suggested that he had no opportunity for
resistance. If the LS has minimised the amount of conflict depicted before Jizhong was
captured, this is only to be expected, as it was clearly in Liao interests to show crossing
to be as painless as possible. Equally, it is in Song interests to make the most of
Jizhong's brave resistance, and the southern sources leave us with a picture of Jizhong as
a great hero, fighting to the death but being overwhelmed by the enemy. That they do this
means that Jizhong stands completely apart from our previous case studies, all of whom
are said to have crossed in non-violent circumstances. To be sure, the situations in which
they crossed generally resulted from war, but none showed the least sign of individual,
10. Jing k here contains an element of surprise at the outcome.
11. Compiling a dynastic history was a balancing act. Wang Chao's and Sang Zan's biographers were unlikely
to accuse them of cowardice, and Wang Chao's biography is careful to record the investigation into accusations
of withdrawal. This laid all the blame on two of the deputy-level expeditionary commanders, thus leaving Wang
Chao and Sang Zan with official reputations unscathed. SS 278:9464.
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active resistance, whether this meant taking up arms, as Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou
could have done, or non-cooperation, as all four could have done. Even Li Huan did not
-a
refuse his services when he was offered rehabilitation. As a general, Jizhong clearly had
more opportunity to resist by force of arms than did a bureaucrat, but the changed
circumstances must also have been a factor. Whereas the general Zhao Yanshou had seen
service to the north as an opportunity, Jizhong found it less attractive than the fulfilment
of his duty to the Song, even at the risk of death.
Interpretations of Jizhong's crossing
The contemporary appreciation of such behaviour is demonstrated by the Song court's
reaction. Believing that Jizhong had died in the battle,' 2 the emperor posthumously gave
him the position of Datong jiedushi, while his sons were given official posts in a manner
echoing Jizhong's first appointment (§16.) What is curious is that by the fourteenth
century, the commentators in both dynastic histories regard Jizhong with considerable
ambiguity (§17.) The SS is clear that he 'was willing to serve to the death,' but because
Jizhong took service with the Liao, the commentator concludes that 'his moral integrity
was most certainly compromised.' Such a verdict sits uneasily beside the enhanced
heroism found in the biography itself. Moreover, the LS declares,
Since Jizhong was unable to die for his country, even though he concluded peace between the
south and the north and was a mirror for knowing people(' s character), how could he be worthy
of esteem?
Hence his fault in allowing himself to be captured, rather than fighting to the death or
committing suicide, is felt to outweigh any positive service. It is quite possible that the
main compiler of the three histories project, Ouyang Xuan, wrote both cornmentaries,13
which would account for the similarity of views. Whoever the author, there is no
mistaking that there is little to be said for Jizhong's behaviour from the official
historiographical standpoint of the late Yuan, so it appears that by this time the ideal of
loyal behaviour was much more rigid than it had been possible to practise in the tenth
century. The earlier cases treated here, where they are commented on at all, are generally
appraised positively, in line with their biographies. Jizhong, however, suffered from
being the last crosser of serious note before the frontier, and attitudes, solidified. There is
an impression that the neo-Confucian commentators would have liked Jizhong to have
been a precursor of the 'new world order' which their movement represented, and were
disappointed that he had failed them.
12. Incidentally, this shows the extent of non-communication between the two sides.
13. Chan, Official historiography, p.86; Chai Degeng, Shi ji juyao, pp.123-4.
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Even before the compilation of the dynastic histories, Jizhong became a reference
point for those discussing the morality of crossing to the north, and how to deal with it
when it arose. The early eleventh-century Song official Ka Changchao gi advanced
a pragmatic view in defence of one Liu Ping gi*, who was captured by Li Yuanhao
CA of the Tangut Xi Xia NX." The minor frontier officials accused Ping of
submitting to the enemy, and wanted to execute his whole family in punishment.
Changchao responded,
The [Former] Han A wiped out Li Ling's family [c.99 B.C.]; Ling did not return, and the
Han hated him. The former emperor [Zhenzong] treated Wang Jizhong's family generously, and
in the end got service from Jizhong. We cannot know what Ping did; if we wipe out his family,
then even if Ping is alive, we will not get him to return.
Such an open-minded approach was a practical one, focussed upon the importance of
retaining or recovering even single officials from across the borders. Changchao was a
court literatus, but the frontier attitude towards Jizhong was even more favourable, as
quoted in the LSSY.15
Some of the common people and literati of those lands [Hejian Film praised him saying, 'The
ancients considered that to be entirely loyal, one could only be loyal to a single lord. Now that
the Hejian wang filrga [Jizhong] has concluded such a happy peace between the north and
south, we can say that he is entirely loyal to the rulers of two states.'
Evidently a contemporary view from shortly after 1005, this probably reflects the
gratitude of those in the frontier region for the stability brought by the peace. It is
immediately qualified by the author, who says:
However, Jizhong himself fell into the hands of a strange state, and could not die accordingly; he
brought no benefit to his master and, as one who (continued to) live (even) at the expense of
honour, betrayed (that master.)
The uncompromising 'correction' of the contemporary view echoes the dissonance
between the SS biography and its commentary.
Such disagreement reflects an ambivalence in the approach to Jizhong which can first
be seen amongst contemporaries in the Song. The SS biography of Zhao Anren
records that after Jizhong's crossing, a Song official called Yao Dongzhi #()LW
'repeatedly praised [Jizhong's] talents.' But Anren said,
`Jizhong formerly served in the establishment of the heir apparent, (I've) heard that he is a little
cautious, (but) I do not know anything else (about him.)'
14. Jia Changchao's biography, SS 285:9614.
15. LSSY 20:392, quoting Wang Wenzheng gong bilu
16. Not the same person as the Anren who crossed to Liao and became a eunuch. (Table 1, #159.)
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Anren's unwillingness to commit himself on the subject of Jizhong's talent, let alone his
virtue, constitutes damnation with faint praise, especially when Anren is then himself
commended for his ability to cut straight through to the heart of matters.
A more complex ambivalence is presented in the Yuhu qing hua,' 7 which records the
prediction of a fortune-teller about Jizhong:
'This person will surprise you; for half his life he will eat Chinese rice, for half his life he will
eat foreign rice.'
Here fate is introduced as a factor in Jizhong's behaviour, and by thus reducing or
removing his scope for the exercise of free will, diminishes his responsibility for what
happened to him. Because he was not in control of events, he cannot be judged so
harshly. Later in the same work we find an account ofJizhong's attempt to return home:
Jizhong wore Chinese clothes and looked south to the (Song) emperor's palace and called himself
a subject who had not died [wei Si Chen	 if], and weeping he bowed and did not rise.
The picture is of a Jizhong who remained loyal to the Song, which faithfulness further
mitigates his questionable behaviour in crossing the frontier. The name he gives himself
in this text, 'a subject who had not died,' shows him subscribing to the moral code of
loyalty even though he has broken it by taking service with the Liao rather than dying for
the Song.
The range of viewpoints found here illustrates the fluidity of attitudes towards the
practice of loyalty in the period between Jizhong's arrival in Liao and the compilation of
the official histories. Although the earlier cases contribute a certain amount to the
continuing discourse on loyalty, the difficult political circumstances of the Wudai
rendered it hard to make clear judgements about loyalty. In addition, the position of the
JW compilers, who had themselves all crossed from another regime to Song, disinclined
them to treat their fellows too harshly." It is only with the historiographers of the
established Song, Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang, that we find criticism of crossings
between the different Wudai regimes. Even then, where Ouyang Xiu dismisses the
officials of the period with blanket condemnation, Sima Guang is a great deal more
measured, and reserves his judgement and criticisms for Feng Dao Z igia." The discourse
to which all of these writers contributed is the subject of the last two chapters, but before
moving on we must briefly consider the remainder ofJizhong's life.
17. Yuhu qinghua 4:3b.
18. See Zhou Jun, Songchu `erchen,' pp.126ff.
19. XW 54:611-2; TJ 291:9511-3.
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Service under the Liao and the treaty of Shanyuan
The CB and QG say that Jizhong was entrusted with increasingly important jobs under
the Liao, while the LS credits the empress dowager with knowledge of Jizhong's
worthiness and with getting him his first Liao appointment, as hubushi pfq.-sit (tax
commissioner) (§18.) Once again, the women of the imperial clan were influential in
ensuring the employment and advancement of a Chinese."
Not only did the empress dowager get Jizhong a job, the LS tells us that she also
provided him with a good marriage, joining Jizhong with the clan of Kang Moji
an early arrival in Liao whose family were now well-established in the Liao bureaucracy.
It is gratitude for these favours which is said to have made Jizhong energetic in his
service to the Liao. The fact that Jizhong already had at least three, and probably four,
sons at the time of his arrival in Liao did not prevent him from marrying again (§19), and
there was another son by this union. We do not know if Jizhong was a widower, but
even if his first wife were alive there was no question of her being sent for as Zhao
Yanshou's wife had been, because she would have been in enemy, not allied, territory.
The Kang marriage does suggest that Jizhong, even having not long arrived in Liao, did
not anticipate ever getting back to Song, and it is quite possible that, regardless of his
marital status in the south, this was a proper marriage and not the taking of a concubine.
Certainlythere are later cases of Song merchants living in Korea who had second families
there while their first wives waited for them.21
From the southern sources (§26) we know that the regular envoys instituted after the
treaty of Shanyuan would bring gifts for Jizhong. However, the LS biography places
these presents before negotiations for the treaty even began. Hence, while the southern
sources mark the opening of discussions with special gifts of bow and arrows; in the LS,
these same gifts are set in the context of regular present-giving. The southern sources
claim that Jizhong's letter opening negotiations was the first indication that he was still
alive, but if the LS is right that gifts were sent to Jizhong before this, then that implies the
Song knew more than their records are admitting. However, there is no way of proving
this, and it is perhaps more likely that the anomaly has arisen by mistake.
Although Jizhong's role in the peace negotiations will not be discussed in detail, the
course of events is summarised here as background to points of comparison with the
other case studies. According to the southern sources (chiefly the CB), after gaining the
20. Cf. Han Yanhui, Chapter 3.
21. Luo Jun WO, Baoqing si ming zhi j.6, quoted by Sung Shee, The contribution of Chinese
merchants to the trade relations between Sung China and Koryo, Chinese culture 18:4 (1977), p.11. This is a
recurrent phenomenon. Of the Guomindang soldiers who settled on Taiwan, a significant proportion remarried
there, despite still having living wives on the Mainland. The lifting of travel restrictions made for some
uncomfortable reunions.
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trust of the Liao, Jizhong 'seized the opportunity to argue the benefits of a peace,' and
succeeded because this tapped into the wishes of the empress dowager to end the
fighting. He drafted a letter asking the Song to send an eiivoy to negotiate, and when this
was refused, wrote another. When Zhenzong did agree to send an envoy, the person
chosen, Cao Liyong gflifg, was detained at Tianxiong by the official in charge
there, Wang Qinruo .Vt. It was only after further exchanges of letters between
Jizhong and the Song court that Liyong was released to go north, and thereafter peace
was concluded with remarkable swiftness: according to the CB it took just four days of
negotiations. The LS condenses this account and says that the initiative for peace came
from the Song side (§21-24.)
Schwarz-Schilling points out how Jizhong's first communication not only set out the
reasons for ending the war, but also justified his own conduct in taking service with the
Liao.22 Such justification was also advanced by Han Yanhui, whose stated reason was
strictly practical: fear of Wang Jian I. Yanhui appears confident that his rationale will
be accepted by the Taiyuan Jin, and although he feels the need to explain his behaviour,
he does not apologise for it. Jizhong's reasons suggest he was less self-assured (§21.)
First he describes the battle in which he was captured, pointing out for how long he
fought, the unpreparedness of the troops, the lack of supplies and the exhausting effects
on his forces, the resumption of battle on the second day, and the non-appearance of
reinforcements, leading to his capture. He goes on,
It is not only that Wang Chao and the others underestimated the enemy and had not planned
carefully enough, it was also my fault (that I was captured.) The northern court, because I had
previously served in the palace, and have borne frontier responsibilities, treats (me) with special
favour, and places (me) amongst the various ministers. I often recall my parting audience last
year, and the kind words which I personally received from your majesty, and (I) serve (the Liao)
only in order to rest the people and end fighting. ....23
Jizhong is not merely explaining what he did, he is also trying to excuse it. He details the
battle in order to scotch any accusations of cowardice, and he meliorates his criticisms of
Wang Chao and the other commanders by frankly admitting his own share of
responsibility for his capture. In assuring Zhenzong that he has not forgotten the favour
received from him, Jizhong addresses the issue of his personal loyalty to the emperor as
an individual. In arguing that his sole aim is to end hostilities, he appeals both to the
general mood of war-weariness and, obliquely, to the Confucian principle that rulers and
officials should seek the best interests of the people, choosing peace in preference to war.
If we accept that Jizhong really did write something resembling what the CB quotes, this
shows his own consciousness of, and subscription to, a standard of loyal behaviour far
22. Schwarz-Schilling, p.41.
23. I have referred to Schwarz-Schilling, p.110, but the translation is my own.
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higher than that practised by our other subjects. Where frontier crossing had been
regarded as normal behaviour in earlier decades, and martyrdom considered
_.
extraordinary, now Jizhong felt he had fallen so far short of the expected standard that
even as he justifies his actions, he apologises for not dying. This passage is a fine
illustration of Song ambivalence towards the treaty of Shanyuan, and thus to Jizhong.
The positive aspects of the peace (from the Song point of view) are reflected in efforts to
show Jizhong's courage and continuing loyalty, but the uncertainty as to the long-term
wisdom of the arrangement comes through in the indications that Jizhong ultimately failed
the Song morality test.
The LS version of the opening of negotiations, found in Jizhong's biography, also
refers to the benefit of the common people. Here, Song envoys bring Jizhong gifts of a
bow, arrows, and a whip, accompanying an imperial directive to ask for peace. The text
quoted opens, 'You yourself are in a high position and love to nurture the masses,' thus
flattering Jizhong for Confucian virtues. More significantly, the text ends,
You can report secretly (to the Song), and if they [the Liao] consent to make peace, then at that
time different envoys will immediately come and request it.
In requesting a secret report from Jizhong, the Song are acting in a tradition of inviting
Liao Chinese to act in the interests of the Central Plains regimes. 24
 Aside from Li Huan,
Zhao Yanshou was also approached in this way. The Song seek to use Jizhong's inside
information to ensure that their peace initiative stands the best chance of success, but the
fact that this is reported in the LS not only shows the Song as eager for peace, it also
suggests that any activities of Jizhong's on behalf of Song were not so secret after all,
because the Liao seem to have known about them. If Jizhong had been set up as a Song
spy, in informing the Liao of his Song contacts he is acting as a double agent_ The
dangers of such a double-cross were recognised, and the southern sources, in which the
initiative comes from Jizhong, show clearly that however many professions of good faith
he made, his initial approach was treated with mistrust by Song Zhenzong. Schwarz-
Schilling argues that this was probably mostly for show: a face-saving tactic on
Zhenzong's part. 25 Such reasoning does not detract from the possibility that Jizhong was
a Song spy, but given that peace was the ultimate goal of both sides, espionage does not
seem to be an appropriate rubric under which to consider these events. This is less a
matter of espionage, than of the uncertainty in the sources about who Jizhong was really
working for and where his loyalties lay.
24. There is an article by a Chinese scholar which apparently argues that Wang Jizhong was a Song spy
deliberately planted in the Liao court, but I have been unable to locate this.
25. Schwarz-Schilling, p.42.
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The southern sources say that after the treaty established regular envoy exchanges, the
Song missions regularly brought presents for Jizhong. There were precedents for this:
Han Yanhui and Zhao Yanshou had both received regular gifts from the Central Plains
regimes. In these two cases the presents can be explained by the senior positions of the
recipients. Jizhong became a Liao military secretary (shumishi in 1019, but his
rank in 1005 did not justify the sending of gifts, unless it was in recognition of his efforts
in securing peace. Jizhong received the presents openly, so if he was being rewarded for
helping Song, then it was only with the collusion of the Liao.
According to the DDSL/LPJ, CB and SS, Jizhong was quite open in expressing a
desire to return to the south (§26.) He wept on receiving the Song gifts and sent back
petitions with various Song envoys, asking to be recalled. Attempts to return south by
one means or another are found in several of the case studies here, but this is the first
instance of a request for a formal recall. Given the new framework for peaceful relations,
Jizhong's request does not seem so unreasonable. There was also a precedent: Zhao
Yanshou's wife had been allowed to move between the friendly states of Liao and Later
Jin. These, however, were in an alliance based on personal relations in which Liao
Taizong was the senior partner; the relationship between Liao and Song was one between
equal states26 whose emperors never met, and was structured strictly within the
framework of the treaty of Shanyuan. The agreement included a provision for returning
fugitives from the other side, and the sources state explicitly that it is 'because of the
sworn treaty' that the Song emperor refused to grant what Jizhong asked. That Zhenzong
would not ask for an exception to be made in Jizhong's case shows how important it was
to him that the treaty not be immediately undermined, reflecting the strength of the
imperial desire for peace. Zhenzong was not, however, inherently opposed to the idea of
Jizhong's return, for according to the CB he also had the message conveyed that
if the ruler (of the Kitan) would let the minister go of his own volition, then a great payment
would be made in thanks.
Such a volunteering of the initiative suggests how tentative was the Liao-Song
relationship at this early stage. There is a distinct sense that despite the fixed terms of the
treaty, there was still a great deal of working out of ground rules to be done, and
Zhenzong did not want to be the one to upset things before an equilibrium had been
reached. Thus it was Jizhong who paid the price for the peace he had worked so hard to
bring about, when that peace, ironically, turned out to be the instrument which prevented
him from getting what he wanted for himself. Faced with no opportunity of returning
26. See for example Tao Jingshen, Sung-Liao relations: a case of diplomatic parity, Chine ancienne (1977),
pp.319-22; Twitchett, Liao, pp.121-4.
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home, Jizhong continued in Liao service, rising to high rank and being honoured with
bestowal of the imperial name of Yelii.
The Song sources naturally skip over the remainder of Jizhong's career in Liao, but the
LS biography gives details not only of his official posts, but also relates an anecdote
demonstrating Jizhong's morality. In 1017, Liao Shengzong asked Jizhong for his
assessment of the suitability of Xiao Hezhuo EIS .  1 for the most senior job in the
bureaucracy, that of beiyuan shumishi kru'VV5 (commissioner of the military
secretariat of the northern division) (§29.) Jizhong advised that,
Hezhuo, although he has scholarly ability, is ignorant of morality. Xiao Dilie's men ability
and behaviour are both perfect, it is proper to employ (him.)
The emperor appointed Hezhuo anyway, but if anything this only emphasises the image
of Jizhong speaking his mind and upholding the primacy of morality, even over
scholarship, thus demonstrating some of the classical characteristics of a Confucian
official. The biographies of Hezhuo and Dilie show that in arguing against the former and
for the latter, Jizhong was only reiterating views widely held at court, but he was also
suspected of having a factional interest in the appointment of Dilie, which is said to have
prevented Dilie's selection. After the failure of the 1017 campaign against Koryo, led by
Hezhuo, the emperor admitted that Jizhong 'was clever in understanding people;' in other
words, that he had probably been right about Hezhuo.
Thus, in contrast to the ambivalent picture found in the southern sources, the LS
gives Jizhong an orthodox treatment. His crossing is apparently painless, and he is noted
for his particular service to the regime. Overall, he is depicted as an exemplar of the
virtuous Confucian official, upright in character, defending morality, fulfilling his duty in
the proper manner, and being proved right against the emperor. It is in combination with
the southern sources that we uncover the more complex aspects of Jizhong's situation.
His key role in the negotiations around Shanyuan suggests in him an ability to straddle
the frontier, giving grounds for the contemporary comment quoted earlier that he was
'entirely loyal to the rulers of two states.' Jizhong, in working on behalf of south, was
heir to the tradition claimed to have been established by Han Yanhui and his ilk.
Jizhong's loyalty to the south seems to have been stronger than that of the earlier cases;
he lived up to his name, 'continuing faithfulness.' In terms of activity levels, Jizhong
surpassed even Li Huan, but he was not able to put his loyal feelings into practice save
through any influence he managed to acquire in Liao. While it was changed political,
rather than personal, circumstances which allowed him to use his position to bring about
a peace, his individual situation did differ from that of earlier crossers to the extent that he
tried to practise a higher ideal of loyalty. Yet when return to the south was denied him,
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he, like his earlier counterparts, was apparently willing enough to serve the Liao. It is the
roots of the ideas of loyalty variously employed by Jizhong and his fellow crossers
_.
which are the subject of the next chapter.
,
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.
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brought gifts bcs
was former official,
Shengzon2 permitted
this
81:1284 biog
Chapter 7 - Wang Jizhong: Table 6
S S
	
LS
	
QG
	
CB
	
DDSULPJ
1004:int 9,9 Nov
J sent letter to Shi
Pu to discuss peace
7:125 annals
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14:160 annals
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gifts, he wept,
petitioned to be
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PART THREE
INTANGIBLE FRONTIERS
Chapter Eight
The question of lojialty:
zhong ,1 3. and the representation of crossing
So far we have discussed, in increasing detail, the circumstances in which people came to
cross frontiers. Crossing frontiers involves changing allegiances, and this necessarily
raises the question of loyalty. But whether an act is loyal or disloyal depends upon the
perspective of the judge. The same deed can be judged loyal in one context but disloyal in
another, and the passage of time can see the reversal of the verdict.' This is what
happened to the Liao Chinese; although their case was never black-and-white, and the
changes worked upon them are accordingly intermediate between extremes. In this
chapter the changes will be examined in two parts. In Part 1 we briefly survey the
concept of loyalty as it developed and changed through Chinese history up to the
compilation of the LS. At least some of these ideas would have been available to those
making decisions about crossing frontiers, and were subsequently drawn upon and
developed further by those who wrote, and particularly those who rewrote, the records.
During the tenth century itself, current concepts of loyalty could be applied between any
two states, but in the course of successive re-recording down to the fourteenth century, it
became clear that in the case of the Liao Chinese it was their service to the Kitan which
was the concern of the historiographers, who balanced this with an increasing emphasis
on the attachment of these people to the south. These developments are the subject of
Part 2, which draws together findings from the case studies to survey the changing
treatment in successive texts of frontier crossers to Liao.
Part 1 - The concept of zhong
The first problem is the translation of the Chinese word thong as 'loyalty.' This is
frequently taken to refer to a continuing adherence to a single leader or regime in times of
difficulty, but it does not give anything like an adequate rendition of the range of concepts
as understood both through time, and particularly in the texts under consideration here.
1. See Morton Grodzins, The loyal and the disloyal: social boundaries of patriotism and treason (1956),
pp.16-7. Although Grodzins is chiefly concerned with 'national loyalty' in the context of the Cold War, his
analysis of the nature and functions of loyalty and the process of becoming 'disloyal' has general application.
2. This is true of Chinese-English dictionaries on both the mainland and in Taiwan. The Shangwu yinshueuan
dictionary (PRC) gives 'loyal, devoted, honest' (p.908); the Dongya tushu chengsi yinhang's New practical
dictionary (ROC) gives 'faithful, loyal, sincere, patriotic, loyalty, sincerity, devoted, honest' (1517, p.315)
Mathews gives 'loyal, faithful, devoted, honest, patriotic;' and Giles, 'loyal, patriotic, faithful.'
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We would expect an evolution in the meaning of any word in the moral code of any
culture; the word zhong, along with the concepts attached to it, was no exception.
Furthermore, within any particular set of circumstances theword and concepts of zhong
could be, and were, employed in a highly flexible manner. The widespread and uncritical
use of the modern meaning of zhong, within a context where 'loyalty' has acquired
meanings associated with patriotism and nationalism, has erected an artificial obstacle to
our understanding of officials who served more than one regime. The meaning of zhong
is by no means clear. Each successive commentator on the texts has applied an
understanding of the word as it was in their own day and thus overlaid earlier meanings
with a gloss which is at best complicating. Here we are concerned to look at the different
meanings rather than attempting to come to a single definition. How was thong defined?
How did interpretations change over time? How can these ideas be applied to the five
individuals covered in the case studies? The attempt to answer these questions involves
cutting through some of the accreted layers of historiographical opinion, both to
distinguish between what was meant by the writers, and how that is interpreted now; and
to separate perceivable historical events on the one hand, from the recording of those
events on the other.
The roots of meaning: zhong ft_r; and legitimacy
The most important concept behind the early usage of the word zhong appears to be that
of faithful service. Early versions of the graph for thong appear on Zhou M bronzes,
where the word means 'consciously devoted to the ruler.' This, it can be argued, implies
the 'moral precept of loyalty,' but we should perhaps be wary of the dangers of reading
back modern meanings into symbols produced nearly 3000 years ago.
Nevertheless, thong was already an important concept, and closely related to a
number of other ideas crucial in the establishment of the earliest recorded Chinese
polities. For our purposes, the most important of these was zheng TE, variously
translated as 'correct and proper,' or 'orthodox.' Zheng seems to be rather similar in
meaning to zhong, and the two words are often found together, when they mean
'orthodox.' The association of the meaning of zheng and thong suggests the essential
point that it is only possible to be zhong to a legitimate regime. If someone is thong to an
3. Definition from Zhengzhong xing yin yi zonghe da zidian (The great Zhengzhong dictionary of picto-
ideographical and phonetic roots of etymology and meanings), (Taiwan: Zhengzhong 19'71), p.474, cited in
Chen Chi-yun, Orthodoxy as a mode of statecraft: the ancient concept of cheng. Orthodoxy in late imperial
China (1990), ed. Liu Kwang-ching, p.30. He cites K.C. Chang, Shang Civilisation (1980), pp.207-8 and
fig.52 in support of this.
4. Chen, Orthodoxy, p.30.
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illegitimate regime, then they are not zhong, but rebellious. This sounds simple enough,
but it is not always easy to decide when a regime is legitimate.
Chen Chi-yun's discussion of the meaning of zheng concludes:
The etymology of the Chinese words for orthodox and its antonym .... indicates a nonmoral but
goal-oriented root meaning that is concerned mainly with the result of the action, namely the
successful versus the unsuccessful. Moral meaning was added later. The reference of zheng
evolves from 1. a military action, which gives rise to 2. a political dominion, which is given 3.
a moral justification.5
So in practical terms, it is military success alone which grants legitimacy.
Related to Chen's third stage of moral justification is the idea that the Mandate of
heaven (tianmingt.11.--3) can be transferred away from an unworthy ruler to one
possessed of the true dao . Hence whilst the regime in power legitimises itself by
claiming to possess the Mandate, a rebel can equally claim that the Mandate has been
transferred to them. 6 The only way of telling which one is right is to see which one wins.
The problem is that for those in the situation, it is not feasible to just wait and see. In time
of rebellion officials are required to act. When the situation becomes critical they are
further required to make a decision and choose between ruler and rebel, in a situation
where it is still impossible to know which leader or regime will be successful; for this
knowledge comes only after the event. Hence it is never possible, in any one set of
circumstances, to be absolutely sure that one's actions are in fact (going to be) considered
thong, even if it might happen that they appear to be so at the time. On the plus side, the
concepts of zheng and the Mandate of heaven, with which thong is inextricably bound
up, are both ultimately impermanent, and this allows for a similar element of flexibility in
the usage of zhong. The difficult moral choices created by the interplay of these three
concepts were partly addressed in the development and use of the idea of thong as a
framework within which to structure an impossible dilemma.
The consolidation of Confucian meanings during the Han A
The meanings derived from the identification and usage of the thong graph on oracle
bones and bronzes are given written definitions in the early Confucian works adopted as
orthodox texts under the Han. In these we find specific examples which locate the
meaning of the word thong rather more precisely, and already with varying overtones.
By the time of the Han, Confucius is said, in the Lunyu riff g, to have given the word the
basic definition: 'when dealing with others do your best,' 7 and we also see this meaning
5. Chen, Orthodoxy, p.31.
6. Chen, Orthodoxy, pp.33-4.
7. Lunyu 13:19, trans. D.C. Lau, (Penguin classics 1979) (hereafter Lau), p.120; cf. James Legge, The Four
books (repr.1985), (hereafter Legge), 1:271: 'in intercourse with others, to be strictly sincere,' g4A,`,.1",.
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in Zengzi's	 self-examination, 'In transacting business for others, I may have been
not faithful.' 8 The Zuo zhuan Li4 gives a particular nuance to this definition by saying,
'to be without consideration for oneself is zhong.9 Historically, this notion of doing
one's best without thought for oneself has been the most important aspect of the
meaning, but it split early on into two quite distinct branches, founded upon different
practical applications of the single concept.
Moral loyalty
The first branch was a principled, and in some sense intellectual, approach to the idea.
The Shu It (Book of history) makes clear that zhong is that quality which fits one for
service to a lord: 'To occupy the high places it is enough to be illustrious, to be one of the
lower people it is enough to be zhong. i ° The Xunzi 7- makes the same point, whilst
also expressing one of the important dilemmas associated with the concept. 'Yu Shun
and Xiao Ji ?r-	 E were filial, but their relatives did not love them; Bi Gan tLT and
Zi Xu .T- 7ff were zhong, but their lords did not employ them.' 1 ' Hence, even if one
possessed the requisite qualities for serving a lord, that lord was not obliged to have the
dao to recognise one's talents, and if outspokenness resulted in exile, this interpretation
of thong demanded that the banished official simply wait for a better time.
Confucius was very clear that the relationship between ruler and minister was a
reciprocal one, and should be governed by yi A or correct principle.
A prince should employ his ministers according the rules of propriety [ii 12.]; ministers should
1
serve their prince with faithfulness [zIwng.] 2
Principled opposition to rulers who broke the 'rules of propriety,' and thus showed
themselves lacking the dao necessary to be a true king, was praiseworthy in Confucius's
mind, as shown by his approbation of the actions of the brothers Wei M, Ji 	 and Bi
Gan in the sufferings brought by their opposition to their immoral lord. Such opposition
(as well as faithful service to those with dao) could be defined by Confucians as zhong.
8. Lunyu 1:4, trans. Legge, 1:139, AAN
9. Zuo zhuan, Chenggong 9th year. Quoted in Hanyu da cidian 7:414, Att
10. Shu, Yi xun 01--11, quoted in Hanyu da cidian 7:414.
11. Xunzi, quoted in Hanyu da cidian 7:414; Ciyuan, p.1104. Classically, the dilemma was that of Qu Yuan
Elg , who was exiled because his zhong consisted in speaking his mind even when his ruler did not want to hear
it. See Schneider, Madman of Ch'u, which mentions several of the zhong heroes of antiquity.
12. Lunyu 3:19, trans. Legge, 1:161. Also Lunyu 2:20, 'Let him [the ruler] be filial and kind to all; then they
will be faithful to him,'
	 P.M, Legge, 1:152.
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Political or dynastic loyalty
The other branch of meaning appears to have been enshrined in the Zhou shu )19, 21,"
which included a section providing definitions for the canonisation titles awarded
posthumously to exemplary individuals, of which thong was one. The Zhou shu
explicitly adds an element of physical bravery, requiring that to be worthy of the title an
individual had to risk their own person in the service of their lord, and without attempting
to evade danger. The canonisation system was to continue into the Wudai and beyond,
with a very similar definition of this 'political loyalty' or 'dynastic loyalty.'
The uses of loyalty
The two branches of meaning distinguished above can be said to reflect the differing
viewpoints of ministers and masters. From Confucius onwards, ministers were often
keen to defend their positions with relation to their lords. They were particularly jealous
of their right to speak out against immorality, which, in association with zhong, was
elevated to a responsibility. The first branch of the meaning of thong supports the
independent position of the minister over against the lord. Under this interpretation,
officials had the authority to suggest that a ruler had or lacked dao by agreeing or -refusing
to serve them. Officials could thus not only express their independence and individuality,
but could do so from the moral high ground. The second branch of meaning is more
attractive to rulers, demanding, as it does, that the faithfulness of officials extends to their
putting their lives on the line if necessary, whether in a continuing loyalty to a regime
under threat, or in a 'premature' loyalty to an unproven claimant to the Mandate. As such,
the second branch was an expression of the official's interdependence with the state, by
means of an attachment to the ruler, whether 'rebel' or 'legitimate." 4 Accordingly, it was
this second branch of meaning which was enshrined as the official definition of zhong,
through the institution of canonisation titles, while the first branch survived in less-clearly
defined traditions of folklore and legend around figures such as Qu Yuan gm-, the
famous 'loyal' minister of Chu V. The vehicles for both meanings were already set in
motion in early dynastic times.
Despite the clear distinction thus drawn between the two sets of meanings, we should
be constantly aware that they have common roots, and it is only in the divergent practice
of the same principle that a distinction can be made between them. In this context, it also
13. This, at least, was the Tang view, based upon the contents of the Ji thong Zhou shu aggpm a work dated
to the Zhou and unearthed by chance in 281. See David McMullen, The cult of Ch'i T'ai-kung and T'ang attitudes
to the military. Tang studies 7 (1989), p.80.
14. On the other hand, the decision to hold out against all odds was also an expression of individualism, by
going against the prevailing military trend.
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makes sense to see the two branches of meaning as a further expression of the wen-wu
,\L:A division.
This divergent practice also has a sanction attributed to Confucius himself, in an
incident which already indicates the importance of a continuing dialogue on this subject,
in the effort to mediate the dilemmas of real individuals in actual situations. The idea that
one should die in the service of one's lord was clearly already embedded by the time of
Confucius. It is the confident assumption of one of Confucius's disciples, who supposed
that the Qi	 minister Guan Zhong rfrp could not have had ren fz. because he failed to
die for his master Prince Jiu 2- 411. Not only that, but he went on to serve the very
Duke Huan who had killed Prince Jiu. Confucius subverts the universality of the
assumption by setting Guan Zhong's achievements against this one shortcoming.
It was due to Guan Zhong that Duke Huan was able, without a show of force, to assemble the
feudal lords nine times. Such was his ren. Such was his ren. .... [He] helped Duke Huan to
become the leader of the feudal lords and to save the empire from collapse. To this day, the
common people still enjoy the benefits of his acts. Had it not been for Guan Zhong, we might
well be wearing our hair down and folding our robes to the left. Surely he was not like the
common man or woman who, in their petty faithfulness, commit suicide in a ditch without
anyone taking any notice.15
The Guan Zhong story was a famous one, with its ability to mediate deriving
precisely from the possibility inhering for different interpretations. Confucius's positive
response to Zhong on the occasions just cited did not prevent him from criticising Zhong
for using rites above his station:6
Other Confucians took the story of Guan Zhong in an entirely different light. Mencius
believed that any leader could become a true king and so was critical of Zhong for
allowing Duke Huan to remain a mere leader when he should have made him a true king.
Where the overriding need is for a true king, the means are secondary, and Mencius does
not even consider the issue of whether Zhong should have died for prince Jiu.
Contemporaries of Mencius" saw Zhong as a model for bringing order to chaos. Xunzi,
accepting that true kings were rare and that a second-best ruler could still bring some
order, regarded Guan Zhong as a gongchen ff or 'accomplished minister,' ranked
middle in worth between the sage minister and the rebellious or flattering. It was,
however, still clear to Xunzi that whilst Guan Zhong could be praised for his
15. Lunyu 14:17-8, trans. Lau, pp.126-7 (cf. Legge, 1:282-3.) According to the preceding argument, in
defending Zhong. Confucius can be said to be taking the minister's part against the definition of zhong
naturally favoured by rulers. At the same time, the pragmatism of his defence would not have offended a ruler.
16. The following paragraph derives heavily from Hoyt Tillman, The development of tension between virtue
and achievement in early Confucianism: attitudes towards Kuan Chung and hegemon (pa) as conceptual
symbols, Philosophy east and west 31:1 (1981), esp. pp.20-5.
17. Stated by Tillman, Virtue and achievement, p.21. He does not say who they were.
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achievements, his lack of the great virtues of ren and integrity' 8 rendered him unfit for the
highest position of minister of a true king.
Hence for those in situations involving a change of regime or wider disorder, the
Guan Zhong story, in particular, offered reassurance that there were other options than
dying for a defeated master, reflected in different interpretations of zhong, although it
was plain that taking one of these alternative courses would probably disqualify an
official from being ranked amongst the truly virtuous. The line an individual official took
through this dilemma, set out in the Guan Thong story, would of course depend upon the
particular circumstances, but a great deal of the response to those circumstances would be
decided by the individual's own view of themselves in relation to the aspects of the
Confucian 'tradition' in which they had been brought up.' 9
Ideal and reality during the Disunion ZialfAjtql
After the raising of Confucianism to canonical status during the Han, the subsequent
three-and-a-half centuries of the Disunion provided the first opportunity to test out the
ideas of imperially-endorsed Confucianism on the question of zhong. In a survey such as
this it is not possible to cover every comment on the subject, hence we will draw our
observations from one of the best-known works surviving from the period, Yan Zhitui's
aMtit Yan shi jiaxun N.E*ZII, the 'Family instructions for the Yan clan.' 20 Yan was
of noble family, and looked back with some pride to his grandfather under the Qi
This ancestor, when Qi was overthrown in 502, had starved himself to death in protest,'
thus displaying a classical interpretation of refusenik zhong, expressing both
individualism and continued support for the previous regime. By contrast, Yan himself
served four dynasties, and lived to see the reunification, ending his days under the Sui
Yan was familiar with the Confucian classics' and their comments on zhong, and
he had a family connection with the heroic practice of the highest standards of that virtue.
He clearly admires this quality above many others, praising a 'southern barbarian' who,
18. Tillman does not make clear what character is translated by this word.
19. For partial discussion see Margaret Ng, Internal shame as a moral sanction, Journal of Chinese philosophy
8:1 (1981), pp.75-86.
20. Yan Zhitui, Yan shi jiaxun, in Baizi quanshu j.51. See also full translation: Teng Ssu-yii, Family
instructions for the Yen clan (1968), (hereafter Teng.)
21. Yan Zhitui's grandfather was Yan Jianyuan alantt. His actions are recorded in the biography of his son,
Zhitui's father, Yan Xie ffi V., in the Nan shi ALt 72:21 and Liang shu 50:26-7. Cited by Teng, pp.xv n,
In, 96n.
22. His four periods of service were under the following dynasties: Liang M' 549-554; Northern Qi J.L7.1 556-
577; Northern Zhou jtal 577-581; Sui 581-591. Teng, p.xxiii.
23. Teng notes that Yan was especially well-versed in the Zhou Ii jazil and Zuo z,huan. He also gives full
references for biographical material on Yan, p.xviii &
266
Chapter 8 - The question of loyalty
when his master's enemies demanded to know where his master had fled to, was beaten
to death without telling. 24 He also states that
to lose one's own life in the protection of the whole family, and to sacrifice oneself in order to
save the nation: the junzi E.T- does not regret such acts.25
On the other hand he is entirely pragmatic, and despite his espousal of Confucian
virtues and the example of his illustrious forebears,' for himself he had evidently made
his peace with his own conduct, and he passed on what he had learned to his sons in the
Instructions. Although he strongly advocated the proper fulfilment of duties, an important
basic interpretation of zhong, his work is full of warnings that it is best to keep one's
head down. He advised his sons against pushing themselves forward, whether with
unsolicited advice or in competition for a post, and he warns of the dangers of
opportunism in taking high office.' His final position on the issue of serving different
regimes is this:
Not to bend (the knee) before two (imperial) families was the integrity of Yi 	 and Qi V; to
refuse to serve the wrongful ruler was the principle of Yi and Ji N. Since the Chunqiu period
there have been many families annexed and nations conquered; and thus the relationship between
a prince and a minister cannot be permanently maintained. However, when a junzi breaks
friendship with a person, he should never speak ill of the latter. If suddenly he has to bend his
knee in serving another person, he should not change his thoughts toward his former chief,
whether the chief still exists or not. When Chen Kongzhang PkTIA was writing under [Yuan]
Shao VIB, he called [Cao] Cao WtZ a jackal or wolf; while later writing official proclamations
for the Wei kingdom, he regarded [Yuan] Shao as a venomous serpent. In these times this was
what the (current) ruler ordered and he did not have any control over it; nevertheless, this is a
great source of trouble for men of letters. You must tactfully avoid it.28
This balance between awareness of the ideal and a pragmatic acceptance that given the
circumstances one cannot live up to it, is resolved here by accepting external necessity
whilst maintaining internal integrity. This resolution is one which had direct application to
the next period of disunion: the late ninth and tenth centuries.
24. Yan shi jiaxun 1:11 b and Teng, p.73.
25. Yan shi jiaxun 2:3b, translation adapted from Teng, p.135.
26. One is tempted to wonder whether such a grandfather as Yan Jianyuan did not exert an oppressive influence.
27. On the fulfilment of duties: 'if you are in a position where you have to speak, you ought to perform the duty
of giving the emperor admonitions. You should not shun your duty, take your ease, cast down your head and
close your ears. But you should "in every possible way wait on and nourish him, — (Yfuz shi jiaxun 2:2a; Teng,
p.120.) On keeping your head down: 'Princely law-abiding scholars would not submit memorials. Modem
people with integrity and virtue would all feel ashamed to do so.... the Biao ji chapter says, "In the service of a
ruler, [(for) a minister] whose place is remote from [the court] to remonstrate is an act of sycophancy; for one
whose place is near the ruler not to remonstrate is to hold his office idly for the sake of gain." (Yan shi jiaxun
2: lb-2a; Teng, pp.119-20.) On the dangers of opportunism: In this time of chaos I have seen many who
utilised the opportunity to obtain wealth and position by luck. In the morning they took charge of important
affairs, at night they were buried in graves; on the first day of a month they were as joyful as Zhuo 4 and Cheng
on the fifteenth they wept like Yan a and Yuan J. This did not merely happen to five or ten. Be careful, be
careful.' (Yan shi jiaxun 2:3a; Teng, p.127.)
28. Yan shi jiaxun 1:14a, translation adapted from Teng, pp.92-3.
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A range of interpretations in the Tang
Between these two periods of disunion was the Tang: a dynasty celebrated as China's
_.
golden age. Despite the implications of stability in that designation the Tang had its share
of upheaval, and accordingly provides a series of changing interpretations of zhong in
practice.29 As the people of the Wudai period drew heavily from Tang models and
structures, the Tang case will be considered in some detail as a base against which to
measure any change in how the concept was used and understood in the Wudai.
The official Tang definitions for zhong are conveniently listed in the Tang hui yao
(THY) section on canonisation titles.3°
To place oneself in danger in the service of one's lord is called zhong.
To place oneself in danger for the love of one's lord is called zhong.
To surrender one's position to someone more worthy and be completely faithful is called zhong.
To place oneself in danger as a gift to the state is called zhong.
To be concerned for the state and not think of one's family is called zhong.
To be completely unmoving in good times and bad is called zhong.
In times of calamity not to rebel is called zhong.
To live peacefully without remembering (past grudges) is called zhong.
To be incorrupt and upright, just and impartial is called zhong. 3 '
Various topoi emerge in the biographies of those canonised zhong, such as energetic
remonstrance, the demonstration of great filial piety, virtue unrecognised, and refusal to
serve, but overall, the most important interpretation of thong seems to be that involving
military valour.' From the definitions given in the THY, and the lives of those granted
the title in practice, it seems that in most circumstances being thong was a risky business,
regardless of whether the official concerned was in an inherently dangerous situation (for
instance on the battlefield) or not. Indeed, an essential part of the definition seems to be
that one behaves in an upright and proper manner in precisely those situations where it is
dangerous to do so, at least inasmuch as it is unusual in one's own day. Hence if all
around you were corrupt, but you were willing to speak out and risk at least your career
prospects, that could be zhong, but if all around were already upright, your behaviour
would simply be what was expected. Mere proper behaviour, without some degree of
danger, however small, does not constitute zhong. There has to be some element of
nonconformity, of running counter to the tide for the best of motives. As such, the
29. Tang attitudes to the question of zhong are worthy of extensive study in their own right, for which there is
not space here. I am indebted to David McMullen for his observations on zhong in this period (personal
communication), many of which are followed in this section.
30. THY compiled 961.
31. THY 79:1461.
32. From a random sample of 21 out of 47 thong title-holders scattered chronologically through the main
section of the JTS biographies, over half are clearly in the military valour category, while rather less than a
third are included for their zhong remonstrance, and have little or no involvement in military campaigns. The
remaining sixth show a mixture of the two strands, with neither clearly predominating.
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requirement to be zhong was simply a specific application of Confucian ideas regarding
the unconventionality of the true junzi, 33
 which, through the system of canonisation titles,
became institutionalised.
Despite these apparently fixed definitions, we can also see in the Tang a retrospective
emphasis of different aspects of zhong at different times, in a manner which seems to be
largely dictated by the legitimation needs of the dynasty. The biographies of zhongyi
FP, , ' loyal and upright,' officials in the JTS fall into three groups: the foundation period
of the Tang; the period c.684-712 including the reign of Empress Wu Zetian
(690-705); and the An Lushan LU rebellions.' In the founding period 11 out of 14
biographies are of people who exhibited great valour, often to the point of death, in the
maintenance of their allegiance to the Tang against rebels and bandits. The kind of
military zhong found in these cases was crucial to the success of a would-be dynastic
founder, whose legitimacy was bolstered significantly by the steadfast allegiance of
others. But we should also note that all the people in this group are, by definition, those
who changed sides, abandoning their allegiance to the Sui in order to join the new
dynasty promised by those who would turn out to be the founders of the Tang. The Later
Jin compilers of the ITS were happy to praise those who transferred their loyalty to the
Tang, because in thus reinforcing the legitimacy of their predecessor, they also argued for
the legitimacy of the current dynasty. The paradox which this creates for those having to
make decisions on the spot is the one in which the tenth-century frontier crossers were
also trapped.
Only three of the 14 zhongyi officials from the reign of Wu Zetian are shown to
exhibit military valour. By far the majority are included for showing forms of non-
military zhong (such as fearless memorialisation, suffering false accusations, and
protecting members of the imperial family against plots or calumniation) which reflect the
stresses of court life in this period: it was the moral aspect of zhong which was valued. In
the first half of the eighth century the Tang dynasty was firmly established and
unquestionably legitimate, fostering a self-confidence amongst the ruling elite reflected in
a period of immense cultural achievement. Difficult decisions about where to place one's
allegiance did not have to be made, and reflection upon the quality of zhong seems to
have been restricted to genres such as the frontier poetry of Cen Shen 43 and his ilk.35
33. As seen in the life of Confucius himself. See for instance, Robert Henricics, The hcro pattern and the life of
Confucius, Journal of Chinese studies1:3 (1984), pp.241-60.
34. JTS j.187 A & B. The origins of the JTS are not without distortions, but few of these are traceable now. For
an exhaustive discussion of the sources for the JTS and their relationships to each other, see Twitchett, Writing
of history.
35. The range of work produced in the pre-rebellion period is admirably discussed by David McMullen,
Historical and literary theory in the mid-eighth century, Perspectives on the T'ang (1973), ed. Denis Twitchett,
pp.307-42. The 'frontier school which includes Cen Shen was a category created after the Song; Marie Chan,
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It was thus retained within the bounds of the first strand of meaning identified here; a
'moral loyalty' associated with unjustly exiled officials.
The An Lushan rebellions provided a testing time for the conception and practice of
the second branch of the meaning of zhong, and this period supplies half of the total
number of zhongyi biographies. 36 18 of the 28 exhibited military valour; more than from
the other two groups put together, but even at this time, faithful displays of courage were
still not the only thing to be regarded as zhong. The group includes fearless memorialists,
the deeply filial, people who attempted to maintain respect for the Tang court in their
regional positions, and those who refused to serve either rebel or court and retired from
public life. Although the size of the threat produced a suitable proportion of courageous
officials devoted to the Tang, nevertheless this was really no more than was expected of
them, for by the time of the rebellions, the Tang dynasty was not the challenger of
established power, but the challenged. As An Lushan ultimately failed, there was no
question afterwards that he and his followers were rebels: his military activities against
the Tang court are called a rebellion in our sources because they were written after the
Tang house had been restored to the capitals. If Lushan had established a lasting dynasty,
he would not have been called a rebel, but the new holder of the Mandate, so in this
respect, the rebellions can be seen as a failed dynastic foundation. As such, we can see
that the choices were identical to those found in the period around a successful transfer of
the Mandate: in both situations individuals faced the same impossible task of deciding in
advance who was going to be the de facto, and therefore legitimate, ruler. Had An
Lushan succeeded, we would expect to have seen the formalised praise of those
exhibiting zhong to him appear in his dynastic history much as it does in the JTS. As it
was, the recovery of the Tang brought with it, retrospectively, a greatly increased
concern with zhong and with encouraging thong behaviour.
The aftermath of the An Lushan rebellions
By the ninth century, exemplars of dynastic loyalty from the An Lushan period, such as
Duan Xiushi V, Guo Ziyi Yan Zhenqing IMMO, and Zhang Xun3.Kg,
were among several well-known to a wide audience through semi-popular biographies.'
Most of these thong heroes died martyr's deaths, and any official looking for patterns of
upright behaviour would have had no shortage of examples in circulation at the time.
Zhong heroes from earlier periods also entered the wider imagination, and in the case of
Qi Taigong *t0„ the Tang imperial house even promoted an official cult in his
Cen Shen (1983), p.75.
36. There was also a rash of posthumous promotions after the rebellion. McMullen, Ch'i T'ai-kung, p.78n.
37. David McMullen, personal communication.
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honour, which was continued by at least some of the Wudai regimes." Duan Xiushi,
Guo Ziyi and Yan Zhenqing were canonised zhong,39 . and in their lives we see an
emphasis on the kind of thong involving military valour and stubborn faithfulness to the
death." The very stress given to these figures is perhaps suggestive of 'a somewhat
different reality, and in fact, many Tang officials fled during the rebellions, going south
to an exile which gave them cause to reconsider their outlook.' However, not all of them
could flee and numbers of the officials in the capitals submitted to the rebels and took
service under them, while others in the provinces, finding themselves in rebel-held
territory, did the same.' Most hurried to return to their allegiance to the Tang once the
capitals were recovered, but the suppression of rebellions took another five years, and in
an atmosphere suggestive of witch-hunting, the 'collaborators' had to suffer deliberately
humiliating treatment, followed by trial for treason, and in many cases the punishment of
exile, before they were allowed back into the fold.'
One of those who 'fell into rebel hands,' was the intellectual Li Hua 	  (c.710-
c.767.) He was evidently traumatised by the experience and although eventually
welcomed back into Tang service, he refused to take any official post, feeling that his
integrity had been irredeemably compromised by the breach of allegiance implied by his
service for the rebels.' In this and similar cases we can see the seeds of the problem
which was going to explode into practically a universal one in the Wudai period, but Li
Hua's conscience plagued him at a time when the issue of thong had once again become
clear-cut. The Tang forces had won, the dynasty was restored, and, now blessed with
38. In 788, a group aiming to downgrade the status of the cult criticised Qi Taigong for abandoning Yin & for
Zhou. See McMullen, Ch'i T'ai-kung, p.98. This provides a further example of the vigour and uses of the debate
over zhong in the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellion.
39. The doubts about Zhang Xun's virtue were enough to keep him from receiving a zhong title, but his JTS
biography appears in the zhongyi section, JTS 187B:4899-4902.
40. They are also noted for their fearless remonstrance, for it is fitting that these most important amongst the
exemplary should be recorded as absolute paragons. The emphasis remains upon martial loyalty and (usually)
violent deaths.
41. See E.G. Pulleyblank, Neo-Confucianism and neo-Legalism in T'ang intellectual life, 755-805, The
Confucian persuasion (1960), ed. Arthur Wright, pp.77-114 for discussion of the background to this exodus and
the main schools of thought.
42. McMullen, Historical and literary theory, p.316, cites a figure of 300 as an example. This is a reference to
the more than 300 officials, headed by Chen Xilie NATI, who turned out to welcome the forces loyal to the
Tang who had retaken Luoyang 4r4 (Dongjing Art.) TJ 220:7042. Examples of those noted as serving the
rebels and/or as returning their allegiance to the Tang could be multiplied from a variety of sources.
43. The treatment of the 'collaborators' is described in the monograph on law, JTS 50:2151-2, and given dates
and context by JTS 10:247-11:270, 316; Ti 220:7041-222:7136. A problem with the sources for this section
of the monograph on law is pointed out by Twitchett, Writing of history, p.236.
44. Li Hua himself sets out his feelings in surviving poetry. See QTS 153:1587-8 and McMullen, Historical
and literary theory, p.317.
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hindsight, Li Hua had no difficulty in knowing whom he should have served during the
rebellion.
He was not alone in holding this view of collaborative actions: there is evidence of
resentment towards those who were considered thus to have helped end the halcyon days
of the pre-rebellion period.45 On the other hand, Dugu Ji AMR (725-777) admired Li
Hua's writing for its manifestation of loyalty and filial piety. 46 In so doing he separated
Li Hua's laudable inner qualities from his circumstantial external actions, and did not
deem it necessary to condemn Li as Li had condemned himself. 47 We will find echoes of
this ability to distinguish internal intent from the acts of necessity, as recommended by
Yan Zhitui, in some treatments of the first generation Liao Chinese.
Dugu Ji also considered the zhong issue from a more theoretical standpoint, via
commentary on the behaviour of Ji Zha *-ift, who three times refused to take the throne
of Wu 5 . 48 Dugu acknowledged Zha's concern to 'preserve his integrity,' but felt that he
had failed the state by his refusal to help Zhou and keep the 'barbarians' under control.
Dugu emphasised the duty of service over the demands of personal morality, and thus
lent his support to the second strand of zhong, dealing with political or dynastic loyalty.
At around the same time, Yuan Jie 5- EM produced an essay on Guan Zhong, whom he
thought overpraised." Yuan felt that instead of going over to Qi, Guan should have
remained zhong to the Zhou, arguing that had he done so, Zhou would have survived and
the rise of Qin been prevented. This is an even more explicit statement of the second,
political, conception of zhong. This intense post-rebellion discussion of thong within the
framework of the second branch of its meaning contrasts with the lesser pre-rebellion
focus on the strand concerned with 'moral loyalty.'50
45. McMullen, Historical and literary theory, p.326 locates examples of this view in QTW 336:14a: 315:9a. It
is also noted by Peter Bol, 'This culture of ours:' intellectual transitions in T'ang and Sung China (1992),
p.115, that Jia Zhi accused the Tang officials of having lost their vision of a moral order and of having
never acquired the principles of ethical behaviour, such that they 'lacked the wherewithal to stay firm in the face
of the An Lushan and Shi Siming ZETA (d.761) rebellions. An Lushan "gave one shout and all within the four
seas were disturbed." This was perhaps a scapegoating of civil officials for a military situation that the
increasingly civil establishment simply could not control.
46. Bol, Intellectual transitions, p.116. Bol does not say what character he is translating as 'loyalty.'
47. Li Hua's JTS biography was expanded in the XTS (McMullen, Historical and literary theory, p.320), so
Ouyang Xiu also appears to have seen no insoluble problem in his 'collaboration.' This contrasts with
Ouyang's view of the Wudai crossers (see below), who in his eyes generally lacked redeeming wen jC virtues.
48. In his Essay on Ji Dia of Wu A*tl.,V QTW 389:10a-11a. Information in this paragraph is derived from
McMullen, Historical and literary theory, p.328-9. Dugu Ji seems to have had a particular interest in defending
the actions of those whose zhong was doubted. See, for example, his unsuccessful argument in favour of Lu Yi
being granted the canonisation title zhong, JTS 187B:4894 (zhongyi section.)
49. Essay on Guan Thong I MC written 757. QTW 382:9b-12a.
50. Although in addition to these products of the 'official' definition of zhong, there was a flourishing in the
genre of literature concerning the difficulties of 'retired scholars,' contributing to the myth associated with Qu
Yuan. See Schneider, Madman of Ch'u, p.50ff.
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Whilst there was a renewed emphasis on the importance of dynastic loyalty, there was
some debate as to how fanatical this should be. In 757:12 there were discussions over
whether the Tang loyalist Zhang Xun should be consideTed virtuous. 51 Xun had been so
determined not to be starved out by rebels that he and his troops are said to have killed
and eaten the entire non-combatant population of their besieged city. 52 In the aftermath,
some questioned whether this had not been somewhat excessive behaviour, and
suggested that it may have been better for him to have surrendered and preserved more
life. The emperor settled this question with an edict saying unequivocally that Zhang's
actions were undoubtedly meritorious. Given the recent danger to the imperial house it is
not surprising that the restored dynasty should be concerned to praise precisely those
actions which were the most extreme in their expression of loyalty to the state.
Ideas of zhong in the Wudai
The constraints under which the compilers of the JTS produced their work are reflected in
the complete absence from the zhongyi section of any individual who lived after the An
Lushan rebellions. 53 This is unfortunate as the Huang Chao NA rebellions surely could
have produced some zhong exemplars. However, given that many of the founders of the
Wudai regimes were either leaders or direct descendants of leaders during this confused
period, to give examples of faithfulness to the Tang at that point in the Tang History
would undermine the legitimacy of the Wudai regimes and thus have precisely the
opposite effect to that which a Standard History was supposed to produce. As noted
earlier, the zhongyi biographies from the founding period of the Tang do not include
people who remained loyal to the Sui, but only those who, having changed sides, were
loyal to the new dynasty.
The thong canonisation titles given in the Wudai show a much stronger emphasis on
military valour, with all but one of eleven noted for this quality above all others. 54 The
Wudai regimes never got beyond their various founding periods, so it is not surprising
that they should emphasise military valour in their interpretation of zhong, as this would
correspond with the legitimation needs of the various founders of the Wudai regimes.
51. TJ 220:7046-7.
52. Apparently amounting to 20 or 30,000 people by the time the city fell. Xun had encouraged his troops to
the necessity of this course of action by first killing and eating his own concubine. The rebels were said to have
had respect for Xun, but as he clearly would not serve them, they could only kill him. See his biography, JTS
187B:4900-2. The THY does not record him as receiving a canonisation title.
53. This is partly due to an absence of material. See l'witchett, Writing of history, passim.
54. The list is in WDHY 12:209-10. All but Wang Chucun a (JTS 182:4699) have JW biographies. Lu
Zhi IN is the single case showing non-military zhong, .11V 93:1227-9; XW 56:643.
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Ideas of zhong in the Wudai-Song transition
When it came to the compilation of the JW in 973-4 it was necessary for the Song
compilers to make judgements on those who had changed sides during the Wudai. But as
we have seen in the case studies, the Later Jin historiographers produced little
condemnation of side-changing in either texts or commentaries, nor any explicit
discussion of the issue. At this time, only 13 years into the Song and still some way from
consolidation, the officials involved in the historiographical project had themselves
changed their allegiance to the Song from some previous regime. Many would also have
served more than one of the Wudai or Ten Kingdoms. The compilation of the dynastic
history was an important element in the legitimation of the new regime, and that
legitimacy relied in part on the extent to which the new dynasty was able to attract the
service of the officials of its predecessor. Given their own circumstances, it is not
surprising that the JW compilers were notably non-judgmental in their treatment of
changes of allegiance by the officials of the Wudai. This is the same situation noted above
as a problem for the compilers of the JTS. In the Wudai-Song transition we are fortunate
to have a contemporary commentator on the difficulties involved.
The noted Southern Tang itP, poet Xu Xuan joined the Song when Southern
Tang was conquered in 975. He was fortunate to join a regime which turned out to be
successful. His biography in the SS reads as that of a memorialising zhong official, and
contains a formulaic passage in which his virtue of zhong is recognised and respected by
the new dynastic founder. 55 Taking literary office under Song Taizu *&,, Xu set out a
highly pragmatic version of the relationship between lord and minister in three
discussions appended to his collected works. 56 He believed that the relationship was one
of mutual benefit: the lord needs the reflected merit and skills of the official; the official
serves in pursuit of the wealth and honour which lords can give them. Accordingly, the
ruler-minister relationship is complementary, not like that between superior and inferior
or father and son. The minister may choose whether to serve a ruler according to whether
the ruler has dao or not. A king with dao will naturally select worthy ministers and the
minister then has the responsibility to advise and support the chosen ruler, but in fact, the
definition of possession of dao comes down to how the ruler treats the minister:
He who treats the minister as a teacher is a king, he who treats the minister as a friend-to-be-
taught is an oppressor.57
55. Biography in SS 441:13044-9. The recognition passage is on p.13045.
56. The Jun chen lun EE ato , Chi chen lun Watt and Ski chen lun Riffarne`. In Ku gong wen ji buyi
fti.aX4ia SBBY edn. The Ku gong wenji without the appendix is also part of the SBCK, vol. 44, Shanghai
shangwu yinshuguan. The account here is largely taken from that given in Zhou Jun, Songchu 'erchen,' esp.
pp.123-4.
57. Quoted in Zhou Jun, Songchu 'erchen,' p.124. No reference given.
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This leaves the minister at absolute liberty to abandon a ruler believed to lack dao, and as
Zhou Jun observes, this means that those who had served more than one dynasty were
_.
not seen to have lost their integrity, but had simply abandoned unworthy rulers. Such an
interpretation is highly reminiscent of the views of the early Confucianists, and reflects a
return to the first strand of zhong, that of 'moral loyalty.' Xu Xuan was using the
interpretation of zhong favoured by ministers, but coming when they did, Xu's
arguments had the effect of bolstering the legitimacy of the new regime. In fact, his
explanation elides, or recombines, the two main strands in the meaning of zhong. The
political and pragmatic necessity to change sides, itself an immoral act, is converted, by
retrospective appeal to moral loyalty, into an action inspired by dynastic loyalty, but to
the new, not the old, regime. Xu thus provides, from within the tradition of discussion of
zhong, a justification for those who successfully changed sides. In so doing he provided
a further demonstration of the flexibility inherent in the formulation of the concept of
zhong, which enabled an interpretation to suit any situation. This view also effectively
pardons all Wudai side-changers, for these regimes had to be legitimate for the Song to
be considered their successor, 58 and if they were legitimate, then it was expected that
officials would be zhong towards them.
Neo-Confucianism: a change of stance
A century later the Song was in its turn securely established. In such a period of relative
security and confidence for the dynasty, we would expect thong to be interpreted more
according to its moral than its political strand. In fact, some writers show a drastically
changed retrospective attitude towards the ministers of the Wudai, focussing especially
on Feng Dao mia , 5 9 who was to become the archetypal side-changing minister.
Criticism of him was symptomatic of the beginnings of a shift to an increasingly absolute
view of zhong, much closer to the patriotic loyalty which has come to be the commonly
understood meaning of the word today. As many of the sources for the tenth century
come from this period, the views held by the relevant historians must be considered.
Sima Guang in the TJ, and Ouyang Xiu in the XW, discuss thong with reference to
Feng Dao. Ouyang says,
I have found in the Wudai three gentlemen of perfect integrity and fifteen ministers who laid
down their lives; but (I) blame those scholars who, adhering to Confucianism, call themselves
followers of the ancients, and yet accept salaries and serve the state in great numbers; but if the
virtues of faithfulness gr. and uprightness a were manifested solely by the military men who
died in battle, how could it be that there were really none such amongst the Confucians? Is it not
that those scholars who were of high principles, detesting the disorder of the times, hid from the
58. See Chan, Official historiography, pp.74ff; and Davis, Historiography as politics, pp.37ff.
59. He was rehabilitated by Wang Gungwu in 1962. Feng Tao: an essay on Confucian loyalty, Confucian
personalities, edd. Arthur Wright & Denis Twitchett, pp.12345.
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world and were unwilling to come out? Or that those who ruled the tianxia T were unworthy
of (their) attention, so that in no case could they get them [the hiding Confucians] to come
forward? Confucius said on this: 'In a village of ten houses, there will certainly be some
faithfulness kt=', and integrity.' How could these be empty words!60
Ouyang implicitly devalues the military zhong displayed by zhong heroes of the Wudai
by his argument that this zhong by itself was insufficient to any age. 61 The type of zhong
he prefers is that high principle which should keep virtuous Confucians in reclusion
during times of disorder, protesting the immorality of their age through their refusal to
serve. This is another aspect of the 'moral' definition of thong used earlier by Xu Xuan,
but now with a completely opposite cast placed on it, such that those defended by Xu
Xuan are condemned by Ouyang.
Sima Guang, who quotes most of Ouyang's passage, takes the argument, and the
meaning of zhong, a stage further. Where Ouyang is quite clearly drawing the respected
distinction between becoming a recluse and taking service at all, Sima makes a link not
just with serving at all, nor with valiant military service against a rebel, but with serving
two masters, and the unfortunate Feng Dao is pilloried to make an example.
.... in the home there are husbands and wives, outside (in the world) there are rulers and
ministers. Wives (should) follow their husbands, and not change [remarry] throughout their
whole lives; ministers (should) serve their rulers and should not change their allegiance let IQ
even if (it means) their deaths; these are cardinal principles of human morality. If some abrogate
them, there is no greater chaos than this! .... [I] consider that an upright woman does not follow
two husbands and a faithful ;ft: minister does not serve two rulers. When a woman is not upright,
although she still has the beauty of her gorgeous appearance and the skill of her weaving, this is
not enough for her to be considered virtuous; when a minister is not faithful, although he still
has great talents and knowledge and the excellence of his administrative actions, this is not
enough for him to be considered honourable. Why is this? It is because they have shown
themselves deficient in virtue. Dao being a grand councillor to five dynasties and eight surnames
in succession, was like an innkeeper watching travellers pass by; they would be enemies at
daybreak and ruler and minister by evening. He changed his face and transformed his words and
never once was he ashamed. With virtue like this, although he might have had some small good
points, how can he be worthy of praise? .... While the emperors followed one another closely in
their rise and fall, Dao prospered as before. He is the worst of treacherous officials.62
Ouyang and Sima agree that there are at least two sides to any conflict, and that one
could not have a civil war unless officials were willing to abandon their integrity and
ignore any sense of shame in order to go and serve masters other than their original lord.
It is assumed that this original lord must be the legitimate one, and must continue to be
so. Hence lack of integrity readily leads to disloyal behaviour because it allows for the
changing of master. The notion of the transfer of the Mandate is nowhere to be seen.
60. XW 54:611-2.
61. On the other hand, in his revision of the zhongyi biographies for the XTS, the range of behaviour treated as
zhong is greatly reduced, with the memorialists and others being left out and others substituted, leaving a
definition of zhong almost exclusively confined to military valour.
62. TJ 291:9511-3. Translation partially adapted from Wang, Feng Tao, pp.123, 140.
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The stinging condemnation of Feng Dao does not seem justified by the circumstances,
unlike, for instance, the vengeful treatment of those who had served the An Lushan
rebels. Where the latter was the immediate response, fuelled largely by panic, to the close
shave the Tang dynasty had just had, the attitudes expressed by historians such as
Ouyang and Sima were formed upon returning to the historical account at a distance
allowing cool reappraisal. Ouyang and Sima wrote in a stable dynasty; the transfer of the
Mandate due to internal upheaval was far from their minds, whilst external dangers were
increasingly exercising them. The source of danger had shifted from rebels to foreigners.
Living under the terms of the treaty of Shanyuan mg, there was a foreign power
available on which to heap all blame, so it is odd that Ouyang and Sima pick on Feng Dao
rather than on a Liao Chinese, who could easily have been characterised as traitorous. In
fact, so much do Ouyang and Sima concentrate on the number of regimes which Feng
Dao served, that they make nothing at all of his brief service to the Liao. The focus here
is on the issue of integrity and two masters, regardless of which particular two masters
they happened to be.
These developments in the meanings of thong remove the flexibility in the concept
traced here for the earlier period. The actions of the Song loyalists at the fall of both
Northern and Southern Song showed that the idea of thong was developing further, from
a sense of integrity demanding service to a single house into a notion of a loyal ism related
to proto-nationalism. 63 Those resisting the Mongols seem to have been particularly
conscious of their loyalist role, and Jennifer Jay has argued recently that there is a
'construction of loyalism' in the records left by the loyalists themselves which ensured a
'fixing' of Song loyalism 'as a paradigm of virtues unchanged through the passage of
time.'" The Yuan 5, Ming lE91, and Qing N all had their loyalists,65 and loyalty,
overlaid by ideas of nationalism and patriotism, remains an issue into the present day.66
63. See Rolf Trauzettel, Sung patriotism as a first step toward Chinese nationalism, Crisis and prosperity in
Sung China (1975), ed. John Haeger, pp.202ff; also Julia Ching, Neo-Confucian utopian theory and political
ethics, lvlonumenta serica 30 (1972-3), pp.37ff.
64. Jennifer Jay, Memoirs and official accounts: the historiography of the Song loyalists, HJAS 50:2 (1990),
p.611, and A change in dynasties: loyalism in thirteenth-century China (1991.)
65. Yuan loyalists included Yang Weizhen: Davis, Historiography as politics, p.50 & n; Edmund Worthy in
Dictionary of Ming biography, 1368-1644, p.1550. The Qing regime was not fully secure from Ming loyalists
until 1681: Jacques Gernet, A history of Chinese civilisation (1982), pp.467-71. Qing loyalists focussed
around Puyi: eg. Pamela Crossley, Orphan warriors: three Manchu generations and the end of the Qing world,
c h . 6.
66. For an example of the completeness with which the Song idea of a loyalist definition of loyalty has
dominated the thinking of the best scholars, see James T.C. Liu, Ytieh Fei (1103-41) and China's heritage of
loyalty, JAS 31:2 (1972), pp.291-7. This article also indicates the kind of pressures and tensions under which
Chinese scholars can find themselves when considering the subject of loyalty.
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Part 2 - The actions and historiography of the Liao Chinese
The survey given here of the shifting concept of zhong shows the range of behaviours
allowed within what was a highly accommodating framework. Particular attention has
been paid to the facet of thong which employed the idea of the transfer of the Mandate to
legitimise the abandonment of one lord for another. It is clear that the behaviour of those
who pledged allegiance to the Song was permissible on this basis. Those who crossed
between Central Plains regimes in the Wudai would have come under that same rubric,
save for the short-lived nature of the dynasties they joined. This brevity meant that the
Wudai subsequently suffered a troubled legitimacy, so that even though they had to be
recognised in order for the Song to make good its claims, it was uncertain whether it was
possible to be loyal to them.
Inasmuch as the Liao was simply another north China regime, the first generation
Liao Chinese could also potentially be treated according to the same standard, but
halfway through the century the Liao conquered a relatively unified north China, and
those Chinese who crossed to Liao subsequently appear far more uncomfortable with
their situation than had their predecessors. Song attitudes with regard to thong were
already hardening by the beginning of the eleventh century, and as these attitudes became
increasingly uncompromising, Song rewriters of history grew uncomfortable with side-
changers. One significant response to this was the intense criticism of Feng Dao noted
above. Furthermore, because of the ambivalence towards the Liao resulting from the
treaty of Shanyuan, the same rewriters were uncertain as to how to treat the Liao
Chinese, and this comes through in the changing emphases to be found in the successive
sources which we have dealt with here.
Given the climate of heightened morality amongst the Song literati who were
responsible for producing so many of the sources which pertain to the tenth century, we
might expect the later records to display outright condemnation of the Liao Chinese.
Surely in Song eyes such people, who did not simply join an internal rebel but took
service under foreigners, were guilty of the worst kind of disloyalty? Had they not
betrayed ruler, state and their own ethnic group?' According to such a view, we might
think to find virtually all the Liao Chinese simply omitted from the southern records
altogether, with perhaps a handful of counter-examples showing the wickedness of
working for the Liao and the misfortune that would accompany it. This viewpoint could
be expressed, as we shall see in the case of Zhao Yanshou tag-, but in fact, only
Ouyang Xiu's XW goes so far as to refuse a full biography to any Liao Chinese, and
even he grants them at least thumbnail sketches in the appendices on barbarians
67. The question of ethnicity is discussed in the next chapter.
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nniga. 68 As we have seen, the remainder of the southern sources give full accounts
of individual Liao Chinese, and the successful careers of these people could not by any
stretch of the imagination allow them to be seen as counter-examples.
In fact, the individuals concerned are treated exactly the same as any other worthy
official, often with stress on their moral qualities. These include Han Yanhui 02
maintaining his dignity as envoy and refusing to bow to Liao Taizu, for which Yanhui
suffered banishment as a herder of flocks." In the TJ and QG Yanhui is also noted for
speaking out on behalf of the Later Tang envoy Yao Kun Vt4, whom Taizu wanted to
execute. Zhang Li WE is lauded in the earlier texts for his implied criticism of the prince
Jiji VAV. over the execution of Quo Chongtao NMEI, and from the TJ onwards his
criticisms of wrongdoing bring the wrath of the powerful upon him, ending in his death.
Even Zhao Yanshou, in some sources, is noted to have spoken out in order to save the
surrendered Later Jin army. The absence of the two later subjects from this list has a
significance which we shall come to in due course.
A quality common to several of the first generation is filial piety, which has been
noted above as a form of behaviour potentially qualifying somebody as zhong." The
connection is made explicitly by Zhang Pi Ra, recorded in the JTS zhongyi
biographies:
if I am a filial son to my family, then I will be a faithful [zhong] minister within the state.71
In these circumstances filial piety is expressed almost exclusively with reference to a
mother, who almost always appears to be widowed, or at least separated from her
husband by the demands of his postings. Han Yanhui visited his mother before he left Jin
after falling out with Wang Jian Zhang Li was noted for taking his filial mourning
obligations to an extreme by giving his father's beloved concubine the same treatment as
he had given his mother. Gao Xun rANJ argued for lenience with regard to Li Huan's
behaviour in fleeing Liao by saying that he went only because he so missed his
mother, who was over 80. This latter case is transparently using ' filial piety as an excuse,
and Han Yanhui admits in his explanatory letter to Jin that he had used his mother as a
pretext to get himself out of a difficult position.'
68. XW j.72-3.
69. References back to the case studies can be located via the tables appended to the relevant chapters, for
which reason full cross-references are omitted in what follows.
70. See pp.268ff.
71. JTS 187114909.
72. The continued usefulness of the 'mother excuse' as a means of getting out of trouble is attested by a British
commentary from the nineteenth century:
The Imperial Government dare not refuse leave of absence to a mandarin if he, as an only son, requires
it in order to tend his widowed mother during her declining years; even though the government may
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However, more than all these conventional virtues, the aspect which is stressed most
in successive southern texts is the attachment of the Liao Chinese to the south. This
contrasts with the pictures of the same individuals as found in the LS. It is these
developments which are discussed below for four of our case study subjects; Zhao
Yanshou will be covered separately.
Zhang Li
Zhang Li presents the clearest picture of how the emphases change, and his case will be
discussed in most detail. In the earliest text, the JW, Li comes across as a normal
biographical subject, displaying many of the Confucian virtues. The JW includes details
absent from later works, such as his recommendation and financial assistance of the
talented, and his display of filial piety mentioned above. He was also prepared to speak
out for what he believed to be right, as when he demanded the execution of the rebel
Kang Yanxiao , but his advice to Liao Taizong on not employing Kitan to rule the
Central Plains, which so offended Xiao Han MO, appears in the JW only amongst the
accusations Han hurls at Li during their confrontation.
Most importantly, throughout the account of Li's life there is an emphasis on personal
loyalty, to individual superiors, at every important stage of his life. He helped his old
sponsor Li Yu to obtain a post at the court of the Tang restoration; he wept at the
illegal execution of Guo Chongtao, who is said to have recommended Li for a post on the
Shu campaign; and when his former commander Zhao Yanshou was refused the
emperorship of the Middle Kingdom, it was Li who proposed that Yanshou be
compensated with a number of posts. He also demonstrated a degree of loyalty to the
Middle Kingdom in his attempt to escape, but upon his recapture he appears to give up
any idea of return home, and while this story rounds off the JW biography, it does not
dominate the account.
In contrast to the balanced and detailed account of Zhang Li in the JW, the XW
presents a drastically abbreviated picture in which Li is shown to have literary talent, but
which concentrates on his transferral to and service of Liao. The escape attempt is
included but there is nothing further to emphasise his loyal nature. Moreover, Ouyang
Xiu adds an incident in which Li is blamed by the Liao emperor for the destruction of the
south, and shortly afterwards he is summoned by the new Liao ruler, Shizong, and
apparently removed from his post.
know that the real cause of his asking for leave, is to escape from some impending official difficulty.
Thomas Taylor Meadows, British civil service interpreter before and during the Taiping Rebellion, quoted
without reference in Yang Lien-sheng, Female rulers in imperial China, HJAS 23 (1960-1), p.47.
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The TJ omits the accounts of Li's great filial piety and early demonstrations of virtue.
It also drops his personal loyalty to Li Yu. Apart from the loyalty apparently inherent in
his escape attempt, it is here that Li's advice to employ Chinese officials is placed in
chronological sequence. The reduced enumeration of his general virtues serves to place
more emphasis on his continuing attachment to the south.
The QG account includes only two events from Li's life before he entered Liao, one
of which is his principled weeping for his wrongly executed superior. 73
 The QG then
selects from the incidents in Li's later life in order to emphasise his personal loyalty and
his belief that Chinese should rule in the Middle Kingdom. It omits his transfer of service
to Guo Chongtao's deputy, Ren Huan 	 , reduces the number of occasions on which
he speaks out, and does not include the incident in which he is blamed for the destruction
of the Middle Kingdom. As a result, his attempt to escape south is given still further
prominence.
Hence, in working through the southern texts we find an increasingly abbreviated
picture of Li, with the Confucian virtues being the first to go and with a steady reduction
in the number of incidents showing his personal loyalty. The most lasting elements of his
story are precisely those showing his attachment to the south, and particularly his
explanation for his escape attempt, giving his view of the north:
I am a Chinese, and [Chinese] food, drink and clothes are not at all the same as those here: living
like this I might as well be dead.
Han Yanhui
A brief account in the XW, the earliest of the main texts for Yanhui, shows his principled
nature as he refuses obeisance to the Liao emperor and his subsequent humiliation as a
herdsman, until his worth is recognised. Fully half of the account is devoted to a
description of his return to Liao after his escape, and the image is of a minister who
ultimately gave his adherence to the Liao.
The expanded account of Yanhui found in the TJ adds significantly to the picture of
him. The Shulii empress is seen to recognise Yanhui's virtue, and his pretext of
visiting his mother is transformed into a genuine visit by the news that he completed it.
The QG gives almost exactly the same picture, but exhibits its tendency to hagiography
by placing Yanhui alongside Sun He as a remonstrator with the tyrannical Liu
Shouguang gli y6. These new emphases bring the image of Yanhui's general virtue up
to the level expected of a normal biography.
More important than this is the even greater emphasis, in the same texts, of Yanhui's
continued attachment to the south. Accounts of his escape and return appear in the TJ and
73. The QG mistakes the person involved in each case; see Chapter 4.
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twice in the QG, but where the XW shows Yanhui ultimately giving his allegiance to the
Liao, in the TJ and QG we find an account of Yanhui's letter to the Taiyuan Jin
explaining his actions, declaring his attachment to the south and promising to ensure that
the Liao will not 'govern in the south.' It is these works which add Yanhui's assistance
in the settlement of large numbers of captured Chinese, providing them with wives and
working to ensure them a livelihood under stable government. Later on, he saves the life
of Yao Kun, and the TJ observes a continuing connection with the south in Yanhui's
regular receipt of gifts from the Later Jin. In contrast to the XW, the overall picture in the
neo-Confucian works is of a Chinese who, though he returned to the north, still remained
ultimately loyal to the Central Plains regimes, and did what he could on their behalf.
Li Huan
The scanty JW account of Li Huan records two main elements which show a balance
between general commendation and a continued loyalty to the south. Huan is said to have
literary talent, though it is important to note that no moral qualities are mentioned. After
the fall of Bian in 947 he apparently reported to the Thou court on the state of Liao.
The XW pays scant attention to Huan, but what it does say is telling. Not only does it
mention no moral qualities, it makes specific Huan's lack of them by implying that it was
his drunkenness which gave Jin Gaozu an excuse to abolish the Hanlin academy.
Subsequently it says that he went north after the fall of Bian, but nothing is said about
any continued loyalty. These haphazard accounts are partially amended in the Ti, which
repeats the allegation of drunkenness, and thus implies moral deficiency, but balances
this with a newly detailed account of Huan's espionage on behalf of the south, thus
emphasising his continued allegiance to the Central Plains regimes.
The SS removes any reference to Huan's drunkenness, and at the same time makes
even more of Huan's espionage,' but perhaps surprisingly, mentions his escape only in
passing. Nevertheless, the emphasis here is very definitely on Huan's loyalty to the
south, and it is implied that he did a good job, perhaps for some considerable time, as a
southern agent in the Liao court. The fact that his morality is no longer questioned creates
a consistently positive picture of him.
Wang Jizhong
The portrayals of Wang Jizhong reflect an increasingly uncomfortable attitude towards
frontier crossing. The DDSL and LPJ begin by showing Jizhong with virtue reflected
from his father's apparently heroic death on the northern frontier. Jizhong repaid the
favour he had received by fighting hard against the Liao when he was himself posted to
74. The CFYG has the most detailed account of all, demonstrating how far Huan would go on behalf of Zhou.
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the northern frontier. The Song believed him to have died heroically, but subsequently
the Liao made him ask for peace and he became the architect of the treaty of Shanyuan.
His continued loyalty, in the form of a wish to return home, was frustrated by the very
treaty he had just helped to make.
The CB provides the most detailed account of Jizhong's hard fighting to try to avoid
capture by the Liao, and of his request to return south. Now he is not made to ask for
peace but actively encourages the Liao to ask for negotiations. Furthermore, his own
discomfort at his position is reflected in his sending south a long letter apologising for his
service to the Liao, using as justification his desire 'to rest the people and end fighting.'
The QG, which abridges the CB account, omits this letter, but a report of the incident
does appear in the SS. It is also the SS which seems most concerned to shift the blame
for Jizhong's crossing, heightening the danger he faced in the battle and accusing his
fellow generals of cowardice.
Although the CB, followed by the SS, gives a catalogue of Jizhong's posts before his
capture, in the southern sources generally there is a notable absence of comment upon his
inherent moral qualities. The most we find is the SS remark that he gained the personal
confidence of the future Zhenzong. Lacking other laudable aspects to his character,
Jizhong's entire reputation rests upon his resistance to capture and his efforts towards the
peace treaty. Although his attachment to the south is undoubted by any source but the
QG, his case was one which troubled later commentators, as shown by the number of
sources in which it is considered, and by the ambivalence of the appraisals, several of
which criticise him for failing to die for his cause.
Hence all four of the subjects above are shown in the southern texts to have a continuing
attachment to the Middle Kingdom. They all make efforts to return there and from their
positions in Liao they sometimes act in the interests of the south. From this evidence we
could suggest that whilst the JW tends to give a full picture stressing the usual virtues,
and the XW effectively damns all the Liao Chinese by noting them only in terms of their
service to the Liao, the Ti and QG seem to provide for the possibility that although
Chinese did work for foreigners, they were not necessarily all bad, and that by remaining
loyal to the south in at least some of their actions - and thus retaining their personal
integrity - they could perhaps be judged to have retained their virtue. In the SS we see
indications that there was a change in views over time, as the two cases with records in
that source are not shown to have any virtue independent of their loyalty to the south. In
the SS, CB and other Song and Yuan sources there also seems to be a growing
ambivalence to the literally borderline case of Wang Jizhong.
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Attachment to the south and the LS
If these people were so loyal to the Middle Kingdom, how is it that they rate biographies
in the LS? And not only do they rate biographies, but even the escape attempts remain.
However, there are new emphases too.
Zhang Li's moral stance against Xiao Han is retained in the LS, and his Willingness to
speak out is recorded, but overall he appears as just another Chinese giving good service
to Liao. Most importantly, in contrast to the southern loyalty retained throughout the texts
so far, there is now no reference to loyalty to anyone except the Liao emperor, and
although Li's escape attempt remains, he explains himself without implying that death
would be preferable to life in Liao.
For Yanhui, the LS hammers home the picture of him as formulator of the Liao
administrative system, such that he appears to have created it singlehandedly. This
stresses faithful service, but events showing the sincerity of his filial piety are omitted,
along with anything showing his practical attachment to the southern regimes: he does not
promise to keep the Liao out of Taiyuan, and he does not save any Chinese lives. In
addition it is not explicitly noted that he receives better treatment after his return to Liao,
rather it is made clear that the Liao emperor firmly expects Yanhui to return and, unlike in
the earlier sources, he is not surprised nor overjoyed when Yanhui does come back.
Instead, when Yanhui returns to Liao after his escape there is an explicit declaration of
loyalty to the Liao emperor. The overall picture is of a transference of loyalty to the Liao,
balanced by the observation that Yanhui wrote poetry about his sadness at being away
from home.
The LS image of Li Huan is less clear, but whereas the earlier sources do not mention
the moment of his entry into Liao service, the LS says that Huan 'pledged allegiance' to
Liao. The LS nevertheless allows for a continued attachment to the south, now seen to be
in the form of an escape attempt at the invitation of his older brother Tao 	 0. It is when
this fails that we see perhaps the most bizarre addition in this account: that of Huan's
repeated attempts at suicide. This version shows both a pledging of allegiance to the Liao
and also what could be read as an extreme loyalty to the south. Although it is likely that
Huan's suicide attempts were motivated chiefly by fear of the unpredictable emperor
Muzong, Muzong perceived only that Huan was disloyal to him. This could be taken to
imply Huan's continued attachment to the south, but in the end he did not refuse a return
to office when it was offered.
Lastly, the LS version of Wang Jizhong's life removes references to his heroism, and
the loyalty implied by it, saying only that he was captured while on a scouting mission. It
goes on to say that he served Liao energetically in order to repay the kindnesses he had
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been shown, and we see him later fighting for the Liao against Koryo. The overall picture
here is of a transference of loyalty to the Liao.
In all four cases, some, though by no means all, of the incidents showing a continued
attachment to the south were cut in the LS, but at the same time, it appears that the LS
compilers were willing to include biographies of individuals who demonstrated their
continuing attachment to the Middle Kingdom, provided that they could in some way be
shown to have allegiance to the Liao as well. As a result, the LS shows itself to be
unexpectedly tolerant of loyalty to the Middle Kingdom. At least some of the Chinese
compilers of the LS under the Yuan were sympathetic to those showing continued
attachment to the south," but that such references were not completely edited out
suggests that the Mongol emperors may have been as understanding of such cultural
loyalties as the Liao emperors seem to have been."
Zhao Yanshou
Despite the generous treatment given to the cases above, it is clear that feeling against
those working for a non-Chinese dynasty could run high. One particularly striking
example is the exchange between Zhao Yanshou and the prefect Shen Yun 'rtN at
Qizhou m in 945, when Shen Yun says that he
would rather die for country and family, and certainly will not imitate what you have done.
Because it first appears in the JW, this cannot be simply a neo-Confucian emphasis.
Yun's criticisms that Zhao Yanshou (and Zhao Dejun mo.,p) were unashamed of their
treacherous conduct do sound like neo-Confucian criticisms of frontier crossers, but then
the Zhaos are easy targets. The JW and Ti give a reasonably balanced picture of them,
pointing out Dejun's sound service in his regional posting, and Yanshou's period in high
office, but it is impossible to ignore that Dejun negotiated with the Liao for control of the
empire and that later Yanshou led the Liao armies to conquer the Jin on the promise of the
emperorship of the Middle Kingdom if he succeeded. The two Zhaos were
unquestionably traitors to the Middle Kingdom in the conventional sense, and
accordingly, it is Yanshou who is confronted for his treachery by Shen Yun. 77 The J'W
has built in its criticism of the Zhaos, and this makes it far more obvious what it is that
75. Jay, Change in dynasties, p.71.
76. For a concise discussion of the current state of the debate over the extent of censorship in the Yuan, see
Jay, Historiography of loyalists, pp.598-604, reprising Change in dynasties, pp.71-9.
77. The 5VV reports that the Liao empress dowager shamed Dejun for seeking to be Son of heaven. In the Ti and
later sources, this account is greatly amplified to include criticism for Dejun's failure to serve his master (the
emperor of Later Tang), and a recognition of his errors by Dejun, who 'hung his head in shame.' For references
see Table 4, §52.
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the LS has to change: these incidents of contemporary criticism simply do not feature. In
these clear-cut cases there is no subtlety in the images presented by either side.
That it was thus entirely possible for the earlier as well as the later sources to tear into
'traitors' only emphasises the contrasting treatment of the other four examples. Perhaps
with a couple of unequivocal 'traitor' figures on whom to hang all the acrimony, the less
prominent officials were able to escape criticism. Furthermore, Jay's overall conclusion
that there is a spectrum of behaviour amongst the Southern Song loyalists, ranging from
martyrdom to collaboration, indicates that even with the increased importance of zhong
under the Song, which was such that 'doubtful' cases were included under that same
rubric, the flexibility in the practical definition of the word remained, even as the
theoretical definition became rigid.
It was, however, the theoretical definition by which the Song and Yuan
historiographers judged the Liao Chinese, who did not benefit from such a self-conscious
recording movement as did the Southern Song loyalists. We have seen how the same
code could be used to justify both those who crossed and those who did not.
Accordingly, it should be clear that the behaviour of the Liao Chinese did not, in itself,
run counter to the established, available interpretations of zhong. These people did not
consciously seek to betray their lords, rather their pragmatic behaviour was completely in
line with the practical options available within the concept of zhong. The pattern of what
they did was conventional enough, but they were recorded according to changed, harsher
standards: they lived according to the norms of political loyalty, but were judged on their
moral loyalty.
Nevertheless, the same sources which show Yanshou's wickedness also focus
progressively upon precisely those aspects in the lives of the remaining Liao Chinese
which show the virtue of zhong, however tenuously, strongly suggesting a less
sophisticated version of the 'construction of loyalty' demonstrated by Jay for the
Southern Song loyalists. The chief component of this virtue is felt to be their continued
attachment to the south, expressed in their efforts to carry on being of service to the
southern regimes even as they take positions under the Liao. In the earlier cases of Han
Yanhui and Zhang Li, the claims for such attachment are hard to take seriously when set
against the overall pattern of their lives, but with Li Huan a change is perceptible, and by
the time we come to the case of Wang Jizhong it is clear that there really was a sense of
belonging in the south, even though Jizhong's efforts to express it are not enough to
satisfy the increased demands of the Song historiographers. Whilst it is reasonable
enough to identify in Wang Jizhong and Li Huan some kind of ethnic consciousness, in
trying to show how the earlier figures were attached to the south the sources imply a
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sense of place in them which appears to be far less strong than close examination would
find warranted. On this note we move on to the next chapter.
287
Chapter Nine
The question of ethnicity:
From pragmatism to the defining of an ethnic frontier
The previous chapter has dealt with the ethical constructs available in the tenth century
within which acts of crossing from one regime to another could be framed, and with the
representation of that act and its consequences in the records. As we have seen, zhong
was an important concept when it came to recording events, but it only rarely had any
bearing on the concrete acts of individuals. It did not prevent Chinese from crossing to
Liao, or from giving faithful service once they were there. We have noticed changes in
the approach to zhong both in the course of the tenth century and subsequently, but these
changes are such that they cannot be explained solely from within the theory of zhong
itself. The concept of zhong alone does not explain the variation in the overall pattern of
crossings, nor the changes in the concerns of individuals considered here in detail. There
must have been another factor.
Those who crossed to Liao have often been regarded as disloyal to their origins in
China. Because they are identified as Chinese, it is assumed that they had a consistent
sense of Chinese identity, and that this should have been strong enough to make them
stay loyal. However, we have already seen that the concept of loyalty was, in the first
half of the century at least, largely divorced from perceptions of ethnic origins. In this
chapter it will be argued that whilst a continuing sense of ethnic identity can be perceived,
the use of that identity varied considerably. As a factor in decision-making, Chinese
identity did not always have the same importance. It was not necessarily a primary
concern, and concepts and consciousnesses of ethnic identity could be selectively ignored
or utilised in accordance with the needs of individual and governmental self-interest.1
Earlier approaches to the question of the Liao Chinese and Chinese attitudes towards the
Liao have tended to deal with only one side of the frontier and have produced apparently
contradictory findings. This chapter will trace the essential link between the use or non-
use of ethnic identity, whether by individuals or governments, and the development of
unitary, politically consolidated states in both north and south. It is this connection which
enables sense to be made out of contradictions, and which also helps to explain the
changes in the approach towards zhong.
1. The degree to which the constructions of 'race' and loyalty could be manipulated by later governments
(governments which had a greater consciousness of these matters) has been suggested by Pamela Crossley,
Chinese-martial banners, pp.63-107.
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Ethnic ideas and ethnic mixing in Chinese history
Passing reference has been made to the increasingly overt connection, from the Song
onwards, between ideas of loyalty and attitudes concerning ethnicity. The Southern Song
loyalists left a plethora of anti-Mongol statements in their writings; increasingly anti-
foreign sentiments helped the founding of Ming and the Ming loyalists; and the Republic
was established beneath an anti-Manchu banner.' The use of ethnic ideas in that
millennium had dramatic effects, but we should be clear that ethnic ideas in themselves
were nothing new in Chinese history.
Beginning with Confucius, we can draw out the implications for ethnic attitudes in his
remarks about Guan Zhong fril quoted in the previous chapter. There, an important
element in the justification of Zhong's 'disloyalty' is the remark,
Had it not been for Guan Zhong, we might well be wearing our hair down and folding our robes
to the left.
These were practices of people living beyond the Chinese cultural reach, so in other
words, Confucius is saying that but for Guan Thong, 'we' - the Chinese - might have
become barbarians. That salvation from foreigners can be set against breach of a moral
imperative such as zhong suggests at least the potential importance of ethnic ideas at an
early stage of Chinese history. 3 Where the disorder of the Wudai appears so far to have
brought greater flexibility of action and attitude, the greater disorder of the Chunqiu *V(
period appears to produce in Confucius the opposite reaction.
There is not space to go into this here, but it is worth bearing in mind that Confucian
ideas did not become canonical until the Han A, by which time a unified Chinese empire
was deeply concerned about the neighbouring Xiongnu empire.4 The Han
considered the Xiongnu as having the 'heart of a wild animal,' and it is fair to say that
'the mythicised Han view of Sino-Xiongnu relations has served as the "model" by which
other sino-foreign relations [have been] gauged since the writing of the Han dynastic
2. For Song anti-Mongol writings: Jay, Change in dynasties, pp.70-1. Ming and Republican anti-foreignism
is so well-known that there is no need to document it here.
3. Frank DikOtter, The discourse of race in modern China (1992), pp.3ff, has argued against 'the delusive myth
of a Chinese antiquity that abandoned racial standards in favour of a concept of cultural universalism in which
all barbarians could ultimately participate.'
4. It is possible that the argument that follows in this chapter could be applied equally to the Han-Xiongnu
period; certainly current scholarship argues for their interdependence in more than one area, see Barfield,
Perilous frontier, ch.2, Sophia-Karin Psarras, Perilous myths (review of Barfield, op. cit.), Early China 17
(1992), pp.240ff.
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histories.' 5 One aspect of this is that later writers would sometimes refer to the current
'barbarian menace' not by their own names but as 'Xion.gnu.'6
Conventionally, the Disunion stfAkM is said to have seen the first serious
mixing of the northern population as the Tuoba Wei Man emperor Wendi (r.471-
499) encouraged Tuoba-Chinese aristocratic intermarriage as part of his sinicisation
policy.' This started a 'trend towards cultural synthesis' against which there soon
followed a Chinese reaction, which can be seen, for instance, in the emphasis placed by
the Northern Qi k#AY (550-577) compiler of the Wei shu EL, upon 'Chinese' virtues in
the lienii IJ biographies. 8 The Sui i% are conventionally praised for `put[ting] an end
to the empires of non-Chinese origin in North China,' 9 but the Tang imperial house
was in all likelihood of mixed blood," and certainly practised a mixed culture, to the
extent that Barfield can call Tang Taizong PjKT-,=;-- a 'Chinese khaghan' for his ability to
rule sedentary and nomadic peoples with equal success." Despite, or rather because of,
the mingling of people and cultures which continued through the Tang, certain ninth-
century thinkers, notably Han Yu at, became deeply concerned with the definition of
and distinction between what was hua t (Chinese, civilised) and what was hu 411
(foreign, uncivilised.)12
These very brief observations suggest an alternation between extensive ethnic
mingling and the reassertion of 'Chinese' ways which can be seen echoed in the Wudai
and early Song. As I have suggested, and hope to explain below, hua-hu distinctions
were not a concern of the first half of the tenth century, but began to return during the
second.
5. Sophia-Karin Psarras, personal communication. See also vol.2 of her thesis, Chinois et Xiongnu a l'epoque
Han: rapports culturels, rapports politiques (Ph.D. diss. Universite de Paris VII, 1990.)
6. Eg. discussions in the early Song. CB 28:637; 31:702; 32:712; 45:972ff; 46:999ff; 50:1086-8, 1094ff; et
al. Sometimes 'Xiongnu' refers to the Kitan, sometimes to the Xi Xia 	 leader Li Jiclian
7. Gemet, History of Chinese civilisation, p.193. Eberhard, Conquerors and rulers, ch.2, holds that the 'ruling
group' of the early Zhou I'M dynasty (1122-771 B.C.) was dominated by non-Chinese tribal leaders.
8. Jennifer Holmgren, Widow chastity in the Northern Dynasties: the liena biographies in the Wei shu, Papers
on Far Eastern history 23 (1981), pp.185-6.
9. Gernet, p.235.
10. CHC 3:1, p.151 & n, citing Chen Yinke, Tangdai zhengzhi shi shulun gao (1944), repr. in Chen Yinke
xiansheng lunji (Taibei 1971), pp.109-17.
11. Barfield, Perilous frontier, pp.139ff.
12. Charles Hartman, Han Yli and the T'ang search for unity (1986), ch.2, esp. pp.129ff.
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Present-day scholarship on tenth-century attitudes
Scholarly consideration of the Liao has often bracketed it with other 'alien regimes.'
Although there is no doubt that there remained real cultural differences between the Kitan
and the Chinese both in the north and the south (for instance, the Kitan continued to
speak, and sometimes write, their own Kitan language, they continued to eat food which
the Chinese found at best strange, and the briefest glance at archaeological remains shows
continuing distinctions between the material culture of the Kitan and the Chinese), 13 these
continuing differences between the cultures have been passed over, and debate has
centred around the degree of sinicisation shown by the Liao and the reasons for it. This
trend has been common amongst both Chinese and Western historians, though it has
been more pronounced in China." Present-day Chinese historians point to the very large
numbers of Chinese who came under Liao control in the tenth century, and tend to argue
that such movements of population necessitated major changes in the economic, political
and even social structure of the Kitan people, which continued throughout the dynasty.
Such changes include the adoption of much of the Tang system of administration, the
wearing of Chinese-style clothing by the imperial family and the officials of the southern
division, adherence to Buddhism, adoption of the Confucian thought-system and
formalised reverence of the sage, an increased interest in scholarly and learned pursuits,
and even, it is claimed, widespread use of the Chinese language among the common
people.'
Although one might well take issue with the general interpretation that the sinicising
influence of the Liao Chinese was an unqualified positive development towards Liao
leudalisation,' nevertheless one would not want to deny that the Liao did indeed, as time
went on, adopt more Chinese-style institutions. But this 'process of sinicisation' did not
bring any decrease in the consciousness of difference between Liao and the southern
13. This is recorded in the LS and was made amply clear by Wittfogel and Feng, despite their arguments for a
synthetic 'third culture.' WF pp.16-20 (summary), 219-25. Luo Jizu, Qidan ren de yinshi, Liao fin Qidan
Ni4zhen shi yanjiu dongtai 1986:1, pp.38-9. despite taking issue with Western claims for continuing
differences in food, ends up showing precisely that. Some of the most striking archaeological evidence is from
the Kulun ** tomb-paintings, which show marked differences in dress and hairstyles: Wang Jianqun & Chen
Xiangwei, Kulun Liaodai bihua mu (1989.)
14. There is a large literature in Chinese on the sinicising influence of the Liao Chinese, which is uncritically
regarded as an entirely positive development For instance, Yin Keming, Qidan hanhua; Liang Shuqin, Cong
chutu wenwu kan Liaodai Qidan zu dui Han zu wenhua de xishou he jicheng, Liao Jin Qidan Niizhen shi yanjiu
dongtai 1986:1, pp.40-43; Ren Chongyue, Liaodai Qidanzu dui Hanzu wenhua de xishou he jicheng, Thongzhou
xuekan 1983:3, pp.95-99, 88; Yao Congwu, Qidan hanhua. Most of this literature explains Liao sinicisation in
terms of political advantage, which demanded the winning over of the Chinese governing classes. Only passing
reference, if any, is made to the likelihood of a mixing of cultures, with 'influence' flowing southwards as well
as northwards, although Yao Congwu's article (originally published 1952) is more balanced than most later
works. Pamela Crossley, in particular, has written about the unhelpfulness of the extraordinarily persistent
sinicisation framework: Thinking about ethnicity in early modern China, Late imperial China 11:1(1990),
p p.1-35.
15. See Chinese articles cited in previous note.
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regimes, at least in the early Song. From the southern side of the frontier, the attitudes of
the Song official classes towards the Liao have been examined by Wang Gungwu and
Tao Jingshen. 1 6 From their work, chiefly with literary Materials, it is clear that during the
latter part of the tenth century there was a continuing perception of the differences
between Chinese and Kitan, with no reduction over time in the use of derogatory names
for the Kitan in materials not intended for their consumption. 17 Indeed, they have found
that Song language expresses 'increasingly hostile Chinese attitudes toward non-Chinese
cultures and the "inferior" people such cultures produced.'
If we take actions as partly indicative of attitudes, then this increasing hostility seems
to connect with the change in attitudes to loyalty illustrated in the cases of Wang Jizhong
fla,18 and Li Huan WI: , as well as fitting with the broader findings presented in
Chapter 2. There we saw significant changes in the range of options taken, and therefore
perceived, by people in frontier situations faced with the decision to serve foreigners or
not. In the earlier part of the century there were many crossings by persons of higher
status who had a certain amount of input into the decision, but after the fall of Northern
Han more crossings were involuntary and involved people lower down the social scale.
What is curious is that such a development away from taking service with Liao should
be growing even as Liao came to look more like one of the southern regimes. If Chinese
practices and institutions were what mattered, then it should have been easier, not harder,
for Chinese voluntarily to take service with the Liao.' 9 Yet if we look ahead to the more
heavily studied eleventh and early twelfth centuries, we see that while certain Chinese
practices and institutions became more firmly established in Liao, simultaneously the
Song court became increasingly irredentist, a trend culminating in the Song-Jin
alliance against Liao in 1115. The idea of sinicisation lacks the explanatory power to deal
with such apparent contradictions; indeed it is itself part of the problem. There are,
however, ideas from the study of ethnicity, and particularly ethnocentrism, which have
proved helpful. From the information presented in the earlier chapters we can make the
case that the changes in perceived options are intimately related to developments in the
political situation.
16. The two main articles are Wang Gungwu, The rhetoric of a lesser empire: early Sung relations with its
neighbors, and Tao Jing-shen, Barbarians or northerners: Northern Sung images of the Khitans, which reach
broadly the same conclusions from different approaches to the materials. Both are in Rossabi, China among
equals, pp.47-65, 66-86.
17. Tao, Barbarians or northerners, pp.72-4.
18. Wang, Rhetoric, p.48.
19. A recent article has argued that this logic was successfully applied with the Chinese who were already in
Liao. The early Liao 'process of sinicisation' is seen as a response to Liao Chinese resistance to serving
'barbarians,' and is said to have eventually won them over. Meng Guangyao, Huayi zhi bian.
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Ethnicity and ethnocentrism
'Ethnicity' and 'ethnic identity' are used as synonyms here. The meaning of 'ethnicity' in
the sociological and anthropological literature remains problematical, if not
controversial.' A theory exists for almost every eventuality, but overall there is a
'paradigmatic crisis.' We can, however, say two things which ethnicity is not". Firstly, it
does not mean anything defined in racial terms. As is now becoming widely recognised,
ethnic differences have only a coincidental relationship with so-called racial differences.'
In any case, intermarriage such as that found on the north China frontier, most notably in
the Tang imperial house, destroys any possibility of there being any kind of 'pure race.'
We have already seen that where we can identify people as Chinese, Shatuo IIE, or
Turkish 5M, such 'racial' identities give little indication as to likely behaviour.
Secondly, the objective definition of ethnic identity in terms of cultural practices has also
been shown to be impractical, because shared practices are not necessarily taken to
bestow a shared identity, as the Manchus found to their cost at the end of the Qing
It appears that at present there are two contrasting notions of what 'identity,'
including ethnic identity, means. Either it is something essential 'which an individual or a
group has in and of itself,' or something 'only existing in a context of oppositions and
relativities':" we define ourselves with reference to the 'Other.' Although these two
notions apparently sit uneasily together, we will see both of them operating in tenth-
century north China. In the case of the first generation Liao Chinese, although a sense of
Chinese identity does seem to have continuous existence, it is not necessarily used, but is
brought to the fore or pushed into the background in a context of oppositions, which are
often consciously fostered by governments.
This process is one of those provided for by some theories derived from the concept
of ethnocentrism. This was an early expression of the idea of definition in terms of the
Other, and was the name given to the attitudes, often negative attitudes, of an `ingroup'
towards foreigners or 'outsiders' comprising an `outgroup.' Ethnocentrism is, if you
like, the expression of a felt identity by one particular group (an ethnic identity) in terms
of other groups which are specifically not identified with. It arises, then, out of a sense of
ethnic identity, and in turn contributes to the maintenance of that ethnic identity. In its
20. 'Conceptual ambiguity still constitutes the prevalent picture.' Azril Bacal, Ethnicity in the social sciences:
a view and review of the literature on ethnicity (1991), p.11. For a deeper discussion, with reference to China,
see Crossley, Thinking about ethnicity.
21. The sociologist Michael Banton has written extensively on race as a construct created independently of
biological fact. See, for instance, his Racial theories (1987.) Geneticists back this up; see Steve Jones, The
language of the genes (1994), esp. ch.13.
22. The best known exposition of this point is probably Fredrik Barth, ed. Ethnic groups and boundaries: the
social organisation of cultural difference (1969.) For the Manchus see Crossley, Orphan warriors.
23. Tonkin et al, History and ethnicity, p.11.
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turn, ethnocentrism helps to define ethnic identities: both those of the ingroup and, via
ingroup views, those of outgroups as well.' Although currently the concept of
ethnocentrism appears to be unfashionable in social scientific circles, it has proved useful
here because, unlike ethnicity, it is conceived of as being necessarily dynamic in nature,
and necessarily involving both sides of any given 'ethnic frontier.' It thus enables the
discussion to be shifted away from descriptions of changing structures on one side, to the
relation of processes involving both. It is hoped that this will give a better understanding
of what was going on.
I shall trace the processes in three sections. 25 Firstly: in the early decades of the tenth
century ethnic identity existed, but was an irrelevance in the face of the immediate need
for survival in constantly changing situations. Then: in the middle of the century the ritual
subordination of north China to Liao created tensions in the south which led to war and
the Liao conquest of Later Jin in 947. Finally: this provoked the revival of ethnic
consciousness as one tool in the legitimation of a centralising state.
1. Frontier groups in the early tenth century, c.900-93626
Redrawing the frontier
We begin by characterising the situation on the early tenth-century frontier. The sources
necessarily think in terms of conventional political-cultural divisions based upon a
generalised frontier line established by the ancient tradition of Qin Shihuang's gma
wall; by the tenth century that tradition was already over a thousand years old. The ideal
was that people identified as 'Chinese' should not cross that frontier to serve those
beyond it, and there are a few tenth-century examples, such as Shen Yun &W, of those
who actually lived up to that ideal. Yet there are also many examples, set out in the
preceding chapters, of behaviour showing active cooperation with the Liao, more of
which come from the first half of the century. Such people are still regarded by the
sources as being Chinese, and so are their descendants, even after they have been in Liao
for several generations.27 They were still placed on the southern side of what we might
24. A comprehensive discussion of the theories deriving from the concept of ethnocentrism can be found in
Robert LeVine & Donald Campbell, edd. Ethnocentrism: theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes and group
behavior (1972) (hereafter LeVine & Campbell.)
25. As we will inevitably be revisiting some of the events described in Chapter 1, the three sections here
mirror the major divisions there, for ease of reference.
26. The dates in these headings are approximate, and are supplied only for the purpose of giving the reader
some points of orientation.
27. This emphasis varies with the sources. The LS biography of Han Derang otts (third generation) does not
give any ethnic origin, only mentioning that his grandfather was Han Zhigu %%It, but the QG is careful to
point out that Derang was 'originally a Han.' LS 82:1289; QG 18:174, Meng Guangyao, Huayi zhi bian, pp.63,
68, sets out several cases of Liao Chinese who very actively retained their Chinese identity.
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call an 'identity frontier,' which meant that this could run in a very different place from
the 'traditional' or even the 'political' frontier.
Frontier regions throughout history are frequently studied in terms of centre-periphery
relations.28 This assumes that we are dealing with entities focussed upon a 'central
government' of some kind. Power relationships are considered to taper in their strength
from the centre outwards to the 'frontier.' At this often imaginary line (sometimes
acknowledged as a zone) a different (though similarly structured), neighbouring entity
begins. In the case of tenth-century north China we need to define 'centre' from a
political point of view; it has nothing inherently to do with the physical location of the
'capital.' A 'centre' is a power-group which held, or was soon to hold, the imperial
dignity, for which it required a widespread and powerful combination of support,
consent and tacit agreement, in which regional backing was crucia1. 29 They thus include,
besides the more obvious candidates, the Taiyuan Jin (the pre-dynastic Later Tang) and
the Kitan-Liao regime.
For the early tenth century it does not help to think of the Great Wall as the frontier in
a centre-periphery situation. We need to rethink. In the frontier provinces anybody
holding an official post, from regional level down to junior military commanders, could
become a leader possessing more or less autonomy. There are countless such cases.
Although the situation was confused by the two or more 'centres' being themselves major
players in the frontier region, nevertheless the local leaders on both 'sides' of the
traditional frontier had a great deal more in common with each other than they had with
the nominal 'centres.' The local leaders shared similar ambitions. After survival, these
included chiefly the retention of posts and individual or familial power, and perhaps the
extension of these. These leaders also shared similar problems, and as such minor
players could not survive without some kind of backing, their concerns boiled down to
the practicalities of which 'centre' was best going to provide for the fulfilment of their
ambitions. We can thus define the local frontier leaders as a group seeking advantage
from the 'centres.' Accordingly, we can draw a new, working boundary, putting a line
around the local leaders on both 'sides' of the conventional frontier. This separates them,
at least conceptually, from the 'centres,' between which is created a frontier region, itself
now central.
28. For a consideration of comparative frontiers in approximately the same period, see Bartlett & MacKay,
Medieval frontier societies; for this same north China frontier, a millennium later, see Marjorie Dryburgh,
Song Zheyuan, the Nanjing government and the north China question in Sino-Japanese relations. 1935-1937.
Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, 1993.
29. This should not be underestimated: the activities and authority of the centre were so circumscribed by the
need for provincial support, and by limited resources (possession of which itself depended not a little on that
same provincial support) that the centre could not be quite the dominating factor it is often assumed to be.
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In doing this, we have effectively redefined our groups. Previously we had 'the
Chinese' versus 'the Liao.' The Chinese group embraced a confusing mixture including
people to whom the frontier was no more than a distant 'problem,' and crossing it largely
a matter of theory, as well as those to whom the frontier was an everyday reality, and
crossing it a realistic option. The redefined 'frontier' group contains people on both sides
of the old frontier: the inhabitants of the frontier zone, from both sides of the traditional
frontier. The other new group consists of the 'centres' amongst which the frontier zone
inhabitants can, in certain circumstances, pick and choose their allegiances, and along
with the various so-called 'Chinese' powers, it also includes the Liao.
For the sake of making a comprehensible definition we have not yet considered
individuals, but the only difference between them and leaders was that individuals had
recourse to a wider range of authorities, embracing both 'centres' and minor leaders. A
further level of complexity is that the minor leaders, being in the middle of the power-
scale, could be both patrons to those weaker than themselves and receivers of patronage
not just from 'centres' but from other minor leaders stronger than themselves. Thus was
created a fine network of constantly shifting allegiances functioning at all political levels
for which we have information.
Pragmatism
It is characteristic of the early tenth century that people at all levels would turn to whoever
would help them in their immediate situation, with an almost complete disregard of other
considerations, notably the issues of loyalty and ethnicity. Most of the early tenth-century
frontier leaders sought support at one time or another from other powers they perceived
to be significantly stronger than themselves, and such powers could readily include the
Liao. Appeals to the Liao elicited varying responses, but in all cases, the 'foreignness' of
the Liao was an irrelevance.
The number of voluntary crossings shown on the graphs in Chapter 2 shows the
prevalence of this behaviour earlier in the century. Even if we consider only the more
significant players of the time, there are many examples. In 908 Li Cunxu 2 14-111 (a
Shatuo Turk), future founder of Later Tang, bribed the Kitan Abaoji [riPRS (Liao Taizu)
to send cavalry to serve against the Liang A (Chinese.) The Liao were noted for their
cavalry skills, so they were an obvious source of mercenaries. 30 At the end of 913, Liu
Shouguang gi,)r6 (a Chinese) was besieged in Youzhou *1'1 by Taiyuan Jin (Shatuo)
troops, and his followers were deserting him on all sides. Having exhausted all other
sources of support, Shouguang now made a last-ditch appeal to the Kitan Liao. Did
30. Ti 266:8694. These examples are placed in a fuller context in Chapter 1.
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Shouguang perhaps turn to them last because they were non-Chinese? It appears not,
because according to Liao sources, the emperor Taizu himself had led an attack on
Shouguang only the year before, and relations between them had not improved since.
Taizu was reportedly suspicious of this latest request, and refused to help his erstwhile
enemy.31 He probably also saw no reason to get involved in an obviously lost cause.
The small northern power of Yiwu Al-4 was sandwiched between Liang and Taiyuan
Jin. The Yiwu jiedushi Wang Chuzhi iy,SA (Chinese) received his governorship from
the Jin (Shatuo), but in 921 he became concerned at his overlord's encroachment into the
neighbouring small power of Zhao kft, and sent 'bribes' to Liao with a request for help.
The Jin now clearly had the upper hand against Liang, and Chuzhi is said to have 'feared'
only Jin and Liao, discounting the Liang (Chinese) as a source of support. 32 That left
Liao, and the fact that it was foreign did not come into the equation at all. Requests for
help were made according to the perceived strength of the regime, not its ethnic
composition.
These examples illustrate a common behaviour pattern of the time, apparently
reflecting an attitude which paid no attention to ethnicity. At the same time, from our
detailed studies of individuals, there is evidence for a continuing sense of Chinese
identity strong enough to influence actions. The cases of Han Yanhui agit and Zhang
Li 3K-Tig are commonly taken as examples of the attachment of the Liao Chinese to their
homeland, and so they are, but only up to a point. In fact they demonstrate the flexibility
of approach available in the early tenth century.
Han Yanhui (Chinese) flees Liao for unstated reasons; an opportunity to describe him
as unhappy in Liao is missed, although it could be that this would automatically be
assumed to be the reason. In contrast to the unexplained departure from Liao, we are told
very clearly that Yanhui leaves Taiyuan Jin (Shatuo) because of the antipathy of Wang
Jian iX (Chinese.) Yanhui does not apparently consider a move to Liang (Chinese),
although it claimed the imperial dignity at the time, and controlled the Central Plains
including the ancient capitals. He is instead sanguine about his return to Liao, confident
of his inestimable value to Liao Taizu. He tells his friend Wang Deming es,s1E1A,
Those (Kitan), ever since I came (away), have been as if their hands and eyes were damaged; when
I now go (back) there, those hands and eyes will be whole again; how could they allow me to be
harmed!"
In returning to Liao, Yanhui is taking a wholly pragmatic approach based upon his
certainty of secure employment and recognition. Ethnic considerations never arise, and
31. TJ 268:8777.
32. TJ 271:8868-9.
33. TJ 269:8811 et al, see Table 2, §21.
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we saw in the previous chapter how the emphasis on Yanhui's continuing attachment to
the south is an apologetic creation of later sources based on very little hard evidence.
Zhang Li's case is less immediately a matter Of pragmatism because of the
smokescreen of his declaration regarding his ethnic identity: he says very clearly, 'I am a
Chinese,' and this was pounced upon by later compilers.' But in fact, the practical
upshot of U's lamentation is that he gets better treatment from the Liao, and it is possible
that his claim to cultural unhappiness there was an oblique method of improving his pay
and conditions. After this incident we hear no more of Li attempting to escape, even
though, given his later career, he would probably have had other opportunities. Not only
did he not repeat his escape attempt, but he is credited with helping to plan the conquest
of Later Jin in 946-7. Like Han Yanhui, Li appears to have been operating on the basis of
personal advantage, in which case his exploitation of the ethnic argument to achieve his
ends shows a very high degree of sophistication in the use of available concepts.
This manipulation of current ideas suggests a further point about both Yanhui and Li.
Although they were more educated than many of their fellows, they were no more likely
to act in accordance with the set of Confucian norms of behaviour which were later laid
down as orthodoxy. If anything, their education would have given them more choices in
their interpretation of Confucian ideology, and more tools with which to justify their
chosen course of action.
In this period the Chinese in north China lived in the constant presence of people
clearly identified as Shatuo, Bohai gm, Kitan, et al. If ethnicity had been a major issue
then we would expect the challenge to Chinese identity represented by these people to
have produced some kind of reaction amongst the Chinese. That this appears not to have
been the case may be because in north China the Chinese were still a majority and their
culture (albeit modified by contact with non-Chinese) still the dominant one. By contrast,
the Liao Chinese were members of a subordinate group in a state where the dominant
group was largely ethnically defined and culturally different. This meant that the Liao
Chinese, moving from a region in which their ethnic group was the dominant one, to a
region where it was subordinated, necessarily acquired a more clearly-defined ethnic
identity simply because of the contrast in their situation: they had become the minority.
The behaviour of individuals on the north China frontier in the tenth century was
characterised by an intensely pragmatic approach not confined to China or the tenth
century.35 Those who crossed into Liao voluntarily were almost all attracted by the
34. Chapter 4, Table 5, §27.
35. There is a striking case from modem Africa, cited in the anthropological literature, of a Gusii man captured
by the enemy Kipsigis, who fought on the ICipsigis side against the Gusii before escaping back to his own
people, who received him without difficulty. The researchers found that the Gusii
did not regard him as a traitor or turncoat and, in fact, their vocabulary did not include equivalent terms.
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success, at least the relative success, of the regime there, when compared with the
Chinese regimes. 36 This success found its practical expression in the rewards handed out
to those who joined up, and it is more than likely that those who crossed voluntarily were
aware of the likelihood of generous reward before they made their decision. Those who
were supposedly less willing to give their allegiance to a foreigner were also 'Seduced' by
the rewards which they received. The Liao emperors were well aware of the principle,
that, in crude terms, everybody has their price. More important still, the Liao ruling
group, though dominated by members of the Kitan-Uighur imperial-consort clans, was
never closed to members of other ethnic groups, as demonstrated by the important
positions achieved by Han Yanhui, Zhao Yanshou kagg, and later dominant figures
such as Han Derang MM. Although the move from a confident majority to a
subordinated minority position might have helped to bring out awareness of ethnic
identity amongst the Liao Chinese, the individual benefits of such a move more often than
not outweighed any abstract considerations.
From this evidence, we can see that early tenth-century crossings between the
different regimes of north China took no account of whether the crosser or the regime
was of Han or Shatuo or Kitan or whatever other descent. The rationale for crossing was
not constructed upon an ethnic basis; whatever the felt definition of 'Chinese' ethnic
identity, those who crossed to Liao were not rejecting that identity; they did not seek to
take on 'Liao' identity, but rather were 'blind' to the ethnic differences between the two
conventional groupings. In most cases they were simply following their likely best
fortunes. In the early tenth century, ethnic identity was very rarely, if ever, invoked as a
reason for giving or withholding allegiance, and the enormous extent of frontier-crossing
to Liao in the early tenth century would also seem to demonstrate that whilst there could
be an awareness of ethnic identity, this was not employed to create any attitude of
ethnocentrism.
The anthropologists LeVine and Campbell discuss the relationship of ethnocentrism to
the level of political development achieved by a group or a state, arguing that a well-
bounded state' requires a certain level of ethnocentrism for its existence. They suggest
that where a state has collapsed and there is fragmentation, then although the old,
necessarily ethnocentric, 'ideology of statehood' will be retained in name and theory, in
Loyalty did not seem to be conceived of in terms that transcended current residence and strategic
advantage, although for most persons at most times these would coincide with membership in the
Gusii ethnic group .... // This surprising state of affairs along a tense boundary between two sharply
differentiated peoples__ suggests that such boundaries may not have received adequate attention in
anthropological research. (LeVine & Campbell, pp.94-5.)
This case could be retold with the names changed to 'Chinese' and 'Liao,' without a hint of anachronism or
inappropriateness.
36. According to LeVine & Campbell, pp.63-5, factors influencing choice of group include wealth, power,
prestige, or success in war. Grodzins summarises his similar, if more holistic, view, Loyal and disloyal, pp3-7.
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practice the level of ethnocentrism will be greatly reduced.' Hence when the Tang empire
broke up, competing regional leaders of Han, Shatuo and Kitan descent attempted to set
themselves up as 'emperors' of 'dynasties,' following the Tang pattern. They did this
without reference to the preliminary studies on hua-hu differences produced by Han Yu
and others a century before. Despite these early efforts, the ideologies and other bases for
the rule of individual leaders were not, in the early tenth century, based upon
identification with a particular ethnic group. It is not that these identities did not exist or
were not recognised, but what we see is almost a suppression of ethnic identities such as
`Shatuo' in favour of a continuation of the concept of the 'Middle Kingdom.' The fact
that it was Shatuo Turks who led the efforts to restore the Tang is not dwelt upon in the
sources, though neither is it concealed. It is possible that the Shatuo were really more
different than our sources would have us believe,' and that they have been 'adopted' as
Chinese by later writers anxious to show the legitimacy, and the Chinese-ness, of their
own dynasty's line of descent, but if the consciousness of ethnic identity were so finely
tuned in the early tenth century itself, then we might expect a clearer expression of this in
the behaviour of frontier people towards Liao. As it is, the enormous extent of frontier-
crossing to Liao in the early tenth century would seem to demonstrate that there are no
ethnocentric attitudes here.
2. The revival of ethnic consciousness, c.936-950
Although in the early tenth century ethnic identity was more or less irrelevant, and
ethnocentrism non-existent, during the Later Jin a transformation of attitudes to the Liao
seems to have begun. This is not least because political relations between the Central
Plains and Liao were redefined when in 936 Shi Jingtang -4kf* turned to Liao Taizong
for help in his bid to replace the Later Tang. In one sense this was simply another
incidence of the situation we have discussed above, in which weaker powers turned to
stronger ones for support in attaining their immediate goals. The cases of Zhao Dejun
MVP- and Yang Guangyuan SY6A, who also sought Liao support for their ambitions
at this time, were examples of this pattern, except that the balance of power was shifting
around them, putting a different cast upon their actions. 39 Up until now, Liao support had
been requested and granted for the purposes of maintaining regional positions, usually
against a threat from a larger power. In 936, the request was for Liao support not just for
the defence of regional autonomy, but in a bid for empire. In return, the Liao emperor
37. LeVine & Campbell, p.100.
38. Eberhard sets out the cultural distinctiveness of the Shatuo in Conquerors and rulers, ch. 6.
39. See Chapter 8 for discussion of how this could happen.
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was offered not just the usual 'bribes,' but annual payments, the territory of the Sixteen
prefectures, and a father-son relationship with Shi Jingtang.
Some people were quick to see the implications of this raising of the stakes. With the
accession of Li Cunxu to the throne in the Central Plains in 923, the Taiyuan Jin had been
united with Liang, and the number of 'centres' reduced to two. For a minor regional
power to receive positions from the Liao as one of at least three centres was one thing,
but to effectively subordinate one centre to the only other one was altogether different.
Almost immediately after the deal with Liao was proposed there were objections to the
extent of the repayment offered. Liu Zhiyuan g1.1--LiA said,
Calling yourself his minister ff is permissible, but serving him as your father is going too far.
Bribe him with generous gifts of gold and silk and be pleased with yourself that you get his army
to come, but there is no need to promise him land and fields; I fear that on some future day this
will bring calamity upon the Middle Kingdom, and your regrets will know no end."
This advice was disregarded, and for the remaining five-and-a-half years of Shi
Jingtang's life he worked hard to maintain good relations with Liao. In this period there
was a dramatic fall-off in crossings or appeals to Liao, with only three which were not
directly related to the fulfilment of the Liao-Jin bargain. 4 ' This change reflects the
importance of opposition between centres as a provider of alternative authority which
could support the discontented. This is not to say that there was no discontent. On the
contrary, Jingtang spent almost his entire reign engaged in putting down rebellions, but
the lack of an external supporter for this internal unrest was undoubtedly a factor in
ensuring that the rebellions did not succeed.'
When Shi ChongguiZ 1t (Jin Chudi 1-4 ±) succeeded his father in 942:6, it
was expected that in informing the Liao he would refer to himself as Taizong's 'subject'
and 'grandson.' Jing Yanguang xgg objected to his emperor being the 'subject' of
another state and it was Chudi's refusal to use this term that provoked the war. Jing
Yanguang's objection is the opposite of Liu Zhiyuan's: Zhiyuan objected to 'grandson,'
Yanguang to 'subject,' suggesting that the content of the deal was a good deal less
important than what was represented by it. There is little doubt that the real issue here
was the question of seniority: the whole intellectual and cultural tradition sustaining the
'Middle Kingdom' was threatened by the submission to an external power. Yet although
the distinction between internal and external was traditionally most clearly articulated with
40. TJ 280:9146.
41. Even these three are related to the deal less directly: Table 1, #62 (opposition to Liao), 64 (Zhao Yanshou's
wife), 68 (rebellion against Jin.)
42. See Chapter 1. According to TJ 281:9194, the nearest the Liao came to supporting a rebel was when they
talked with a Yang Guangyuan disgruntled at Sang Weihan's 4vgn efforts to divide Guangyuan's army. No
concrete events are recorded as following these talks.
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reference to the northern 'barbarians,' this ready-made framework was not used by Jing
Yanguang in his arguments. In his long speech to the Liao official Qiao Rong 1"
-
Yanguang said,
Go home and tell your lord that the former emperor was established by the northern court, and
therefore called himself a subject and submitted reports, but the present emperor was established
by the Middle Kingdom, and the reason that he submits to the northern court is just because he
does not dare overlook the treaties of the former emperor. As a neighbour, calling himself
grandson is enough; there is no reason for him to call himself (your) subject. {The emperor of
the northern court should not believe Zhao Yanshou's deceits and beguilements and insult the
Middle Kingdom. The soldiers and horses of the Middle Kingdom, you have seen with your own
eyes.} If the grandfather [Liao Taizong] gets angry, then let him come and fight; his grandson
[Jin Chudi] has 100,000 naked swords: enough to receive him. Do not regret it when the day
comes that he is defeated by this grandson and laughed at by all under heaven!43
As he was effectively making a declaration of war, Yanguang could presumably have
said anything he liked about the Kitan. He did not have to be polite about them being
barbarians when he was already threatening to destroy them. Yet an argument based upon
territorial or more overtly 'ethnic' matters is nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, the
sentiment expressed shows the clear political opposition established in Yanguang's mind
at least, between the Central Plains and Liao.
Yanguang's provocative speech should also be seen in the context of a changed
regional situation. Once the two main regimes had entered into a formal relationship,
there were few outlets for ambition. It was no longer possible for regional officials to
establish themselves in the kind of autonomous provincial governments which had
characterised north China since the An Lushan rebellions. Lacking the scope for
independent action in the regions, individuals now had to channel their aspirations
through the court of the regime to which they were subject. Where great generals had
held regional posts enabling them to be the immediate actors on the spot, creating 'foreign
affairs' by their actions in their own provinces, after about 936 their scope for action was
more limited, and they could only contribute to the making of 'foreign policy' at court.
Yet although their individual freedom of action was constrained by having to work within
a court, the importance of the decisions made was that much greater. The events
produced by the policies could be more far-reaching and profound than had been possible
before the Liao-Jin alliance, because they involved the whole of large regimes and not
just individual provinces.
Thus it was that Jing Yanguang precipitated a war between Liao and Jin which swiftly
went out of control, and his policies ended up losing the Jin empire to a Liao invasion.
This was enthusiastically supported and led by the Liao Chinese Zhao Yanshou, who
coveted the emperorship of the Central Plains for himself, as his father had done before
43. TJ 283:9253-4. Translated with reference to Yang Lien-sheng, Posthumous letter, pp.425-6. {} show parts
omitted in QG 2:22.
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him. Ironically, it could be argued that it was the machinations of individual influential
Chinese at both courts which provoked the war and thus, ultimately, lay behind the
growth of anti-foreign feeling in the south, and was really very little to do with the Kitan
themselves.
By the beginning of 947, the whole picture had changed again. The Liao occupied the
Central Plains, including the capital, and court and provincial officials had all submitted.
Even Liu Zhiyuan had played safe and sent letters to Liao vouchsafing his good faith.
However, he soon changed his mind about the desirability of submission to the Liao,
sighing that
The rongdi Zk barbarians have invaded and insulted us, and the Central Plains have no lord,
they have made the provincial governors give their adherence to foreigners; I am a noble
governor, if I am virtuous then I should be ashamed!44
At this time Liao Taizong was emperor of the Central Plains in Daliang )Cn-4s-Bian
Hence Zhiyuan, in lamenting the leaderless state of the Central Plains, appears to be
expressing a deeply-felt, and evidently readily-available concept that a foreign ruler of the
Middle Kingdom is no ruler at all. That he was not alone in this feeling is demonstrated
by the numerous risings against the Kitan which followed in the same month.' These
were only the first, and the Liao proved unable to hold what they had taken. As they
departed, so Zhiyuan established his Later Han dynasty.
To a certain extent, the source for the remarks here has set up Zhiyuan's earlier
worries about the Liao-Jin deal in order that Zhiyuan can now say 'I told you so.' Those
earlier comments exhibit basically the same concerns as were behind Jing Yanguang's
aggressive stance towards Liao. The subordination of parts of north China to external
powers might be acceptable, but the subjugation of the entire Middle Kingdom to them
was not. Jing Yanguang had the confidence of '100,000 naked swords' behind him and
therefore had no need to frame even his most insulting statements in any other than
political and military terms. Liu Zhiyuan was surveying a conquered state under military
occupation. At such a low ebb to have expressed political and military arguments like
Yanguang's would have been pointless, if not laughable; whereas to talk about barbarians
and revive a sense of shared identity in the Central Plains did not require political success
for its force to be felt. In fact, one strand of ethnicity theory would argue that it is
precisely in situations such as conquest that ethnicity becomes, or is made, a significant
factor." There is a sense that if Zhiyuan is to have anything practical to say at all in this
44. TJ 286:9339.
45. TJ 286:9340-45, passim.
46. Orlando Patterson, Ethnic chauvinism: the reactionary impulse (1977), pp.57ff.
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disastrous situation, he has no other recourse but to the ancient concepts of ethnic
identity, revived now for use in the creation of ethnocentrism.
Hence although the war itself had nothing to do withethnic identity, it paved the way
for a strengthening of ethnic awareness and the development of ethnocentrism. The
conquest distinguished between the two sides most effectively by providing a real
external threat which was conducive to the fostering of anti-foreign feeling. 47 The first
concrete expression of this renewed emotion was the driving out of the Liao garrisons,
which happened piecemeal all over the Central Plains within the space of a few months.
Nevertheless, the widespread reaction against Liao rule did not mean that Liu Zhiyuan
was welcomed with open arms. His short dynasty faced many rebellions, and with the
return of opposition between northern and southern regimes, two of the rebels, Du
Chongwei thmg and Li Shouzhen turned to the Liao for help." This almost
instantaneous reversion, by some, to pre-alliance modes of behaviour suggests that there
was still some scope for the pursuit of regional self-interest in the post-conquest disorder,
and that any ethnocentrism was still only in its youth.
These political changes did not just affect the ruling classes. It was suggested in
Chapter 2 that the common people were perhaps more consistently resistant to crossing to
Liao than were their masters.' Most notable are the detailed accounts of the common
soldiers' distress at the news that Du Chongwei was planning to surrender in 946:12. We
cannot know whether the ordinary troops were conscious of all the implications of Liao
rule in the Central Plains, but there may have been longer-established reasons for their
objections. The advantages of working for the Liao which accrued to those in a position
to be useful at a high level were not so apparent or available to the commoner, whose best
hope in serving the Liao (other than being left alone) was to be resettled on new land,
though probably in an unfamiliar place. Not being in a position to reap immediate benefits
from crossing to the Liao, the common people had little reason to be flexible in their
approach to the Kitan.
47. LeVine & Campbell, pp.29-33.
48. With unhappy results, as both were killed. Du Chongwei, Ti 287:9369; Li Shouzhen, TJ 288:9391.
49. This picture may itself be suspect. It is possible that the 'virtue' of the common people is being set up as a
rebuke to the official classes who are said by Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang to have looked only to their own
immediate interests. TJ 285:9318-9.
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3. Polarisation and legitimation, c.947-1005
These faltering beginnings bring us to a final phase, in which ethnic identity becomes an
element in the justification of rule and thus forms part of an emergent 5° ethnocentrism
which accompanied the political changes of the period.
The Liao conquest and the ending of the balance of power existing under Shi
Jingtang's rule turned the two groups from cooperating neighbours, working along
roughly the same axis, into enemies whose opposition was necessary to the consolidation
and continuation of both their states. As Han was replaced by Zhou, which then became
the Song, the territory of the Middle Kingdom expanded. Meanwhile the Liao emperors
were working on the consolidation of their realm, chiefly by adopting selected Chinese-
style institutions. As the states grew and became more complex, there was an increasing
need for active legitimation of the ruling regimes. An important element in legitimation is
the public definition of where the boundaries of the state lie, and a powerful way to do
this is to define one's own state in the context of its neighbours. Accordingly an
opposition is set up between internal and external, and ethnocentrism increases. This
process is intensified if there is any perception of external threat, 51 and the end result is a
pair of ideologically opposed states meeting at, and divided by, a distinct frontier line.
We are considering this issue in relation to Chinese who crossed into Liao, so our
perspective is chiefly from the south. The Liao's potential as an external threat had been
plainly demonstrated by the conquest of 947, making subsequent Central Plains regimes
increasingly self-conscious and deliberate in their efforts to pull north China together. In
952 Zhou Taizu )19. t/14. appealed to ancient moral foundations by sacrificing to
Confucius, a practice which had fallen into disuse. In 961 Zhou Shizong's shilu
prgt,=-7;21a were completed and Song Taizu 50Ktd had the Tang hui yao Jgt"
compiled, followed two years later by the Wudai hui yao Hf-t-ig5. 52 Similar
legitimating acts continued throughout the rest of the century, but at least equally
important were the programmes of reunification followed by both Zhou and Song
emperors. These can be tracked by their well-known results, ending with the fall of
Northern Han in 979. Accompanying every stage of expansion, and every pause in
between, was a continuing discussion of the best means of dealing with the northern
barbarians. The 03 is littered with a large selection of the memorials which contributed to
50. It is tempting to say 're-emergent,' but this assumes too much about the processes operating in earlier
periods, and accordingly 1 refer here only to the case in question.
51. LeVine & Campbell, pp.99ff, and restatement of Sumner's definition of ethnocentrism (William Sumner,
Folkways (1906), pp.7ff.
52. JW 112:1482 (sacrifice) and CB 2:39 (Tang hui yao). 2:53 (shilu); 4:97 (Wudai hui yao.) The Liao also
reinforced their legitimacy in the Chinese mode, for instance, a calendar was presented in 961:5 (LS 6:77) and
in 983:11 rewards were given to commoners demonstrating filial piety (LS 10:112.)
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this debate. As related by Tao Jingshen and Wang Gungwu, the new realism with which
Song officials approached relations with Liao did not reduce the widespread use of
derogatory names for the Kitan, at least in internal documents. Such names emphasised a
negative approach to non-membership of the group identified as Chinese, and thus
reinforced the feeling of internal solidarity which enabled emperors to appeal to the
inhabitants of the Central Plains in the name of defence against an external danger. At the
same time, by setting themselves up as the defenders against this danger the Central
Plains emperors also enhanced their legitimacy as rulers. The Song emperors were able to
make use of old ideas about 'barbarians,' revived and reworked to suit contemporary
circumstances and dynastic needs. The strength of and need for the ideology were such
that the change happened even as the Liao were adopting more Chinese-style institutions.
As the division between Song and Liao became more closely defined, so the frontier
prefectures - no longer provinces - lost their character as a separate region and became
more like the peripheral areas of central powers. One example of this is that more
communications were now channelled through envoys as representatives of the court.
These bypassed the frontier prefects and governors who, by virtue of their extensive
contacts at the local level, had formerly acted as the conduits for communication between
the two sides. Local contacts did continue to have some importance (for instance, it was
border prefects who exchanged the first diplomatic communications between Liao and
Song in 974),53 as the individual influence and authority of those holding posts on the
frontier diminished, so the contacts they had decreased in significance. The increased
direct contact between centres reduced the number of people who had personal contact
with the other side, and allowed the easier propagation of ethnocentric ideas.
We can see evidence for the results of these attitudes in the pattern of crossings.
Under the Song, there was only one individual, voluntary crossing to Liao, and that by a
fugitive from justice. 54 This is suggestive not only of the reduced opportunities available
under a centralising regime, but also of a growing trend in the Central Plains to prefer
attachment to Chinese regimes. There were still many crossings in total, but these are
closely associated with major campaigns, and comprise mostly involuntary crossings
where groups of soldiers were captured as a result of battle. These people did not choose
to cross to Liao, even in the limited senses we defined in Chapter 2. This trend also
suggests that the difference between the attitudes of the elite and the masses has been
reduced. No longer do the ruling elite appear less ethnocentric than their people.
The cases of Li Huan and Wang Jizhong illustrate some of the practical effects
associated with the hardening of the frontier line. Despite being treated well, Li Huan
53. CB 15:328; SS 3:43; cf. LS 8:94, which says that the Song sent envoys, presumably to the court.
54. The case of Li Xu	 Table 1, #216.
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appears to have retained an identification with the southern regimes that was a good deal
more active than anything we saw from the early part of the century, as demonstrated by
his espionage activities, and his escape and suicide atte.mpts. Huan was only released
from Fengguo temple 2rA4 after he demonstrated his literary abilities, and it is clear
that although these were felt to be considerable, such talents were not in such short
supply that Huan could be sure of employment. In this his case contrasts markedly with
those of Han Yanhui and Zhang Li. They had been so sure of their positions that they
could almost bargain over their terms of service, and Yanhui was even able to choose his
master. Li Huan had no bargaining power and his choices were very much more limited.
In supplying information and gambling on an escape south, he was risking the severest
penalties, to the extent that having failed, suicide seemed like a reasonable alternative.
The fact that he still took those risks is indicative of very strong negative feelings about
serving the Liao; there is little sign of the pragmatism of earlier years.
Wang Jizhong's case is rather different. Unlike Li Huan, he does appear to have been
in demand; certainly the Liao heaped him with rewards and offices from the moment he
arrived. Nevertheless, Jizhong appears to have retained a preference for serving the
Song, prompting his unsuccessful request to be recalled there. Whether he ever stopped
longing for the south we do not know, but his continued service, in the highest posts and
with much reward, suggests at least some acceptance of his situation. On the other hand,
it was perhaps the only sensible option. He could have declined to serve, but to do so
required a private income, and in any case, the conclusion of the treaty was prompting
many long-term refusenik Liao Chinese to come out of retreat and re-enter public life."
Escape was out of the question because the treaty contained a clause pledging to return
fugitives, so even had he reached the south, he would have been sent back again. In this
respect, Jizhong had even fewer choices than Li Huan, which is a direct reflection of the
fixed definition which had now been given to the frontier.
We have come a long way from the notional frontier region with which we began. There,
multiple regimes conducted constantly shifting relationships without reference to ethnic
identities, and the individual had many choices of where to give allegiance. As the
number of competing powers diminished, so did the choices. As regimes increased in
complexity, so ethnocentrism grew as an aspect of legitimation, accompanied by a
strengthening sense of ethnic identity. After the fall of Northern Han it is no longer
possible to think of the frontier as a separate region. The 'centres' have reduced in
number to only two, and their edges have advanced across the notional frontier area until
they meet in a single line. This was fixed by the treaty of Shanyuan MN, and the
55. Meng Guangyao, Huayi zhi bian, p.68.
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allegiances operating at that point were made permanent. Thereafter, the diplomatically-
maintained peace between Liao and Song did not prevent the spread and intensification of
strong feelings against the Liao, which culminated in the—almost gleeful agreement of the
ill-fated Song alliance with the Jurchen Jin.
Faced with this shift from the irrelevance to the revival of ethnic identities, it is vital to
remember that ethnicity in itself had no inherent significance, despite its constant
existence. Ethnic identity was a concept which could acquire considerable power when
used as an instrument to enhance the position of a particular group when it was
advantageous to do so; it could be ignored or emphasised at will. From the evidence here
it is clear that conflict between political communities, rather than ethnic ones, was of most
significance.56 It is this which explains how the increasing adoption of Chinese-style
institutions by the Liao could be accompanied by an increasing, rather than a decreasing,
ethnic awareness in the southern regimes. The degree to which the Liao were sinicised
was not the important issue; what mattered to the southern regimes was their own self-
definition, upon which was based the authority of the centralising states of Zhou and
Song. The maintenance of that definition, and ultimately the functioning of the Central
Plains states, required that the Zhou and Song cling to the differences between
themselves and the Liao even as those differences were diminishing. The similarities in
political structure and ideology between the two states had been crystallised when Liao
Taizong declared himself the son of Heaven T:=P in Daliang in 947. To the southern
regimes, that put the whole contest onto a different level. It was now not just frontier
regions which were stake, but the whole tianxia 	 . —Fs . Faced with such a threat, the
southern regimes needed all the help they could muster. A renewed and enhanced
awareness of ethnic identity was a valuable resource in the creation of legitimating, state-
defining, ethnocentric ideas, and it is these ideas which also lay behind the increasingly
rigid definition of zhong.
56. LeVine & Campbell, p.57.
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The Western understanding of the 'Frontier' is of a place wild and free: potentially
dangerous, but exciting and full of scope for the initiative.' The Chinese conventionally
saw the frontier not as a place of adventure and opportunity, but of difference,
unrewarded hardship, and fear. It was associated with the punishment of exile, and we
know most about it from those who were sent there unwillingly and then wrote poetry
expressing how unhappy they were. What we have found here, though, is that there were
some Chinese who not only were able to live successfully in the frontier zone, but were
also able to see opportunities there, and exploit them. The court tended to associate such
adaptation with disorder, and, fearing that such people were too close to the 'barbarians'
in every way, sought to bring them back under central control as soon as possible. As far
as the court was concerned, the frontier was another world.
From what we have seen, that world was one in which frontier crossing constituted
normal behaviour and was regarded pragmatically. Changing sides was simply one of
many strategies open to people on the frontier and was widely used, without regard for
the ethnic composition of the regimes involved. In the first half of the tenth century, the
interaction of factors in north China, including breakdown of central control and the
consequent struggle for legitimation, the presence of many realistic alternatives for
officials seeking positions of power combined with widespread opportunities to choose,
and an ethical system which necessarily gave some sanction to changing sides, resulted in
a seller's market for the services of officials. In these circumstances, a certain group of
individual officials, most notable amongst them Han Yanhui found themselves
with the unusual opportunity to enjoy freedoms which usually remained at the level of
theory, and could rarely be exercised in the form of active choices.
Yet the practical choices made by these individuals could not but contribute to an
evolving system of governmental institutions which had long been endowed with moral
force. The connection between the concepts of loyalty and legitimacy meant that every
time an official took service with a ruler, they were adding to the legitimacy of that ruler..
Furthermore, although in tenth-century China the morality of loyalty at first had no e I it 01,-c
connotations, in the course of the century it came to be entwined with considerations of
identity through an increase in ethnocentric ideas. A growing concern with the frontier
discussed it as a 'problem' area, the existence of which was itself a significant factor
behind the creation of a Han identity associated with specific territory and bolstered by an
ideology of single-master loyalty and loyalism. And as loyalty came to be defined in
ethnic terms, and more complex states increased their need for legitimation, so choice
1. Stated most famously by Frederick Jackson Turner, The significance of the frontier in American biWe/c„ rite
Frontier in American history (1920), esp. pp.30ff.
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contracted. This was partly a matter of practicality as the number of competing regimes
decreased and it became clearer where the real power lay. But it was also a question of
moral or emotional demands. As the holders of that growing central power laid increasing
stress on the ethical and symbolic bases of their claim to legitimacy, they demanded - and
received - a loyalty which was structured largely with reference to the enemy over the
northern frontier. And by the latter years of the tenth century that enemy was increasingly
characterised as not just coincidentally foreign, but as an insatiable barbarian. The irony
that the early flagbearers for Chinese identity - Liu Zhiyuan giza and the Later Han -
were not themselves Chinese is worthy of further study.
The disorder of the early tenth century offered a rare opportunity for certain people to
act in a more individual manner, but by the end of the century there had been a
contraction of choice. It would be wrong, however, automatically to associate individual
choices with freedom, and automatically to assume that the reduction of that choice is a
bad thing. In the earlier part of the century people on the frontier had a great many
choices, but they were also placed in positions where they were compelled to choose:
they had no choice but to make a choice. The existence of a few cases of diehard loyalty
indicates that such choices were not always easy, so whether those placed in a position of
choosing therefore had more freedom than those for whom the choice did not exist is a
nice philosophical point. Certainly some individuals embraced the opportunities that came
with the unusually wide range of options available, although with mixed success, as can
be seen in the life of Zhao Yanshou kM:-X-. Others appear to have felt compromised to
the extent that they had to justify their behaviour, as did Han Yanhui, although we must
remain sceptical about the appearance of such stories in later sources. Still others seem to
have made accommodations with both conscience and reality, and this is perhaps best
expressed by Zhang Li's 3KT4 declaration of discomfort with the different culture of the
north, followed by years of faithful service. Such cases illuminate the issue of slavery.
The fact that Han Yanhui calmly and deliberately returned to Liao makes it extremely
unlikely that the official classes at least, can have been enslaved in any meaningful way.
Whatever the legal technicalities of their status, they must have seen anything they chose
as an improvement on their former position.2
However, such pragmatism came less easily as the century went on, governments
became fewer and attitudes less flexible. Increasingly, loyalty became an unambiguous
issue on which no compromise was available. Accompanying this change was a clearer
sense of the role of ethnic identity in forming and maintaining that loyalty: Chineseness
was no longer separable from loyalty. The agonies apparently suffered by Li Huan
2. Cf. WF pp.196-9.
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and the sadness implied in Wang Jizhong's 'Mg r, resignation to his fate show how
much more difficult the choices had become. It was no longer a case of choosing between
several options each regarded as legitimate at the time, but a question of deciding whether
or not to serve the enemy, where the only real alternative was death. Although many in
the early tenth century seem to have responded to the challenges of their situation with
practical imagination, it was, ironically, partly their actions in enhancing the legitimacy of
regimes by serving them, which helped to strengthen those regimes and thus bring about
the very tightening of control which denied their successors these choices. Yet absence of
choice also implied stability, and if there is a strong enough desire for that then
restrictions can be more easily tolerated.
Comparison of the sources shows up the ambivalence in the situations of the crossers
at the time, and the continuing, indeed the deepening, ambivalence in the attitudes to them
of later generations, who felt the need to make clear-cut statements about people for
whom life, available options and 'right' decisions were anything but clear-cut. This
ambivalence was but an intermediate stage, because by the time the official histories of
Liao and Song were compiled, the growth of orthodoxy had turned the act of frontier
crossing from one of necessary pragmatism into something which necessarily
contravened moral codes. The concerns of the later recorders were less with the
difficulties of the choices faced by people in the tenth century, than with the wrongness,
in their eyes, of what had been chosen. Frontier crossing had become the inverse of the
orthodoxy of state (some would say 'national') and ethnic loyalty, and deviance was
created from what had been normality.
The concern with the kind of 'ethnic loyalty' expressed by the commentaries critical
of Wang Jizhong also created a contradiction, because tenth-century frontier crossers
were both too numerous to ignore and clearly identified as Chinese. The Song rhetoric
which condemned Feng Dao Zigit claimed to dismiss almost the entire generation of
Wudai officials, but whatever the faults of those officials who served only Wudai
regimes, those who took permanent service with the Liao are shown in the later sources
to retain some degree of integrity, where integrity was equated with loyalty to the Middle
Kingdom. Hence there is a sense in which they become, in the later sources, martyrs to
the Chinese cause, and thus contribute to a developing ethnocentrism.
It is in this shifting perspective through the texts that we can see how what was meant
by 'China' and Thineseness' was constructed by those in charge of recording history.
Though apparently glib, it is literally true to say that the Chinese are who they say they
are, and their identity means what they want it to mean. If we borrow from anthropology
the idea of the 'conceptualisation of ethnicity as a resource,' we see that
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Ethnicity may be a resource in the making of a group' s history, but the process of
categorisation, .... illustrates that the superior capacity of some groups to define the
circumstances under which that history is made is a cruciaLfeature of asymmetrical power
relations. Ethnicity is not, therefore, merely a counter resource to some other basis of power
chances; it is deeply embedded in the overall power relations of the society, ....3
Several Shatuo leaders were accepted as legitimate rulers of the Central Plains in the
course of the Wudai, and it was one of them who took up (or revived) ethnic identity as a
resource against what was felt as the oppression of the Liao invasion. The Han-led
regimes which followed increasingly promoted ethnocentric attitudes, and their historians
recreated the past in their own cultural image. They claimed the Shatuo for their own - as
sinicised Chinese - despite the continuing cultural differences between them. The fact that
it was the Han historians who did the categorisation of groups enabled them to define
history in their own terms and thus sustain an asymmetrical power relationship with
themselves ranked higher than the Liao. The power endowed by this historiographical
activity is suggested by the extraordinary survival, in the face of repeated assaults, of
"sinicisation" as a habit of thought among China scholars,' as noted by Pamela
Crossley.'
That the Liao were not claimed as Chinese in the same way as the Shatuo has much to
do with their lack of success in holding the Central Plains. But it is at least equally
important that the Liao never recognised the centrality of the Middle Kingdom. Unlike the
Jurchen Jin and the Mongols, the Liao showed no signs of wishing to relocate
themselves southwards: Liao Taizong conquered and then headed home. The removal of
the Middle Kingdom from the centre of Liao concern not only enabled the driving out of
the conquerors, but by not recognising the power of history, the Liao allowed the
Chinese to recover their monopoly of that area, and by historiographical means to recreate
their own cultural dominance for the benefit of future generations. It is in the area of this
construction of history, and with it the ideas of 'China' and `Chineseness,' that the most
fruitful directions for further research lie.
This thesis has been querying the idea of 'the frontier' as a single, neat line on a map, and
what began as an examination of a frontier turns out to be an exploration of multiple
frontiers. These frontiers - drawn according to geography, military strength, culture,
loyalty, ethnic identity, conceptual issues or sheer personal advantage - existed
simultaneously but often did not coincide. Not only that, but the location of those
frontiers was changing in the course of the tenth century and some of them were moved
3. David Mason, Introduction, Theories of race and ethnic relations (1986), edd. J. Rex & D. Mason, p.9,
discussing the work of Sandra Wallman, Ethnicity and the boundary process in context, pp.226-33.
4. Thinking about ethnicity, p.4.
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again by successive generations. We have tried to maintain a focus throughout upon real
people in real situations. Through these stories, to quote Richard Guisso,
.... we acquire .... renewed respect and understanding for .... the 'actors' in social structure, for
those people whose calculation of advantage and disadvantage for themselves, whose strategies,
whose compromises with fate, give social structure its primary interest. Perhaps our deepest
experience of recognition is the encounter with so many individuals. It is the cumulative effect of
so many stories of actual people .... that conveys a sense of degrees of human freedom, of
options taken and refused, of the exercise of aspiration and will - even if sometimes within
patterns of severe constraint. .... It is this complexity and ambivalence of moral experience that
brings us close to the Chinese, and makes these histories of Chinese .... immediately relevant to
our own moral existence.5
In living their lives the Liao Chinese were applying various understandings of various
frontiers depending upon the circumstances they were in, and the same person could refer
to different frontiers, or different understandings of the same frontier, at different times.
Different understandings again have been applied by historians, including, inevitably,
this one. These multiple interpretations of the frontier suggest a fluidity in the concept in
practice which enabled individuals to find some sense of order in a confusing world,
while the reinterpretations of successive historians indicate continuing efforts to derive
order from confusion, this time by the attempt to draw together multiple frontiers into a
single line. In this context, rather than rejecting the tidy impression given by cartography
as entirely false, we can see its vision of the frontier as simply one more interpretation
amongst the many discussed here.
The changes traced here between our earliest source, the JW, and the official history
of the Liao, the LS, reinforce the point that Chinese historians, like historians
everywhere, were no more objective than their time and place would allow. The changes,
in some cases even the manipulation, remind us again of how careful we need to be even
with sources regarded as reliable, like the TJ. The surviving sources all had specific
interests in seeing the frontier in a certain light, and the comparative case studies
undertaken here show how the picture has been skewed progressively to emphasise one
aspect of the frontier story above all others. These results show the value of the
methodology applied, and also the wealth of information which can be found in the
annals and biographies. These materials do not tell us only about the development of
institutions; neither are they merely formulaic.
We have discussed the many and shifting political frontiers of tenth-century no
China, revealing an undercurrent of the need for legitimation and the changing role of
individuals in providing it. We have looked at actual crossings of an actual frontier in
general and particular. And we have related all this to the movements in the boundaries
around the concepts of loyalty and identity, where the link with ethnocentrism brings us
5. Women in China: current directions in historical scholarship (1982), Introduction,
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back to the need for legitimation. It has not been my aim to 'prove' whether the Liao
Chinese were loyal or disloyal to the Central Plains regimes; rather I suggest that they
acted within a tradition capable of accommodating exactly what they did at the time they
did it, but which then called it loyalty or disloyalty depending on the outcome of events
and the needs of later times. Our picture of the Liao Chinese has been too much filtered
through the judgements of successive historians. They, desiring to categorise, attempted
to make these stories of pragmatism and accommodation fit into a theoretical ideal based
not on the real situations of real people in a turbulent time, but on the fears and
distinctions which developed around the establishment of a fixed frontier and the clear
division of the immediate universe into `us' and 'not us,' 'Chinese' and 'barbarian.' In
expressing their desire to bring order out of disorder, the historians, too, reveal their
humanity.
Z41;.
Chronology
895	 Li Keyong (Taiyuan Jin) supports Liu Rengong for appointment as Youzhou
jiedushi, Rengong starts raiding Kitan territory
897:7	 Liu Rengong refuses Li Keyong's request to send troops, with excuse of
Kitan raid
900	 Zhu Wen (Henan) recommends Wang Chuzhi to be Yiwu jiedushi
Wen attacks Liu Rengong, Rengong asks Li Keyong for help .
901	 Abaoji made commander-in-chief of Kitan tribal confederation, Zhu Wen
controls many Tang provinces
902
	 LS records its first Kitan raid on north China
903:12	 Liu Rengong captures Abaoji's brother-in-law
905/907	 Abaoji and Li Keyong swear brotherhood for attack on Zhu Wen/Liu
Rengong, raids stop
905	 Kitan raid on Youzhou
906	 Abaoji attacks Liu Rengong, sends gifts to Zhu Wen
Zhu Wen attacks Rengong, Rengong sends to Li Keyong for help, Ding Hui
surrenders Lu
907:1
	 Abaoji takes the title of emperor
	
:4	 Zhu Wen founds Later Liang (Taizu), replacing Tang, Abaoji sends envoys,
Li Keyong resents this
Liu Rengong's son, Shouguang, imprisons his father, submits to Liang, is
confirmed as jiedushi
Shouguang's brother Shouqi flees Pingzhou governorship, to Kitan/Hedong
	
:11	 Shouguang's brother Shouwen, (Jin) Yichang jiedushi, asks Liang to punish
Shouguang
908:2	 Li Keyong dies, succeeded by son Cunxu. Cunxu requests Liao help against
Liang siege of Luzhou
	
:5	 Abaoji asks Liang for investiture, Liang seek promise for help against Li
Cunxu, Cunxu asks for help against Liang
Liu Shouwen attacks Liu Shouguang, who requests help from Li Cunxu
909	 Liu Shouwen hires Kitan help, is captured by Liu Shouguang
	
:6	 Shouguang offers Liang the pacification of Li Cunxu (Taiyuan Jin), offers
Cunxu the destruction of Liang
	
:7	 Liang make Shouguang prince of Yan
910	 Liu Shouguang secures his position in Youzhou
911	 Liu Shouguang appeased with titles, but declares himself emperor of Yan in
Youzhou; Kitan take Pingzhou, Li Cunxu sends punitive forces
Kitan twice send envoys to Liang
:10-11 Shouguang aggressive towards Jin, invades Yiwu, jiedushi Wang Chuzhi
got Jin help
912:1
	 Jin army reaches Youzhou (Abaoji attacked Youzhou?), Liu Shouguang got
Liang help
	
:6	 Zhu Yougui kills au Wen to become Liang emperor (Modi)
	
:7	 Kitan take Pingzhou, send envoys to Liang
913:2	 au Youzhen succeeded brother Yougui as Liang emperor
914	 Liu Shouguang crushed, Youzhou comes under Jin control
915:3
	 WeiBo jiedushi Yang Shihou dies, garrison rebels
916:2	 Abaoji (Liao Taizu) adopts a reign era title, Liang continued to send envoys
	
:8	 Kitan take (Jin) Yuzhou
Li Cunxu revives cooperation with Kitan
917:2	 Lu Wenjin kills Xinzhou i jiedushi, crosses to Kitan, made Youzhou liuhou,
(Jin) Youzhou jiedushi Zhou Dewei holds out successfully
921:2	 Zhang Wenli takes semi-autonomous Chengde over to Kitan, asks Liang for
help, asks Li Cur= for confirmation, subsequently sought Kitan backing
but killed by Jin, son held out in Zhenzhou
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Yiwu governor Wang Chuzhi seeks Liao help against Jin aggression in
Chengde, son Wang Du usurps Chuzhi as liuhou, confirmed by Liang,
Chengde asked Chuzhi for help, Kitan assistance attacked Wang Du in
Dingzhou, Du sent for Jin help
922	 Wang Du and Jin defeat Liao, Zhenzhou falls to Jin
Kitan raids on Youzhou (to 925)
	
923:4	 Li Cunxu of Taiyuan Jin founds Later Tang (Zhuangzong), replacing Liang
	
925:2	 Tang appoint Zhao Dejun as Youzhou jiedushi
Tang conquer Shu
Kitan make peace with Tang, attack Bohai
926:2-4	 Mutiny of WeiBo army, Li Siyuan to suppress, acclaimed emperor
(Mingzong) by troops
	
:7	 Liao Taizu dies, succession problems for Deguang (Taizong)
	
:8	 Kitan subjugate Bohai
	
:10	 Lu Wenjin takes (Liao) Lulong back to Tang
	
927:9	 Kitan peace with Tang
928	 Kitan recover Lulong
	
:5	 Yiwu (Dingzhou) jiedushi Wang Du seeks Liao help against Tang
	
:8	 (Liao) Lulong jiedushi Zhang Xichong takes army to Tang
	
929:2	 Dingzhou falls to Zhou Dewei, Yiwu comes under Tang control
	
930:11	 Abaoji's son Yelii Bei flees to Tang
	
932:11	 Fearing Kitan were planning major attack, Tang appoint Shi Jingtang to
several northern governorships
	
933:11	 Tang thwart prince Li Congrong's coup
Tang Mingzong dies, Li Conghou (Midi) succeeds
	
934:4	 Midi tries to transfer Li Congke, Congke rebels, becomes emperor (Feidi),
Yelii Bei (Li Zanhua) asks Liao to punish Feidi
	
:9	 Continuous Kitan raids begin
	
936:5	 Tang try to transfer Shi Jingtang, who rebels
	
936:7	 Shi Jingtang's capital Taiyuan-Jinyang besieged, asked for Kitan help,
offers 16 prefectures, becomes son and subject to Liao Taizono, founds
Later Jin (Gaozu), replacing Tang, with control of all north China
	
937:3	 Tianxiong jiedushi Fan Yanguang requests Kitan help
	
:6	 Yanguang rebels, pardoned, moved to Tianping
940	 Tuyuhun flee Liao for Jin, Gaozu returns them
	
941:6	 Chengde jiedushi An Chongrong demands war on Kitan, this refused but Jin
envoy detained by Liao
	
:12	 Chongrong rebels, Liao release envoy, Chongrong executed, head sent to
Kitan
	
942:6	 Gaozu dies, succeeded by son (Chudi), in informing Liao refuses to call
himself subject
	
943:9	 Jin minister Jing Yanguang sends insulting message to Liao, preparations for
war begin
	
:12	 (Jin) Pinglu jiedushi Yang Guangyuan and Liao minister Zhao Yanshou urge
Liao to attack, Yanshou promised emperorship of Middle Kingdom
	
944:1	 Liao take Beizhou, refuse Chudi's request for peace
	
:2	 Yang Guangyuan joins Liao, Liao army defeated, Guangyuan killed
945	 Jin defeat Liao at Yangcheng, offer to accept designation as subject but
refuse new Liao demands
Presentation ofJTS
	
946:6	 Sun Fangjian in Dingzhou encourages Liao invasion
	 .
:10-11 Liao defeat Jin imperial armies under Du Chongwei, advance south
	
:12	 Chonowei surrenders, surrendered Jin general Zhang Yanze takes capital
Bianzhou for Liao
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Chronology
	947:1	 Liao Taizong enters Bian, declares Great Liao dynasty in Central Plains, Jin
court personnel transferred north, Liao formally establish some Chinese-
style administrative institutions
	
:2	 Liu Zhiyuan declares self emperor, orders all circuits against Kitan,
widespread risings against conquerors
	
:3	 Liao Taizong heads north
	
:4	 Taizong dies, Wuyu (Shizong) succeeds against claim by Zhao Yanshou,
Liao withdraw after 5 months' occupation
	
:6	 Liu Zhiyuan enters Bian, founds Later Han (Gaozu), replacing Jin
	
:7	 Du Chongwei submits to Gaozu, rebels at attempt to transfer him
	
:8	 Liao governor Mada abandons Hengzhou for Dingzhou when Han attack
assisted from within city
	
948:1	 Du Chongwei surrenders, executed
	
:2	 Han Gaozu dies, succeeded by son (Yindi)
Liao try to transfer Sun Fangjian from Dingzhou, he returns to southern
allegiance, Mada abandons Dingzhou, all former Jin territory recovered by
Han
	
:3	 3 rebellions against Han crushed in the absence of requested Liao assistance
	
950:4	 Han appoint Guo Wei to deal with Kitan raids
	
:11
	
Wei rebels, establishes new emperor, then himself proclaimed emperor by
army
	
951:1	 Guo Wei founds Later Zhou (Taizu), replacing Han, Liu Chong founds
Northern Han (Shizu) in Taiyuan, makes alliance with Liao for recovery of
Central Plains
	
:9	 Liao Shizong assassinated, Liao-Han attack on Zhou delayed, cousin
succeeds (Muzong)
Murong Yanchao rebels,weakened by withdrawal of allies including Liao
	
952:9	 Zhou Taizu bans raids on Liao
	
954:1	 Zhou Taizu dies, succeeded by Chai Rong (Shizong)
	
:3	 Zhou defeat Han-Liao force at Gaoping, Liao attacks much reduced
	
:11	 Han Shizu dies, succeeded by Liu Chendun (Ruizong)
	
955:11	 Zhou attack Southern Tang, Liao refuse Tang request for help
	
958:4	 Liao recommence frontier raiding
	
:5	 Southern Tang falls to Zhou
959: spring Zhou Shizong takes three passes in 16 prefectures
	
:6	 Shizong dies, succeeded by child (Gongdi)
	
960:1	 News of Liao attacks, Zhou army demands adult leadership, insists Zhao
Kuangyin become emperor, Kuangyin founds Song (Taizu), replacing Zhou
Han-Liao attacks on Song, Zhaoyijiedushi Li Yun rebels, Han invite him to
join them, Song forces crush Yun
	
961:9	 Liao general Jieli surrenders to Song
	
:10
	
Song ban cross-border raids
962	 Song frontier appointments to allow conquest of south
963	 Liao-Han relations soured by Han refusal to pay subsidies, patched up
	
964:1	 Liao helped Han resist Song attack
	
966:1	 Separate Liao and Han raids on Song
	
968:7	 Han Ruizong dies, succeeded by Liu Jien (Shaozhu), then Liu Jiyuan
(Yingwudi)
	
:9	 Liao save Han from Song attack
	
969:2	 Liao Muzong murdered, cousin accedes (Jingzong)
	
:5	 Song besiege Taiyuan-Jinyang, defeat Liao relief force but withdraw
	
:10	 16 Kitan tribal groups give allegiance to Song
974	 Liao-Song peace talks, envoy exchanges begin
Presentation of SW
976	 Song Taizu dies, succeeded by brother (Taizong)
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979:3
:5
:9
980
982:9
986:1
:3
986:2
:7
988:11
989:7
994:9
995:1
997
999:winter
1004:int 9
:12
1013
1073
1084
1183
1247?
1344
Song attack Han, defeat Liao relief force
Han Yingwudi submits to Song, Liao defeat Song at Gaoliang, Liao-Song
envoy exchanges cease
Liao attack south, defeated at Mancheng
Sporadic Liao-Song warfare
Liao Jingzong dies, succeeded by son (Shengzong), Liao and Song dealing
with internal affairs
Song-Korean alliance attacks Liao
Liao defeat Song at Juma river
Dingnan liuhou Li Jiqian offers submission, confirmed as jiedushi
Liao gain upper hand in war
Song recovery begins
Song drive off Liao, direct hostilities cease, opposition continues by proxy
in Dingnan, Koryo etc
Song Taizong requests formal peace, refused
Han Dewei leads large raid on Song
Song Taizong dies, succeeded by son (Zhenzong)
Final phase of Liao-Song war begins, inconclusive fighting
Peace talks begin
Treaty of Shanyuan concluded (1005), armies withdraw, treaty fixes and
seals frontier, establishes regular envoy exchanges
Presentation of CFYG
Presentation of XW
Presentation of TJ
Presentation of CB
Presentation of QG
Presentation of LS
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bei mian xingying zhaotaoshi
beiyuan shumishi
bingbu shilang
bingbu yuanwailang
boyi
canjun
Chongwen linggong
cishi
da chengxiang
da xueshi
dianqian duyuhou
dianzhifshil
dongxiban dianshi
du zhihuishi
dubushu
dudu
dudu zhongwai Thu junshi
dutong panguan
duyuhou
fangyushi
fu dubushu
fu zhaotaoshi
fuma duwei
fushi
gemen shi
gongbu shilang
guancha duzhishi
guanchashi
Hanersi
Hanlin
Hanlin xueshi
Hanlin xueshi chengzhi
hubushi
jianjiao taishi
jianjun
jiaoshulang
jiedu fushi
jiedushi
jinshi
jishi zuoyou
Jixian dian
Jixian jiaoli
Jtrage
-Sf#P13
-.36=51%'31-P13
"*" "<"••
777:
Viftt
te±
PIRM132A
({4)
WgXMf4
agait
tuzim
19314191-0WV
Igt,AMV
Safg
MOtt
Plat-ff
Z-ftlEtWI
rArItt
if514P13
EMPIFit
Nigft
M5Eq,
fit*
Wif-M±
0***±*
'ffft
*Vt
VZPI3
Vagragt
MIR
ZffiS01
juzi
Glossary of titles
Ranks given in brackets, where known. T= rank under Tang S= rank under Song
expeditionary punitive commissioner for the
northern region
commissioner of the military secretariat of the
northern division
vice-minister of the ministry of war (4a)
bureau vice-director in the ministry of war
(usually 6b)
unofficial laudatory reference to a new jinshi
graduate
adjutant
manager of the Institute for the veneration of
literature (honorific)
prefect (3b 4a)
grand counsellor/councillor-in-chief (prestige)
grand academician (prestige)
inspector-in-chief of the palace armies
palace attendant
palace attendant in the companies of the east
and west
commander-in-chief
chief administrator of the imperial quarters
supreme commander-in-chief (1-3)
supreme commander-in-chief of the affairs of
all the armies
administrative assistant to the campaign
commander
inspector-in-chief
defence commissioner (given to certain
prefects)
vice-administrator of the imperial quarters
deputy punitive commissioner
imperial son-in-law
vice-commissioner
commissioner of memorial reception staff
vice-minister of the ministry of works (4a)
surveillance and revenue commissioner
surveillance commissioner
Chinese bureau
Hanlin academy
Hardin academician
Hanlin academician recipient of edicts
tax commissioner
acting grand preceptor
army supervisor
editor in the palace library (9a1)
deputy governor
military governor
metropolitan graduate
executive assistant-attendant
Academy of scholarly worthies
sub-editor in the Academy of scholarly
worthies (unranked)
provincial graduate (unofficial)
319
lianshuai
	
mnio
libu
libu langzhong	 thnoria
libu shangshu	 In5 A
libu shangshu	 tt% AV
libu yuanwailang	 it% Pi-P5
libu yuanwailang	 ttE13 M-PI3
liuhou
liushou
lu shangshu shi
	
OA**
lushi canjun	 a*g_W
menxia	 r9T
menxia shilang	 rulTi4P13
mouzhu
nan mian xingying zhaotao fushi 	 Milt-figlEr1-11711.1ft
nan mian xingying zhaotaoshi
	
Mf-Prg-#111t8
nanfu zaixiang
neidian chongban	 PsKOH
neiguan	 rs'g
pan liujun zhuwei shi
panguan
pingzhangshi
puye
qiju lang
quan shumi zhi xueshi
sansishi
shangshu
shangshu bibu langzhong
11441
EgP13
&M±
.7-2A it
AZ
A Sitfin13
shangshu sheng	 A211
shangshuling	 AZ4-
shi guan	 ttit.
shiyi
shizhong
shumi fushi
shumishi
shumiyuan
sima
Glossary of titles
provincial governor (unofficial)
ministry of rites
bureau sUrector in the ministry of rites (5a)
minister of the ministry of rites (T:3a/S:2b)
minister of the ministry of personnel
(T:3a/S:2b)
bureau vice-director in the ministry of rites
(usually 6b)
bureau vice-director in the ministry of
personnel (usually 6b)
successor governor
vicegerent
overseer of the department of state affairs
administrative supervisor
imperial chancellery
vice-director of the imperial chancellery
(T:3a/S:3b)
planner
deputy expeditionary punitive commissioner
for the southern region
expeditionary punitive commissioner for the
southern region
grand councillor of the southern
administration
imperial palace warder
central appointment - in the palace as opposed
to the capital or the capital as opposed to the
provinces
controller of the six armies and the guards
administrative assistant
manager of affairs (see tong zhongshu menxia
pingthangshi)
vice-director of the department of state affairs
imperial diarist (T:6b1, in chancellery/L:rank
unclear)
provisional auxiliary academician in the
secretariat of military affairs
state fiscal commissioner
department of state affairs
director of the bureau of review in the
ministry of justice in the department of state
affairs (T:5b/S:6b)
department of state affairs
director of the department of state affairs
(T:2a/S: la)
History institute
reminder (8b1)
T/S: director of the imperial chancellery
(T:2a/S: la) L: attendant (senior official in
herds offices)
vice-commissioner of the military secretariat
commissioner of the military secretariat (lb)
(military secretary)
military secretariat
adjutant
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tianxia bingma da yuanshuai
tong zhongshu menxia pingzhangshi
tongpingzhangshi
tongshi
wenxue
wuqi zhihuishi
xi ting shumishi
xiang
xingying dubushu
xuanhui (nan/bei) shi
xuanhui shi
xuanhui yuan
Xuanzheng dian xueshi
xueshi chengzhi
xunguan
you shiyi
yuanshuai
zaixiang
zhangjunshu
zhangshuji
zhaotaoshi
zhengshiling
zhengshisheng
zhihou yuan
zhihuishi
zhizhigao
zhongshu
zhongshu sheren
zhongshu shilang pingzhangshi
zhongshuling
zhu dao xingying dutong
zong shannan shi
zongguan
zuo sariqi changshi
zuo wuwei shang jiangjun
zuoyou buque
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PI***
APIM118
ffniEvr,138
flfl
fr-g-AUEZZ
1.71A (Mk) tt
tiltft
21AR
tacK-M±
M±jAlft
3EV
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Tarli
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SZE
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*RR
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c116
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Glossary of titles
KtP4
taizi
taizi taishi
heir apparent
grand preceptor of the heir apparent (usually
1 b) -
grand commander-in-chief of the empire
jointly manager of affairs with the secretariat
and chancellery
abbreviation of tong zhongshu menxia
pingzhangshi, above
interpreter (usually unranked)
instructor
commander of cavalry
commissioner of the military secretariat
(variation)
grand councillor
administrator of the expeditionary imperial
quarters
commissioner of the (southern/northern) court
of palace attendants
commissioner of the court of palace attendants
W:court of palace attendants; L:court
ceremonial institute
academician of the Xuanzheng palace
academician recipient of edicts (abbreviation of
Hanlin xueshi chengzhi)
inspector
right reminder (8b, in secretariat)
marshal
grand councillor
variation of zhangshuji, below
chief secretary
punitive commissioner
director of the department of administration
department of administration
court of ushers
commander
T: participant in the drafting of proclamations;
S:drafter
imperial secretariat
secretariat drafters (T:5a/S:4a)
manager of affairs and vice-director of the
imperial secretariat (T:3a/S:3b)
director of the imperial secretariat
overall expeditionary campaign commander
administrator-general of affairs south of the
mountains
areacommander-in-chief
left policy advisor (3a, in chancellery)
generalissimo of the left guard (T:2b/S:2b,3a;
prestige)
rectifier of omissions (7b1, in chancellery (L)
and secretariat (R))
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Character list
Abaoji (Liao Taizu) iNiga
An Chonghui
An Chongrong
An, concubine dowager
An Lushan
An Shenqi
An Shuqian
And
Anguo
Anyang shui M7j
appendices on barbarians [EMIRO
Baicheng
baiguan zhi
Beijing kr;
Beiping wang j.t*.T
beiren kA.
beirong
Beizhou g
Bi Gan
Bianzhou (Dahang)
biao
Bo Sheng ex
Bohai Aiit
Botuanwei cun emoin
Bozhou -144‘H
Cai Xingyu 4fT3A
Cangzhou th.4fi
Cao Bin Wit
Cao Cao
Cao Liyong "ffft1
Cen Shen -4-4.--
Chai Rong (Zhou Shizong)
Chang Xian
Chang' an
Changling fu AitAf
Changshan
chen
Chen Chuyao NZA
Chen Da [mg
Chen Daren
Chen Jiru Wag
Chen Kongzhang NTLM
Chen Xilie pot-n
Cheng
Chengde filtt
Chenqiao
Chi chen lun 44ffird
Chigang
Chong, lady #
Chongwen hall 03Ctig
Chu V (c.704-506 B.C.)
Chunqiu *t1/4. (722-481 B.C.)
Cizhou
Da Yan JOK
Da Yinzhuan
Daibeilt
Daizhoul-M
Daliang (Bianzhou)
Dangxiang (Tangut) tJA
dao
Datong
Dengzhou Mist
Dezhou
dili zhi
Ding Hui T*
Ding Shenqi TVA1
Dingnan
Dingnian ji
Dingzhou
Disunion ati1J.011
Dizhou fil4ff
Dong Wenqi (Hua Wenqi) NE.3E4
Dongdan *19-
Dongjing *TT':
Dou Mengzheng
Du Chongwei (Du Wei) thaga
Du Hongsui t±314f4
Du Wei (Du Chongwei) tEN2
Du Zhimin tUEIVSZ
Duan Xiushi
Duanming dian MEM
Dugu Ji MAR
Dunhaang
Duoluo
er A
fan *
Fan Yanguang MEY6
Fang Hao
Fang Tai
Feng Dao 3
Feng, empress 3
Feng Yu 3-1
Fengguo si
Fengxiang
fu
Fu Tinghan ggtii
Fu Yanlun	 -
Fu Yanqing
Fuyang
Fuzhou fff
Gao Tangying (Gao Yanying) Aiff3
Gao Xingzhou A fill]
Gao Xun Agit
Gao Yanying (Gao Tangying)
Gaohe
Gaoliang he AAA-
Gaoping
Gaoyang
Gaoyangguan
	 NI
gaoyuan AbH
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Geng Shaozhong gkeitfis
Geng Yanyi If*g
gongchen 1,7 If
Guan Zhong
Guan Zhong lun
gui
Guide we
Guizhou
Gujin shi hua
Guo Chongtao -gimm
Guo Chongwei wraz
Guo Rong --T1V
Guo Shourong
Guo Wei (Thou Taizu)
Guo Ziyi #13- f1a
han A
Han A (206 B.C.-A.D. 220)
Han Derang /CM
Han Deshu amg
Han Dewei onf.,A
Han Gaozu (Liu Zhiyuan) AA 411.
Han Mengyin 440N
Han Yanhui
Han Yindi (Liu Chengyou) Am*
Han Yu*
Han Zhigu
hanren
Hanzhou 4f1
He Chongjian friag
He Fuyin *MN
He Jiyun 'Ran
He Lingtu
He Ning frita
Hebei
Hedong
Hejian
Hejian wang DATE
Henan RM.
Hendejin tri.MX
Hengshan tHiLl
Hengzhou fE4ii
Hexi
Heyang 77-1F4
Hezhong
Hong jian lu
Hou Yi
hu 413
Hu Qiong
Hu Sanxing
hua
Hua Wenqi (Dong Wenqi) Mig.TA
Hua Zhaoyin anal,
Huainan am
Huan, Duke MI;
Huang Chao
Huang he Mfq
Huang he (Yellow River) Xiiff
Huangfu Yu..1-1=43A
Huanzhou wlisf
Huitong	 (938-947)
huo
Hutuo shui grE71(
Ji
Ji Zha
Ji zhong Zhou shu &WM
Jia Changchao wig*-A
Jia Zhi
jiao ken yi tg,gb
(jiedu) liuhou 0:SEW&
jiedushi Malt
Jieli (Yelti Jieli) ATM
Jieli frITFJ
Jin fEt
Jin (Jurchen)
	 (1115-1234)
Jin Chudi (Shi Chonggui) LUV
Jin Gaozu (Shi Jingtang)
Jin Shaodi (Shi Chonggui)
Jin' an zhai
Jing Yanguang Fe./ft
Jingzhou
Jingzhou -1-4+[
jinshi
Jinwang (Li Keyong) faf
Jinyang iitrA
Jinzhou
Jisu
Jiu guo zhi ARM-
Jiu, Prince !2}.,V1
Jizhou i Alf4+1
Jizhou2
Juma he
Jun chen lun
junzi EP
Jurchen
Kaifeng
Kang Moji WItgE
Kang Yanxiao ,WA* •
Kang Yicheng 1&-A
Kang Zhaoyi WFPaA
Kangcun lAtsi
Kitan KFI
Koryo
Kulun *14
Langshan LI-I
laobaixing
Leshou
li 42
Li Chongmei
Li Conghou (Tang Ntirtdi) Sit
Character list
Li Congke (Tang Feidi (Modi), Luwang)
Li Congrong
Li Congyi
Li Cunxu (Tang Zhuangzong)
Li, empress dowager
Li Guangmei 316
Li Hua
Li Huan
Li Hui
Li Jida
Li Jiji (Weiwang) 34A
Li Jilong
Li Jipeng (Zhao Baozhong)
	 4;$
Li Jiqian (Zhao Baoji) am
Li Jitao ?PIM
Li Keyong (Jinwang)
Li Ling
Li Renfu
Li Shaobin
Li Shaochen
Li Shouzhen
Li Shu
Li Sian
Li Siben
Li Sibi
	 /€3
Li Siyuan (Tang Mingzong) Wog
Li Song 221`4.
Li Tao
Li Xu
Li Yantao
Li Yanxi
Li Yi
Li Yichao 21kE
Li Yin .-#1
Li Yixing
Li Yiyin	 41:
Li Yu VY.i,
Li Yuanhao
Li Yun
Li Zanhua (Yelti Bei) NM
Liang
Liang Hui g
Liang Modi (Zhu Youzhen)
Liang shu
Liang Taizu (Thu Quanzhong, Zhu Wen)
Liao
Liao Jingzong (Xian)
Liao Muzong (Shulii) Me-*
Liao Shengzong (Yell! Longxu) ME*.
Liao Shizong (Wuyu) -
Liao Taizong (Yelti Deguang)
Liao Taizu (Abaoji) #Z)K
Liaoning M211
Liaozhou
lienti 71.1
Lihu 2t1JJ
Linzhou
Lingzhou
Liu Chengjun (Bei Han Ruizong) g'11*
Liu Chengyou (Han Yindi) gq**
Liu Chong (Bei Han Shizu)
Liu Chuo gIN
Liu Hanzhang MA*
Liu Jien (Bei Han Shaozhu) gum
Liu Jiwen glAUc
Liu Jiye ESA
Liu Jiyuan (Bei Han Yingwu) MATE
Liu Kang
Liu Ping gli4L
Liu Rengong
Liu Shouguang
Liu Shouqi
Liu Shouwen
Liu Wensou
LiuXuljflJ
Liu Xun
Liu Yanhan gia_Etrk
Liu Yanlang PAM
Liu Yin gm.
Liu Yuan gili-tg
Liu Zaiming glJWIA
Liu Zhiyuan (Han Gaozu) RIZA
Liu Zuo El*
liuhou (jiedu liuhou)
Liyang
Lizhou
Lu Guoyong
Lu Jun ra.R
Lu Wenji gsctz
Lu Wenjin E1A
Lu Yi
Lu Zhaolin align
Lu Zhi LaW
Luancheng
Luguo Zn
Luguo gong t Pei
Lulong (Youzhou) att
Lunyu
Luo Binwang
Luoyang gr
Luozhong ji yi lu it.1112Aft
Luwang (Li Congke, Tang Feidi)
Luzhou (Shangdang)
Ma Yinqing
Math
Majiadu ,%*g
Majiakou AMC!
Mancheng
Meng Hanqiong Xit
Meng qiu
E
a
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Meng Youfu
	
-4?-
Mengchen
Ming HA (1368-1644)
Mingzhou 4ti
Mozhou
Muguajian *an
Murong Yanchao
nan bei er wang
Nan shi
Nanjing MP;
Nansongmen 11 in
Neiqiu
Nie, lady A.L2
Northern Han kA (951-979)
(Northern) Han Ruizong (Liu Chengjun)
(Northern) Han Shaozhu (Liu Jien)
(Northern) Han Shizu (Liu Chong)
(Northern) Han Yingwu (Liu Jiyuan)
Northern Qi JZO (550-5 r
Northern Song J.t* (960-1126)
Northern Zhou jum
Pan Mei itA
Pan Yunian g*IA
panfu Igrtf
panxiang 4Ra
Pei Xin
pianwen
pijiang 16g4
Pinglu
Pingzhou 41fli
Qi
Qi
Qi Taigong
Qi Xingben
	 T-74
Qian Liu Ra
Qianlong
	 (1736-1796)
Qiao Rong
Qicheng giAt
Qidan (Kitan) RFJ-
qin
Qin 0 (221-206 B.C.)
Qin Shihuang AM& (221-210 B.C.)
Qing
	 (1644-1911)
Qingtai M* (934-936)
Qingzhou
Qinwang
Qizhou
Qu Yuan RIR;
ren
Ren
Rixin gff
rongdi TIR
rongwang 3,ja
rushengft
Ruzhou
Ruzhou
Sal Xiangyu
Sang Weihan
Sang Zan AN
Sha Yanxun.tpaiv
Shandong 111*
Shangdang (Luzhou) ±.2k
Shangjing
Shanyuan
Shanzhou M nJii
Shao Ke 131354
Shatuo
Shen Shijun (Shen Yun) &ism-
Shen Yun (Shen Shijun) ttW
Shenzhou
shi
Shi chen lun grT Eve-
Shi Chonggui (Jin Chudi, Jin Shaodi)
Shi Chongnii ma
Shi Hongzhao
Shi Jingtang (Jin Gaozu) Ewa
Shi Kuangwei
Shi Siming tiglEA
Shi Xunzhi titb:
Shi Yanbao EMV
Shi Yanxu Egn
shilu
Shiwei
Shu
Shu
Shucheng
Shulti (Liao Muzong)
Shulti empress AO Ei
Shun 0
Shunzhou
Shuozhou 4+1
Sixteen Prefectures
Song 51-C (960-1276)
Song Bo 71-"Ei
Song Shun 51-40
Song Taizong (Zhao Kuangyi) Cgt;--7s-
Song Taizu (Zhao Kuangyin) 51-Ett
Song Yanyun
Song Yao 5tE
Song Zhenzong (Zhao Heng)
	 -
Songzhou 5g4ff
Southern Song A51-E
Southern Tang M.)*
Su Wu KfitA
Su Yijian gAim
sui
sui
Sui IS% (581-618)
Suicheng AtfiA
Sun Fangjian Ps.1M
325
Character list
Sun He Nit
Taining OY
Taiyuan tR.
Taizhou
Taizong huangdi tongyi zhi
Tang * (618-907)
Tang Dezong Fgtt7,- (r. 779-805)
Tang Feidi (Luwang, Li Congke) wgv
Tang Midi (Li Conghou) *DM
Tang Mingzong (Li Siyuan) I E)M-
Tang Modi ((Feidi), Li Congke, Luwang) J*-V
Tang Muzong	 (r. 820-824)
Tang Taizong 1*7,c'j'; (r. 626-649)
Tang Wuzong	 (r.940-846)
Tang Xianzong (r. 805-820)
Tang Xuanzong Fgr:C77; (r. 846-859)
Tang yu lu
Tang Zhuangzong (Li Cunxu) Jffkm-
Tangut (Dangxiang)
Tanzhou friti
Taoshan tfh [11
Tian Chongba BMW'
Tian Fengji
Tiancheng	 (926-930)
Tianfu1,1 - (936-944)
tianming
	 115-
T i an ping
tianxia
Tianxiong
tianzi (son of Heaven)
Tiao
Tongguang frEfiy6 (923-926)
Tuanboyu gliti ,'n-
Tuoba Wei #,ERM (386-502)
Tuque (Turk) 5VX
Tuyuhun
Uigur cmg
waiguo 31-IA
wang
Wang Bo Ee
Wang Bo Et
Wang Chao .fif
Wang Chong EFA
Wang Chucun
Wang Chuzhi AA
Wang Deming (Zhang Wenli)
Wang Du .ES
Wang Hui .i{M
Wang Jian
Wang Jien .EAgg's
Wang Jingchong Evo,
Wang Jizhong
Wang Qinruo EVA--
Wang Quanbin .EVt
Wang Rong Eg
Wang Shufei 1,1i/PE
Wang Song Et',
Wang Wei _EA
Wang Wenzheng gong bilu
Wang Yanqiu ER.T4Z
Wang Yu
Wang Ze
Wang Zhou Iffl
Wangdu 21$
Waqiaoguan •ar41
wei
Wei Rt.
Wei a
Wei Desheng 4itiV-F
Wei Lin fgagt
wei ren mou, er bu thong hu
AKA
Wei shu
wei si chen *35Eff
Wei Wendi 023m (r.471-499)
WeiBo
Weiwang
Weiwang
Weizhou (Yedu)
wen jC
wen-wu
Wenan
Wu A
Wu Bo
Wu Ji zi Zha Jun
Wu Luan
wu si, zhong ye Fgt,
Wu Zetian Afitl (690-705)
Wudai E.ft (907-959)
Wudai tongjian EttAZ
Wuhuang 12-t
Wuqing xian Amu
Wuyu (Liao Shizong)
Wuyue
Wuzhou Ami
xi A
Xi Xia NA
Xialie gyij
Xian (Liao Jingzong)
xian yu
Xiang Yansi
Xiangzhou #14f1
Xianping /A4L (998-1004)
Xiao ci, ze zhong
	 glfg
Xiao Dilie NOM
Xiao Haizhen AMO
Xiao Han NO
Xiao Hezhuo N-A-0
Xiao Ji
Xiao Meigude Mgt*
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Xiao Siwen nEig.
Xiazhou
Xichuan
Xin Zhongfu 14sg-
Xingping gongzhu
Xingzhou 5)+1
Xinle §TV
Xinzhoui
Xinzhou2 'F
Xiongnu
Xiongwu kg-A
Xiongzhou tigfli
Xishan
Xitang (Xitang dian) wek,
Xitang dian (Xitang) NjffrN
Xizhou
Xu gong wen ji buyi itoictomt.
Xu Hanlin zhi kgn#„,;
Xu Taifu tVEM
Xu Xuan ite
Xu Xuan wenji buyi
Xuanwu jun tILIM
Xuanzheng dian 1-3.MTERL
Xunzi t-T
Yan
Yan
Yan Jianyuan MR,1
Yan Xie
Yan Zhenqing NAN
Yanwang M.T
Yang Chengxin
Yang Chongjin fg-m4
Yang Guangyuan tikr;u1
Yang Gun MR
Yang Jiong ttA
Yang Jiye (Yang Ye) maA
Yang Ningshi tha
 42A
Yang Shihou 4Kim
Yang Yanxun f4a0,
Yang Ye (Yang Jiye)MA
Yangcheng
Yangtuan cheng Matt
Yanmenguan anis
Yanzhou M4sli
Yanzhou J‘[,[
Yao Dongzhi Vt*Z
Yao Hanying ktgA
Yao Kun
Yedu (Weizhou) $515
Yellow River (Huang he) Xn
Yell! Balide itetR.M.3%
Yelti Bei (Li Zanhua)
Yelti Deguang (Liao Taizong) ifritttty6
Yelti Jieli ift4N-M
Yelti Langwu griMPFH
Yelii Longxu (Liao Shengzong) wrt , r
Yelti Nugualf[MVI
Yi it •
Yi
Yi a
Yi xun #111
Yichang &IR,
YiDing at
Yijinguan
Yin nk
Yin Jilun 9111/0
Yin Jufan 9i-g54
Yingli Erg (951-969)
Yingtian empress dowager fftstt,
yingzhoul
Yingzhou2
Ying7hou3 tik{
Yinshan *111
Yinzhou 21ifii
Yiwu
Yixian a
Youzhou (Lulong) 1ff
Yu
Yu Chongyuan
Yu Jing ri=1
yu ren thong gh-q.AFg
Yu xiong Tao shu fALRAz
Yu Shun
Yuan Tc (1276-1368)
Yuan P.
Yuan Jie t 11:
Yuan Shao
Yuancheng
Yukouguan	 M
Yulin dian ibtt4Z
yuyue
Yuzhou
Yunzhoul
Yunzhou.) Efii
Zengzi 01,77-
Zezhou
Thai Guangye E5If
Zhang Bao gIV
Zhang Chong RA
Zhang Chujin 3:RM31
Zhang Hang
Zhang Hui
Zhang Jingda
Zhang Li
Zhang Lingzhao NsEFe,
Zhang Pi NEE
Zhang Qing 3:K*
Zhang Wenli (Wang Deming) WZI
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Zhang Xichong 3.RIAV
Zhang Xun
Zhang Yanchao
Zhang Yanlang MMIVEJ
Zhang Yanze Nff-
Zhang Yun
Zhang Zuo 3.K*
Zhanguo ce agn
Zhangwu
Zhangyi
Zhao Al
Zhao Anren Mkt:
Zhao Ba Ma'
Zhao Baoji (Li Jiqian)
Zhao Baozhong (Li Jipeng)
Zhao Chong MO
Zhao Dejun kg,ttA
Zhao Feng ktila
Zhao Heng (Song Zhenzong)
Zhao Kuangyi (Song Taizong) tggx
Zhao Kuangyin (Song Taizu) Alga
Zhao Kuangzan
Zhao, lady M.L'
Zhao Shangjiao
Zhao Siwan
Zhao Siwen tilEgita
Zhao Yanshou ktiX
Zhao Ying kra
Zhao Yuan ttii
Zhao Zan kftV
Zhaowang
Zhaoyi
Zhaozhou 4+1
Zhe Congyuan *aa
zhenglE
Zhenming ARA (915-921)
Zhenwu
Zhenzhou
zhi
zhongFg
Zhongdu qiao vit
Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom) 4:1
Zhongjing ri:Irt
-Zhongshan [if
Zhongwu
Zhongxing dian 143 Ta
zhongyi
Zhongyuan (Central Plains) 14-ig
Zhou Feg
Zhou Dewei diA
Zhou Guang FIUM
Zhou Jing
Zhou li Thi2
Zhou Mi yme
Zhou Ru Alitg
Zhou Shizong (Chai Rong) Mtlit7S:
Zhou shu )3MT
Zhou TaizufGuo Wei) flit/11
Zhou Ying f4a
Zhu Hongzhao SMA ITT
Zhu Quanzhong (Zhu Wen, Liang Taizu)
Zhu Wen (Zhu Quanzhong, Liang Taizu)
Zhu Yougui *af±
Zhu Youzhen (Liang Modi)
Zhuo
Zhuozhou /Wfli
zi
Zi Xu
Zuo zhuan
Zuzhou Ig.4‘1,[
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